force, collected on the opposite shores, to pass the channel under their protection, and reach our coast uninjured. In such event,

farewell, a long farewell to all our great66 ness,"I am aware, I shall be told, the attempt I have been supposing, would be dangerous, and its success improbable: this, I, in some degree, allow; but similar considerations would not weigh much with the enterprising Buonaparté, when opposed to the immense advantages it may secure him. -Besides, I cannot admit, that his endeavouring to pass over to Ireland, (which all agree he may be likely to attempt) would be less hazardous; and England holds out an infinitely stronger temptation.-Supposing him to make the attempt in the Channel, and to be closely pursued by Admiral Coruwallis, a retreat would always be open to him in the ports of Holland and Norway, or north about.--In all military operations much must be left to fortune. A maxim

the First Consul has always followed, and hitherto with great success. When opposed to such a man, we ought not to guard alone against probable attacks, but should prepare ourselves to meet such as are barely possible.--At the commencement of the last war, when our naval force was greater, and our enemy's ports were as well secured as now, it was apparently, almost impossible, that their fleets and squadrons should elude the vigilance of our ablest admirals; put to sea; anchor in our ports; capture islands and places many hundred leagues distant; threaten our foreign settlements; considerably annoy our trade; and, finally, return in safety to their own harbour. Yet, it is known, that the French fleet with transports and troops, did get out of Brest, and after anchoring for ten days in Bantry Bay, went almost unmolested back again to Brest. It is equally certain, that whilst Lord Bridport was off that harbour, a French fleet of 23 or 24 sail of the line escaped; and went to Cadiz, Carthagena, and Toulon, and then returned to Brest by the same route, reinforced by the Spanish fleet from Carthagena and Cadiz, without firing a single shot, except at one or two of our ships of war, which they cap. tured. French troops were also landed on the coast of Wales, and the ships that carried them returned safe.--It is also certain, that Richery, with 5 or 6 sail of the line, escaped from Cadiz, where he had been long blocked up; threatened the island of Newfoundland, annoyed our trade very seriously, and then arrived safe in a French port.And, what perhaps, was yet more extraor dinary, the French made a successful enter

prise from Toulon; where, in presence, as it were, of a vast superiority of naval force under Lord St. Vincent, they succeeded in collecting from all the ports in the Mediterranai, an immense Armada; sending it to sea; capturing the island of Malta, and afterwards in landing their troops and stores on the coast of Egypt;. (a distance of nearly 500 leagues,) without experiencing any molestation on their route. In giving this catalogue of former disasters, it has not been my intention, to censure either the marine minister of the time, or the officers employed under him; they are stated, simply as warnings, against a too great confidence being hereafter placed in the blockading systein; the imperfection of which they strongly de monstrate. But, in our present situation, the relying upon such a system, as our sole means of defence from invasion, would be more objectionable than ever, as the enemy's preparations greatly exceed any made in former times; and, as the actual condition of our large ships, unfits them for supporting so wearing and destructive a service --In appreciating the risks the present crisis exposes us to, it would be the height of folly to reject the lessons of experience, or implicitly to rely for security on the measures of one, whose errors the country has already severely suffered from. Had there been a British squadron on the coast of Ireland, (when the French, during the late war, anchored in Bantry Bay,) of sufficient force to contend with it, the enemy, most likely, would never have gone there, or if they had, might have been beaten, and perhaps de stroyed. For the effectual detence therefore of our coasts against the dangers that menace them, it appears indispensable we should have assembled on its most vulner. able parts, a fleet equal to that at Brest; this is particularly needful on the coast of Ireland, and between the Isle of Wight and Yarmouth, If we have not, at present, a sufficient number of ships employed for this arrangement, when coupled with the system now pursued, we ought to preserve those we have with increased care; a duty the more incumbent, as there is small chance of their value being diminished by any addition being made to our large ships, during the present war; (unless it be protracted like the siege of Troy,) for the alarming, and, as I fear it will prove, increasing deficiency in this description of our force; we are indebted to the Board of Naval Inquiry, and to Lord St. Vincent's ill-timed economy !--But to retten to the arguments used by this noble lord's satellites on Thursday evening.-They deprecated Mr. Pitt's motion, as dangerous;

a compliance with it, they argued, would convey information to the enemy, create distrust in !ord St. Vincent, and injure the service, whose officers would be called by it, from their other duties, to attend the House. Surely, such a string of ridiculous objections, have seldom been seriously brought forward. Whoever is master of a 9x-penny piece may obtain Steele's Navy List in exchange for it, and whether the purchase be made by a Frenchman or not, the dreaded information will be found in its pages, without reserve or mystery. But distrust of 1 ord St. Vincent; is that to be so lightly treated? To this I must answer, with the bluntness of my profession, that the navy cannot think worse of him than they do; and, as to sea officers being called from their stations, Mr. Pitt could never have thought their being so an immediate consequence of his motion. Some opinion of this kind, perhaps took possession of people's minds, from Sir Edward Pellew's unexpected appearance in the House. It was immediately rumoured, that he had been sent for post, by the Admiralty, in defiance of their customary parsimony. When, however, it is known, what was certainly the case, that Sir Sydney Smith, just before, vainly solicited the Board's permission for passing a week in London, that he might transact some private business of great importance. Sir Edward Pellew's being sent for will scarcely be believed.---To end this digression, however, for the immediate pressure of Mr. Pitt's motion, officers on half pay, unless the novel opinions started with respect to them the other evening were fully established, might have been supposed unexceptionable, and competent channels of professional information to the House. The

fulsome panegyricks, on Lord St. Vincent's general conduct and character, that closed the speeches of several members, particularly those of Messrs. Tierney and Sheridan, I should have passed over in silence, for they were perfectly irrelevant to the motion before the House, (as was well observed in your excellent papers of the 24th) had 1 not now seen with you, an evident intention on the part of those gentlemen, not only to obtain an indemnity for his past faults, but security for future ones. Or rather, perhaps, to persuade the House he was impeccabe; for they undoubtedly imputed an unpopularity they could not deny, solely to the exercise of his virtues.Struck with the violence of this noble reformer, some people out of doors have doubted the purity of his motives, questioning whether the principal objects in establishing the Board of Naval Inquiry, were not the casting over general

unpopularity a veil of economy and reform; they also pretend, that an increase of influence both in and out of Parliament, was too probably in view. Sir Charles Pole, how. ever, who laboured so indefatigably in opposition to Mr. Pitt's motion, contrary to the general sense of his brother officers, is a very good sort of a man. Mr. Ford is a good sort of man, and an old schoolfellow of Mr. Addington's. Mr. Listen is a very good ort of a man, and so is Mr. Bouverie, who is a great friend of Mr. Fox's. Some naval offi cers, on half-pay, fancy they know more of navy matters than these gentlemen do, and find some unbigotted to the belief of Lord St. Vincent's and Mr. Addington's perfect disinterestedness, ready enough to concur in their opinion. But this is nothing; halfpay officers are known to be, generally speaking, abominably poor; and the enlightened and fashionable part of society care little for what may be said by such queer looking weather beaten old fellows. Our naval offi cers are certainly discontented with the present First Lord; but they are, certainly, neither peculators or contractors; no body of men can excel them in disinterestedness, and high sense of honour!, But, for the sake of argument, call them mercenary, what advan age is to result to them from a conti nuance of the abuses in question? Assure yourself, Mr. Editor, that from real reform they must benefit. But, what further de gradation is in store for naval officers? Not content with holding them up through the medium of his retainers, as men unreasonably dissatisfied, undeserving of credit, leagued with peculators, and traitors to their country, the minister has thought proper, in his own person, to insult the feelings of all the superior officers, by presenting to the attention of Parliament, as his ablest and most confidential advisers on maritime affairs, Capt. Day and Lieut. Tokeley! Capt. Day is a commander on half-pay. Lieut. T. has, for some years past, had the command of a gun-boat!!!One is really almost led to imagine from this, and some other strange circumstances, that the patience of our naval officers is systematically tried. It is, perhaps as part of this discipline, near 30.000 sea fencibles commanded by naval officers not above the rank of captain, in the event of invasion, are put under the command of generals; whilst three fourths of the list of admirals remain on half pay; and are, it is conjectured, destined to fight in the ranks, or take an oar in a gun boat? Is such treatment of officers calculated to support their dignity, and to enable them to resist the rapid progress a spirit of insubordination

is making in their service? Those against whom similar insults have been practised, would be degraded in their own eyes, as well as those of others, if honourable indignation against the introducers of despotism and anarchy, did not support them! In attempting fairly to estimate Lord St. Vincent's former services, 1 must regret having to speak of some, which I cannot approve, and of others, where he appears to have been, in my opinion, criminal. If the past alone were in question, I would stifle part of my sentiments, and join in the general plaudits; but now, placed at the head of one of the high.. est offices in the state, his own imprudence, or that of his friends, induces him to call on the country for future credit in consideration of past services; it ought not, therefore, to be deemed an invidious undertaking in any to investigate the real quality of these achievements, and in attempting it as a duty to those, who cannot appreciate their merit themselves, I pledge myself" to set down

naught in malice."--With his lordship's first services in the navy, I am unacquainted; but, the professional knowledge he has shewn. since the capture of the Pegase, make me suppose they were creditable.-Beginning with this service performed when Capt. Jarvis, and for which he received the red ribbon. It must be remarked, that the Foudroyant, which he commanded, was superior in force and sailing to the Pegase; and that the latter had been very hastily built, and was just come out of port, (as was said) badly manned; the channel fleet is believed to have been in sight when she was first chased; and the action, or rather running fight, took place in the dark; for the commander of the Pegase, did not dare to shorten sail, or even to yaw his ship, from apprehension of the British fleet being near.-After the war, which commenced in 1793, his lordship remained some time upeinployed, from a known reason. As Comman der in Chief, his first services were with his firm friend and zealous supporter, Lord Grey; (who is one of the best officers, and most worthy men the country ever produced.) Some parts of Lord St. Vincent's conduct, and their consequences, during that command, have been so minutely described by you, as to render the dwelling upon them here needless. At the moment, I did not think his lordship so culpable in the transaction you alluded to, as he appeared to many others. There was a practise strongly imputed to him, of unnecessary searching, which one of his present colleagues at the Admiralty can speak to most pointedly.The battle of the 14th Feb. -The battle of the 14th Feb.

was eminently useful to the country, and much of its success has generally been attributed to his lordship: yet it is incontestibly true, that this was not done by all the flag officers who shared in the honours of the day. During his lordship's subse quent command in the Mediterranean, he strove to establish some nerú doctrines and principles in the navy, that at first sight alarmed many, whose apprehensions of their nature and tendency, the event has but too seriously justified. At the same period he is also known to have had serious and extraordinary differences with the greater part of the superior officers under his orders, some of which were little creditable to the Commander in Chief, and ill calcu lated to support his claim to indemnity_for past faults, and security for future. Respecting the Toulon expedition in 1798, which led to such an expense of British blood and treasure; and, probably, contributed heavily to the production of immeasurable calamities; his lordship's conduct always appeared to me extremely reprehensible; he has, perhaps, the means of accounting satisfactorily for it, but I know not that he has ever done so: my own opi nion, and the only lights afforded me, compel the remarks given above, and a concurrence of sentiments with those correspondents of yours who spoke largely on the subject in the Politicial Registers of the 9th July, 1803, and the 3d of March, 1803.— 1. H. says, in your last number, nothing can be more unfair than looking back "through a series of years to judge the "merits of a military transaction; the in"formation a general can obtain, the or"ders he is under, the force he commands; "in short, the circumstances of the mo"ment which pressed upon him, are the

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only elements from which honour and "justice will decide upon his conduct." There cannot be a better general rule than I. H. has here given; but, I must contend, that the case which it produced, is a fair exception from it. Retrospective in quiry has a look of asperity, and should not be lightly instituted, yet it may be necessary. In the in-tance before us, the officer whose merits are under examination, narrowly avoided an inquiry called for by the importance of the busi ness, and some suspicions attached to it, when recent. Had he been contented with security, we might have been with silence; but, no; he springs forward to the bar of the public, and boldly claims future confidence, as a reward of past services. It is not thep an anbecoming, or harsh mea

sure of justice, as the documents and evidences requisite for considering some of those past services are now existing, that decisions should be a little delayed, that time and opportunity for cool reflection should be given on points, from which so strong an inference is to be deduced; nor can it be fairly deemed a mark of pique or prejudice, that we refuse with head-long and revolu tionary impetuosity to follow Capt. Markham in determining upon them by acclamation.--No stranger to the difficulties of ficers have to encounter, and the prejudice which a faithful discharge of their duty too often excites against them, I should always wish the most liberal construction might be put on their actions, and all proposals of vexatious inquiry resisted; but this is no trivial and paltry question of military array, as whether round or cocked hats should be the dress of our quarter decks; but one in which the existence and security of the country are implicated; difficulty and danger threaten us from without, and may we not examine whether our greatest bulwark is in safe and strong keeping. Not a doubt of it can be entertained without palsying some man's courage, and every arm may soon become of importance.--A man's refusal to throw strong light on any part of his conduct subject to different interpretations, is no argument of conscious integrity. --Mr. Fox thought highly of his friend, and therefore voted for inquiry, similar reasoning should have led Lord St. Vincent to call for it. It is true, he has refused it himself to officers who claimed it as their birthright, they have been injured and dissatisfied. but are not, I dare venture to believe, goaded into a wish that the same measure be used should be used to bim again; and that, in defiance of all that has formerly been held sacred, then should be condemned unheard. Lord Klwarden's last words, speaking of a wretch who had assisted in mordering him, were, "let him bave bis fair trial" so says, of Lord St. Vincent, hamble servant, your

March 24, 1804.

AN OLD SEAMAN.

LONDON COMMON COUNCIL.

SIR, I am an old sea officer resident upon the sea coast of Kent, much attached to my profession, and devoted to the mainteDance of its honour and its interests. Whatever has a tendency to affect either cannot

of common council of the city of London on the 20th instant, in which they appear, without a spark of official information, to have taken it upon themselves to stamp with their positive approbation the conduct of some of the officers. commanding his Majesty's fleets and squadrons in the British and Mediterra. nean seas; while that of others has been marked, if not with their indirect censure, at least with their neglect and disregard.

It is wide from my intention, Sir, to disparage the characters of the able and gal lant officers whose persevering exertions have called forth the unqualified approbation of the common council, or, in the most remote degree, to detract from merit so conspicuous as theirs; but I cannot consider it consistent in. any corporate body to enter into discussions or resolutions of this nature, except on the authority of the votes of Parliament, or on the communications made by his Majesfy's government, through the medium of the London Gazette, one or other of which I believe it has been hitherto customary to await for, however meritorious the conduct of officers may appear, it is impossible that the propriety of such conduct, through all its detail, can be judged of by the public, without a knowledge of the orders that have been given, and of the precision with which they have been obeyed. And I trust to make it appear from the following observations, how egregiously (though unintentionally I hope and believe) the common council have erred on this occasion; as in fact, public bodies, as well as individuals, must ever do; when they pretend to proceed to decisions. on subjects not well understood, or respecting which they are either ill, or altogether uninformed.The thanks of the common council have been voted" to Admiral Corn

I'

waili, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, "Rear-Admirals Collingwood, Calder, and "Graves; and to Captains Sir Edward Pel"lew and John Sutton, commanding the "fleets blockading the ports of. Brest and "Ferrol. To Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, "commanding the fleet blockading the port "of Toulon. To Rear-Admiral Thoru❤ brough and Captain Sir Sidney Smith, commanding the fleet blockading the "Texel and the ports of Holland. And to "the captains, officers, seamen, and ma"rines on board the respective fleets,"meaning, without doubt, the ships composing the fleets and squadrons under the command of Admiral Cornwallis, Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, and Rear-Admiral Thorn

fore, with surprize, as well as regret, the very extraordinary resolutions of the court

who bave been requested to communicate the thanks to the officers, seamen, and mid