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that he openly broke with the ministers: from that day they appear to have numbered him amongst their enemies: and, accordingly, from that day, their partisan, the Near Observer, seems to have received instructions to commence the work of retaliation.

The charge of the Near Observer against Mr. Pitt is made in a very irregular way; we find its parts scattered from one end to the other of the pamphlet; it is a skirmishing, bush-fighting sort of warfare; but, the substance of all the parts collected together, may be expressed in one sentence, thus: That Mr. Pitt recommended the present ministers to the King, and prevailed upon them to accept of their places; but, that previously to their doing so, he promised them his constant support; that he did support them, up to the day, when the • memorable negotiation for his return to power was broken off; but, that, from that time forward, from the time when Mr. Addington refused to surrender at discretion, Mr. Pitt commenced a most ⚫ foul and rancorous opposition; and, in the course of that opposition, showed himself to be "selfish, malignant, profligate, cor"rupt, unprincipled, and perfidious."'Hard words, to be sure; and, certainly, if applied without qualification, very unjustly applied to Mr. Pitt; but, since they have been applied to him, one cannot help being pleased to hear them proceed from the mouths of the Addingtons and Hawkesburys, from the mouths of those, whom he had cherished, only, because they were little and low; only because they suited him as instruments, whereby to keep from all participation in power those persons of whose talents and whose influence, he was jealous.

That Mr. Pitt did, on the 3d of June last, in moving the previous question upon Mr. Patten's motion, commence an opposition against the ministers is certain; nor can it be denied, that he has continued that opposition ever since. The question to be decided, therefore, appears to be this: whether his opposition arose from that pure sense of public duty, by which he professed, and still professes, to be actuated; or, from the motive, to which it is ascribed by the hireling of the Treasury, that is, malice against Mr. Addington for refusing to give him carte blanche in surren." dering the government into his hands. This is the question, upon which those who wish duly to estimate the conduct of Mr. Pitt have to decide. It has, by Mr. Bentley, by Mr. Long, by Mr. Ward, and by several phers, been so entangled with circumstances, So choaked up with digressions of censure on one side, and of panegyric on the other, that,

after having read their productions, we really lose sight of it altogether; and, in order to arrive at any thing like a rational conclusion, are obliged to return to the point whence we first started on the inquiry. Here, then, confining our view to the main point before us, we hear the Near Observer, charging Mr. Pitt with having commenced an opposition out of revenge, which revenge arose from his not being able to re-possess himself of his former place upon his own terms. This is the charge, unequivocally alleged, and maintained by a show, at least, of fact and argument; but, receiving much greater support from the internal evidence afforded by the circumstances of the case: for, if we know that a man has been in negotiation for a place in the cabinet, if we know that the negotiation has broken off on account of a disagreement as to the terms, if we know that before the negotiation he never openly disapproved of the measures of ministers, and if we hear him openly disapprove of those very same measures after the negotiation, do we not fairly, do we not naturally, nay, do we not almost necessarily, conclude, that his opposition arises from his disappointment? Every man of common sense and common sincerity, to whom this question is put, will, without hesitation, answer,

yes.

Mr. Pit and his partisans seem to have been fully aware of the truth and the force of this observation; and, accordingly, the two writers who alone are, in this respect, worthy of notice, have endeavoured to point out "metives for his conduct more

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probable than those of mortification and "disappointment," But, the zeal of Mr. Long and Mr. Ward, though the former had, doubtless, all the aid which Mr. Pitt himself could afford him, has been insufficient for the purpose. The internal evidence of the case is too strong; it is of too simple and too convincing a nature to be overset, to be shaken, or even to be, in the slightest degree, affected, by any thing short of wellestablished facts, instead of which we find, in the writings here spoken of, a reliance upon hint, conjectures, and insinuations, and some of these stated with so much reserve and obscurity, that we are compelled to guess at the literal meaning of the writer, as well as at the object of his allusions. Let us hear Mr. Long's list of justificatory reasons. "It will not be difficult to suggest "motives for Mr. Pitt's conduct more pro"bable than mortification and disappoint.

ment. A person, not blinded like the "Near Observer, by his aversion to the "late minister, may, perhaps, think that it "is just passible, that some difference of opi

"nion with Mr. Addington upon the gene"ral subject of finance; that some differ

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ence as to the management of our foreign "affairs; that some difference in particular "as to the conduct of ministers in the negotiation with France, may have operated on Mr. Pitt's mind. He may have "thought the representation of our finan"cial resources on the 10th of December "last, was not perfectly correct; though "afterwards he may have thought it of little "avail to revise or to comment upon a "statement made in contemplation of peace,

when war had been declared. He may "have thought that the necessary steps to "conciliate foreign powers had been omit"ted, that alliances had been neglected.

He may have thought that though the "hostile spirit of the First Consul of France

was sufficiently manifest, yet that from "the treaty of Amiens to the breaking out "of the war, that spirit had been met in a

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manner more likely to invite and encou"6 rage, than to counteract and resist it. He may have communicated these opinions, or at least some of them, to his Majesty's "ministers, and he may have found that "they were either rejected as ill founded, " or unattended to altogether."--To this Mr. Ward has added nothing, except words. He has taken up precisely the same sugges tions, and has given to them that cambrous amplification, which, together with an affectation of dignity in the manner and of candour in the sentiment, illustrated occasionally by far-fetched similies expressed in new-fangled phrases, constitute that which, in the frivolous cant of the day, is denominated the "gentlemanly style." But, does Mr. Long think, that mere suggestions, and does Mr. Ward think, that mere words are sufficient to resist the potent circumstances, the strong circumstantial evidence, to which they are here opposed? We know that Mr. Pitt never openly expressed his disapprobation of any of the measures of Mr. Addington, before the latter refused to admit him into the cabinet upon his own terms; and we also know, that after that refusal, he commenced an open opposition, grounded upon the measures which Mr. Addington had adopted previous to the refusal. These are facts; this is presumptive proof; and is this to be met by" probabilities?" Are we to disbelieve our own senses; are we, at once, to abandon all the principles, according to which we have been accustomed to judge, because Mr. Pitt is the defendant? Is there one law, one moral and politic code for him, and another for other men? And, if there is not, let me ask Mr. Long or Mr.

Ward, what would, under circumstances similar to those of this case, have been their decision, with respect to the conduct of any other man? Would they have considered mere suggestions, mere probabities, as forming a satisfactory answer to a charge founded upon circumstances so convincing?

But, supposing Mr. Long's suggestions to be, in reality, assertions. Suppose, that he means to say, and ought to be understood as saying, that "a difference of opinion with Mr. Addington," upon several subjects, posi tively did operate on the mind of Mr. Pitt;" suppose Mr. Long to mean, not that Mr. Pitt" may have" disapproved of such or such a part of the conduct of ministers, but that he positively did disapprove of that conduct. Having adopted this supposition, let us, then, inquire a little into the nature of the subjects, upon which Mr. Pitt differed in opinion with Mr. Addington, and discover, if we can, what were the grounds of this difference because, if we should find, that the subjects are of an unimportant nature, or that the disapprobation of Mr. Pitt was unreasonable and unjust, we shall by no means be inclined to admit, that his entertaining such disapprobation is a proof of his not having commenced an opposition from notives of mortification and disappointment.

--Mr. Long deals so much in general terms, that one can hardly fix upon any thing that he says. It is, however, pretty clear, that he wishes to have it understood, that Mr. Pitt differed in opinion with Mr. Addington upon subjects of finance generally, and that he particularly disapproved of the Doctor's "representation of our finan"cial resources on the 10th of December, "1802." As to the general subject of finance, it is impossible for us to know, or even to guess at, what were the grounds of Mr. Pitt's disapprobation; nor, indeed, would it be very easy to conceive how it was possible for any grounds of this sort to exist, sceing that, up to the end of the session of Parliament which closed in June, 1802, Mr. Pitt not only approved of, but openly sup ported, every one of Mr. Addington's measures of finance; and, I know of no financial measure whatever that was adopted between that time and the evening of Mr Patten's motion. "The representation of the 10th of December, 1802," is particularly mentioned, by Mr. Long, as being disapproved of by Mr. Pitt. But, though that representation was certainly fallacious, though it was proved to be so at the time, though it showed the vanity and incapacity of the Doctor, yet, it cannot be regarded as a cardinal political sin, a sin of so heinous a

a nature as to make a man's dearest friends shun him, as if he were infected with the plague; not certainly a sin of a magnitude to induce members of Parliament to desert a minister. The Doctor over-rated his means: he estimated the surplus of the Consolidated fund at 7,800,0001. and actually inserted it at 6,500,000 1. whereas, as it was then foretold, and as it has now been proved by expérience, he should have estimated it at between 4 and 5 millions. But, was it fair for Mr. Pitt to desert a minister, and a minister who depended on him too, for a cause like this? Was it for Mr. Pitt to resent so deeply the making of an over-estimate? Was it for Mr. Pitt, above all men living, to punish so severely the crime of playing off a financial deception? The Doctor's fallacious statement was, it is true, published in a pamphlet, at the expense of the public, and transmitted to our ministers at all the foreign courts: and was not the fallacious pamphlet of George Rose published and circulated in the same manner? The Doctor's receipts have fallen short of his calculations; and did not Mr. Pitt's receipts frequently fall short of his calculations? And, were he to return to office, aided by his trusty Empson and Ded. ley, would not his receipts still fall short of his calculations? Does it not, then, require an uncommon degree of hardihood for Mr. Long to hold forth the incorrectness of the December statement as a reason for Mr. Pitt's opposing the Doctor at all, and especally for commencing, on that account, an opposition, which had been delayed till six months after that statement was made?

The next subject of Mr. Pitt's disapprobation of the measures of ministers, is, their mismanagement of our foreign affairs, and particular mention is made of their having neglected to form continental alliances. How much any ministry, in any period of our history, could have done in this way, in the space of eight or nine months, Mr. Long has not told us: indeed, it was impossible that he should; but, it was, “under existing "circumstances," his duty to endeavour, at least, to show, that there was a possibility of obtaining a hearing, upon such a subject, in any one court of Europe, after the conclu sion of the treaty of Amiens, that treaty in which Britain basely abandoned her most faithful allies, and prostrated herself to the earth before her rival: it was Mr. Long's duty to show, not that there existed the means, not that there was a likelihood (that would be asking too much of him), but it was his duty to show, that there was a possibility of forming continental alliances, in nine months after the di-grace and infamy

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of Britain had been signed and sealed in that treaty, to which Mr. Pitt gave his unequivo、 cal approbation and support. I know, that there prevails, with Mr. Pitt and his defenders, a strong desire to inculcate a belief, that he did not entirely approve of the peace with France, nor of the convention with Russia: Mr. Long, every where, carefully avoids an avowal that Mr. Pitt did give to those mea sures, or either of them, his decided approbation; and, in one place, he speaks of all "the qualifications which accompanied Mr, "Pitt's approval of the treaty of Amiens." But, where? will he be so good as to tell us, where we are to look, to what speech, or what action of Mr. Pitt we are to refer, for a sign of all these qualifications, or any one of them? At the very first appearance of the preliminary treaty of peace, Mr. Pitt declared, that it " afforded matter of joy "and exultation to the country, and entitled "the government" [that is the ministers] "to its warmest approbation, and mot

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grateful thanks." When that treaty came to be discussed, he made a long and elaborate defence of it, interlarded with ccasional sarcasms upon those by whom it was thought to be of an injurious and dangerous tendency. During all the discussions on the definitive treaty, he never opened his lips but for the purpose of approving of that compact, or of thwarting and attacking the persons who disapproved of it; and, at the close of the first day's debate upon the address proposed by the New Opposition, he rose to oppose an adjournment, because he was 66 ready to vote for the amended ad

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dress, being perfectly satisfied with the ar"guments so ably and successfully urged by "his noble friend, Lord Hawkesbury." Where, then, as it was once before a ked, where are we to look for all the qualifi "cations," with which Mr. Pitt gave his approval to the treaty of Amiens? And, where, too, I again ask, are we to look for an apology for those, who now endeavour to make the world believe in the existence of such qualifications? It is not necessary for me to say, that I have no partiality for the miserable inefficient creatures, with whom Mr. Pitt found it convenient to fill up the offices of the state; but, I have a partiality for truth and fair play, and certain I am, that every honourable man will agree with me, that nothing ever was more foul than for Mr. Pitt now to attempt to get rid of the share of that shame which is due to the makers and advisers of the peace; and, at the same time, to blame his as ociates for not having since accomplished that, which, as was repeatedly foretold at the time, the

peace itself must necessarily render them unable to accomplish.

"that system of precaution and firmness so "strenuously recommended by Mr. Pitt, and "upon which, in the discussion of the pre"liminaries of peace, he represented our "security to depend-who is there who can say the war might not have been avoided ?1

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-Mr. Ward, after stating those obsta cles to the execution of the article respecting Malta, which, so early as the month of March, 1802, were stated in the Political Register, and which were, much more minutely and with infinitely greater ability and effect, displayed by Lord Grenville in his speech on the definitive treaty, proceeds thus: "Yet these glaring defects in the most important stipulation of the whole arrangement; that upon which France was known to be most obstinate, most ir"ritable, and most ready to quarrel; that "upon which, finally, she has quarrelled; "they signed the treaty, knowing it could "not be executed, as a man signs a bond

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The third ground of Mr. Pitt's disapprobation is stated to be, the manner in which the last negotiation of France was conducted. We are told by Mr. Long, that the ministers exhibited a want of firmness; that they should have transported those " ac"credited spies," the French military commissaries, with indignation, from our shores. Several other instances of pusillanimity are pointed out; and, indeed, the readers of the Register and of the Parliamentary Debates, will find that these instances were all pointed out, and commented on, with just severity, more than eight months before" Mr. Pitt thought proper to let the world know that they had attracted his attention; and, if they were not of importance enough to bring him down to the Parliament for a day or two, though he was in town, and was ready to become minister in the earlier part of the session, will any one allow, that it is fair to urge them as a ground of that oppo-i sition, which he commenced in the month of June, against the very men, in conjunction with whom, provided his own terms were acceded to, he was ready to re-enter the cabinet? But, the main objection, we are told, that Mr. Pitt had to the conduct of ministers, with respect to France, was, their having delayed too long the opening of nego tiations for an arrangement with regard to Malta; and we are even given to under'stand, that he, from the first, disapproved of the part of the treaty which related to that island. Upon this point let us hear both his defenders. Without entering," says Mr. Long, "into the merits of the peace "of Amiens, it was not difficult to per"ceive, at a very early period, that it could "only be preserved by a firm, manly, and "uniform system. We should not, in the "first instance, have entered into stipula-lative to Malta, which act Mr. Ward, in "tions respecting the future state and go

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vernment of the island of Malta, without "the full authority and consent of those "powers upon whom the execution of "those stipulations depended; but, in

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every point of view, we should have ad"justed the final settlement of that island, "the only difficult point the negotiation

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presented, with our conquests in our hands. "We should have insisted that the restitu"tion of those conquests should have been

accompanied on the part of France with "pacific dispositions and pacific measures. "In no case should our conduct have been "submissive. If we had manifested this "determination at the beginning, and acted upon it throughout; if we had adopted

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which he knows will lodge him in a "gaol. Even this might possibly have "with prudence been repaired, had they "been more intent upon the duration of "the peace, than the temporary impor"tance of having achieved it. Had they

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applied themselves with fidelity and zeal "to the correction of their errors, and frankly avowed the original obstacles; "had they set themselves to work ON THE

INSTANT with their antagonist, animated with "an equal love of peace on his side; it is possi"ble they might have new modelled the article, "and all might yet have been well. But no: "they dreaded all farther altercation; they "dared not hazard the reputation they had

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acquired; their advantage was imme"diate, the danger contingent. The consequence was what might be expected; "the dreadful mine has since exploded!” -Now, as to the signing of the article re

another place, ascribes to "infatuation be

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yond all mental power to conceive;" we may surely ask, whether he who defended and applauded the treaty must not also have laboured under infatuation, unfortunate in any man, but peculiarly so in a second " Camillus," anofher" Cato," he who is to save the city and restore the "tottering state?" Am I told, that there were circumstances regarding Malta, obstacles to the fulfilment of the article, which the ministers hid from Mr. Pitt? My answer is, that they could not hide them from Lord Grenville: his lordship saw them all, and, if Mr. Pitt had not the advantage of timely information from that quarter, he had similar information from Mr. Windham, in

his place in the House of Commons. So that, there is no refuge here: either he saw the obstacles, or he wanted penetration and judgment; or, as Mr. Ward has it, he laboured under "infatuation beyond all men"tal power to conceive." But, it is to the remedy, which we are desired to believe Mr. Pitt would have employed, and which he disapproved of the ministers for not employing, that I wish to direct the reader's attention. This remedy was, we are now told by his partisans, "a firm, manly, and "uniform conduct; a system of precaution " and firmness; no surrender of conquests "till we had finally adjusted and settled the difficult points in the arrangement; "the ministers should have set themselves to work on the instant;" and, if they had thus acted, "all might yet have been well," says Mr. Ward, and "who is there that can say," asks Mr. Long, "that the war might not have been avoided?" And was not this remedy prescribed by the New Opposition, in their proposed address of the 13th of May, 1802? Did they not, in that memorable, that prophetic address to their Sovereign, expressly state their apprehensions from "the numerous subjects of clashing interest «and unavoidable dispute, which the treaty "had left entirely unadjusted;" and did they not, as "a necessary consequence of "their sincere wish for the permanence of "the public tranquillity, earnestly recom

mend to his Majesty's wisdom the press"ing necessity of arranging, by immediate "aul amicable discussion, those points of "essential interests, for which no provision "had been made in this negotiation?" Did they not here prescribe the very remedy, which we are now requested to believe, that Mr. Pitt wished the ministers to adopt? Did not Mr. Pitt vote against their address; and did not his Caledonian colleague, with that truth and modesty for which he is so famous, ascribe it to a conspiracy for place?" Was Mr. Pitt só "perfectly satisfied" of its impropriety, that he was willing to dispense with any additional information that might be derived from an adjournment of the dis- cussion? And shall we now be told, that the non-adoption of this remedy is a valid ground for his opposition to ministers? Shall we tamely and silently listen to this unbearable affront to our understandings, merely because it is offered in the behalf of Mr. Pitt?

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Thus, then, I think, the grounds of Mr. Pitt's preténtled disapprobation of the measures of ministers sink from beneath him

and, as to the only efficient cause of his •pposition of the dd of June, 1503, we are

naturall, led back to the failure of the ne❤ gotiation for place; to that "mortification and disappointment," than which Mr. Long tells us any persón unblinded by passion might have suggested motives" more próbable," but which motives, notwithstanding all the stimuli and all the advantages, under which he must have written, he certainly has failed to suggest. Were we, however, to allow, that Mr. Pitt did disapprove of the measures of ministers, and that he had no act or part in producing that which was the object of his disapprobation, we naturally ask, how it came to pass, that that disapprobation was, for so long a space of time, confined to his own breast? The session of Parliament began in November, and he never made his appearance in the House If he did really till the latter end of May. differ in opinion with his protegé upon the general measures of finance, upon the mode of conducting our foreign affairs, and especially upon that in which the negotiation with France was conducted, why did he not come to the Parliament and say so? Why did he reserve the expression of his disapprobation, till it was too late, as to the purposes of preventing the evils he is said to have dreaded, to disapprove with any effect? If he thought that the ministers ought to have "set themselves to work on the instant," to adjust and settle the affairs relative to Malta, why did he not come and tell them so, on the 23d of November, while we were yet at peace, and while, too, there was, probably, yet time to retain some of our conquests, which were afterwards surrendered? If the deceptive financial statement of the 10th of December was of an importance sufficient to be now cited as a legitimate cause for commencing an opposition against the minister, whom he had thrusted into office, whom he had recommended to the Parliament, whom he had eulogized, to with-hold confidence from whom he had stigmatized as "repugnant to common sense and common justice;" if that statement was of a nature so moment. ous, why did he not appear in his place, at the time, or as soon after as might be, and correct it, seeing that his health permitted him to come to town during the Christmas recess, and seeing that by the month of March he was stout enough to encounter the toils attached to the office of prime minister? Before he joins in the clamours of the Jews and the Jew-like citizens, who were duped by the fallacious statement, let him satisfactorily account for his not having imitated Lord Grenville in exposing thefa]lacy while yet there was time, in spite of all the efforts of the Treasury hirelings to

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