inquiry respecting the Admiralty? Why don't they come forward? To this I answer; it is useless to name them: no means have yet been afforded them of giving their opinion publicly with effect?--Let the House call to their bar, and examine any number of sea officers, employed or unemployed, and I will answer with my head, no member will longer doubt the source of Mr. Pitt's information, or the singularity of Admiral Pole and Sir E. Pellew's opinion. These last mentioned officers are stated to have said in the House of Commons, that Mr. P.'s motion was calculated to excite a groundless distrust in the Admiralty, whose system they perfectly approved. They said we have ships of the line and every description of ships, and armed vessels sufficient for our purpose. They disapproved our building ships in merchants' yards, and hiring small craft, because in both, impositions have been practised.

They said, that gun-boats

ought to be resisted by ships of war, not by gun boats, and that of the latter, we have numbers sufficient for our purpose.--They are further represented as having said the exertions used to obtain men were unparal. leled. Sir E. Pellew is made to declare, that all ranks and descriptions of men in the navy have shewn more zeal and ardour in the service, than were ever manifested on any former occasion; that there was never greater satisfaction manifested on board each particular ship, nor were they ever better stored, or in better condition in every respect, than from 1801 to this time.-By what - facts or arguments these officers could have supported their assertions, I cannot judge. (Sir E. Pellew's abilities I fully admit,) bat, I must venture to assert, both deceived the public, though I dare believe unintentionally.Examine the best informed naval officers, and they will tell you we have not ships and vessels enough of any description for our present purpose, nor a proper succession for the protracted warfare we are likely to be engaged in; they will tell you, we have neither stores nor artificers in our dock-yards, proportioned to our wants; that our ships are, generally speaking, in bad condition and ill supplied; that they are ill manned, and their stores, particularly rope, are of bad quality; they would tell you, that the zeal, spirit, and ardour of our officers is not impaired, but that the treatment they experience from the Admiralty is revolting, and the nature of their instructions embarrassing, that unprecedented restrictions are set on their conduct, and that it is watched by encouraged informers of every description. They would tell you, if we had a fleet

of large ships on the coast of Ireland, at St. Helens, in the Downs, and in Leith Roads, of sufficient force to meet the Brest fleet, in the event of its escaping Admiral Cornwallis' vigilance, there would be no unnecessary preparation against possible and serious nis chief. They will tell you, that we are deficient in small craft; that the French gun-boats, when becalmed in deep water, or when they are amongst shoals, can only be effectually resisted by similar vessels; that our armed boats are private property, and constructed for other purposes than those of war; they are consequently not always to be had when wanted, nor are they strong enough to bear the frequent firing of artillery, whilst laden with a quantity of ammunition suflicient for serious engagement with the enemy; be. sides this, their motion (from their lightness), is too quick to allow of their firing cannon with good effect at any material distance; and when near, they are exposed to suffer severely, from want of cover for their men, and room for a sufficient number with small arms. They will allow, that impositions have been practised from constructing ships in merchants' yards, and in hiring small vessels, yet that these impositions being now detected, may be guarded against in future; and that unless we adopt these methods to obtain each, we shall obtain neither. the sum of their opinion, they will assert, that whilst any means are omitted of increasing our naval force of every description, our number of seamen, and quantity of stores to the utmost possible extent, whilst in hostility with France, blame is imputable to those who preside at the Admiralty.--Much remains untouched, that might be adduced in support of Mr. Pitt's motion, and reply to the various objections it met with; but for the present, at least, I will not attempt to engross a larger share of your time.——Į remain, Sir, your's faithfully,

AN OLD SEAMAN.

POWERS OF THE CONTINENT.

As

SIR, Before entering on the eventful scenes before us, it will be proper to take a short view of the theatre on which they are acting to avoid referring to single and insulated transactions, it will be necessary to take a rapid retrospect of some of the prin cipal events that have led to the present dislocation of Europe.--Europe had been divided between the rival houses of France and Austria, for about two centuries previous to the extinction of the male line of the House of Habsburg, when Prussia arose, occasioned new connexions, new alliances,

and has contributed considerably to produce | great changes in this quarter of the globe. In the early part of that period Austria predominated, but during the latter and much longer part, the power of France had been constantly on the increase, while that of Austria had comparatively been on the decline. England, and afterwards Holland, though far from steady in their political conduct, had repeatedly entered the lists in time to prevent the balance from being materially shaken. But, although the balance was not lost, France, notwithstanding civil wars, the dotage of Louis XIV., the profligacy of the regency, and the inanity of Louis XV., had successively added to her dominions, and wanted nothing but an able administration to appear more formidable than in the most shining days of Louis XIV. The only effectual opponent to so great and growing a power, would have been an union of the German empire, suf. ficiently strong to call forth the whole force of that great body with energy and effect. Since the peace of Westphalia, that could never fully take place. Among so many princes with jarring interests, there were always some who had foreign connexions, and even France found allies in the empire itself. Much, however, had been done with the assistance of the maritime powers to oppose the progress of France, till Prussia, in becoming an independent state, did, in fact, dismember the Germanic body, and crippled the power of the House of Austria. When it first acquired the title of kingdom, the change of name was of little consequence, as it continued under the influence of the empire; but, when the throne came to be filled by a prince, who not satisfied with the name of king, was resolved to be an independent sovereign, a fatal blow was given to the union and power of the German nation; more sensibly felt, as it happened under a female succession, that was bringing, and with some interruption, a new family to the imperial dignity. In asserting his independence, that prince unavoidably became hostile to the head of the empire, and seated on the confines of the hereditary dominions, Austria was his nearest and most dangerous enemy. But the subjects of contention were not confined to these obvious causes of dissention. The first essay in the political career of that great monarch, who drew Prussia from obscurity, was to seize upon one of the Austrian provinces. To preserve his conquest he became the ally of France; and, regardless of treaties, took the field on the first appearance of any superiority of the Austrian arms. It was pro

bably more from a desire to regain that province, and the animosity arising from those aggressions, the more poignant to so haughty a house, as they proceeded from one whom they considered as little more than a feudatory of the empire, than from any views of profound policy, that the court of Vienna formed an alliance with France. By that treaty Austria abandoned her former friends for an old enemy, converted into a new and dangerous ally; the ancient political system of Europe was overthrown, and among all the numerous powers engaged in the war that succeeded, there was not one that had not departed from those principles which it might have been expected their political interests would have dictated, except Prussia alone, that was combatting for independence and almost existence. The court of Vienna introduced French armies into the empire; France and Russia joined in the coalition against Prussia; Sweden supp orted the cause of Russia; England was engaged against Austria. Freed by that treaty from any apprehension on the side of France, the cabinet of Vienna excited so vast a force against the King of Prussia, that there did not seem a possibility that so new and so small a state could resist it. How far it was consistent with sound policy, in the great minister, who at that time directed the affairs of this country, to enter into so close an alliance with that monarch, as almost to amount to a guarantee of the dominions that he then possessed, is problematical. Great Britain. could have very little inducement to wish for the destruction of Prussia, but still less that it should become the rival of Austria. A prince of less powers of mind would have yielded to the storm; he braved it, and after one of the greatest struggles that stands upon the records of history, placed Prussia, by the peace of Hubertsburg, among the considerable nations of Europe.--The alliance between Great Britain and Prussia had been virtually dissolved before the end of the war; and the peace of 1763, found the former without an ally upon the comtinent. The navy of Great Britain had not, at that time, arrived at the perfection which it has since attained, but it far es ceeded any that then existed. The navy of Louis XIV, perished before himself; the fleets of Holland, which had so long dis puted the empire of the sea, were worn only, like the nation itself, which made an expiring exertion in the war of the Austrian succession. In wars of wealth, of.com. merce, or of colonies, England was beyond comparison the first nation in the world; in

continental wars, where the great interests of Europe are decided, England was a powerful auxiliary, but without allies, nothing. With continental allies Great Britain had contributed largely in the war of the revolution to curb the ambition of France; in the war of the Spanish succes sion, to humble Louis IV.; in the war of the Austrian succession, to preserve that succession nearly undiminished; and, in the war of 1756, with very inferior force, to save the North of Germany, and beat the French in every other part of the globe. Without allies, the American war, a war upon our own element, was disastrous. If we had had powerful allies upon the continent, it is not improbable that the French would not have entered, at least openly, into the quarrel; but their frontiers being secured by the treaty with Austria, they had paid little attention to the army after the peace of 1763; and, in concert with Spain, made every exertion to create a navy equal to cope with that of Great Britain; they did contest the empire of the sea, conquered many of our foreign possessions, and we were obliged to purchase peace by the separation of the colonies, and the loss of part of the acquisitions of the war of 1756.— From the changes that had taken place on the continent, the line of political conduct - was neither so clear nor so uniform as before, but opportunities of forming alliances were not wanting, if proper use had been -made of them. It was not the interest of Prussia that the empire should be farther dismembered or divided; it was a defence against foreign enemies, and even against Austria. Upon this principle Frederick the Great acted at the time of his greatest hostility against the House of Austria; he declined supporting the Court of Versailles in schemes for subverting the empire. The alliance between France and Austria was not annulled, but their interests were too discordant, and the causes of dissension too many for the connexion to be cordial; on several occasions their mutual jealousy was so great as to be little short of actual hostility; even so early as a few years after the peace of 1763, the Emperor and the King of Prussia came under an engagement to defend the neutrality of the empire, in case of a war between France and England. But, for twenty years, Great Britain seemed to be engrossed with a scheme of raising a tax upon the colonies, which would hardly have been worth collecting, shewed scarcely any other signs of political existence, had very little share in the affairs of the continent, and remained without an

ally till that fatal contest was brought to a conclusion.The partition of Poland brought a new actor upon the stage. Rus. sia, separated from the rest of Europe by tributary or dependent states, had before that time entered but little into the general political system of this part of the world. The war with Prussia was undertaken in the cause of the King of Poland, and the discussions of the Court of Petersburgh with those of Vienna and Versailles, had almost exclusively related to Poland and Turkey; but the boundaries of the empire being then brought forward to those of some of the prin cipal powers of the continent, Russia became immediately interested in most of the transactions of Europe. From vast ex tent of dominion, the achievements of Peter I, numerous conquests, great inAuence in the North, and the sway exercised in Poland, Russia had been regarded as a formidable power, even while viewed at her former distance; great late acquisitions, and the dazzling reign of Catherine, have, in the opinion of many, afforded un common importance to Russia; a train of splendid victories seems to have induced a belief, that her armies are at least equal to any on the continent, and that they have only to enter the field to repair the disasters of the neighbouring nations. From the supineness of the court of Petersburg there is reason to fear that it partakes of the delusion, but whatever may, upon trial, be the result, it is at least judging rashly. Russia is still but half emerged from barbarism; great part of her extensive kingdoms are thinly scattered with savage tribes, that add little to her strength: her new provinces are not incorporated with the old, her government is despotism, great part of her people are slaves, and the abuses of administration are enormous; her armies are almost untried against European troops, and, when they have been opposed to them, the issue has been various; at Zomdorff, although they repulsed the first attack of the Prussian troops, the battle ended in a route little inferior to that of Naiva; at Kunnersdorff, when on the point of being totally defeated, they gained the victory; at Cassileggio they at first gave way, but when supported, maintained their position; at Novi they were repulsed; in Swisserland they were cut to pieces; in Holland they miscarried. But, let it not be supposed, that I mean to detract from the real consequence of Russia; Russia is a great na tion, her dominions immense, her people numerous, her acquisitions, in the last century, greater than those of all the other na

tions of Europe together; the spirit of her government improving, and her resources many; the superiority of her armies over the Asiatic troops, with whom her principal -contests have ben, decided; at Novi the attack was difficult; in Swisserland they were greatly out-numbered; in Holland they were separated from the rest of the army; the assault of Prague was brilliant. Russia would have great weight in the scale; I only wish to banish the dangerous and dastardly idea, that, should other nations not fight their own battles, Russia could ever avenge the cause of Europe, or prove the last asylum of freedom or civilised society.

March 14, 1804.

CAMILLUS.

BRITISH CREDITORS..

SIR,I have read your observations on British subjects holders of French stock, prior to, and on the commencement of the revolution, without entering into the merits. or demerits of their case. I wish you would pay some little attention to that of those British merchants, who established in France under the sanction of a treaty of commerce, had their property, consisting in merchandise and mercantile establishments only, violently taken from them; these unfortunate men, few comparatively in number, are now with their families, reduced to extreme poverty; in pleading their cause, I do not mean to comprehend manufactories conveyed from hence to France, or, indeed, any trade or establishment inconsistent with the regular traffic and advantage of our own country; but to bring forth the unrewarded merit of those, who sacrificing every other motive to their loyalty and love of England, took the earliest opportunity of flying from the yoke of Robespierre; many of whom have been obliged since the con clusion of the treaty of peace, to pay the French such debts, interest included, as formed the original amount of goods purchased in France, and afterwards taken from them by the French government at the maximum which was tantamount to no. thing. I am the more inclined to wish the insertion of these remarks in your paper, because it is become the criterion of truth, often revealed with energy by you, six months before it strikes the comprehension of others.I am, Sir, your most obedient

68

servedly been considered as a matter of considerable delicacy, and it is on that account, I presume, that no discussion on it has lately appeared in the "Register." Whether, indeed, that delicacy has not been somewhat over-rated from interested motives, both in and out of Parliament, though it may admit of a doubt, I shall not now enquire. The few observations I am about to make, and which, if you do not think them altogether unworthy of notice, I take the liberty of offering for insertion, relate to a view of the subject which is not only very important, but of which no person, however scrupulous, can be expected to disapprove.It is now some time since his Majesty's confidential servants, not indeed, till they had been strongly and repeatedly pressed, declared that there did not exist any necessary suspension of the personal exercise of the "royal authority." Perhaps, had this declaration been made spontaneously, and had the accounts of the physicians been expressed in clearer terms, they might have contributed more to tranquillise the public mind, and might have prevented that air of mystery, and ambiguity, which it would be in vain to deny, has hung over the whole transaction. Still, however, I should be very unwilling upon any ground short of positive and incontestible evidence, to suppose that the ministers had practised, and the physicians connived at any fraud upon the public in an affair of such magnitude; and indeed, it is wholly foreign to the purpose of my argu ment, to contest the authority of either. Admitting then, as I am ready to admit, that his Majesty is sufficiently recovered to be able to go through the actual business of the state, without danger, or material inconvenience; does it follow, or will it even be pretended, that he would be equal to that extraordinary load of affairs, which any sudden and violent change of circumstances would bring upon him?Ministers have long since assured us, and what is far more to the purpose, many wise and well informed men believe, that a formidable invasion 'may be at the distance of only a few weeks, perhaps, a few days. When we recollect the sensa tion produced in this country, by the preda tory incursion of a handful of convicts in Wales, what may we not lock-to as the effect of a serious and extensive attack, upon every class of persons; not excepting from the general "panic" the Cabinet and its hero, the magnanimous Col. Tierney. The duties of the Sovereign, increased beyond conception, both in number and urgency, must then be performed; not in that manner, at those hours, and in such portious as

may be most compatible with his mental and bodily repose; but at the most inconvenient moment, abruptly, amidst danger, difficulty, and confusion. Will the state of discipline to which (supposing the event not to happen before) three weeks per"manent pay and duty" are to bring the volunteers, secure us from the chance of defeat? And in that case what must be the feelings of our venerable Monarch, whose kingdom during one of the longest reigns our history records, has never till this moment, with any prospect of success, been even threatened with invasion? What would be his agitation at hearing for the first time, at once, of the destruction of an army, and the waste of a province? I pass over what would not be the least painful, and embarrassing circumstance of his situation, the total failure of all national confidence in his servants; which, if it has not takea place already, would infallibly be occasioned by the presence of the crisis. Surely, it is neither indecent, nor absurd, but perfectly consistent both with loyalty and sound sense, to suppose, that were his ministers for the sake of protracting the duration of their own power, to risque exposing him to these accumulated labours, and poignant anxieties; the consequence might probably be a return of his indisposition. The situation of things would not then allow us to remain a single day, much less whole weeks, in perfect uncertainty, whether we had, or had not, an executive government. The King must either be constantly prepared to meet his council; or, if unhappily prevented, for however short a time, from executing the indispensible functions of his supreme office, some power must be instantly created to supply the deficiency. In some shape or another we should have recourse to a rigeng. Now, of it we must observe, that notwithstanding, all the discussions which took place on the subject, at a former period, neither the persons of whom it would be composed, or the principles on which their authority would be established and limited, are sufficiently known to this hour. The whole affair, as a " res integra" must be brought before Parliament; and, an arduous task it would have to perform, even under the most favourable circumstaures; and one which more than any other would require a full attendance and mature deliberation. But, to what number would Parliament assemble, were a powerful army of the enemy already landed? Of whom woold it consist? Of a few infim, a few superannuated, a few placemen, who would sit trembling on the benches of St. Stephen's, whilst the remain

der were gone to fight the battles of their country. Fit persons truly, to decide upon a great legislative provision, to erect another laud-mark of the constitution, to establish a precedent for future ages! Yet, they mu-t decide, and we must be guided by their decision, in the disposal of the supreme autho rity; otherwise, the kingdom must fall into a total anarchy; or, what is nearly the same thing, we must continue to trust to the responsibility of Henry and Hiley.-I know not, that in the case which I have now stated, there is either any thing impossible, or so remote in point of probability, as to justify' us in remaining unprovided against its occurrence. Why, then, instead of prattling about a nugatory bill, by which, Mr. Addington wants to make the volunteers a little less, and Mr. Pitt a little more like soldiers, are not Parliament seriously occupied in preparing some plan, by which we might be guided in this most important particular, should any severe relapse deprive us of the protection of our Sovereign, in the hour of danger and trial? Would there be any want of delicacy" in such a proceeding, any thing that could wound the personal feeling of our beloved Monarch? On the contrary, I am convinced, that there could not be a more groundless misrepresentation of his character, than to suppose, that from him it would meet with any obstacle. He is not like those tyrants, of whom we are told, that they were desirous of enhancing the splendour and tranquillity of their own time, by laying the foundation of future misery, and discord. No; his wishes are, that during his absence, as well as during his presence, his people should be happy; and, his paternal care extends to those moments, when he himself is unable to watch over their welfare. -It is indeed, hard to conceive, what has prevented us from having recourse to so na tural, and so necessary a measure; and one, which the late serious warnings, must have pressed so forcibly upon the mind of every thinking man. Nothing, indeed, conld account for the omission, but that torpid indifference to all but the concerns of the m°Cment, that wretched short-sightedness, that total absence of such wise and manly counsels, as would teach us to encounter an immediate difficulty, in order to avoid an approaching disaster-those worst symptoms of the worst times, which are in so eminent a degree, characteristic of the present days, and the present government; and which, unless we soon have recourse to other men, and other principles, must bring on, if not our utter destruction, at least our final degradation from the place, to which our an