though we are told of the poverty of France, we know she has no national debt worth speaking of, and, which is the same thing, she has no paper money; none of that sort of property which gives to its owners an interest at variance with that of the country, and which, in case of foreign invasion or internal commotion, vanishes into air, leaving its present possessors to perish. It is, however, with no small satisfaction, that every well-wisher of England must hear the Consul talk of his sinking fund. "The "sinking fund," says he," fulfils, with "constancy and fidelity, its destination. "Already in possession of a portion of the

public debt, it every day accumulates a "treasure, which secures to the state a "speedy liquidation." This is delightful! A "sinking fund," a "public debt," a "speedy liquidation!" These are the things, precisely the things which we must wish our mortal enemy to boast of; but, it is to be feared, that he is joking upon this subject, or we might hope, that our great grand children would see France what England now is.The destruction of the French commerce, which has been regarded as a master stroke, on our part, has, perhaps, done more real injury to this country than to that; for, it is well known, that the losses, sustained in consequence thereof, have, at last, chiefly fallen upon the insurers, the merchants, and the bankers of England. This is another of the political effects of our vaunted" capi "tal, credit, and confidence." The French are now a military people; a people completely military, following scarcely any other civil profession than that of cultivating the earth. In such a nation nothing is fluctuating; nothing that can suddenly and materially effect the value of property; nothing that can induce the government to abandon its projects; and, particularly, to make a peace that shall leave us in safety. With such a people for our enemy, and having the Doctor and his brethren for our guardians, where are we to look for hope? For the death of Buonaparté, and some consequent overthrow of the government and power of France? Foolish and base hope! Every person that returns from France, on whom reliance can be placed, represents the people as being generally well pleased with their ruler. There are no visible discontents; the ambition of the people is highly gratified by the achievments of their government; and, indeed, "when they look at their proud attitude with respect to all other nations, and especially with respect to their now humbled rival; when they com pare the talents and measures of the people

who rule them, with the talents and measures of the miserable souls, to whom the affairs of this country are committed, who can wonder, that they are reluctant to hazard the consequences of a change? It is not that they hate monarchy, but that they love national honour; not that they love an usurper, but that they hate that national humiliation and disgrace, which they see but too frequently the lot of the subjects of kings. This is a consideration of much more weight than we are generally aware of; and, it behoves us well to reflect on the sort of example, which que ourselves are giving to the people of France; it behoves us to ask ourselves, whether our situation is such as to be an object of envy with our neighbours; whether our slavish submission to a ministry, whom we all despise, is a circumstance likely to induce the French to seek for any change that shall subject them even to the chance of being governed by Addingtons, Braggs, Jenkinsons, Marsdens, Hobhouses, and Tierneys? *

WELSH COAST.If the accounts given by the ministerial writers, relative to the formidable state of our defensive means, be true, it is certainly not unreasonable to expect, that the coast of Wales should be tolerably well protected; yet, it is very positively asserted, that the Cambrian principality is not, in this respect, more fortunate than Norfolk, Yorkshire, or Scotland. If an invasion should be attempted, and all our warlike measures are founded upon the presumption that it will, no part appears to be more likely for the enemy to fix on, than the coast bordering on the Bristol Channel. The practicability of sending a division of ships very far up that Channel cannot be denied; and, if any considerable object is to be answered by it, why should it not be attempted? The chance of plundering such a city as Bristol, and the liberation of such a body of French prisoners as are lodged in that neighbourhood, is by no means unwor thy of an expedition. Ought we not, therefore to be surprised, that, for the protection of the coast of the Bristol Channel, there is only one frigate with half her compliment of men, 2,000 men, militia and army of reserve, to which may be added a regiment of volunteer infantry, three troops of cavalry,

* A STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, by M. le Chevalier de Tinseau, is well worthy of the attention of those gentlemen, who wish to obtain a correct knowledge of the resources of France, and of the state and distribution of those resources. This work may be regarded as unquestionably accurate, and certainly it is of great utility in all the inquiries to which it relates.

and about 4 or 500 sea fencibles. The city of Bristol, which contains, perhaps, 10,000 men fit to bear arms, and which was the foremost in offering its services, has been so contumeliously treated by the ministers, that a very small portion of its inhabitants are enrolled. As to regular troops, they are, in that part of the kingdom, as scarce as the eagle or any other rare and solitary bird. The coast of Wales is left to its fate. If the inhabitants do not defend themselves, they must, if attacked, be subdued. It is to be confidently presumed, that the Welsh would bravely fight for their country; but, that is no reason why it should be so shamefully neglected. Let it not be said, that this is giving information to the enemy: such charges are become stingless: nobody is now so weak as to be misled by them: thanks to the Scotch magistrates, this mode of stifling the voice of complaint is exploded. If Buonaparté does not already know the state of the Welsh coast, the ministers have quite time enough to send a force to protect it, as also a naval force sufficient to protect the Bristol Channel. The ministers have appointed a General, indeed, to command in the district, of which Bristol forms a part; but, the General, alas! instead of telling the people to rely on him and his army for security, called upon them to adopt measures for securing themselves! There was no time, he told them, for applying to government; but, he did not inform them why the government neglected to provide the means of security before. To say the truth, however, the general was not answerable for this neglect; he could not help the naked state of the harbour and Channel of Bristol; his endeavours to cause them to be put in a state of defence were perfectly laudable, and no blame attaches to him for any thing, except for having accepted of a command from a ministry, whom, it is absolutely impossible that he should not despise. The parishes of Bristol rejected the general's proposals. They admitted the justice of his representation respecting their defenceless state; but they refused to provide the remedy themselves, stating it to be the duty of the government to provide for the protection of every part of the Empire. "Is "not," said they, "the flower of the Bri"tish army employed for the protection of "the metropolis? And, does not Bristol "contribute its share towards the support "of that army." They were told, that 10 or 20,000l. would have been no object with such an opulent city as Bristol. True, but, as the parishes observed, the advance of that sum would have been to sarction a very un

just and very unconstitutional principle and, there was a time, when parliament would have asked, whence a general derived his authority to propose to a city to raise money for warlike purposes. But, notions of this sort now appear to have taken their leave of men's minds. So far from having any fear of being charged with causing money to be raised without consent of parliament, the ministers are never so full of confidence as when they are asserting that money, and for war-like purposes too, will be so raised. Indeed, for the purpose of obtaining the popularity to be derived from a nominal economy, the ministers have adopted every scheme, that they can devise, for the purpose of supporting the expenses of defence by subscription. Such a course of proceeding must inevitably lead to destructive consequences; but, it will keep the mi nisters in power a few months longer, and that is all that they have in view. There is, however, this consolation; that, whatever evils, whatever miseries, whatever degree of slavery and infamy the people of this country may be compelled to bear, in consequence of the duration of the Doctor's power, must be infinitely short of their de

serts.

THE FLEET.- Great praise has been bestowed, and, perhaps, very justly bestowcd, on the perseverance of the Admiral; who, amidst all the gales that we lately have had, has, with so little intermission; maintained his station off the harbour of Brest; but, it is the opinion of those, most likely to be accurately informed upon the subject; and, it is said to be that of Admiral Cornwallis himself, that the system of blocking Brest, as it is now conducted, will shortly destroy a considerable portion of our navy. The ships are hurried out, half fit ted and stored; in a state, in which British men of war would not formerly have been sent to sea. It is stated, upon authority, in which perfect reliance may be placed, that several of the ships, after the late gales, had scarcely a whole sail on board; and, the consequence may be, the loss of one or more or all of them, in the event of their being overtaken with a gale, upon a lee shore. We have, or shall soon have, 14 sail of the line at sea with Admiral Cornwallis; but several of them are in need of repair, and will want to be taken into dock at no very distant day; and, there are no ships in forwardness to replace them, while a very great deficiency of stores prevails, at Plymouth in particular. These facts are not stated upon slight grounds-Instead of blockading Brest, some very able officers think, that we

should keep a squadron of line of battle ships constantly in Cawsand and Torbay, and another in Ireland, ready to sail at a moment's notice, with a chain of frigates continually reconnoitring to give immediate information of any movements in Brest; for, the object should be rather to have a squadron always ready to pursue a French flect, than to tear our own to pieces during the winter months, and, when driven off their station, giving the enemy an opportunity of pursuing his plans without being able to interrupt him. By keeping a squa dron in reserve, we should never suffer him to gain above a few hours start of us; and, indeed, should he make for Ireland, he would have no starting time at all. It will be said, perhaps, that our reconnoitring fri gates would be driven off in a gale as our ships of the line now are; and, consequently, could not give information of any movements that the enemy might make immediately after such a gale. True, but, our naval commander would, of course, at such times, push out, withou; waiting for advices, and return again after a short cruize. --The system of blockade is a defensive system; purely defensive; and, like all others of the kind, it costs most to him who pursues it. We know not exactly what force Buonaparré may have at Brest: we often hear, that he has no naval force at all: his naval means are a standing jest. Bat, if he has naval force enough to keep all our naval force amply employed; to compel us to strain every nerve; to fit out all we can abrain men and stores for; to anticipate our naval resources; to work up our stock of materials without being able to replenish it; if he can compel us to do all this, what contolation is it for us to know, that he is dessitute of naval force? Really, when we conider the number of ships, of guns, of men, he immense quantity of stores, that we have afloat, and reflect, that all these are merely to watch an enemy, who, we are told is perfectly contemptible upon the ocean; and, when we further reflect, that all these ships and sixty thousand sailors are employed to prevent an army (at most a hundred thousand) of "Frenen slaves" from coming to attack seven-hundred thousand free-born Bri"tons;" when one thinks of this, one is really almost tempted to wish oneself, not a French slave, to be sure; but almost any thing other than what one is. We have heretofore blockaded Brest, and the circumstance was not thought humiliating. True; but we were never before engaged in a war, in which all was defensive; for, as to the colonies that we have taken, the capture of them is totally unworthy of being regarded

as offensive operations; all that the captors had to do was merely to exchange the custom-house and other civil officers, merely to cause the produce to be shipped to England instead of France and Holland. VOLUNTEER SYSTEM. Instead of taking measures, in order to attack the enemy and to put an end to the war, the ministers are engaged in turning and patching their means of defence; or, rather, the means by which they hope to be able to defend their places. The regular army is a perfect skeleton. Exclusive of the men obtained from the army of reserve, the recruiting of the regulars scarcely makes up for deaths, discharges, and desertions; and, if regiments on colonial service are taken into the account, it falls short even of that. Of the men obtained from the army of re serve five-sixths are mere men of straw: absolutely the refuse of the land, actually collected, not a few of them, from before the magistrates of the metropolis. And thus it is that we are to become a "military peo"ple!"--The militia cannot be filled. The source from which it was supplied is also dry. And here we stand, a population of fifteen millions of souls incapable of sending forth a single brigade to any part of the world! Of volunteers we have, indeed,. an abundance; but what service they are to be of has never yet been clearly pointed out; and, that they will be, for any length of time, kept together in corps, is more than any thinking man will venture to assert.It was hoped, by some persons, that the ministers were about to propose a complete re vision of the volunteer system; but, alas! just what was anticipated in the preceding sheet, a mere patching of it up, is all they now appear to have in view! The truth is, that the system cannot be improved: it has in it the seeds of destruction; destruction to itself, or to the monarchy. Such was my opinion at the first, such it still is, and such it shall still be declared, notwithstanding the insinuations that it may bring forth of my being an enemy to my country, an ap pellation which is indiscriminately bestowed on all those who dare to doubt either the disinterestedness or the talents of ministers. "A clamour against the Volunteers!" Who ever raised such a clamour? So, all the persons, who have foreseen and foretold the present existing evils of the system are to be, accused of hatred and hostility to the 400,000 men, who have arms in their hands! Wherein have I shown myself the enemy of these men any more than Mr. Yorke? Why should I be their enemy? They have done me no harm; but, on the contrary, appear very willing to do me and

all of us good. I want to get no fees from them, nor to put any officers over them. I have no purpose to answer by their dissolution; nor can their continuing embodied ever do me much harm. I have no lands in Richmond Park; I am no Clerk of the Pells; very little mischief can happen to me from any of the consequences that I apprebend from the system. -The childish whine about " designing persons, who are "endeavouring to set the volunteers against "the government, and the government "against the volunteers," is really pitiful. It is a shame for men to give way to such miserable plaintive accusations. We shall, by and by, I suppose, hear of designing persons charged with setting the people against the ministers. With those who are acquainted with the modesty of the Addingtons nothing in this way will appear incredible. --But, is Mr. Whitbread, too, a “design

ing person?" Is he also an enemy of the volunteers; of the 400,000 men in arms > He, who is himself a colonel of volunteers, will scarcely be thought their enemy. Yet, as the reader will observe, there is scarcely one objection, which I have, at any time, urged to the system, which Mr. Whitbread has not, by experience, found to be well founded. He has found the exemptions to impoverish the army and the militia; he is of opinion that there is no economy in the system; he declares that the funds of the corps cannot last long, and that the public treasure must support them, or recourse must be had to "compulsory subscriptions ;" he disapproves of the fines; he reprobates the idea of compelling men to remain in the corps; and, upon the whole, though origi nally a cordial friend of the systein, he now wishes it never had existed. Will the modest ministers, therefore, say, that this gentleman is an enemy of the country, an enemy of the volunteers, and a designing person? They will scarcely venture so far; not publicly at least; but their hirelings will continue to repeat these charges against all those, who agree with him in opinion, and whom they can revile with impunity. I do not know any thing that is a more severe trial to loyalty and patriotism than the reflection, that what one pays to the state; what one earns hardly, and chearfully contributes for the support of the honour and welfare of the country, goes, in part, to the feeding and pampering of the scurrillous slaves by whom one is openly belied and abused. -Great complaint was made, in the debate of the other evening, that those who found fault with the plans of the ministers did not propose others. They have proposed others. Mr. Windham began his op

position to the present system by proposing another system. It was not adopted. Why should he propose any more? Indeed, it is by no means incumbent on members of parliament, not belonging to the ministry, to propose measures in lieu of measures that they may think proper to oppose. To those who are to execute a plan belongs the task of devising and proposing it; and, the bu siness of those, who have nothing to do with the execution, is to approve, or to disapprove, of the proposition; because, it is always understood, that they who are most capable of devising measures are the fittest persons to carry them into effect; or, in other words, when the nation relies more upon the wisdom of the Opposition than upon that of the Ministry, the Ministry ought to be changed, and the Opposition put in their places. Unless, therefore, we suppose a state of things, in which the weakest and most ignorant part of the Parliament are, by some over-ruling necessity, obliged to be kept in power, it is not only not the duty of the Opposition . propose measures, but, it really appears to be their duty to abstain from it. This state of things, however, the ministers would make us believe now really exists. They do not openly say, in the Parliament Houses, that the King has resolved never to change them for any other ministers; but, their hirelings make no scruple to assert it in conversation, and many of them in print. If this were the case, as it certainly is not, there might be some doubts as to how far an Opposition ought to aid, with their advice, a ministry so constituted and so esta blished in power; but, while we presume, that no such over-ruling resolution has been adopted; while we presume, and it were disloyalty to presume otherwise, that our gracious Sovereign has, in his ministers, no choice or predilection but that which arises from his desire to preserve, untarnished, the honour of his crown, and to secure the liberty and happiness of his people; while this is our presumption, we must ever regard it as the duty of a parliamentary Opposition to abstain from the proposing of measures, to be acted upon by the ministry. -Besides, if the Opposition were to propose a new system for the Volunteers, what would be the consequence? It would be garbled by the ministry, who, by appearing reluctantly to yield to whatever part of it should bear hard upon the people, would gain popularity from the very thing which they would pervert into the cause of odium on their opponents. No; let them propose. Let their schemes be approved of or disap proved of; but let them still be theirs. No amendments, except for the purpose of

throwing out the whole measure; no middle cause; no effusions of candour; no cant, no crying. There they are; they have their cystem in their own hands; it is the subject of their exultation; it is the pride of their lives; let them alone with it, then; let us see what they will do with it; for, as to the argument that their ignorance or perverseness ought not to prevent us from endeavouring to save the conntry, it falls to the ground the moment you reflect, that our danger arises solely from their being in power, and that your recommendation of measures will only tend to prolong the duration of that power.

In case, indeed, of any imminent peril, the providing against which would not admit of a delay sufficient to give his Majesty time to change his servants; in such a case, it would, undoubtedly, be proper for any member of Parliament, however he might deprecate the continuation of the ministers, to propose such measures for them to act on, as he should think likely to prevent the dreaded mischief; but, at present, there is time sufficient for the changing of ministers; the peril is great, but not so near at hand as to render a short delay destructive; and, therefore, there can be no good reason given for the Opposition members to enroll themselves under the ministers as volunteer statesmen. All that they have to do, all that they ought to do, is to show the evil effects of the past, to point out to the Parliament how the nation has already been harrassed, injured, and exposed to the enemy, by the ignorance and imbecillity of the ministers; to warn them of the mischiefs, which are likely to arise from the miserable compromise now pro posed; and, of course, to vote against such proposition. If there be any man, who, unable longer to exist out of the air of a court, pining to death after the exercise of power, yearning after that flattering and fawning which patronage only can secure, wishes to creep in amongst ministers whom he hates and whom every one else despises; if there be, amongst the oppositionists, such a man, it is for him, and him alone, to slide into their ranks by proposing to them plans or improvements, by mixing up his measures with theirs, and, by such means, imperceptibly creating a plausible pretext for defending both measures and ministers against their opponents.

PARTIES. If it were put to the whole nation, man by man, whether the present ministers ought not to be turned out, there would be for the affirmative 999 out of every thousand; and if you were then to put to this vast majority, the question, whether they would beseech the king to turn them out,

there would be for the negative an almost unanimous vote. Those, therefore, who think that an universal expression of contempt for the ministers and of disgust and loathing at their ignorance and vanity are indications of an approaching change, do not sufficiently attend to the distinction between the expressions which men make use of in their private and those which they make use of in their public capacities; between their wishes and their actions; between their duty. and their fears. But, why, some one will ask, "in God's name, why should the peo"ple of England be afraid of Doctor Ad

dington?" They are not afraid of Doctor Addington, but of poverty and misery; and, if you ask me, how their situation in life depends on him, I need only beg of you to recollect, that he is either directly or indirectly, actually the paymaster of nearly one balf of the people, as must be evident to any one who will give himself time to consider the amount of the revenue and of the loans, the mode of the collection of the former, and the manner in which the whole finds its way, through the hands of the government, into those of the community. Let any ten readers of the Register make out a list of their acquaintance, then inquire strictly into the connexions, views, and interests of each. and, if they do not find, that a very great majority of them are in a state of ministerial dependence, more or less complete, I will give up all pretensions to political calculation. When, therefore, we express to one another our astonishment at the duration of a ministry, who have neither weight of family, of public character, or of talents, one of which, at least, has always heretofore been, in this country, regarded as absolutely necessary to the support of a ministry, we forget the vast and fearful addition, which, since the commencement of Mr. Pitt's sway, has been made to that power which is attached to the office of the minister; we forget, that the taxes have been tripled, that the tax-gatherers and others receiving their bread immediately from the hand of the government have been more than tripled, and that, by the help of companies, of boards, &c. the chain of dependence is now so complete as to render the whole nation a sort of vassal village, of which the minister is the lord. Mr. Pitt retired, or he might have been minister to the end of his life; that is to say, if his death had not been preceded by the death of the funding and taxing sysMr. Pitt, upon his retirement, ap pears to have thought, that the unbounded influence he had enjoyed belonged to his person and talents, and not to his office; a mistake, which, if he had not perceived it be

lem.