Rex v. Sexton. account of it. I will receive nothing as a confession in writing that was not taken down from the mouth of the prisoner in his own words, nothing that he says that has any relation to the subject being omitted, nor any thing added, except explanations of provincial expressions or terms of art. The reading this paper to the prisoner, and his acknowledgment that it was correct, does not remove the objection. By the change of language, a very different complexion might be given to the story from what it had when it came from the mouth of the prisoner, and which he might not discover when it was read over to him. The lower orders of men have but few words to convey their meaning, and they know as little of expressions that they are not in the habit of using, as if they belonged to another language. I will not receive this paper in evidence, and I hope that I shall not find a police officer again employed in preparing, either the depositions of witnesses or the confessions of prisoners. Alderson, counsel for the prosecution, then said, that DALLAS C. J. had refused to receive, at a former assizes at Norwich, a confession because it was not in the prisoner's own words. Punishment. A Conspiracy. [Vide 1 Burn, 566.] N indictment against workmen for conspiracy against their employers, to prevent them from taking any apprentice, was held to be sufficiently proved, by evidence of their having turned out from their employment with intent to compel their masters to dismiss any one apprentice. Rex v. Ferguson and Edge, Lancaster Spring Ass. 1819. Cor. Wood B. 2 Stark, N. P. 489.—N. B. In Easter term following, the defendants received sentence of fine and imprisonment. On a prosecution for a crime to be proved by conspiracy, general evidence of an existing conspiracy may in the first instance be received, as a preliminary step to the more particular evidence, by which it is to be shewn that the individual defendants were guilty participators in such conspiracy. In such cases, the general nature of the whole evidence should be opened to the Court, and if upon such opening it should appear that there was no particular proof sufficient to affect the individual defendants, it would be the duty of the judge to stop the case in limine, and not to allow the general evidence to be received. The Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 310. So, assuming that an alleged conspiracy to suborn witnesses against the accused party is a legitimate ground of defence, general evidence of an existing conspiracy is admissible, with this qualification, viz. that the proposed evidence should be previously opened to the Court, as in the former case, in order to enable the judge to form an opinion of the probability of bringing the evidence home, so as to affect some person whose acts are material and relevant to the issue of the indictment then under trial. The Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 311. See stat. 3 G. 4. c. 114. post, title "Denders." 105 Constable (How chosen, &c.) [1 & 2 G. 4. c. 88.3 G. 4. c. 40. See 1 Burn, 575.] - quo warrantô against a constable, the affiport of the rule stated, that for 50 years back, davits in sup REX v. Lane, H. 2 & 3 G. 4. 5 B. & 4.488. In M. T. 1 G. 4. Where, in an a rule nisi was obtained for a quo warranto against the defen- application for a dant as constable of the township of Failsworth, in the county of Lancaster. The affidavits stated, that for 50 years and upwards, and as far back as the deponents could recollect, it had been the usual and established custom for the constable to be elected by the payers of rates at a meeting for that purpose; and that at a meeting so held on the 3d of October last, Joseph Lancashire was appointed; but that, notwithstanding, the deputy steward of the court-leet of the wapentake of Salford had sworn in the defendant as constable for the year. But none of the deponents expressly stated, that to their belief there had been immemorially such a custom in the town. Cause was about to have been shewn, when the court called upon counsel to answer the preliminary objection, that no immemorial custom was stated in the affidavits. He contended that it was sufficient if facts were there stated from which a jury would necessarily draw that conclusion, and that such facts were stated in this case. Per Curiam. It is necessary on the face of the affidavits to state that there is, as the witnesses believe, an immemorial custom to elect in this way; and it is not enough to state facts from whence the conclusion may be drawn, for it may be consistent with these affidavits that the parties making them may know when the custom originated. In the case of Rex v. Standard Hill (4 M. & S. 378. 4 Burn, 25.) which was an application to have overseers appointed for a vill, it was held to be necessary to swear positively that it was a vill by reputation. R. D. See Rex v. Williamson, 3 B. & A. 582. See 1 Burn, 580. - a Smith v. Wiltshire and others, E. 2 G. 4. 2 Brod. & Bing. 619. Trespass. At the trial before Burrough J. Taunton Spring Ass. 1821, it appeared that the defendants, who were constables, searched the plaintiff's house under a warrant for the discovery of some black kerseymere which had been stolen. They found no black cloth, but they took cloth of other colours, which they carried before a magistrate. Upon being asked whether they had warrant, they refused to give any answer. The action not having been brought within six months after the alleged trespass, it was contended that the defendants, as constables, were protected by stat. 24 G. 2. c. 44. § 8.; and the jury, under the direction of the learned judge, found a verdict for the defendants. It was moved, that this verdict should be set aside and a new trial be granted, on the ground that, as the defendants were specifically authorized to take black cloth, in taking any cloth other than black, they were not acting as constables protected by the statute, but as mere unauthorized trespassers, so that the jury should have been directed to find for the plaintiff, and Price v. Messenger (2 Bos. & Pull. 158. 1 Burn, 581.) was cited as expressly in point; and it was con and as long as deponents could recollect, there had been a custom in the town to elect a constable in a parbut did not expressly state that they believed such custom to be immethat it was not morial: Held, sufficient. ticular mode, tection of the statute 24 G. 2. c. 44.; and that an action against them ought to have been com menced within six months after the grievance complained of. tended, that unless the plaintiff was bound down by the case of Parton v. Williams, ( 3 B. & A. 330. 1 Burn, 842.); the cases of Money v. Leach, (3 Burr. 1742. 1 Burn, 581.); Milton v. Green, (5 East, 233. 1 Burn, 579.); Bell v. Oakley, (2 M. & S. 259. 1 Burn, 581.); Postlethwaite v. Gibson, (3 Esp. 226. 1 Burn, 581.) shewed that the protection of the statute only extended to cases where constables were acting in obedience to a warrant from a magistrate. The Court having taken time to consider, Dallas C. J. (C. P.) now delivered the judgment of the court. -This is an action of trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house and seizing his goods; and also, in another count, for seizing his goods only, brought against constables and others acting in their aid. The defendants produced at the trial a warrant of a justice of peace, commanding them to search the plaintiff's house for certain cloth suspected to have been stolen, and to seize it : they accordingly searched and seized certain cloth not strictly falling within the description of the warrant. The action was not brought within six calendar months from the time of seizure. The question is, whether the defendants are entitled to the benefit of the stat. 24 G. 2. c. 44. §8.? We are of opinion that they are. The case of Parton v. Williams and others is in point, where the defendants, having a warrant to seize the goods of A., seized, by mistake, the goods of B., and the court held the action ill brought after the lapse of six calendar months. All the judges then held, that the 8th § of 24 G. 2. was intended to give to constables some benefit not given by the 6th §; observing, that the 6th § protected them absolutely and at all times against any action for acts falling with that §, namely, acts done. in obedience to a warrant, and that it was nugatory to limit to six months by the 8th §, actions which, by the 6th f, could not be brought at all. It is true, that, in Part on v. Williams, the case of Price v. Messenger and another does not appear to have been cited, where the defendant, having a warrant to search for and seize stolen sugar, seized certain sugar which was not stolen, and also certain tea and nails; and where one of the judges is reported to have said, that, when the defendants seized the teas, they were not acting in obedience to the warrant. But that point did not there arise, for the defendants had suffered judgment by default as to the teas and nails, and the decision was, that the defendants did act in obedience to the warrant, within § 6, although the sugar seized turned out not to have been stolen : and no question whatever arose on § 8. The only case therefore that militates against Parton v. Williams, is the case which was there fully considered of Postlethwaite v. Gibson. That however was only the opinion of one very learned judge at N. P., and is the less to be regarded, because the plaintiff there ultimately submitted to be nonsuited, so that the opinion could not afterwards be questioned. That case, therefore, was properly disregarded in Parton v. Williams. In Parton v. Williams, the court did not expressly decide that the 8th § applies to all cases of constables acting as such, but we think that their reasoning extends to such construction, and that such is the true construction. The words as aforesaid, there refer either to the words immediately preceding, namely, for any thing done in the execution of his office, to which extent parties are protected by § 8., and it would be strange if constables were not equally protected; or else they are explanatory only of the word "person," and § 8., by the words " or person acting as aforesaid," means any person not an officer, who acts by order and in aid of an officer. Godin v. Ferris, (2 H. Blac. 14.) in trespass, and Saunders v. Saunders, (2 East, 254.) in trover, shew that, when a statute limits the time of bringing any action against an officer to a certain time from the time of the act by him done, the time must be computed from the original seizure of the goods. By stat. 1 & 2 G. 4. c. 88. § 2. it is enacted that "if any person shall assault, beat, or wound any constable, officer, headborough, or other person whomsoever, with intent in so doing, or by means thereof, to obstruct, resist, or prevent the lawful appre hension or detainer of any person charged with or suspected of felony; or if any person charged with or suspected of felony, shall assault, beat, or wound, any constable, officer, headborough, or other person whomsoever, with intent in so doing, or by means thereof, to obstruct, resist, or prevent his or her apprehension or detainer; then and in every or any such case, if the person or persons so offending shall be convicted of a misdemeanor only, it shall be lawful for the court by or before whom any such person or persons shall be so convicted as aforesaid to order and direct, in case it shall think fit, that such person or persons shall, in addition to any other pains, penalties, or punishment to which he, she, or they are now subject or liable, be kept to hard labour for any term not exceeding two years, and not less than six months." Et vide stat. 3 G. 4. c. 114. post, title "Defenders.” Expences of his Office. See 1 Burn, 584. Punishment of persons assaulting constables apprehension or detainer of persons charged with felony. Et vide title "Rescue," post. to prevent the misdemeanor his presence in a place of religious worship, him before a and carried magistrate, and secute him for Rex v. Seville and others, M. 2 G. 4. 5 B. & A. 180. This was A constable ap an appeal by the defendants, who were overseers of the poor of prehended an the township of Quick, in the W. R. of Yorkshire, against the offender for a accounts of John Robinson, late constable of that township. At committed in the trial it appeared, that on a Sunday in the month of December, 1819, a person of the name of William Whitehead, being in a state of intoxication, met a young woman on the road, and on his attempting to take liberties with her, she made her escape from him, and took refuge in the chapel, where divine service was just beginning; he followed her and behaved in an unbecoming and rude manner. In consequence of which he was taken into custody by the constable, (who was then in the chapel,) and the chapelwarden, and was the next day by them taken before a magistrate; and they were both bound by recognizance to prosecute him at the next Wakefield sessions for a misdemeanor, which they accordingly did; and he was found guilty, and punished by six months' imprisonment. No notice was ever given to the overseers or other inhabitants, that the prosecution was intended to be carried on at the expence of the township, nor was it mentioned or approved of, at any meeting of the inhabitants. The sessions at Wakefield, where the indictment against Whitehead was tried, were held in the month of January, 1820, and in that he could the March following, the constable regularly, and in the way in his accounts not charge them pointed out by the act 18 Geo. 3. c. 19., presented his accounts of under 18 G. 3. the expences incurred by him in the discharge of his office as con- c.19. § 4. stable; the whole of which were allowed, except the item of 187. expences sof such a prosecution were not monies expended by him in doing the busi ness of his township, and Rex v. Seville. The 18 G.3. c.19. § 5. gives an appeal only in case the majority of the overseers con cur in it. for the expences incurred in the prosecution of Whitehead, the allowance of which was negatived by a large majority of the meeting of the inhabitants, held for the purpose of investigating them, upon the ground that it was not a charge which, by law, the constable could make upon the township. In consequence of this refusal, the constable duly applied to a justice of the peace, for a summons for the overseers of the poor to shew cause, why they should not pay this sum; and, upon the overseers appearing, the magistrate made an order, allowing the above sum of 18., against which order the overseers appealed. Upon hearing the appeal, the sessions confirmed the order. After argument in support of the order of sessions, per ABBOTT C. J. The difficulty in this case is to shew that it was the business of the township to prosecute the individual who in this case committed the offence; for unless it be clearly made out to be the business of the township, it is impossible that the sums expended by the constable in this case can be said to be a charge in doing the business of the parish, township, or place, so as to bring it within the act of parliament. Now I am aware of no law which says that it is the business of a parish or township to enter into such prosecutions; and I am therefore of opinion, that these expences ought not to have been allowed by the sessions.- BAYLEY J. The constable in this case acted perfectly right in taking the of fender before the magistrate, but he should have done no more. He, however, together with the chapel-warden, enters into a recognizance to prosecute, having no authority to do so. Now, before he did this, he should have considered whether he was willing to enter into such a recognizance at his own expence; and if not, he should have endeavoured to have obtained some authority from the township, in which case it would have been different; but not having done so, I think he cannot charge these sums in his account, as monies expended on account of the township. Very mischievous consequences might arise, if the act of a constable could thus subject the township to heavy law expences.-HOLROYD J. The constable is entitled to charge, in his accounts, the monies expended by him in his office, on account of the township. In this case, his duty was completely at an end when he had carried the offender before a magistrate; and to prosecute, and to be bound over by recognizance to do so, was no part of his duty. In this respect, however, he chose to submit to the authority of the magistrate, and permitted himself to be bound over. But that act is not binding on the township. I am clearly of opinion, that these charges do not fall within the act of parliament, and that the sessions did wrong in allowing them.- Order of sessions quashed. See 1 Burn, 583. stat. 18 G. 3. c. 19. § 5. Rex v. The Justices of Lancashire, E. 3 G. 4. 5 B. & A. 755. J. Williams had obtained a rule nisi for a mandamus to the defendants, to enter continuances, and hear the appeal of Samuel Stansfield, one of the overseers of the township of Ashton-underLyne, in the county of Lancaster, against the allowance of the sum of 247., in the constable's accounts for that township. It appeared from the affidavits, that the constable, pursuant to the 18 Geo. 3. c. 19. § 4., had laid his accounts before a vestry meeting, on the 26th October last, when the item in question, being the amount of the expences of a prosecution for a misdemeanor |