in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, "it would be a huge injustice if a joint-stock company, under the earlier acts, by becoming registered as a limited company, could get rid of their liabilities and debts:" (Garnett and the Moseley Gold Mining Company v. Sutton, 34 L. J., Q. B., 118). It followed that the creditors of this company, retaining the same rights as they always had, inasmuch as they were expressly debarred of the remedy of bringing actions against the company, must be entitled to call upon the members to contribute, as if the company were still unlimited. Elderton, for the respondents, was not called upon. LORD CHANCELLOR.-I cannot accede to this application. I am asked to make an order for contribution as between the members of this company. I must take the company as I find it, for the purpose of determining the liabilities of the members as between themselves; and the company, as I find it, and as I can only treat for the purpose of winding up, is a limited company, and viewed as a limited company, the members in question are not liable to contibution, for they have paid to the full amount of their shares. I am then told that the Industrial Societies Act of 1862, under which this company is now registered, incorporates the Joint-stock Companies Act of 1862; and, therefore, that it incorporates the section of the Joint-stock Companies Act which defines what is a contributory, namely, every person who is liable to contribute under that act. But when the words of the Industrial Societies Act, which relate to the liability to contribute are examined, they will be found only to come to the same thing, namely, that every member of the company is liable to contribute as between himself and the other members, according to the qualifications mentioned in the act of 1862. But then, it is said, that the definition of the word "contribute," contained in the act of 1862, and inserted in the Industrial Societies Act, is qualified by a further section, the 194th, which has for its object this declaration-that "the registration of any company shall not affect or prejudice the liability of such company to have enforced against it, or its right to enforce, any debt or obligation incurred, or any contract entered into, previously to such registration;" and that that was decided in the case which has been cited from the Exchequer Chamber. But this section has no application to the case of a pure contributory. When I am called upon to determine that these two gentlemen are contributories, upon what is the notion of contribution founded? It must be according to the contract of partnership. But that contract of partnership, as it exists, and with respect to which alone I have power to enforce contribution, is a contract of partnership which excludes all liability to contribute; because the partners have paid up to the full extent of their liability. It is not necessary for me to consider what are the rights of the creditors. I am limited simply to this consideration, whether, where a company is a limited partnership, and has become the subject of a winding-up order, the members of that company, who, upon the principle of limited partnership, have nothing to contribute, because they have paid to the full amount of their shares, must contribute in respect of the rights of the creditors, who might have had claims against the company at the time when the winding-up order was made. I think I have no such power. The contribution must be founded entirely upon the partnership engagement; and the partnership engagement which exists here, and which can alone be regarded for the purpose of winding up, is a partnership with limited liability. There may be some failure of justice in the fact that machinery has not been inserted in the act of 1862, but I cannot, on the ground of any defect, take upon myself to put a construction upon the act, which would have the effect of adding an additional clause to the statute, merely because I think there may be a failure of jus tice. I can only take the partnership as I find it exist ing when it was made the subject of a winding-up order. The winding-up order was directed to a limited partnership. There might have been inserted in the Companies Act of 1862 a provision similar to the 116th section of the act of 1856, directing that the creditors of limited companies which were subject to a winding-up order in respect of former liabilities incurred under a contract of unlimited partnership should lose none of their rights, and then it might be possible to arrive at what is now contended for. But the jurisdiction under this order is confined to a limited partnership; and, upon that ground, these two gentlemen do not appear to me to be liable. The appeal must be dismissed; the respondents' costs to be paid by the official liquidator, who is to have his costs out of the estate; the deposit to be returned, on the appellants undertaking to pay the respondents' costs. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. HADLEY v. LONDON BANK OF SCOTLAND.-June 29. Vendor and purchaser—Injunction-Contract. Where there is a contract for the sale of land, the Court. will restrain the owner of the land from dealing with it until a suit for the specific performance of the contract has been disposed of; but when a plaintiff sues for spe cific performance, and there is a serious question, whe ther any contract exists, the Court will not so interpose. This was a motion, by way of appeal, to discharge an order of Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, granting an injunction to restrain the defendants from selling certain houses, otherwise than to the plaintiff, until the hearing of the cause, which is a suit for specifie performance of a contract alleged by the plaintiff, and denied by the defendants. Baily, Q. Č., and J. Pearson were for the defend ants, the appellants. Glasse, Q. C., and Waller were for the plaintiffs, the respondents. See Dart V. & P. 707. Sir J. L. KNIGHT BRUCE, L. J.-This controversy has arisen as to maintaining an interlocutory injuns tion in a cause that has not yet been heard. This is a suit for the specific performance of a contract entered into by the defendants to sell to the plaintiff by pris vate contract certain leaseholds in London. The in junction has been granted to restrain the defendants from selling the property to others before the cause heard. The defendants deny that they entered int such a contract as is alleged by the plaintiff. The parties have entered fully into evidence, and, so far as I can judge from the present state of such evidence I think the plaintiff is more likely to fail than succeed in his endeavour to force this contract upon the defendants. The plaintiff is seeking to enforce a co tract differing from the terms actually agreed upon, and judging from the principles on which this Court has always acted in such cases, I think that the de fendants are more likely to succeed than the plaintiff. But supposing the defendants to be in the wrong, the utmost inconvenience which the plaintiff can susta by their proposed proceedings before the cause i heard, is their dealing with the mere legal estate which might lead to the plaintiff's being obliged to add another party to the suit, and obtain a decree against him for getting in the legal estate. This in convenience cannot be very great, and is incomparalla to the inconvenience which the defendants would sustain, supposing them to succeed at the hearing of the cause, by losing the present favourable opportunity of selling the property. Both on principle and authority, the injunction ought not to remain. With great deference to the learned judge who granted the injunction, I am in favour of dissolving the injunction, without prejudice to the plaintiff's remedy at the hearing of the cause. Sir G. J. TURNER, L. J.-I agree that this injunction must be dissolved. I think the case of Spiller v. Spiller (3 Swanst. 556) does not go so far as was contended. If all the facts of that case were before us, we should probably find that there was some doubt as to the exact terms of the contract, and that was why the Court would not interfere. I have always understood, that where there is an undoubted contract the Court will restrain the vendor from parting with the legal estate, since by virtue of the contract the whole equitable interest passes to the purchaser, and the vendor is converted into a trustee for him of the legal estate; the Court will, therefore, prevent the trustee from dealing with the legal estate to the prejudice of his cestui que trust. This, however, only applies when there is a clear, undisputed, and undoubted contract. In the present case there is a serious question as to what the contract really was that the plaintiff entered into. The case, therefore, resolves itself into a question of the balance of inconvenience. If the plaintiff succeeds at the hearing, any extra costs which he may incur through the defendant's dealing with the legal estate may then be dealt with by the Court; he cannot, therefore, sustain any great amount of inconvenience. But the defendants may be very seriously inconvenienced by being prevented from selling the property. I think, therefore, that the injunction should be dissolved. Cost of this application to be costs in the cause. Note for reference-Fry's Sp. Perf. 336. NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE STEEL &c. Co. v. CAMOYS.- There were also covenants by the lessee not to break through a fault without license from the lessor, and not to sink shafts, burn materials, or erect buildings within a radius of 100 yards of the principal farmhouse. The mines comprised in the lease consisted of two parts, called the Upper and Lower Grange, and the plaintiffs, who were the assigns of Martin, with the assent of Mr. Bate, the agent of Lord Camoys, began sinking two shafts of the required dimensions at the Lower Grange, and proceeded to erect workshops, &c. They were, however, hindered by water from continuing the shaft beyond a certain depth, and the works were stopped for a time, and they then commenced sinking shafts at the Upper Grange. No formal consent to these works was obtained from Lord Camoys' agent, but nothing was done by him to shew his disapproval of these works beyond an expression of regret that one of the shafts was sunk too near the principal farmhouse. The plaintiffs ordered two powerful engines for these works, and early in January, 1865, commenced the foundations of the engine-houses at the Upper Grange, but, as they alleged, were prevented from continuing the erection of the engine-houses by continuous frosts. The engines were stated to have been ready for delivery on the 1st March, but on the 25th March, at the expiry of the required period, the engines were not erected, and the engine-houses were not ready for their reception. Under these circumstances, the defendant gave the plaintiffs notice of the forfeiture of their lease on the 25th March, 1865. The breaches of covenant alleged by the defendant were four, viz. :— First, that a powerful engine was not erected within the time specified at the Lower Grange. Secondly, that the site of the works at the Upper Grange was not approved of by the lessor's agent." Thirdly, that one of the shafts at the Upper Grange was within a radius of 100 yards of the principal farmhouse. Fourthly, that the shafts were not of the proper dimensions, being only eight or nine feet in diameter instead of eleven feet. Injunction-Landlord and tenant-Forfeiture. Where a lessee had forfeited his lease at law, but shewed reasonable ground for belief that he had a good defence in equity, the landlord was restrained from proceeding to execution at law until the hearing of the cause. Semble, that where a landlord is aware that a lease is or must be forfeited, and allows the tenant to go on spending money on the property, the landlord will be restrained from availing himself of the forfeiture at law. They further contended that the defendant had This was an appeal from a decision of Vice-Chan- full notice through his agent, of the plaintiffs' operacellor Kindersley, refusing a motion for an injunctions at the Upper Grange, and that it was inequitable The plaintiffs admitted that there had been a legal forfeiture, but contended that they were entitled to relief in equity, on the ground that tion. The plaintiffs, the North Staffordshire Steel and Iron Company, were the assignees of a lease of certain mines lying under a farm called Rushton Grange, in Staffordshire. The lease was granted by the defendant Lord Camoys at the latter end of 1863, and by it the mines in question were demised to one Martin for forty-four years, from the 25th March, 1864. The lease contained a covenant by the lessee for himself and his assigns, to erect within a year, at a suitable place, to be approved by the agent of the lessor, a powerful steam-engine for working and unwatering the mines, and also within the same time to mark out and begin sinking two shafts with a diameter of eleven feet each, suitable for being connected with the engine. There was a clause empowering the lessor, on the expiry or determination by forfeiture of the lease, to take possession of all the engines, &c. | employed upon the works without paying for them. First, the Upper Grange had been substituted for the Lower, with the approval of the defendant's agent. Secondly, the erection of a powerful engine at the Upper Grange within a year was prevented by inevitable accident, viz. by frost. for him to stand by and allow the plaintiffs to expend money in works which the defendant alleged were useless in saving a forfeiture of the lease. The Vice-Chancellor refused the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction to restrain the defendant from taking advantage of the legal forfeiture until the hearing of the cause, and the defendant had since commenced an action of ejectment against the plaintiffs, which was expected to be tried at the ensuing assizes. The order of the Vice-Chancellor was made on the 28th April, and the plaintiffs' bill had been since twice amended, and six new affidavits had been filed. Glasse and W. W. Mackeson, for the plaintiffs. Fleming and W. W. Cooper, for the defendant. Glasse, in reply. The following authorities were cited:-Dowell v. Dew (1 You. & C. C. C. 345); Job v. Banister (2 Kay & J. 382; 3 Jur., N. S., 93); Gregory v. Wilson (9 Sir J. L. KNIGHT BRUCE, L. J.-This interlocutory motion for an injunction is in one sense an appeal motion; it is also in one sense an original motion, for the bill has been twice amended, and six affidavits have been filed since the motion was heard by the Vice-Chancellor. I think it is by no means clear, that if the matter had been before the Vice-Chancellor as it has been placed before us, he would not have come to our conclusion. This is a bill by tenants. The landlord insists, and the tenants admit, that there has been a legal forfeiture of their lease. The tenants say they have an equitable defence. They admit the right of their landlord to recover at law. Now, before allowing the matter to go to law, where the tenants will be defenceless, this Court must be satisfied that the tenants have no right to an equitable defence; otherwise, before the case can be brought to a hearing, the tenants might be put out of possession, and their position might be seriously compromised. This is not the time to discuss the points raised by the tenants. All we are now called upon to determine is, whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the tenants have an equitable defence. I am not at all persuaded that the plaintiffs are right in their contention that there was a substitution,_ acquiesced in by the defendant, of the Upper for the Lower Grange. But I think the plaintiffs may possibly succeed in shewing a ground for the interference of this Court in respect of the defendant having encouraged them to lay out money upon the property, with the intention of taking advantage of the forfeiture. I think (though the plaintiffs' case may fail altogether at the hearing) that there is reasonable ground for argument on their side, and a fair possibility of success. The cause ought not, therefore, to be allowed to go to law. I think that, the plaintiffs undertaking to give judgment in the action as the Court shall direct, and to abide by such order as to damages as the Court shall make at the hearing, and further undertaking to speed the cause, the order of the Vice-Chancellor should be discharged, without prejudice to any question; the costs of both applications to be costs in the cause. Sir G. J. TURNER, L. J.—I agree with the form of order proposed by my learned brother. If the plaintiffs have any equitable defence, it should be tried at the hearing of the cause. The simple question now is, whether there is not a case which may fairly be tried at the hearing. The plaintiffs say, that the defendant's agent, having full knowledge that the lease was or would necessarily be forfeited, has stood by and allowed an expenditure to take place, and that it is unjust that the defendant should take advantage of the forfeiture. The lease contains a covenant, that the lessee shall, within a year, erect a powerful steamengine, on a site approved by the lessor's agent, for sinking shafts and working the mine, &c. After the lease had been executed, a site for the engine was agreed upon between the plaintiffs and the defendant's agent. The works for working the Lower Grange were began, but water came in and stopped further proceedings. Nothing had then been done towards erecting a powerful steam-engine." In these circumstances, a fault creating a barrier between the Upper and Lower Grange was discovered. On the 18th October the plaintiffs ceased the works at the Lower Grange, and began to sink shafts at the Upper Grange, where the beds crop out, and are consequently easier to work. Considerable expenditure took place at the Upper Grange, and some expenditure went on at the Lower Grange, in making workshops. The plaintiffs allege, that in March, 1865, they ordered the engine to be delivered for working the Upper Grange. They say that there was a substitution of the Upper for the Lower Grange; but I think it is doubtful whether they will be able to make out this. The question is, whether, independently of the question of substitution, there is not an equity on the part of the plaintiffs sufficient to enable them to say, that the landlord shall not exercise his legal rights. As at present advised, I am inclined to think that the landlord was not bound to tell the plaintiffs that their lease would be forfeited if they persisted in their neglect as to the Lower Grange. But though the landlord was not so obliged, and though the mere expenditure of money by the tenants will not give them an equity against the landlord, merely on the ground of such expenditure, yet if the landlord has encouraged them to go on with such expenditure, it may operate against him, so as to induce the Court to restrain him from taking advantage of his legal right. Now, the evidence shews, that Mr. Bate, the defendant's agent, knew that it would take six months to complete the works for the erection of the engine at the Lower Grange; and yet on the 24th October, 1864, after the plaintiffs had ceased their works at the Lower Grange, and were devoting all their energies to the Upper Grange, he writes to the plaintiffs' manager a letter, shewing that he clearly intended the plaintiffs should go on with their works at the Upper Grange, This was equivalent to telling the plaintiffs that their lease should continue to subsist. Again: in December, 1864, and in January, 1865, he writes to the manager of the plaintiffs to offer them a lease of the farms which comprised the mines that they wanted to work; and this when he knew that the lease under which they were working must necessarily be forfeited. What the effect of this conduct of Mr. Bate may be upon the position of the plaintiffs must be considered at the hearing of the cause. I think this is a proper case for staying the proceedings of the landlord. From the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor, I collect that his opinion went on the question of substitution. There has been material evidence given since his order was made, and our judgment proceeds on different grounds. Note for reference-Powell v. Thomas (6 Hare, 300). ROLLS COURT. BOLITHO V. HILLYAR.-Feb. 18. Will-Vested interest-Deed of arrangement-Married woman. Bequest to A. for life, and after her death to B. and C. or their children, in case of their decease. B. died in the ; lifetime of the tenant for life, leaving children:-Held, that B. took a vested interest, liable to be divested in the event which happened. Members of a family, one of whom was a married woman, executed a deed of arrangement for settling their rights in certain reversionary interests in personal estate. The married woman survived her husband, and died without having confirmed the deed:-Held, that she was not bound by the deed, and consequently that none of the other parties were bound. This cause came on, by adjournment from chambers, upon a statement of facts submitted for the opinion of the Court. Two questions were raised-first, as to the construction of the will of William Bennicke, the tes tator in the cause, which contained the following bequest:-"I give and bequeath the residue of my property in the funds to my dear wife Anne Lacey 15 Bennicke during her life; after which it is, in case I The testator had two brothers, who survived him, and one sister, Susannah Langdon, who died in his lifetime, leaving children who survived the testator. One of the brothers, Joseph Bennicke, died in the lifetime of the widow without having had any children. He left a will, by which he disposed of his reversionary interest in the testator's estates in favour of such of the children of his brother and sister as should survive the tenant for life. The other brother, James Bennicke, also died in the lifetime of the widow, leaving several children, and disposing by will of his reversionary interest in the testator's estate. The testator's widow died in 1862. The question submitted for the opinion of the Court was, whether James Bennicke took such a vested interest in the residue of the testator's property as enabled him to dispose of the same by his will, or whether he took only a vested interest, subject to be divested in the event which happened, namely, his decease, leaving children, before the death of the tenant for life. The second question arose upon a deed of family arrangement, dated the 10th March, 1821. By this deed the nine children of Susannah Langdon and James Bennicke mutually agreed to give up any benefit or right of survivorship which they might have or take in the testator's estate, under the will of Joseph Bennicke, by reason of their surviving the tenant for life. Three of the children of James Bennicke, and one of the children of Susannah Langdon, were married women. They were made parties to, and, with their respective husbands, joined in executing, the deed. One of the married women, Mrs. Lanyon, survived her husband, and confirmed the deed. She died in the lifetime of the tenant for life. Two others, Mrs. Hill and Mrs. Leach, died in the lifetime of their husbands, and before the tenant for life. The fourth, Mrs. Penfound, survived both her husband and the tenant for life. By her will, dated in 1858, reciting that she was entitled under the wills of her uncles William Bennicke and Joseph Bennicke, and her father James Bennicke, to a share of 65001., 34. per Cent. Consols, after the death of her aunt, the widow of the testator, who was then living, "Now, in case I happen to die in the lifetime of my said aunt," she gave and bequeathed her share unto and equally among her children living at her decease. Mrs. Penfound survived the tenant for life, and died in 1863, without having done any act, with the exception of her will, which could be construed into a confirmation of the deed of 1821. The question submitted to the Court was, whether the agreement of March, 1821, could be considered as binding the interests in the trust funds of all or any of the parties thereto, who were married women at the time of the execution thereof; and if the agreement ought not to be considered as binding the interest of all or any of such married women, whether it was valid and binding as against the other parties thereto. for life, leaving children, and consequently that no interest passed under his will. (2 Jarm. Wills, 272; Harvey v. M'Laughlin, 1 Price, 264; Salisbury v. Petty, 3 Hare, 86; Edwards v. Edwards, 15 Beav. 357; Pearson v. Stephen, 5 Bligh, 203; Bennett's Trusts, 3 Kay & J. 280). As to the effect of the deed of 1821, they contended that the will of Mrs. Penfound amounted to a confirmation of the agreement; and that if it did not bind her, it was binding upon the other parties to it. E. Lloyd, for other parties, contended that William Bennicke had a disposing power by will (Sturgess v. Pearson, 4 Mad. 411); and, secondly, that the agreement of 1821 was not confirmed by Mrs. Penfound, and consequently was not binding on any of the parties to it. (Peto v. Peto, 16 Sim. 690). Mackeson, for the executor of Mrs. Finch, on the same side, cited, upon the second point, Thomson v. Finch (22 Beav. 316) and Dart's V. & P. 12. Robson, for other parties in the same interest. Wickens, for the trustees, referred to Ive v. King (16 Beav. 46). Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-Upon the first point, the cases cited by the plaintiff are conclusive, that the share of the property given to James Bennicke was divested upon his death in favour of his children, and consequently that his will did not operate upon such share." Upon the second point, I am of opinion that the agreement entered into between the parties in 1821 is not binding; and I will explain the view which I take of the case. It is settled by the case of Peto v. Peto (16 Sim. 590), and similar cases, that if several persons enter into a mutual contract, the consideration of which is, that all parties to it shall be bound, then, if one of them repudiates the agreement, or if any of the parties, from any cause, cannot be bound, the whole agreement fails, and it cannot be considered as binding upon any of the parties to it. The Court cannot make a new agreement for the parties, separate and distinct from the agreement into which they entered. Assuming that Mrs. Penfound was not bound by the agreement-I will consider directly whether she has done anything to confirm it-it is clear I should be making a new agreement for the parties if I were to hold that the other parties to it were bound, although Mrs. Penfound was not. If it was intended that the parties sui juris should run the risk of the married women confirming the agreement, and that they should be bound whether the married women confirmed it or not, the agreement should have been so expressed; but that is not the agreement into which the parties entered. The next question is, whether Mrs. Penfound has done any act to confirm the agreement. I am of opinion she has not. When this lady became a feme sole she was entitled to elect whether she would be bound by the agreement or not; but it is the settled doctrine of the Court, that, in exercising her election, she must be acquainted with all the circumstances necessary to guide her election. When the Court is called upon to elect on behalf of an infant or a married woman, it looks into all the circumstances of the case, to see whether it is for the benefit of the infant or the married woman; and if it sees that it is not for their advantage, the Court will not elect that they shall be bound. In this case it was the interest of Mrs. Lanyon to be bound by the agreement, because she predeceased the tenant for life; and Southgate, Q. C., and Charles, for the plaintiff, con- for the same reason it was the interest of Mrs. Hill tended that James Bennicke took a vested interest and Mrs. Leach. But as Mrs. Penfound survived the under the will of the testator, subject to be divested tenant for life, it was not her interest to be bound by in the event of his dying in the lifetime of the tenant the agreement. She did no act to confirm the agree ment; it must be taken, therefore, that she repudiated it, because it was her interest to do so. It is contended that her will amounted to a confirmation; but in my opinion it did not. Her will merely amounts to this. "I choose to stand by the agreement, provided the tenant for life shall survive me," which she did not. She makes a certain disposition, "in case I happen to die in the lifetime of my said aunt;" and no doubt if she had done so, the agreement would have stood. I am of opinion that the agreement, not being binding upon Mrs. Penfound, is not binding upon any of the parties to it. The costs of this application to be costs in the cause. Re PHILBRICK'S SETTLEMENT.-March 27. to be in the hands of the executors, and not the trustees of the original settlement. C. Hall, for the trustees of the settlement.-By the exercise of the power of appointment the appointees became cestuis que trust under the settlement, and the funds ought to be paid direct to them, and administered by the trustees of the settlement. Except in certain events, the appointed funds were not assets to be administered by the executors; and until the recent act (23 Vict. c. 15, s. 4), no probate duty was payable in respect thereof. A married woman could not properly appoint executors. [He cited Platt v. Routh (6 M. & W. 756) and Drake v. The Attorney-General (10 Cl. & Fin. 257).] Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-It cannot be contended that a married woman, having a general power of appoint Appointment by married woman-Persons to execute the ment, has no further right than to name the appointees, trusts. que If the donee of a power appoints to the cestuis trust direct, the original trustees are the persons to A married woman having a general power of appointment carry out the intention of the donor; but by appoint by will over a fund vested in trustees, appointed the funding trustees, the donee of the power points out the in favour of specific persons, and nominated executors of her will:-Held, that the administration of the fund was vested in the executors, and not in the original trustees. Petition for payment out of court of moneys paid in under the Trustee Relief Act. By deed-poll, dated the 4th March, 1861, under the hand and seal of Mrs. Hannah Philbrick, a married woman, a trust fund was appointed, in pursuance of a general power, to trustees, upon certain trusts for the appointor for her life, and after her decease, upon trust to pay and apply the trust moneys to such person or persons, upon such trusts and for such intents and purposes as the appointor, notwithstanding coverture, should by will appoint; and in default of such appointment, upon certain trusts therein mentioned. persons who are to administer the trusts. Being a married woman, the donee of the power this case could not strictly appoint executors; and she made her will in pursuance of the power contained in the settlement, and for the purpose of carrying the settlement into effect, it must be taken that she ap pointed executors to execute the trusts of the property appointed by the will. The provisions of the stat. 23 Vict. c. 15, confirm me in the view I have taken of this case. Subject to the payment of the costs of this petition, the fund must be paid out to the petitioners as prayed. VICE-CHANCELLOR KINDERSLEY'S COURT. husband. Mrs. Philbrick, being under coverture, made her will, dated the 20th June, 1856, and which was expressed to be made in pursuance of the power contained Statute of Limitations-Marriage settlement-Bond of in the deed-poll, and thereby, after appointing specific portions of the trust funds, and giving a life interest in the residue to her husband, the testatrix appointed, gave, and bequeathed all the rest and residue of the said trust moneys unto her brother-inlaw, the petitioner, Thomas Conder, for his own absolute use, as some recompense for the trouble he might have in the executorship of her will; and she appointed her brother and the petitioner Henry Golding executors of her will. The testatrix died in 1864, and her will was proved by the petitioners. By a marriage settlement, personal estate belonging to the Adjourned summons.-The question upon this sum The trustees of the deed-poll paid the trust moneys into court under the Trustee Relief Act. By their affidavit, made upon payment into court, they stated their belief that the persons beneficially entitled to the trust funds were the appointees mentioned in the testator's will; but they submitted to the Court, whe-mons arose in the progress of a suit for the adminis ther such trust funds ought or ought not to be paid to the petitioners, as executors of the testatrix's will, to be by them applied in the ordinary course of adminis tration. The petitioners prayed for payment out of court of the trust funds, to be administered by them in accordance with the directions and appointment of the will of the testatrix, or that the same might be distributed and applied under the direction of the Court. Baggallay, Q. C., and Hardy, for the petitioners.By the terms of the will active duties are imposed upon the executors, and the appointment of the ultimate balance to the brother of the appointor, who is named one of the exccutors, as some recompense for the trouble he might have' in the executorship of the will, shewed that the administration of the whole fund was tration of the estates of L. F. Mills and of her husband H. Mills (of whose will she was sole executrix), and was, whether the present claimant, as administrate of the sole surviving obligee of a bond under the hand of H. Mills, dated the 29th January, 1818, was entitled to come in as a creditor against the estates. Previously to the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Mi the latter gave to her intended husband 4001, cash. and the former entered into the bond in question conditioned for the payment of 4001. and interest of the 29th July following, to J. Loftus and Bryan Mills, "or either of them, their or either of their executers or administrators, if required by them, or either of them, to do so." This sum, "when paid," was to be held on the trusts of a settlement of even date. Of this settlement the obligees of the bond were trustees, |