before them, that the funds of the trust are insufficient for the repair of the roads within any parish, &c., to inquire into the state and condition of the repairs within the same; and if after examination it shall appear to the justices necessary or expedient for the purposes of the said turnpike road so to do, then to adjudge and order what portion, if any, of the rate or assessment levied, or to be levied, &c., shall be paid by the parish surveyor, &c. to the commissioners or trustees." It cannot be contended that this language can have reference to repairs already done. [Cockburn, C. J.-It certainly seems difficult to say how the justices are to estimate the cost of work, part or the whole of which has been performed before information and examination.] [He also cited Reg. v. Preston (12 Q. B. 86; S. C., 12 Jur. 1068).] COCKBURN, C. J.-There is no weight in the two first objections, but upon the third it appears to me that this order is not warranted by the statute, and that the objection is fatal. Under sect. 1 of the act in question, the justices are to examine into the accounts of the trust and the state of repair of the roads, and then, if they think it expedient, to order a portion of the rate to be paid over to the trustees, "such money to be wholly laid out in the actual repairs of such part of the turnpike road as lies within the parish from which it is received." This seems necessarily to point only to repairs, which, upon examination by the justices, appear to them to be necessary; indeed, it seems impossible that it can have reference to repairs done before examination, of the nature, extent, and necessity of which the justices could form no opinion. This reading of the statute is neither an unreasonable nor an inconvenient one; on the contrary, I think much difficulty and mischief would arise if we were compelled to decide that the trustees might first repair the roads, and afterwards fall back upon the parish to supply the necessary funds, when the justices have no longer an opportunity of exercising their judgment. SHEE, J., concurred.-Order quashed. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. EASTER TERM. ship The Grenfells, including the usual collision clause whereby the said insurance clubs became insurers to the said Charles Thomas Mitcheson against the da mages which he might become liable to by reason of the said ship The Grenfells running down and coming in collision with and injuring any other ship; and whereas the said ship The Grenfells had during the continuance of the said insurance run down and comm in collision with and injured the said ship of the plan tiffs', called The Westward Ho, and the said ship The Grenfells had been thereupon arrested, and then con tinued under arrest, at the suit of the plaintiffs', by pro cess out of the High Court of Admiralty; and for that an agreement was thereupon mutually entered inte between the plaintiffs and the defendants and the said Charles Thomas Mitcheson, in the words and figues following-that is to say, an agreement made the 13th March, 1863, between George Heard, of Bideford in the county of Devon, shipowner, on behalf of hi self and William Heard, his co-partner (under the f of Heard Brothers), of the first part; Charles Thom Mitcheson, of Sunderland, in the county of Durha shipowner, of the second part; John Holman & Son of Topsham, in the said county of Devon, merchant on behalf of the Western Insurance Clubs of Topsha aforesaid, of the third part; and Charles Thomas Mit cheson, of Sunderland aforesaid, on behalf of the Sunderland Insurance Clubs, of the fourth part: whereas the said Heard Brothers are the owners of the ship Westward Ho, and the said Charles Thomas Mitches. the owner of the ship Grenfells, another ship, having run into and injured the said ship Westward Ho, the said ship Grenfells has been arrested, and now continues under arrest; and whereas, on the application of the said parties of the second, third, and fourth parts, the said Heard Brothers have agreed to release the said ship Grenfells on the terms and conditions hereinafter appearing. Now, these presents witness, and the parties to these presents mutually agree with each other, as follows:-The said Heard Brothers sali forthwith release the said ship Grenfells from the said arrest; and in the consideration thereof the said parties of the second, third, and fourth parts, some or on of them, shall forthwith pay, or cause to be paid. the said Heard Brothers the amount of damage whic the said ship Westward Ho has received from the sai collision, and that the whole of the said parties of the [Before ERLE, C. J., BYLES, KEATING, and SMITH, second, third, and fourth parts shall be, and are hereby JJ.] May 2. declared to be, in proportion to their respective HEARD and Another v. HOLMAN and Another.terests, liable to pay the same amount of damage Ship-Collision-Damage-Meaning of. The ship G. having come into collision with the ship W., the owner of the ship W. caused the ship G. to be arrested, but, in consideration of the insurers agreeing to pay to the owners the "amount of damage which the ship W. had received by the collision," her owners released the ship G. from arrest:-Held, that the word damage included not only the damage to the ship itself, but consequential damage, such as loss of freight and costs in the Admiralty Court. And per Byles, J., that by the word "ship" was meant owner of ship." and also the costs of the proceedings in the Court a Admiralty against the ship. And it is further agree between the said several parties hereto, that if a dispute or difference shall arise between the sa Heard Brothers and the said other parties hereto, any or either of them, with respect to the amount damages claimed by the said Heard Brothers by referred to the award and determination of Willia son of the said collision, and the said amount shall b Richard, Esq., of New City Chambers, Bishopsest street, London, whose decision shall be final and com clusive between the parties, and any party hereto my make these presents a rule of any one of her Majestył Courts at Westminster. Declaration, for that whereas before and at the time And the plaintiffs say, that afterwards they did of the making of the agreement hereinafter mentioned, lease the said ship The Grenfells according to the ter the plaintiff's were the owners of a certain ship called of the said agreement; and the plaintiffs say, tha The Westward Ho, and one Charles Thomas Mitcheson dispute then arose between the plaintiffs and the d was the owner of a certain ship called The Grenfells; fendants and the said other party, as to the amount of and the said Charles Thomas Mitcheson had effected damages claimed by the plaintiffs by reason of the with the defendants, as representing the Western In- said collision, and thereupon the said amount was surance Clubs of Topsham, and also with the Sunder-ferred, according to the terms of the said agreement land Insurance Clubs, represented by the said Charles to the award and determination of the said Willia Thomas Mitcheson himself, insurances upon the said Richards, who thereupon, after entertaining the said matter so referred to him, and the various allegations and evidence of the parties, duly made and published his award of and concerning the matter so referred to him according to the terms of the said agreement, and hereupon awarded and determined that the amount of damages which the plaintiffs were entitled to be aid by reason of the said collision, within the true atent and meaning of the said agreement, was a cerain large sum of money, to wit, the sum of 20731. s. 10d.; and the plaintiffs say that the said costs of he proceedings in the Court of Admiralty amounted > a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of 191. 158. ; and the plaintiffs further say, that all condions precedent were performed and fulfilled necessary > entitle the plaintiffs to be paid by the defendants large sum of money, being a proportionate part of he said several sums of money for which the defendits were liable, in proportion to their said interests, ad according to the terms of the agreement, amountg in the whole to the sum of 20927. 158. 11d.; and though the defendants have paid to the plaintiffs art of the said sum, yet they have neglected to pay e said residue, amounting to 519. Is. 2d., which ill remains due and unpaid. There was a count for oney had and received. The defendants pleaded eas traversing all the material allegations in the dearation, and a plea of accord and satisfaction. The laintiffs joined issue on these pleas. ERLE, C. J.-I am of opinion that this rule must be discharged. I think the meaning of the agreement is, that the plaintiffs shall recover all that they might have recovered in a Court of Admiralty, provided the sum insured was sufficient to cover the damage caused both by the collision and the detention. I do not think the word " damage" is limited to the injury sustained by the ship itself, but that it was intended to mean all the damage sustained by the plaintiffs by reason of the collision. The agreement, after reciting that the ship Grenfells had run into and injured the ship Wesward Ho, and that the ship Grenfells had been arrested, and was then under arrest, and that the plaintiffs had agreed to release the ship Grenfells on the terms and conditions in the said agreement mentioned, viz. that the plaintiffs would forthwith release the ship Grenfells if the defendants would forthwith pay to the plaintiffs the sum of 15007., and the further amount of damage which the ship Westward Ho had received by the said collision; and that in case of dispute, the question as to the amount of damage should be referred to the award and determination of one William Richards. The amount of damage was disputed, and was referred to the said William Richards, who awarded in all the sum of 20737. Os. 10d., being for damage to the ship itself, and for the detention of the ship and consequent loss of freight, and for the plaintiffs' costs in the Admiralty Court. It is said, that by At the trial, before Erle, C. J., at the sittings in the terms of the agreement the plaintiffs can only ondon after last Michaelmas Term, it appeared that claim the damage to the ship itself, because the words e plaintiffs were the owners of the ship Westward of the agreement are, "The amount of damage which io: that the defendants were the managers of a ma- the said ship Westward Ho has sustained from the ne insurance club at Topsham, in Devonshire: that a said collision;" and it is said that these words exclude sip called The Grenfells was insured in the defend- all consequential damage. I am, however, of opinion, nts' office in the sum of 20007.: that on the 21st Feb- that the word "damage," used in the agreement, cannary the ship Grenfells came into collision with The not be construed in such a restricted sense, but must Wesward Ho off Beachey Head: that the plaintiffs mean any damage which arose from the collision; and thereupon took proceedings in the High Court of Ad- the 17th rule of the defendants' association supports miralty, and caused the ship Grenfells to be arrested; this construction. That rule is, "That in case of but her owner being desirous at once to obtain her re- damage or loss by contact which any ship in this ease, applied to the defendants to make some arrange-association may do to others, this society shall be nent with the plaintiffs, in order to obtain her release, liable to contribute its proportion, but not beyond nd the defendants paid to the plaintiffs the sum of the sum insured, and also law costs given in any suit," 500% down as part payment, and entered into the &c. Now, this clearly shews that the word "damage" greement set out in the declaration: that the de- was intended to cover more than the injury to the endants did not agree as to the damage sustained ship itself. the ship Westward Ho, and the question was, as greed, referred to Mr. Richards, who awarded the I of 13371. 138. 6d. in respect of the collision: that e plaintiffs, however, made a further claim for the Cention of the ship Westward Ho during her repair, the further sum of 7351. 78. 4d. was awarded in Spect of the detention, which the defendants refused pay. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs the sum of 519l. 18. 2d. Leave was reserved to defendants to move to set aside the verdict, and 1 ter a nonsuit. Mellish, Q. C., obtained a rule accordingly. Lush, Q. C., and Watkins Williams now shewed use. The plaintiffs are entitled to retain the vert. They are certainly entitled to recover what they ould have obtained in a Court of Admiralty. This ust have been the intention of the parties. They yould not have agreed to release the ship on any other erms. Besides, this is the express language of the reement. The word "damage" must mean the daage they would have recovered in a Court of Adaralty. [They referred to Maclachlan's Law of Shipng, 285.] Mellish, Q. C., and T. Jones, in support of the rule.The word "damage" must be construed in a natural sense. It can only mean the injury done to the ship. The damage by reason of detention is not " damage" in the ordinary meaning of the word. BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think a good deal turns on the meaning to be put on the word " ship," as used in the agreement. If we were to put a literal construction on that word, we must hold that the plaintiffs can only recover for the injuries caused to the ship itself, and the plaintiffs could not recover the consequential damage arising from the collision; but I think when we look at the agreement, and read the recitals, it is clear what was the intention of the parties, and we must give effect to that intention. I think the word "ship," as used in the agreement, is to be construed "owner of ship." It is difficult sometimes to express what is meant. It is no rhetorical expression to speak of the "owner of a ship" as the "ship," just as we use the expression the " саbinet" for the ministers, who sit in the cabinet, and the "bar" for gentlemen who sit behind the bar. KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. We must look at all the surrounding circumstances; at the time this agreement was entered into, the ship had been arrested by process in the Court of Admiralty, and the plaintiffs might have recovered damages in that court, not only for the injury to the ship, but also for the loss of freight. Then the object of the agreement was to obtain the release of the ship, and it is very improbable that the plaintiffs would have parted with the security of the ship upon any other terms than those which they now seek to enforce; and By a policy of insurance plaintiffs' premises were insured against loss or damage by fire." An explosion of gunpowder at the distance of half a mile from the said premises, caused them to be so shaken, that the windows were broken, and other damage was sustained. In an action under the policy for the loss so occasioned-Held, that the loss was not a "damage by fire," within the meaning of the policy. This was an action on a policy of insurance against fire, and was brought to recover the sum of 20%., damage occasioned to the plaintiffs' premises, under the circumstances stated in the following case: 1. By a policy of insurance, bearing date the 17th April, 1862, for the consideration therein expressed, the defendants covenanted and agreed that, subject to the terms therein mentioned, which have been duly complied with on the part of the plaintiffs, the capital, stock, estate, and securities of the defendants should be subject and liable to pay, make good, and satisfy unto the plaintiffs, their heirs, executors, or administrators, such loss or damage as should or might be occasioned by fire to the property of the plaintiffs therein mentioned, and thereby insured accordingly, in each case respectively, the sum of 6001. 2. The premium is stated in the policy to be paid for the insurance of the property, mentioned in the policy" from loss or damage by fire, according to the exact tenor of the conditions and stipulations indorsed" on the policy. A copy of the said policy, and the condition indorsed accompanies, and is to be taken as a part of this case. 3. The 5th condition, indorsed on the policy, was as follows:-"That losses by lightning will be made good when the property insured by the corporation has been actually set on fire thereby, and burnt in consequence thereof." 4. The 8th condition, indorsed on the said policy, is as follows:-"That books of account, manuscripts, written securities, money, bank-notes, bills, stamps, and gunpowder will not be insured or comprehended in any insurance effected by or with this corporation, nor with any loss or damage in any case, or of any description, be made good when more than twentyfive pounds weight of gunpowder shall be deposited or kept on the premises." 5. On the 1st October, 1864, a large quantity of gunpowder in the gunpowder magazine of Messrs. Hall, at Erith, ignited and exploded, but from what cause is unknown, and the before-mentioned premises of the plaintiffs were thereby injured to the extent of 201. plosion of the gunpowder, nor was any part thereaf burnt, heated, or scorched by the explosion. The injury they sustained consisted in the shattering of the windows and window-frames, and the damaging of the structure generally by the atmospheric con cussion caused by the explosion. The question for the opinion of the Court is, whe ther the damage so caused to the plaintiffs' premises is a loss or damage insured against under the before mentioned policy. If the Court shall be of opinion in the affirmative then judgment shall be entered up for the plaint f for 201. and costs of suit. If the Court shall be opinion in the negative, the judgment of non pa with costs of defence, shall be entered up for th defendants. (Signed) J. HANNEN. (Signed) F. P. MAUDE Hannen (Lush, Q. C., with him), for the plaintiffs The defendants are liable, for the loss is a “loss damage by fire," within the meaning of the polic The plaintiffs contend that the damage is "by fire," it be occasioned in any manner by fire; and here t breaking of the windows was the direct result of # explosion. That the explosion of gunpowder was the contemplation of the parties is apparent from t clause relating to it in the policy. Where there been a fire in an adjoining house, and the house i sured has been damaged by the water used to exti guish the fire, the companies have always treated in jury of that kind as within their policies. The e plosion of gas in one house, damaging an adjoinin house, would, no doubt, be regarded by insuranc offices in a similar manner. The only difference il this case is, that the distance is greater. This is mercantile instrument, and must be so construed [He referred to Taunton v. The Royal Assurance (3 L. J., Ch., 406; 10 Jur., N. S., 291).] Maude, for the defendants.-The question is no whether, in some remote manner, the loss was cause by fire, but what, according to the policy, is the natur of the damage by fire insured against? It is cles that the policy contemplates actual injury by fin there must be the action of fire-a heating, burnin or scorching. The explosion here had no such effe on the plaintiffs' premises, the effect was a concussa and damage by the atmospheric disturbance. If st a loss is to be held within the policy, there will be limit to the liability of insurers. An earthquake, breaking of windows by the firing of guns at a revie an explosion causing the overflowing of water, discharge of missiles through the air, would then held to be "damage by fire." But these events can be said to be in the contemplation of parties to f policies, for the damage is only the consequence of result of fire. The authorities on this question are but cases on marine polices are analogous. (Gree Elmslie, Peake, 278; Ionides v. The Universal Mar Insurance Company, 14 C. B., N. S., 259: 10 Jur. N 18). In Marshall on Insurance, ed. 1823, p. 799, "book" on fire insurance (left out in subsequent ed tions), it is even said, that "in order to bring the le within the risk insured against, it must appear to bas been occasioned by actual ignition; and no dam occasioned by mere heat, however intense, will b within the policy;" and reference is made to the c of Austin v. Drewe (6 Taunt. 236). Hannen, in reply. ERLE, C. J.-I am of opinion that our judgm should be for the defendants. The question t 6. The plaintiffs' premises, which are rather more entirely, as the ground stated by Mr. Maude, what w than half a mile distant from the spot at which the the meaning of the parties under the contract? 1 explosion took place, were not set on fire by the ex-contract is to make good "such loss or damage as hould or might be occasioned by fire to the property "This indenture, made the 21th January, 1857, asured." On the construction of these words, it ap-between George King, cattle dealer, of the one part, ears to me that they do not apply to the damage ccasioned to the plaintiffs' premises, and for which rey seek to recover. This view is fortified by looking other clauses of the policy. The provisions in the ›licy with regard to lightning and gunpowder conmplate, and expressly provide, for the case of the struction of property by the action of lightning or npowder on the premises insured, but there is noing to shew that it was the intention of the insurer be liable for damage caused by lightning or gunwder operating in the first instance off the preses. I agree, therefore, that on the proper conaction of this contract, and taking the words in ir ordinary meaning, this is not a damage by fire which the defendants are liable. and Richard Read, brickmaker, of the other part: whereas George King stands indebted to Richard Read in the sum of 3007, as he, George King, doth hereby acknowledge; and whereas George King is possessed of household furniture and farming implements, to be hereby assigned for better securing the sum of 3001. owing by George King; and also, in consideration of 10s., George King doth hereby grant, bargain, sell, and assign unto Richard Read, &c. all the household furniture, plate, linen, china, glass, all the stock, cattle, horses, farming implements, crops, book-debts, and all other the personal estate and effects of George King, now being or hereafter to be, upon or about the dwelling-Louse, farm, and premises of George King, situate at Reedham, or elsewhere; and all the chattels real, and all the goods, chattels, and personal estate whatsoever of George King, whatsoever being, and whether in possession, reversion, remainder, or expectancy, and all securities therefor, and all the estate, rights, titles, interesis, term and terms of years, claim and demands whatsoever of George King therein and thereto, to hold the premises unto Richard Read, with full power to use his name, and act as the attorney in suing for the hereby assigned premises, &c. And it is hereby declared, that Richard Read, &c. shall stand possessed of the premises, upon trust to sell the same, and to stand possessed of the money to arise therefrom, upon trust (inter alia) to retain unto themselves 3007, with interest at 57. per cent., and then to pay the surplus, if any, unto George King. And it is hereby declared that every receipt of Richard Read shall be a valid discharge. And it is hereby further declared, that it shall be lawful for Richard Read, &c., or any other person or persons authorised by him or them, and either with or without any peace officer, to enter upon and take possession of all the chattels real hereby asized, or intended so to be, and therefrom to eject and remove George King, &c.; and also to enter upon any hereditaments and premises upon which any part of the goods, chattels, and personal estate hereby assigned may happen to be, and to take possession of such goods upon the trusts aforesaid; and that for the purpose of taking possession of such chattels, real and personal estate, as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for him or them to break open or remove any doors, &c., without being liable to any action for so doing, or for taking and continuing in possession of the said hereand, that Richard Read shall have full power to comditaments and premises. And it is hereby declared, WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. In these COURT OF EXCHEQUER. ram POLLOCK, C. B., MARTIN, BRAMWELL, | pound any chose in action hereby assigned or intended. to be. And George King covenants, that he &c. shall, on demand being made for the same, pay unto Richard Read, &c., the sum of 5007, sterling, with interest thereupon at the rate of 51. per cent. And further, that in ELDING and Others, Assignees, v. READ.-May 30. Bill of sale-After-acquired property. *ill of sale purporting to convey a right to after-acred property, gives only an equitable right, which can case the said suma of 3001. and interest shall not be ly be enforced, by taking possession, after a demand. paid to Richard Read, on demand being made for the This was an action in trover, to which the defendant Same as aforesaid, it hell be lawful for Richard Read, ded not guilty, and not possessed. The cause was ke., or any of them, or any person or persons authoat the Norfolk Spring Assizes, before Cockburn, rised by them, or any of them, at any time or times J., and a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject thereafter, and from time to time until the said sum special case to be submitted to the Court. of 30, and interest shall be fully paid and satisfied, The special case showed the following state of facts: to enter, by any ways and means he or they may think The plaintiffs are the assignees of G. K. Rendle-proper, into and upon all and every the hereditaments who before and at the time of his bankruptcy aded and carried on the business of a grocer and per, at Reedham, in Norfolk. In January, 1857, bankrupt was carrying on the business of a cattle aler at Reedham, under the name of George King, id being indebted to the defendant to the amount of NO!.. on the 21th of that month, executed to the dedant a bill of sale, under seal, in the following and premises, with the appurtenances which may from time to time be in the occupation of George King, or any part thereof, and for that purpose, if needful, to break open any outer or other door, and then and there distrain the goods and chattels there found, for the said sum of 3007. and interest; and if such and intert, together with the cost of taking and leping such distress, shall not be paid within one day after the making thereof, it shall be law ful for the said Richard Read, &c., to sell such goods and chattels by appraisement, &c.; and for that purpose to keep possession of the premises for any time not exceeding twenty-one days, in order that, by means of such distress and sale, the said sum of 3007., and all interest to become due, and all costs of any distress or distresses, may be fully paid and satisfied to Richard Read, &c. And it is hereby expressly declared and agreed between the said parties, that Richard Read, &c. may plead these presents as a leave and license, or a general release in bar of any action which may be brought for breaking into the premises aforesaid for distraining and selling the goods and chattels there found. And it is hereby declared and agreed, that until the said Richard Read, &c. shall think fit to take possession of the said assigned premises, it shall be lawful for the said George King to retain possession thereof." This bill of sale was duly filed in the Queen's Bench office on the 9th February, 1857. In April next after the execution of the bill of sale, the bankrupt commenced the trade of a grocer and general shopkeeper at Reedhay, and from time to time purchased goods in the way of his trade, and sold some of the same, and so on from time to time until the 8th January, 1862, when he was in possession of goods constituting his stock-in-trade in his business, and of the horse and gig hereinafter mentioned. The whole of such stock-in-trade was purchased after the execution of the bill of sale. On the 8th January all the bankrupt's goods and chattels were taken possession of and dealt with by the defendant as hereinafter mentioned; and in respect of these acts of the defendant this action has been brought. About the 8th January, 1862, Aldred, an auctioneer, was authorised by the defendant to distrain the furniture, goods, chattels, and effects of the bankrupt in default of payment of the sum of 2457. 178. 6d., due from him to the defendant, by virtue of the bill of sale aforesaid. On the said 8th January, 1862, Aldred proceeded to the dwelling-house and premises occupied by the bankrupt in Reedham, where he resided, and upon inquiry Aldred was informed that the bankrupt was from home. Aldred then stated to the wife of the bankrupt that he was authorised (as the fact was) to demand and receive payment of the sum of 245l. 17s. 6d., due from her husband to the defendant, otherwise he should have to put into effect the provisions of the bill of sale; and he made a formal demand of the amount to the wife of the bankrupt, but the same remained unsatisfied; and Aldred immediately distrained the furniture, goods, chattels, and effects found upon the premises of the bankrupt, and on the 14th of the same month sold the same by public auction. The whole of such goods and chattels were of the value of 971. 28.; and such part of the last-mentioned goods and chattels as were purchased by the bankrupt after the giving of the bill of sale, were of the value of 971. 178. 2d. On the same 8th January the defendant entered certain livery stables and premises at Great Yarmouth, not in the occupation of the bankrupt, and seized and took possession of a horse and gig of the bankrupt standing there at livery, and sold the same on the 28th of the same month of January. The horse and gig had been purchased by the bankrupt after the giving of the bill of sale, and were of the value of 167. On the 13th of the same month the bankrupt was adjudicated a bankrupt on his own petition; and on the 14th January notice of the filing of the petition was given to the auctioneer. On the 28th January, 1862, the plaintiffs were duly appointed creditors' assignees of the estate and effects of the bankrupt. The case was argued by O'Malley, for the plaintiff (citing Bright v. Nort 32 L. J., Q. B., 30), and by Keane, contra (citing Holroyd v. Marshall, 30 H.1 C. 191). POLLOCK, C. B.-I am of opinion that our ju ment should be for the plaintiffs. Although the s of sale is not void, its operation is not that contende for by Mr. Keane. The rights contended for a claimed in respect of property not existing in spe at the time of the assignment. No man can by an bill of sale assign property not existing in spee There is no such thing known to the law as a pr phetic conveyance. The defendant, therefore, d not acquire the right contended for in respect to t after-acquired property. And this is not inconsiste with Holroyd v. Marshall. MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. There a two species of property assigned in this bill of sale first, "All the household furniture, and all the sto cattle, horses, and all other the personal estate of i said George King, being, or hereafter to be, upon about the dwelling-house of the said George Ki at Reedham or elsewhere." I think that the we "hereafter to be" are null. But assuming them not be so, there would then be an assignment of aft acquired property; and according to the judgment Lord Chelmsford in the case of Holroyd v. Mursk an assignment of future property would only give equitable right to it-would not give the assignee actual equitable estate, but only an executory rig and no bill for specific performance could be broug by the assignee, for he has only an incomplete eq table right, unless the goods are not in possession consent of the parties. A bill for specific performan only lies for specific goods. The operation, therefor of the first part of the deed was to give the proper in the existing goods only. We now pass on to f second part of the deed, whereby it is declared, that shall be lawful for Read, or any other person authorit by him, to enter upon, and continue in possession the premises where the chattels happen to be &c. T bankrupt meant to give absolute dominion to the fendant; and this is a power to take goods in manner pointed out. But I think that refers to which are the subject of assignment at common In respect to the next clause, I agree that it canno said that any demand has been made upon King, that it is not sufficient that a demand is made to wife. In the succeeding clause the word "distram improperly used; they ought not to have said train," but merely "take possession of the go the creditor to enter on the premises, and take after-acquired goods. If the demand had pro been made, he might have done so; but that state things had never arisen. The creditor never even equitable title in the goods, and the Court of cery would not grant a bill of special performan such a case. The creditor was never in a positi execute the power contained in the deed, never ha made a demand. There is no beneficial interest nature to bring it within the decision of Heir Marshall, which is clearly distinguishable from present case. BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. gig was not on the premises at the time, and th fore could not be seized. As to the residue of after-acquired property, the creditor had no p to seize it, as he never asked King for the me but he says he asked the wife. Now, making mand upon the wife is not enough. Mr. Keane r on the earlier clause in the deed to shew that plaintiffs have not any title to any of the after quired property of the bankrupt, as that clause veys everything the bankrupt had, and everything |