settlement was intended only to serve as a reason or occasion for the institution of this suit, the object of which is to bastardise the infant. Secondly, the refusal of the trustee, on which the suit pretends to be instituted, was wholly collusive and unreal. Thirdly, there is no real controversy, for there is no opposition of interest. The infant, who alone has a contrary interest under the trust to that of the plaintiff, by her counsel very properly disclaims and repudiates all right and title under the settlement. Fourthly, the suit pretends and affects to be instituted for the purpose of determining the alleged right or claim of the infant defendant to this small trust property, but in reality it is manufactured for the purpose of compelling the present trial, in an indirect way, of a most important question affecting the title to large estates, namely, the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the infant. It is wholly contrary to the principles which govern the administration of justice, that any person should be permitted by means of an unreal trust, designed and created for the purpose, to enforce another person as defendant in a collusive suit to try prematurely and against his will an important right or title which has not yet arisen and come into possession, so as to admit of its being brought forward and prosecuted in the regular and legitimate manner. I approve, therefore, of the Vice-Chancellor's decision in the present case, but I cannot at all assent to the principles or reasoning on which his former decision in the case of Gurney v. Gurney was founded.-Appeal dismissed, with costs.

AUSTIN V. AUSTIN.-Re AUSTIN.-May 25 and 27. Infant-Guardianship-Custody-Religious education. In the case of a female child, born in 1862, who had been baptised into the Roman Catholic Church, whose father, a Catholic, had since died, and whose mother, a Protestant, had married a second husband, also a Protestant; the Court refused to associate the child's uncle (a Catholic) with the Protestant mother, as co-guardians; and appointed the mother, her husband, and another Protestant relation (the husband of the child's maternal aunt), co-guardians of the child until the age of seven years; but accompanied the order with a declaration, that the child ought, when capable of receiving religious instruction, to be brought up in the Roman Catholic faith; and directed that when the infant should attain the age of seven, application should be made to the Court respecting its guardianship, education, and religious instruction.

This was an appeal, on motion, from an order made by his Honor the Master of the Rolls on two adjourned

summonses.

The question was as to the appointment of guardians to an infant child, born in 1862, the daughter of Mr. Austin, a Catholic, and Ellen Austin, his wife, a Protestant. The child was baptised at a Roman Catholic chapel, and was alleged to be in a delicate state of health. The father afterwards died, and the mother had since married Mr. Seager, a Protestant.

The guardianship was claimed by Mr. John Austin, a brother of the child's father, and a Catholic, who took out a summons for the appointment of himself as guardian. The other summons was taken out by Mrs. Seager, the child's mother, with a similar object.

Further facts relating to the case will be found in the previous report, ante, p. 101.

The Master of the Rolls refused to take the child from the custody of its mother; and appointed the mother and a gentleman named Wood, the husband of Mrs. Seager's sister, joint guardians. His Honor further declined to make any order at present as to

the religious education of the child, but reserved to himself the right of doing so at a future day.

The Attorney-General (Sir R. Palmer, Q. C.), Bag gallay, Q. C., and Bagshawe supported the appeal on behalf of Mr. John Austin. They did not seek to have the child removed from the mother's custody, but asked that Mr. John Austin should be associated with the mother as co-guardian; on the ground that, according to the rule of the Court, wards were to be brought up in the religious faith of the father, and, in order to secure that result, it was desirable there should be a Catholic co-guardian. [They cited Tall v. The Earl of Shrewsbury (4 My. & C. 672); Re North (11 Jur. 7); Hunt v. Hunt (2 Con. & L. 373); Witty v. Marshall (1 Y. & C. C. C. 68); Houston v. Houston (8 De G., Mac., & G. 760); Davis v. Davis (10 Weekly Rep. 245); and Re Byng (before the Master of the Rolls, 1859, unreported).]

At the conclusion of the argument, the Lord Chancellor said he was indisposed to associate together persons of different religious persuasions as guardians of the child, inasmuch as that might not conduce to its welfare; but he felt inclined to appoint Mr. and Mrs. Seager and Mr. Wood joint guardians, if they were not unwilling to act. At the same time, he thought it was due to the father, and due to the principles of the Court, that the order should be prefaced by a declaration, that it was the duty of the Court and of its officers, the guardians, to take care that the child was brought up in the Roman Catholic faith.

Sir H. Cairns, Q. C., Selwyn, Q. C., and Kay opposed the making of any declaration which would fetter the discretion of the Court in years to come, and injure the child, by harassing the mother in the discharge of her maternal duties.

LORD CHANCELLOR.-The law of this country enables the father to appoint the guardians of his infant child, and thereby gives the father the power, both directly and through the selection of guardians, to determine the character of the religious education of the child. This Court assumes the parental duty; it is bound, therefore, to fulfil it in the manner in which it has a right to assume the father himself would have discharged it. Hence it follows, that where there is a clear proof with regard to the particular religions persuasion of the father-that being Christian-it the duty of the Court to take care that the child is brought up in that religious faith in which it assumes the father would have educated it. It is of course, with regard to an infant of tender years, an idle thing to lay down now a scheme of religious instruction. The natural physical well-being of the child is the thing more to be cared for in the tender years of infancy. The physical well-being of the child is, by every law of nature, that which is best cared for, and best secured by the superintendence and the natural affection of the mother. Therefore, on the present occasion, I do not entertain the thought of giving any directions touching religious education. I find the physical well-being of the child demands from me that the child should be left under the care of a Protestant mother, and under the care of other persons to be associated with her, in order that the Court may have complete security over the child; and, therefore. I associate with the mother persons of the same feeling and opinions as herself, in order to prevent that interference during tender infancy, which undoubtedly would not tend to the benefit of the child, and migh produce an amount of discord and contention which would interfere very greatly with the comfort of the child itself. But inasmuch as I depart from the general principle, in order to secure, during these tender years, what I deem to be essential for the child, I am most desirous to insert in the order a declaration of

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the reasons why I depart from the general rule, and that the order shall vindicate the principle, and lay that down as the rule which is to be resorted to hereafter when the child is capable of receiving a religious education. I do not make an order applicable to a future state of things, or without necessity. I make an order which is applicable to a present state of things, and, inasmuch as I am handing the child over to Protestant guardians, I feel it right to state the reasons of my so doing, and to prevent my having done this being perverted hereafter into an argument that the Court intended to decide the question of what ought to be the rule for the religious education of the child. Therefore, the declaration is dictated by the very form of the order; it is not a future declaration, or one that can be affected by future circumstances; but it is a declaration which the Court requires the order should have, in order that its own ratio decidendi may be manifested by the order itself, and that the order may not be perverted hereafter into a ground for unfounded contention. It is upon these principles that I propose to declare that, it appearing to this Court that the father of the infant was a member of the Roman Catholic Church at the time of his marriage with Ellen Austin, now Ellen Seager, that he was also a member of the Roman Catholic Church at the time of the birth and of the baptism of the child, that the child was baptised into the Roman Catholic Church, and that the father continued a member of the same church down to and at the time of his death; having regard to these circumstances, the Court doth declare that the child ought to be brought up in, and educated, when capable of receiving religious instruction, as a member of, the Roman Catholic Church; but having regard to the tender age of the child, and to the condition of its health, the Court deems it requisite that the child should continue under the care of the mother, and of the persons to be associated with the mother, in order to secure the welfare of the child, and the control of this Court over the condition of the child. The Court, therefore, doth, until the child shall attain age of seven years, appoint the mother, the husband of the mother, and the gentleman who has been already appointed, to act as guardians of the child. The Court doth direct, that when the child shall attain the age of seven years, application shall be made to the Court respecting the guardianship, the education, and the religious instruction of the child, with liberty, however, to any party interested to apply in the meantime; and any further usual directions in the order to be made; and that the Master of the Rolls' order is to be varied, so far as it may become necessary, by the introduction of the form of words in which I have expressed my present order.

the

The costs of the suit were, by consent, paid by the appellants.

Note for reference-2 Set. Dec. 716.

tiff, now applied, that the defendants might be restrained from taking possession until an appeal to the House of Lords, which the plaintiff intended to present, had been decided. The Court would not allow the subject-matter of the suit to be destroyed until the question was decided. There is a reasonable ground for appeal, and the plaintiff intends to prosecute the appeal as speedily as possible [Gloucester v. Wood (1 Ph.493) and Garcias v. Ricardo (Id.498) were cited.]]

Sir R. Palmer, A. G., Sir H. Cairns, Bristowe, and Swanston appeared on the other side.

Sir J. L. KNIGHT BRUCE, L. J., said-My impression is, that the Lord Justice seems not unwilling that this matter should stand in the paper, to be disposed of here as far as we can dispose of it, next week, and then we shall be informed as to what has been done. I do not make any promise, but we shall expect a very good account of the progress in the meantime. Sir G. J. TURNER, L. J.-I do not object, but it must not be at all understood that we intend to stay the defendants.

June 29.—Rolt and Bagshawe renewed the application, and read an affidavit shewing what had been doue in the way of prosecuting the appeal, and that the committee of the House of Lords had declined to stay the proceedings pending the appeal, expressing their opinion, that any application must be made to the Lords Justices.

Sir R. Palmer, A. G., Jessel, and Bristowe, for the Metropolitan Railway Company.

Swanston (Sir H. Cairns absent), for the corporation, said that their Lordships, having dismissed the bill, had no longer any jurisdiction. Even when a decree has been made, as in Topham v. Portland (11 Weekly Rep. 813), the applicant has been made to pay the costs. This would be a method of obtaining an injunction, though it had been refused. Rolt, in reply.

Sir J. L. KNIGHT BRUCE, L. J.-I think this is a case in which an injunction cannot be granted.

Sir G. J. TURNER, L. J.-I am of opinion that the bill in this case having been dismissed, we cannot grant this injunction. The plaintiff, having an intention to appeal to the House of Lords, ought to have asked that the decree might be so framed as to maintain the jurisdiction of the Court pending the appeal. He has not done so, and our jurisdiction is gone. The injunction must be refused.

Swanston asked for costs, and cited Topham v. Portland (11 Weekly Rep. 813).

Sir J. L. KNIGHT BRUCE, L. J.-This case does not seem to be on the same footing as Topham v. Portland. I am not disposed to give costs.

Sir G. J. TURNER, L. J.-There will be no order on the application.

Note for reference-Sid. Smith's Ch. Prac. 692.

COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. GALLOWAY U. MAYOR, &C. OF LONDON.-May 31, and June 1 and 29.

Practice-Appeal-Injunction. Where a bill seeking an injunction has been dismissed, the Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the defendant during the plaintiff's appeal to the House of Lords.

The bill in this case sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from taking the property of the plaintiff, under the compulsory powers of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, and had been dismissed, as reported ante, p. 474.

Rolt, Selwyn, and Bagshawe, on behalf of the plain

VICE-CHANCELLOR KINDERSLEY'S COURT. BEEDEN V. MAJOR.-June 12, 13, and 14. Stock-Purchase in name of stranger—Trustee—Intention-Acts of person in loco parentis. A feme sole purchased 1000l. Consols in the name of her niece, and informing her of the fact, and that she intended this sum should be for her benefit, procured her to execute a power of attorney to enable the aunt to transfer the stock, and to receive the dividends:-Held, that a trust was well created for the benefit of the niece after her aunt's death.

The aunt, by her will, bequeathed to the same niece an an

nuity of 301.; and the facts not establishing a parental or quasi parental relationship between the partiesHeld, that the niece was entitled both to the 1000l. and to the annuity.

Motion for decree.-This was an administration suit by a husband, claiming, either in his own right or as administrator or executor of his wife, to be entitled to a sum of 1000l. Consols, moneys of the wife, and which had been by her invested in the name of her niece, the defendant Mary Major, subject to a power of attorney from the defendant Major to the wife to receive the dividends and transfer the principal.

The plaintiff and his late wife were married in 1856, and shortly before their marriage a sum of 20001. Consols, railway stock, Government annuities, and other like property was settled, as to the income, to the wife Mary Beecher for life, and at her death the capital on uses as she should by deed or will appoint. The former power was unexercised, but by her will, in 1860, Mrs. Beecher gave a life annuity of 30l. to the defendant Mary Major for her separate use; a like annuity of 201. to H. Stone, another niece; and a like annuity of 100l. to the plaintiff, her husband, and directed that after his death her residuary estate should be divided between her two brothers, with remainder to their children, the defendant Major being one.

In July, 1861, Mrs. Beecher bought 4007. Consols, and placed it in the name of H. Stone, from whom she contemporaneously procured the execution of a power of attorney, in the usual form, for transfer of the stock and receipt of the dividends. H. Stone was not informed of this transfer of stock into her name, nor was she aware of the purport of the power of attorney. The dividends were received by the aunt.

In February, 1864, Mrs. Beecher bought 6001. Consols, and at the same time transferred the 400l. which had been standing in the name of H. Stone, and placed the whole sum of 1000l. Consols in the name of Mary Major. Shortly after the date of this transaction Mrs. Beecher wrote to Mary Major, stating that she had placed the 10007. in her niece's name, and that she intended her to have it for herself only, though the writer was to have the interest during her life. Enclosed was a power of attorney as in the previous case, which Mary Major was directed to sign, and to have it attested by the master and mistress with whom she was in service. She was also directed to destroy the letter, and, acting by her master's advice, she did so. Her evidence and that of her master were, therefore, admitted to prove its contents.

Mrs. Beecher died in the month of March following, having in the interval received one payment of dividends on the 10007. stock.

Evidence was brought forward to establish a parental relationship between the aunt and niece, but, in the opinion of the Court, this attempt failed. The judgment, however, did not turn on this point.

Hinde Palmer, Q. C., and C. J. Swanston, for Mary Major.-This is distinguished from the cases cited, because a valid trust in favour of Mary Major was created. (Vanderberg v. Palmer, 4 Kay & J. 204). If a trust is created, it will be supported, though voluntary, even as against creditors. (Barrack v. M'Culloch, 3 Kay & J. 110). It is not necessary to shew that Mrs. Beecher had acted strictly in loco parentis (George v. The Bank of England, 7 Price, 676; Currant v. Jago, 1 Coll. 261); at any rate, the existence of that relationship is only useful in support of the presumption of intention; such a trust has been maintained where there was only a collateral relationship. (Kilpin v. Kilpin, 1 My. & K. 520). A feme sole can put herself in loco parentis. (Holt v. Frederick, 2 P. Wms. 356; Re De Visme, 12 Weekly Rep. 140). There is enough to shew an intention to create a trust for the benefit of Mary Major, the settlor reserving to herself the present beneficial enjoyment, as in Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (2 Beav. 447).

Schomberg, in reply.

Sir R. T. KINDERSLEY, V. C.-The question here is, who is entitled to the 1000l. Consols invested by Mrs. Beecher in the name of Mary Major.

On the part of this defendant, the cases that have been referred to establish the proposition, that the Court will follow the intention of the settlor of the fund.

I think that some of the cases which have been cited have little immediate bearing on the case before me, namely, those where there is a voluntary transfer of stock to A. B., no benefit being intended for him, but the contention being, that he is a trustee for third persons. The question here is, whether there is a trust to the settlor. For the purpose of arriving at the intention of the settlor, the Court has admitted certain presumptions as indications of such intention. One is, that on a purchase of stock by A. in the name of B., without any more, the stock belongs to A., who paid for it. But if B. is A.'s child, the law presumes that the purchase is intended as an advancement. To rebut this presumption, however, it is sufficient that the purchaser of the stock should say that it is to be for the benefit of another; but this must be clearly expressed.

So far as this case depends on the point contended for, that Mrs. Beecher had placed herself in loco parentis to Mary Major, the defendant has failed. Then, is there any declaration of trust as to the transfer of the stock? No such document is brought forward, and if there had not been a sufficient explana tion of the grounds for destroying Mrs. Beccher's letter, this would have gone far against Mary Major's case. But its destruction has been accounted for in such a way as to warrant the Court in receiving se condary evidence of its contents. Both Mary Major and her master, Colonel Crofton, agree that the letter stated the transfer of the stock into Mary Major's name, and Mrs. Beecher's intention that it should be for her benefit. The question is, whether this is evidence sufficient to countervail the implication arising from the fact that the power of attorney executed at the same time, extended to the transfer of the stock as well as to the receipt of dividends. The natural inference from this would be, that Mrs. Beecher intended to retain the power of dealing as she pleased with the fund. In Prankerd v. Prankerd not only did the testator retain the ownership of the copyhold by surrendering it to the use of her will, but there was no declaration of an intention to benefit his son.

had been a declaration of trust, subject to a power of revocation. The mere retaining the power of revocation would not destroy the trust if the power was not exercised, and, therefore, it seems to me that you have, on the one hand, the declaration of benefit, and though on the other, there is an act indicating ownership, by the letter of attorney, it does not appear to me that the case is governed by Prankerd v. Prankerd. Under the circumstances, I can only come to the conclusion, that the letter proves an intention to give a benefit to Mary Major to the extent of the capital sum of 10007. Consols, and that the transfer was made into her name for the purpose of carrying out that intention. All Mrs. Beecher did by the power was to retain a right to receive the dividends, and also a right, which she did not exercise, to revoke the gift. There must, therefore, be a declaration that Mary Major is entitled to the 10007. Consols, and the annuity of 301.

Note for reference-1 Wh. & Tud. L. C., Eq., 165.

VICE-CHANCELLOR STUART'S COURT. MOORE v. BARBER.-June 26. Husband and wife-Divorce à mensâ et thoro-Savings from alimony.

A married woman, divorced à mensâ et thoro, bequeathed the savings of alimony by will:-Held, that the legatee vas entitled to such bequest, to the exclusion of the surviving husband.

Bill for the administration of the personal estate of Ann Wilson, the testatrix in the cause, and for the payment to the plaintiff of the whole of the clear residue. The testatrix, who was the wife of John Wilson, of Pershore, but was living separate and apart from her husband, by virtue of a sentence of divorce à menså et thoro, by her will, dated the 28th May, 1859, after reciting that there had been allotted to her, by a decree in the Court of Arches, made in a suit instituted by herself against her husband, the sum of 3501. per annum, by way of permanent alimony, payable to her by four equal quarterly instalments during the joint lives of herself and her husband, and that she had then belonging to her moneys and effects, which consisted of, or had been purchased with, savings out of her permanent alimony, gave and bequeathed certain specific and pecuniary legacies, and all arrears of alimony, and all such moneys as consisted of savings out of her permanent alimony as she should be possessed of at the time of her decease, together with all the residue of her personal estate and effects, unto the plaintiff, her executors and administrators, subject to the payment of her just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and to the legacy duties upon the specific bequests; and she appointed the defendant executor of her will.

the income to which she was entitled for her separate use, and which the defendant had possessed himself of, and had neglected to pay or transfer the residue to the plaintiff, alleging that he was unable to do so by reason of some adverse claim.

At the hearing of the cause on the 19th December, 1863, the plaintiff undertook to serve John Wilson, the husband of the testatrix, with notice of the decree, and the usual administration decree was made. On the 24th June, 1864, on the application of John Wilson, who had obtained leave to attend the proceedings in the suit, it was ordered that, in addition to the accounts and inquiries directed by the decree, there should be "an inquiry what part of the personal estate of the testatrix consisted of savings from her alimony, and of the accumulations thereof."

The chief clerk certified, as the result of his inquiry, under the order of June, 1864, that the estate of the testatrix consisted of 1650l. 15s. 5d., 31. per Cent. Annuities, which constituted savings from alimony, and 3661. 58. 3d. from the separate estate, and of 170l. 12s. cash, savings from alimony, and 417. 17s. from sepa

rate estate.

Bacon, Q. C., and Freeman, for the plaintiff, stated the facts, and submitted that she was entitled to the whole of the residue of the testatrix's estate. [They were stopped by the Court.]

Malins, Q. C., and Fisher, for the husband, admitted that a married woman had a testamentary power over

her separate estate, and the savings therefrom; but these savings from alimony were not separate estate. The husband was directed to make his wife an allowance fixed by the Court at 350l. a year, in order that she might be supported and maintained. The Court would not have allowed so large a sum if it had known that, as was the fact, a lesser sum would have been sufficient. The alimony was given to the wife for her own support, and not that she might support her friends, and give away the savings out of it to strangers. The Court would not have given the wife more than 501. a year, if that sum had been sufficient to enable her to live. Alimony was payable only during the life of the wife, and the moment she died it ceased, and the savings belonged to the husband. The husband had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court, without being made a party to the suit, but if it were necessary he would file a bill for the purpose of establishing his right to this fund.

Sir J. STUART, V. C.-The bill is filed by the sole residuary legatce against the executor of the will, and I think that as the husband has come in under the decree to establish his claim, I can in a regular manner decide the question.

Springall Thompson appeared for the defendant.

The following cases were cited during the arguments:-Malony v. Kennedy (10 Sim. 254); Messenger v. Clarke (5 Exch. 388); Digby v. Howard (4 Sim. 588; S. C., on app., Howard v. Digby, 2 Cl. & Fin. 637); Brooke v. Brooke (25 Beav. 342); Barrach v. McCulloch (3 Kay & J. 110); Stones v. Cook (7 Sim. 22); and Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere (8 Sim. 315).

it is most extraordinary that the husband should do so, because he had, by a decree of the Ecclesiastical Court, been not only shorn of his marital rights, but

had been mulcted in the costs of that suit, by a decree which compelled him to pay an annual sum of money to the wife. When she is dead, the husband appears here in this case. He obtains an order to come in under the decree for administration, and he claims, in his marital right, all that his wife had saved from her permanent alimony.

There seems a contradiction in terms in the fact of his making such a claim.

No doubt that, as the counsel who have supported the claim of the husband have said, he remained the husband, as it was only a divorce à mensâ et thoro, and that he was entitled in his marital right to become her legal personal representative. If he was so entitled, why he has not made himself her legal personal representative I cannot understand, as in that capacity he could have dealt with his wife's assets. But here is a will unimpeached and unimpeachable, by which the wife has disposed of all her property, including that which she had acquired by the highest of all rights a decree of a court of law, and which was pronounced in derogation of the husband's marital right. Then, upon what intelligible principle does there remain a right in the husband to these savings from the alimony, and to deal with them as his own? It is said that this case is like that of Digby v. Howard (4 Sim. 588), where it is said, that if a husband be ordered to pay money for a particular purpose, and that purpose does not arise, the Court will consider that the marital right has remained attached to the property which was directed to be so applied. Now, what was the position of the Duchess of Norfolk? She was a lunatic lady entitled to a large sum by way of pin-money, which had not been paid, and a bill was filed by her legal personal representative, who claimed the money upon a ground which was perfectly intelligible, so far as it went; and it was thisthat according to the course of decisions in this court as to the separate property of a wife, the husband, if he has not paid what is due to his wife in respect of her separate property, is held to be entitled to keep it, upon the assumption that she had consented to his retaining it. No one can doubt, that if the wife chose to demand payment, she could have got her money; and therefore, it was said, that by her not doing so, she consented to give it up. But in the case of the Duchess of Norfolk, the presumption of consent could not have arisen, as she was not in a condition to consent to anything. That view was entertained by the Vice-Chancellor of England, and he directed an account of the arrears. But when his decree came to be examined in the House of Lords in Howard v. Digby (2 Cl. & Fin. 634), another principle was found to intervene; and it was this that if a trust be created for a purpose which wholly fails, the Court will not interfere at all; and as the purpose for which the trust was created was to supply her, as the presumptive Duchess of Norfolk, with things which, when she came to enjoy that rank, she was incapable of using, the Court declined to interfere. The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Vice-Chancellor of England, and dismissed the bill. But how does the principle in that case apply to one like this, in which, by a decree of a Court, there was taken from this husband an annual sum of money, which was ordered to be paid to his wife in the shape of alimony? It is said she did not require it, and that the purpose for which directed to be paid failed. But how does that appear? The Court which ordered this money to be paid did so in derogation of the marital right, and by the decree the husband lost the right of cohabitation, and had to pay a certain amount at stated intervals for alimony in order that his wife might live in a proper position. That money having been ordered to be paid

8

under the force of a decree of a Court of Divorce, how can the husband say now, that she has not applied it to and for her own purposes? The Court would not, of its own motion, have ordered an inquiry whe ther she had saved any money out of her alimony, for it was her property, and she had maintained herself out of it, and had saved something after answering the purpose for which it was paid, and which savings were now vested by law in the legal personal representative. Where is the equity of the husband to this fund? The principle in the case of Digby v. Howard seems to be against this claim. Upon what possible equity can I take from the executor the money which was clearly that of the testatrix by a decree of a court of law, and give it back to a person who had been ordered to pay it by an adverse decree? I wish distinctly to put my decision upon this ground-that the law has made this money assets of the wife, and that the husband has no equity to come into this court and get back alimony, any more than a wife has to get paid arrears of alimony. If arrears of alimony cannot be a subject of equitable relief for the wife to have, much less is there any equity in the husband to institute a suit for the purpose of getting back alimony. The husband, having thought it right to make this claim, the proper way to have asserted it would have been, not to claim in this suit, but to have filed a bill to get back the money out of the hands of the person in which it was now placed.

The declaration will be in these terms:-The parties having waived all questions as to the jurisdiction of the Court, the assets must be administered according to the terms of the prayer of the bill, and the husband must pay his own costs and the costs of that inquiry, which was directed, by his request, for his benefit, but which has failed so far as he is concerned. Note for reference-Wms. Exors. 754.

VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. THE CORRESPONDENT NEWSPAPER COMPANY (LIMITED) v. SAUNDERS.-June 1. Copyright-Registration before publication-Title of pe riodical-5 & 6 Vict. c. 45.

No copyright is acquired under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, by the registration of a book before its actual publication. Queere, whether protection is given to the title of a periodical by registration under the 19th section of the above act?

This was a motion for an injunction to restrain the publication of a periodical paper, called "The Public Correspondent," and also to restrain the use of the title of "Correspondent" for any newspaper, witheat the license of the plaintiffs.

In the early part of 1864, H. T. Frend proposed a scheme for establishing a weekly paper, the matter of which should mainly consist of letters of unpaid cor respondents, and he selected "The Correspondent" for the title.

On the 8th April, 1864, he caused an entry to be made at Stationers' Hall, in pursuance of the Copyright Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45. This entry stated the title of the book as the Correspondent newspaper: the name of the proprietor of the copyright as H. T. Friend; and the date of the first publication as May or June, 1864, or earlier.

On the 7th June, 1864, a company, the plaintiffs in this suit, was incorporated for the purpose of carrying out the scheme. This company and its objects were advertised for a considerable period; and on Wednes day, the 3rd May, 1865, the first number of the paper