May; and there is no averment that the composition | never was conclusive, and the Common-law Procedure was paid at that time, nor is there any allegation of a Act, 1852, provides that it shall have the same effect tender or offer of payment. All that appears is, that as before]. the defendant was "ready and willing," and we think that that is not enough. It is said that the averment, that all conditions were performed, is sufficient; but an averment of general performance of conditions precedent, I think, does not amount to an averment that there was a subsequent payment. As to the excuse for not tendering payment, that the plaintiff was in Paris, the distinction is clear on the authorities; that when the contract is made in England, and the debt falls due when the plaintiff is in England, it would not be the plaintiff's duty to follow his creditor all over the world. But when the contract is made with a person living in France, and resident there at the time the arrangement with creditors is entered into, then it is the duty of the debtor to pay his creditor, and absence abroad is no excuse for non-payment. WILLIAMS, WILLES, and KEATING, JJ., concurred. -Judgment for the plaintiff. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. [Coram MARTIN, CHANNELL, and PIGOTT, BB.] CAMPBELL v. LOADER.-Jan. 12. 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 50-Estoppel. CHANNELL, B. (after disposing of the other points ou which the rule was moved).-On the third point there might be some doubt; but on the whole I entertain none. It is said the order is conclusive as to the plaintiff's right to the premises, and that the county court proceedings are analogous to an ejectment in a superior court, and so conclusive upon a question of mesne profits, but I think the analogy is more to a magistrate's order. If the order had not been put in, there would have been no case for the plaintiff; and whatever efficacy that order has, it must derive from the statute. It seems to me to be against good sense, that a person obeying a county court order should be thereby rendered liable in trespass. Our attention has been called to the difference of language between sects. 50 and 51. The terms "rent" and "mesne profits," are both used in the latter, I think, to avoid any confusion or doubt being attempted between them, but the right is given only against the tenant. And finding this distinction made, I do not think we can hold the order conclusive on an action for mesne profits. PIGOTT, B., concurred. MARTIN, B.-It is clear no action lies for mesne profits. As to the order of the county court, I agree with my Brother Channell, we cannot give it the effect proposed.-Rule discharged. A county court order for delivery of premises does not [Coram POLLOCK, C. B., MARTIN and PIGOTT, BB.] work an estoppel. Declaration in trespass for mesne profits. Plea, not guilty. Issue. The cause was tried at the Sittings in Westminster in Hilary Term, before Martin, B. It appeared that the defendant was a tenant of one Mrs. Ellis, who was tenant to the plaintiff, of the premises in respect of which the action was brought. On the 26th April, 1864, the plaintiff gave notice to quit to Mrs. Ellis, to the defendant, and to another subtenant. On the 25th May she entered a plaint in the Westminster County Court against these parties, to recover possession. These proceedings were abandoned, as far as Mrs. Ellis was concerned; but an order was made, by consent, against the defendant on the 20th June. The defendant gave up the premises, and in the action attempted to shew that Mrs. Ellis was a quarterly tenant, and that her tenancy was never determined. This evidence was objected to, on the ground that the judgment of the county court was an estoppel, and also that no question of title could be raised on the plea of not guilty; but the learned judge admitted the evidence, and left it to the jury to find whether the tenancy was a weekly or quarterly one. They found for the defendant. M. Lloyd now moved for a rule to set aside the verdict, on the ground that the learned judge should have held the order of the county court an estoppel. [He also obtained a rule on other grounds, which, on cause being shewn, appeared to be untenable in the first instance.] Pearce shewed cause.-The county court order is merely such an order as an order of justices. It, therefore, can raise no estoppel. The plaintiff can recover mesne profits from the tenant, or the person in possession, but not from any other person. (19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, ss. 50, 51). M. Lloyd.-The county court is a court of record, and therefore its judgments are conclusive. (Aslin v. Parkin, 2 Burr. 665; Doe v. Wright, 10 Ad. & El. 703; Vooght v. Winch, 2 B. & Ad. 662). [Martin, B.-That was an action on the case. A judgment in ejectment CHANDLER and Another v. DOULTON and Another.- Excessive distress-Damage. Distraining goods to the value of 2601. for 1601. rent, and detaining them for a week, is in itself evidence of damage to support an action. This was an action for excessive distress. Plea, not guilty, and issue thereon. The cause was tried at Westminster,' at the Sittings after Trinity Term, before Martin, B. The plaintiff were tenants to the defendants, and owed them 1601. for rent. The defendants' bailiff entered and seized corn the property of the plaintiffs, to the amount of 260 which he retained possession of for the space of a week Then the debt and costs were paid, and he left the premises. The jury found that no damage had beer sustained, and the learned judge ordered the verdic to be entered for the defendants, leave being reserved to the plaintiffs to move for a rule calling upon defendants to shew cause why the verdict for them ought not to be set aside, and a verdict entered fo the plaintiffs for 1l., on the ground that the learne judge had misdirected the jury in leaving it to them to find whether any damage had been sustained by the plaintiffs, and in not directing them that they must find a verdict for the plaintiffs. the Laxton now moved accordingly; citing Smith v. Ash forth (29 L. J., Ex., 259); Lucas v. Tarleton (27 L. J. Ex., 246); Willoughby v. Backhouse (2 B. & Cr. 821) and Bayliss v. Fisher (7 Bing. 153). James, Q. C., shewed cause; citing Piggott v. Bertle (1 M. & W.441); Rogers v. Parker (18 C. B. 112); and Williams v. Mostyn (4 M. & W. 145). Laxton, contra, was stopped by the Court. POLLOCK, C. B.-On my Brother Martin's report of what took place at the trial, I think there was ev dence of some damage. (See Lord Wensleydale Piggott v. Bertles). I think the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial on that ground, or to a verdict for 1 There was evidence of an excessive distress, and da mage consequent. The excess was not immediately linquished, therefore it cannot be said that there as no damage. MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. Piggott v. Bertles clearly shews that damage was sustained; and I think I ought to have told the jury, that, under the circumstances, they were bound to find for the plaintiffs. Mr. James says, if a landlord, having a right to enter and distrain, enters and takes an excessive quantity, and then presently relinquishes the excess, that is no cause of action. But that is not the present case..The defendants seized the whole of the stock of the plaintiffs, who were corn-dealers, and kept it for nearly a week. On the rule being moved for, my Brother Channell was of opinion that, in a case of excessive distress, the proper direction to the jury was, that they must find damage. PIGOTT, B.-I am of the same opinion. Damage must always vary, according to circumstances. But how can it be said there was none here? The case of Bayliss v. Fisher was much more bare of proof.-Rule solute for the plaintiff, 11. damages. COURT FOR DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES. Price, Q. C. (Dr. Swabey with him), moved for a similar rule on the part of the co-respondent. Cur, adv. vult. Feb. 14.-THE JUDGE ORDINARY.-In this case I feel bound to refuse a rule to shew cause why a new trial should not be had. That this costly, protracted, and painful investigation should be gone through a second time, would be a grievous hardship on the petitioner; and the reasons which should induce the Court to subject him to it had need be weighty and conclusive. On the part of Mrs. Codrington it was urged, that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and much reliance was placed on the fact, that the jury must have given credit to Mrs. Watson; whereas they ought, after certain contradictions she received, to have done the contrary. But this was essentially a matter within their peculiar province, and I must respect their decision. It was further argued, that I had misdirected the jury, because I had not remarked upon certain parts of evidence so forcibly as it was thought they deserved. This is a new head of misdirection, and one which, if sustained as the ground of a new trial, would be likely to bring about a second trial in all cases of importance; for the weight to be given to the several facts and statements laid before a jury varies so much in the estimation of different CODRINGTON . CODRINGTON and ANDERSON.-Dec. 20, minds, that anything like a common consent on the 1864, and Jan. 17 and Feb. 14, 1865. New trial-Costs-20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 34. That the judge in his summing up has not remarked upon some parts of the evidence so forcibly as they may have desired, is no ground for a new trial. The discretion of the Court as to costs, under the 34th section of the Divorce Act, must depend on the conduct of the parties in each case; so that though it may have been proved that the co-respondent knew the respondent to be a married woman when the adultery was committed, he will not necessarily be condemned in the whole of the costs. This was the husband's petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of his wife's adultery with Colonel Anderson. The respondent and co-respondent traversed the charge, and the respondent further alleged that the petitioner had been guilty of wilful neglect and misconduct, conducing to her adultery, if any. The cause was tried, before the Judge Ordinary, by a special jury, who found all the issues in favour of the petitioner, and a decree nisi was pronounced. Dec. 20.-Bovill, Q. C. (Serjeant Ballantine and Dr. Spinks with him), for the petitioner, moved that the co-respondent might be condemned in costs. Price, Q. C. (Dr. Swabey with him), contra. THE JUDGE ORDINARY.-I must say that the argument in support of this motion has, in my opinion, been put upon too high a ground. It has been assumed that in all cases in which the co-respondent has been found guilty of adultery, he must, as a matter of Course, be condemned in costs. That argument, if Well founded, would deprive the Court of the discretion expressly vested in it by the statute. If this is the first case in which the Court has been asked to Exercise that discretion, the reason perhaps is, that it is the first case in which that discretion could reasonably be exercised. I think it by no means follows, that because a co-respondent is found guilty, he must pay the costs. In dealing with the question of costs, It is necessary carefully to consider the conduct of the husband and of the wife, as well as that of the cospondent. I shall bestow careful consideration on the conduct of each of the parties in this case. Jan. 17.-The Queen's Advocate (Hawkins, Q. C., and derwick with him), for the respondent, moved for a ale nisi for a new trial. subject is not attainable. On the part of Colonel Anderson it was argued, that his identity as the man who drove with Mrs. Codrington to the Grosvenor Hotel was not established. But this man was taken up by Mrs. Codrington at the house where Colonel Anderson was lodging, and Frank Strutt, the porter there, swore he saw Colonel Anderson get into a cab one evening about that time, and that there was a lady in the cab, whom he recognised as Mrs. Codrington. Again: it was urged, that the copy of a letter purporting to be written by Mrs. Codrington to Colonel Anderson, which was necessarily laid before the jury as evidence against her, unduly and improperly biased the jury against him. Now, if this letter was really sent to, and received by, him, he has no real ground of complaint, that the jury should have drawn such conclusions as the letter warranted against him, as well as against her. Upon asking whether he had availed himself of the opportunity which the forms of the court permitted, to make affidavit that he never received that letter, I was told he had made no such affidavit; and his counsel very properly, from that moment, argued the case on the supposition that he had received the letter. It would be of little avail to comment at length on the evidence by which the finding of the jury may be justified. It is enough, that I can by no means say they were clearly wrong. I have now to dispose of the question of costs. The 34th section of the Divorce Act authorises the Court, in its discretion, to cast the whole or any portion of the costs on the co-respondent. This discretion must lean on the special circumstances of each case, though in most cases those circumstances may present very uniform features. But this is by no means an ordinary case. On the part of Colonel Anderson it was argued, that the petitioner's conduct to his wife, though the jury found that it did not amount to such neglect as to bar his divorce, was yet by no means free from blame. It was urged, that for years he had suffered, if not enforced, his wife to absent herself from his bed at night, and lead a separate life by day. Further: that when they did go out together into society, the petitioner was in the habit of leaving his wife to come home alone at night, and that she did so night after night, at a very late hour, in the company of Colonel Anderson; of all which the petitioner was aware. It was also pointed out that James Tuck, the petitioner's valet, who spoke to many acts of gross familiarity with Lieutenant Mildmay, when asked why he had not mentioned what he had seen, replied, "that he thought Admiral Codrington knew all about it," and "that he must have known it;" and, further, that evidence was not wanting to prove that the admiral had withdrawn himself from his wife advisedly, saying that he did not want to have any more children. It was also clear on the evidence that the intrigue with Lieutenant Mildmay preceded Mrs. Codrington's intimacy, if not her acquaintance, with Colonel Anderson. These facts gave rise to much very able reasoning on Colonel Anderson's behalf, to the effect, that the costs incurred by the petitioner in obtaining a divorce ought not to be borne by the co-respondent. But to some portions of that reasoning, as applied to the question of costs, various answers suggest themselves, and other portions depend on the degree to which the facts relied upon were credibly established in proof. The Court is by no means prepared, therefore, to adopt it without qualification; and while it cannot on the one hand deny that the conduct of the petitioner has been such as to invite reasonable challenge, it cannot on the other hand go the length of absolving Colonel Anderson from the costs of proving against him the adultery which he has chosen to put in issue. The Court, therefore, condemns him in those costs, but it will not go further. He will not have to bear the costs of Mrs. Codrington, nor the costs of the petitioner in proving the case against her in respect of Lieutenant Mildmay, nor the costs of the adjourn ment, which arose entirely on that branch of the case. Attorneys for petitioner, H. P. Bird; respondent, Few & Co.; co-respondent, S. A. Beck. COURT OF PROBATE. JONES v. WILLIAMS and Others.-Feb. 28. Testamentary suit-Intervener-Pleading-Practice. A party intervening in a suit after the pleadings have been closed, cannot be allowed by a minute of Court to adopt and adhere to the pleas given in in opposition to a will, but must file his own separate pleas. The plaintiff, Mrs. Sophia Jones, widow, as one of the residuary legatees for life, propounded the will, with five codicils, of Francis Williams, late of Langhern Hill, Wichenford, Worcestershire. The will was dated the 23rd June, 1862, and the codicils respectively the 23rd June, 1862, the 16th February, 1863, the 11th May, 1863, the 9th June, 1863, and the 23rd December, 1863; and in these papers Francis Edward Williams, Edward Jones Williams, and the Rev. William Ellis Wall, clerk, were appointed executors. Probate of these papers was opposed by George Frederick Knipe, one of the nephews and next of kin of the deceased, who pleaded that neither the will nor either of the codicils was executed in accordance with the statute, and that neither at the date of the will, nor of either codicil, was the deceased of sound mind, memory, and understanding. Issue was joined on these pleas, and on the 7th January, 1865, the Court directed the issues to be tried before itself and a special jury. Subsequently a citation was taken out, calling upon all the next of kin of the deceased to see proceedings, and was duly served upon them. One of them, Edward Jones Williams, caused an appearance to be entered; and on his behalf 8 sented by counsel at the hearing, but he does not desire to delay the cause by filing pleas, and so causing the record to be amended. Sir J. P. WILDE.-The Court is very unwilling to make a new precedent, and to suspend its ordinary rules and practice. I cannot allow the intervener to adhere by a minute of Court to the pleas already given in; he must plead afresh. In the Goods of GEORGE GOOLD, Deceased.—March 14. Administration bond-Excessive penalty-Cancellation. An administratrix, under a misapprehension of the amount of the deceased's property, returned_the_value_at, and gave bond in, an excessive sum. On the error being discovered, the Board of Inland Revenue returned the stamp duty paid in excess :-Held, that the bond might be delivered out to be cancelled, when the administratriz had entered into a fresh bond in a penalty proportioned to the actual amount of the property. George Goold, late of Shanghai, in China, deceased, died on the 13th March, 1855, a widower, without child or parent, and intestate. In February, 1856, administration of his property was granted by the Prerogative Court of Canterbury to Henry Michael Francis Goold, his natural and lawful brother, and one of his next of kin, who died in May, 1861, leaving part of such property still unadministered. On the citation and non-appearance of the other brother and sisters, administration of the unadministered effects of George Goold was in June, 1861, granted to Matilda Goold, the widow, relict, and sole executrix of the will of Henry Michael Francis Goold. Mrs. Goold, in the affidavit to lead the administration, swore that the unadministered effects of the deceased did not amount in value to 20007. She paid the stamp duty of 60., and, together with her sureties, executed a bond in the penalty of 40007., which bond was, a usual, filed in the registry. The reason why Mrs Goold valued the unadministered estate at this amount was, that she believed that, at the time of his death George Goold was entitled, under certain deeds of set tlement and family arrangements, to one-twelfth par of a freehold estate, called the Nash Court estate situate near Canterbury, Kent; and such estate wa not sold until October, 1864, when it realised 30,000 She then discovered that the deceased had, by an in denture dated the 31st July, 1830, made between him self of the one part, and George Woodroffe (sine deceased) of the other part, bargained, sold, and leased all his right, title, and interest in the abov estate to George Woodroffe, his heirs, executors, an assigns, for his and their own absolute use and benefit consequently, the whole property left unadministere by the first administrator did not amount in value the sum of 201. On the 24th February, 1865, Commissioners of Inland Revenue, on a representa tion to them of the aforesaid facts being made, dered that 607., the amount of the duty paid on administration of the unadministered effects, shou be returned, and the stamp cancelled. Mrs. Goo with one surety, had entered into a new bond in th sum of 1007. Deane, Q. C., now moved that such new bond migh be substituted for the old one, and that the latte might be handed out to Mrs. Matilda Goold to cancelled. Sir J. P. WILDE.-As a proper investigation h been made by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue Spinks applied to the Court to be permitted by a and they have returned the duty, and as an affidavi minute of Court to adopt and adhere to the issues has been filed by the administratrix, that there is raised by the pleas of the defendant George Frederick such estate, and that the whole matter has originated Knipe, so far as regards the fifth codicil, dated the in a mistake, I think the bond for 4000l. may be cal 23rd December. Mr. Williams wishes to be repre-celled, and may be delivered out for that purpose. 15 PRIVY COUNCIL. Present the Right Hon. Lord CHELMSFORD, Sir J. on board the steam-tug, an operation which was safely L. KNIGHT BRUCE, and Sir G. J. TURNER.] THE FUSILIER.-March 8. Salvage-Lives of passengers-Owners of cargo-Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict.), c. 104. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, s. 458, provides, that whenever any ship or boat is stranded or otherwise in distress on the shore of any sea or tidal water, situate within the limits of the United Kingdom, and services are rendered by any person, first, in assisting such ship or boat; secondly, in saving the lives of the persons belonging to such ship or boat, or any portion thereof; Drilly, in saving the cargo or apparel of such ship or boat, or any portion thereof, and whenever any wreck is sared by any person other than a receiver within the Unital Kingdom, there shall be payable by the owners of such ship or boat, cargo, apparel, or wreck, to the persons by ichom such services, or any of them, are rendered, or by whom such wreck is saved, a reasonable amount of salvage, together with all expenses properly incurred by him in the performance of such services, or the saving of such wreck:-Held, that the owners of the cargo of a vessel to which salvage services have been rendered, are liable to contribute to that portion of the claim of the salvors which arises from the sacing the lives of the passengers on board the vessel. This was a cause of salvage, originally depending in the High Court of Admiralty of England, having been stituted and promoted by Richard Simpson, SteThen Penny, and others, the owners, masters, and es of the steam-tug Aid and lifeboat NorthumberLand, and the luggers Champion and Lotus, the repondents, against the ship or vessel Fusilier, her Lackle, apparel, and furniture, with the cargo then Tately laden on board the said vessel, and the freight due for the transportation of the same, and against T. M. Mackay & Co., of London, and James Baines & Co., of Liverpool, the owners of the said vessel, and against Bligh, Harbottle, & Co., and all others the owners of the said cargo, the above-named appellants. The cause was heard before Dr. Lushington, on the 8th June, 1864. The appellants did not contest the accuracy of any material statements made by the salvors immediately connected with the services, which were shortly as follows: On the evening and night of the 3rd December, 1863, a heavy gale was blowing in the Downs, and at about 6 P.M., signals were observed from the Girdler, Tongue, and Prince's Channel light ships, indicating that vessels were in distress in the vicinity. The steam-tug Aid proceeded out of Ramsgate Harbour, at about 8:30 P.M. of the 3rd December, with the lifebeat Northumberland in tow, in the direction, in the fint instance, of the Tongue light ship, in search of the vessel or vessels in distress. After searching ineffectually for several hours, in the direction indicated by those on board the Tongue light ship, the steamtug, with the lifeboat in tow, proceeded to the Prince's Channel light ship, and guided by the information then obtained, they discovered The Fusilier aground on the Girdler Sand, and by about 3 A.M. of the 4th December they got alongside, and two men from the Lifeboat boarded her. The Fusilier was an emigrant hip, and had on board at that time ninety-five passengers, and a very valuable cargo of general merchandise. When the steam tug and lifeboat reached The Fusilier, the master and pilot of that vessel requested them to take off the passengers, as fears were enterained for their safety, it being then about half flood, nd very probable that the ship would break up on he next high water. Accordingly, the passengers No. 536, VOL. XI., New Series. were taken by the lifeboat from the ship, and placed performed by the lifeboat in four trips, occupying in the whole about four hours. The steam tug left the vessel, with the intention of proceeding to Ramsgate, and the captain of The Fusilier sent by her an order for an anchor and chain, to replace one which had been lost in the gale. The steam-tug, shortly after leaving The Fusilier, fell in with another vessel, The Demerara, which was wrecked on the Girdler Sand, and the crew of which were in great peril; and she thereupon returned to the lifeboat, with The Fusilier's passengers still on board, and took her in tow to the rescue of the crew of The Demerara. The whole of the crew of The Demerara, nineteen in number, were saved by the lifeboat, and put on board the tug, and after performing this further service, the steam-tug and the lifeboat proceeded to Ramsgate without returning to The Fusilier. No further service was performed by the lifeboat, but her crew, or some portion of them, formed the crews or parts of the crews of the luggers Champion and Lotus herinafter mentioned. At about 6 P. M. of the 4th December, The Champion and Lotus luggers, with the anchor and chain on board, which had been ordered by the master of The Fusilier, left Ramsgate Harbour in tow of The Aid, and reached The Fusilier about midnight; these vessels lay by all that night. The next morning at daybreak The Aid went near The Fusilier, and her master reported that the anchor and chain were on board the luggers. Before this time several tugs had been sent to the assistance of The Fusilier by persons acting on behalf of the owners of the ship and cargo, and at the time when the steam-tug Aid returned with the luggers, these tugs were endeavouring to tow The Fusilier off the ground; and The Aid, at the request of the captain of The Fusilier, sent her hawser on board and assisted in towing for a short time, when finding The Fusilier could not be moved, the steam-tug Aid was, by her own desire, cast off. It The master of The Aid then went on board The Fusilier, and offered his services to take off some of the cargo, but was told by the master that his assistance was not required; and The Aid then returned to Ramsgate. The luggers stayed by the ship until 4 P. M. of the 5th December, when they were ordered to proceed to the Nore to wait till the weather should be finer, and the anchor and chain should be wanted. had been, in fact, determined to lighten the ship, and it was not wished to incumber her with the additional weight of the anchor and chain. The luggers remained anchored at the Nore till the 10th December, when The Fusilier was got off, and brought up to London in tow of two steam-tugs. The weather had moderated after midnight of the 5th, and thence became and continued fine. The luggers were towed up to Blackwall on the 11th December, at the expense of The Fusilier, and they then discharged the anchor and chain, and returned to Ramsgate. The value of The Fusilier and of her freight was 50817., or thereabouts, and that of the cargo 52,000l., or thereabouts. On this state of facts, the owners of the cargo on board The Fusilier contended that no services were rendered to the cargo of The Fusilier by the respondents; and as to the services rendered in saving the lives of the passengers on board The Fusilier, they contended that cargo is not liable to any claim for services in the nature of life salvage to passengers. The learned judge of the Admiralty Court was of opinion that great services had been rendered by the respondents, and he awarded the sum of 22001. to be due to the said respondents for the salvage services by them rendered to The Fusilier and her cargo, and for their services in saving the lives of the passengers on board The n Fusilier, namely, to the master, owners, and crew of | pion and The Lotus, to carry them off to The Fusilier the steam-tug Aid the sum of 700.; to the master, owners, and crew of the lifeboat Northumberland, the sum of 7007.; and to the masters, owners, and crews of the luggers Champion and Lotus, the sum of 800%., together with costs; and condemned the appellants and the owners of The Fusilier in the sum of 22001. and costs, and decreed that the appellants and the owners of The Fusilier were to contribute rateably thereto. From this judgment the present appeal was brought. The Queen's Advocate (Sir R. Phillimore, Q. C.), for the owners of cargo, the appellants, contended, that the judgment of the Court below was erroneous, inasmuch and in so far as it pronounced for the appellants, who were only the owners of the cargo, liable to contribute rateably with the other defendants in the suit to the whole sum awarded in respect of the services rendered by the plaintiffs, although a large part of that sum was so awarded in consequence of, and as a remuneration for, the services rendered in saving the lives of the passengers. They also contended that the remuneration in respect to the services of the luggers Champion and Lotus was excessive. Manisty, Q. C., and Vernon Lushington, for the owners of the ship Fusilier. Dr. Deane, Q. C., and Clarkson, for the owners of the steam-tug Aid, the lifeboat Northumberland, and the luggers Champion and Lotus. The following authorities were referred to:-The Westminster (1 W. Rob. 229); The Johannes (1 Lush. 182); The Vzede (Id. 322); The Undaunted (Id. 90); Abb. Ship. 504; and The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, ss. 458, 459). Lord CHELMSFORD delivered the judgment of the Committee. The principal question raised upon this appeal is, whether by the 458th and 459th sections of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, the owners of a cargo of a vessel to which salvage services have been rendered, are liable to contribute to that portion of the claim of the salvors which arises from the saving the lives of the passengers on board the vessel. There was another subordinate question, as to the amount of salvage awarded to some of the salvors, which will require a short notice. It is unnecessary to state the facts of the case, which were all agreed to on both sides. The appellants, the owners of the cargo on board The Fusilier, the vessel salved, admitted that the owners, masters, and crews of the different vessels to whom salvage was awarded, were entitled to remuneration for their services. The value of the ship was 2500l., of the freight 25817. 178. 8d., and of the cargo 52,0007. The learned judge of the Court of Admiralty pronounced "the sum of 22007. to be due to the salvors for the salvage services rendered by them to the vessel Fusilier and her cargo, and for their services in saving the lives of the passengers on board the said vessel, namely, to the master, owners, and crew of the steam-tug Aid the sum of 7001; to the master, owners, and crew of the lifeboat Northumberland the sum of 7007.; and to the masters, owners, and crews of the luggers Champion and Lotus, the sum of 8007., together with costs.' The services rendered by the luggers were these:-On the 3rd December, 1863, The Fusilier was aground on the Girdler Sand. The steam-tug The Aid and the lifeboat The Northumberland had been rendering assistance, and had succeeded in taking all the passengers out of The Fusilier, and placing them in safety on board The Aid, to be conveyed to Ramsgate. The Aid received an order from The Fusilier to bring an anchor and chain from Ramsgate, to be used in getting her off the sand. The weight of the anchor and chain procured for this purpose was found to be too great for The Aid, and it was necessary to employ the two luggers, The Cham These vessels anchored near The Fusilier at midnight of the 4th December, and remained by her the whole night. On the following day unsuccessful attempts were made to tow The Fusilier off the sand. In the course of the afternoon of the 5th December, the gale, which had been blowing from the westward, changed to the southward, thereby lessening the chance of The Fusilier being got off the sand, and the luggers were ordered to proceed to the Nore, and remain there till the weather moderated. They remained at the Nore from the 6th to the 10th December; then, according to instructions, they returned to The Fusilier, which not being sufficiently light to float, although part of her cargo had been removed, they were ordered back to the Nore, still with the anchor and chain on board: and The Fusilier having been got off the sand on the 11th December, they followed her to the Blackwall Docks, and finally arrived at Ramsgate on the 14th December. The appellants objected, that the amount of 8007., awarded to The Champion and The Lotus for their services, was excessive, and urged as proof of the excess, that it exceeded the value of the two vessels. Their Lordships would always be slow to disturb an award of salvage by the learned judge of the Court of Admiralty, on the ground of his having given too large a sum to the salvors, unless they were satisfied beyond all doubt that he had made an exorbitant estimate of their services. The accident of the amount of salvage exceeding the value of the vessels is wholly immaterial. Undoubtedly the placing valuable property in peril may enhance the merit of salvage ser vices, but it does not follow, on the contrary, that the trifling character of the property endangered will ne cessarily detract from the value of such services. It was not quite correctly said in argument at the bar, that what is risked is the first thing to be regarded, and the next the services which are rendered. It would have been more accurate to have reversed the order of these considerations, and to have said, that the first thing to be regarded is the value of the services with reference to the amount of property rescued from peril and the next, how far the merit of these services is enhanced by the risk to life or property which has been involved in them. Taking the grounds of claim to salvage in this order, it is obvious that it never can be an argument against the amount awarded to the salvors, that it exceeds the value of their property put in peril by the service. And even if such an argument could ever be urged, it hardly belongs to the appellants in this case. No complaint was made by them of the total amount of salvage awarded to the salvors in one entire sum of 22007. It is only in the distribution of this sum amongst the different classes of salvors that there is any opening for their objection. Now, the award of salvage is not of such a sum to one set of salvors, and such a sum to another, making a total of 2200l., but of that sum as the whole value of the salvage services which is afterwards apportioned amongst them, according to their respective merits. The amount allotted to The Champion and The Lotus might be made the subject of dispute by the owners and crew of the other vessels, but it can hardly be objected to by the appellants, who have never once suggested that, taking into account the value of the property rescued from peril, and the number of lives saved, the sum of 2200l. was too great a reward for the whole of the services rendered. There is, therefore, no valid objection to the decree upon this ground. The principal question in the case is one of great importance, and of some difficulty. Prior to the pass ing of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, the Court of Admiralty, in a cause of salvage, where no property had been rescued from peril, but where life had been |