separation upon the wife's property. It appeared, that upon the marriage in 1850, of Eliza Insole with a Mr. Puckle, Mrs. Puckle was entitled to certain personal property under the will of a Mr. Insole, dated in 1830, subject to the life interest of her father Thomas Insole therein. By an indenture, dated the 24th July, 1854, Mr. and Mrs. Puckle mortgaged Mrs. Puckle's reversionary interest to the Consolidated Investment and Assurance Company, and by another indenture, dated the 6th October, 1858, further mortgaged the same to a Mr. Barker. In the year 1863, a decree was made by the Divorce Court, at the suit of Mrs. Puckle, for a judicial separation between her and her husband, which decree was still in force, and Mrs. Puckle was living apart from her husband. By an indenture, dated the 1st March, 1864, Mrs. Puckle mortgaged her reversionary interest to two gentlemen named Britten and Wilkinson. Thomas Insole, the tenant for life, died on the 21st March, 1865, and the trustees of the fund then paid it into court. Mrs. Puckle and her mortgagees, Britten and Wilkinson, now petitioned, that out of the fund in court Britten and Wilkinson might be paid the amount of their claims, and that the residue might be paid to Mrs. Puckle. Bagshawe, for the petitioners, referred to stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 25, and stat. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 8. Under these sections the wife, after a judicial separation, was, with regard to her property, exactly in the position of a feme sole. Schomberg, for the Consolidated Investment and Assurance Company, asked the Court merely to order the dividends of the fund to be paid to Mrs. Puckle for her separate use for life, as if no judicial separation had taken place, but the husband had become bankrupt, and was living apart from his wife. Mrs. Puckle did not seek to enforce any equity to a settlement, and the contest was really between the two sets of mortgagees. A decree for judicial separation could not affect rights antecedent to the decree. The act provided, that if the husband and wife cohabited together again, the property should be held to the separate use of the wife. [He cited Re Whittingham's Trusts (10 Jur., N. S., 818).] Speed, for Barker, referred to Purdew v. Jackson (1 Russ. 70). such property may be disposed of by her in all respecta as a feme sole." Well, how may a feme sole dispose of property? She may sell it, she may mortgage it or she may squander it. Then, why am I to cudown these words, and say she is only to dispose of the interest of it? "And on her decease, the same that is, the property)" shall, in case she shall die intera go as the same would have gone if her husband ha been then dead." Does not that say, that it shal disposed of by her in all respects as if she were a fema sole? She may leave it to whomsoever she pleases, and if she dies intestate, it is to go as if her husband were dead, that is, to exclude him. In other words, she may leave it to those whom she pleases, or she may assign it to whom she pleases. The meaning of that clause is, that as soon as the judicial separation takes place, all the property, which in the ordinary sense of the words, comes to the wife, she may dispose of as if she were not married, subjec always to what may take place in case she shall return to live with her husband. Note for reference-20 & 21 Vict. c. 85; 21 & c. 108. LAKE V. PEISLY.-Dec. 16. Practice-Order for leave to use depositions taken in other court-Consolidated Order XIX, rule 4. An order, allowing depositions taken in bankruptcy to be read at the hearing, is an order of course. Higgins made an application to his Honor under the following circumstances:-A cause had been instituted before Sir J. Stuart, V. C., and the secretary to the Master of the Rolls had declined to make, as of course, an order that depositions and other documents taken in the course of proceedings in bankruptcy, might be used at the hearing of the cause. An application had then been made to Sir J. Stuart, V. C., but he had declined to interfere. The practice appeared to be very unsettled. [He referred to Ernest v. Weiss (9 Jur. N. S., 145; 1 N. R. 189). Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-I think it is an order of course. Of course you do it at your own peril. Please to inform my secretary of my opinion. Note for reference-Morg. Ch. Acts, 447. Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-Mr. Bagshawe, I am of opinion that you are entitled to an order in this case. In fact, all that is done by the mortgage of a reversionary interest of a married woman, although the wife joins in it, is merely to mortgage the interest of the husband. It may be that the person advancing VICE-CHANCELLOR KINDERSLEY'S COURT. the money (the mortgagee) takes the chance, and runs his risk, that in future the time will come when the husband will be able to acquire the property, and give Pleading-Demurrer-Appointment by tenant for life is it to him in respect of the incumbrance, but this is all that he does. In this case the 25th clause of the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, in my opinion, disposes of the right of the husband. The moment the judicial separation takes place, the right of the husband is gone, and the property belongs to the wife exactly in the same manner as if the husband were dead. [His Honor then read the section in question.] If those words do not include the falling in of a reversion, I do not know what words could be used sufficiently large for the purpose. It is quite clear, that what is mortgaged here is a reversion that is to come to the wife. So also, a husband might, if he pleased, mortgage the probability of a legacy being paid to his wife, and that would be perfectly good if the legacy were paid in his lifetime; but if the husband died before the payment of the legacy took place, the mortgage would be good for nothing. The section, having referred to property of every description which the wife may acquire, proceeds," and CARROLL v. GRAHAM.-Nov. 15. fraud of power-Bill by reversioner-15 & 16 Vid c. 86, s. 50. A testator, by his will, giving his widow a life interest in his residuary real and personal estate, gave her absolute power of appointment amongst children; in the event of there being no children, or of their all dying under twenty-one and unmarried, there was an abs gift over to the testator's brother. The survivor of the three children of the marriage, infant, being at the point of death, the widow executed the power, by appointing the whole estate, subject to the life interest, to him. The child died four days after wards. Upon a bill by the representatives of the reversioner, pray ing that the appointment might be set aside as fraudu lent, and for an account of the general personal estate; the defendants claiming through the appointment, de murred to so much of the bill as is set forth, on the ground that there was no fraud on the power, and wo title to relief in the lifetime of the tenant for life. E 30 Demurrer. This was a bill to set aside as fraudu- | execution of the deed-poll of the 28th July, 1863, and lent an appointment by deed-poll, made in virtue of as to so much as asks a general account of the assets. a power given by the will of W. Carroll, in the follow- As to the other claims, the defendants put in their aning terms:-" The residue of my property that I may swer. The grounds of demurrer, which have been have at this time, or hereafter become possessed of stated as three, are, in fact, only two; the first, that whether freehold, leasehold, or personalty, I leave to there is no reason for disturbing the appointment on my wife S. E. Carroll for the term of her natural life, the ground of fraud; and failing that objection, that with full power to her to will or give at any time to the plaintiff cannot ask the assistance of the Court any child or children I may have, such portion thereof during the lifetime of Mrs. Graham. as she may think proper and wish. And in case I shall not have any child or children, or if any, that all such should die before attaining the age of twenty-one years, then and in such case I bequeath the reversion after my wife's death, and child or children's, if they should not attain the age of twenty-one years, to my brother B. H. Carroll, for his own use and benefit." The testator died in 1851, leaving his widow and three children surviving him, two of these, daughters, died under age, and unmarried. In 1860 the widow married a second time a Mr. Graham, and it appeared from the statements in the bill, that after that time, and previously to the year 1862, the remaining child, a son, shewed symptoms of mental incapacity, and in the course of the latter year was placed in a private establishment for the care of persons of diseased mind; while there his health gave way, and in the middle of 1863 he became so much worse, that a despatch was sent off to his mother, who was then abroad, requiring her instant return. Mrs. Graham reached the establishment where her son was on the 26th July, and remained in attendance on him till the time of his death, on the 1st August. By a deed-poll, dated the 28th July, purporting to be in execution of the power given her by the will of her late husband, Mrs. Graham gave and appointed to her said son, his heirs, executors, or administrators, all the residuary real and personal estate of Mr. Carroll, reserving to herself a life interest. The bill was now filed by the trustees and executors of the will of Mr. B. H. Carroll, the reversioner, alleging that the defendant Mr. Graham, in right of his wife and their infant children, claimed as sole next of kin of the infant son of the testator W. Carroll, to be entitled to the whole of the residuary estate, so purported to be appointed, and praying that the appointment might be set aside, as being in fraud of the power, and for the ordinary administration accounts. The defendant demurred to so much of the bill as charged that the appointment was fraudulent, and that the plaintiffs were now entitled to the account of the personal estate as prayed. Glasse, Q. C., and L. Bird, in support of the demurrer. The facts averred do not shew fraud; they were only reasonable acts on the part of Mrs. Graham; any dealings to be in fraud of the power, must be in fraud of the objects of the power, but Mrs. Graham had an express right to defeat the interest of the reversioner; the tendency of later decisions has been to restrict the operation of the section of the Improvement of Jurisdiction of Equity Act (15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 50); this Court will not now make a declaration as to the interests of parties entitled in reversion. (Lady Langdale v. Briggs, 8 De G., Mac., & G. 391; 2 Jur., N. S., 982; Farrand v. Wilson, 4 Hare, 344; Fyfe v. Arbuthnot, 1 De G. & J. 406; Morgan's Chanc. Acts, 237, 2nd ed.) The only allegation of the plaintiff that he is suffering injury, is (par. 24) as to his information and belief; that is not sufficient. (Egremont v. Cowell, 5 Beav. 620). Baily, Q. C., and French, for the plaintiff, were not called upon. Sir R. T. KINDERSLEY, V. C.—I really do not feel any doubt upon this case. The demurrer is only to so much of the bill as seeks relief in respect of the Now, as I am of opinion that the demurrer must be overruled, so that the cause must come to a hearing, of course I abstain, as far as I can, from going into the merits of the case for fear of prejudicing future questions. Therefore, looking merely at the terms of the gift of the testator's residuary estate, it by no means appears that there is any power given to Mrs. Carroll so as to override the gift over in the event of all the children dying under twenty-one. But the demurrer says the plaintiff has no right to have any account taken of the personal estate, because of the existence of this deed of appointment. We must look, therefore, at the circumstances under which this deed was executed; and doing so, I will only ask how it is possible for me to hold that (with respect only to the account of the personal estate) the plaintiff may not, at the hearing, be entitled to some relief? On that ground, therefore, without going more into details, I am of opinion that the demurrer cannot be sustained. Then, can it be sustained on the ground that whatever interest the plaintiffs have is reversionary, and that they have no right to come here until the interest falls into possession by the death of Mrs. Graham, the tenant for life? But what would be the result if no such deed-poll had been executed? Then Mr. Carroll, and after his death, his representatives, would be entitled, as reversioners, to an account of the personal estate. The defendant insists that this right is taken away by the deed-poll; it amounts, in fact, to thisthey say, "you have no right to ask for what would, but for the existence of the deed-poll, be your right; and you have no right to ask to have the deed-poll set aside because your interest is reversionary." I need hardly say, that I entirely accede to the doctrine of the cases cited as to prospective declarations, for such a decree gives a plaintiff nothing. If, by a will, an interest is given to A. for life, and there is a question, whether or no it is given over to B. in fee, B. cannot have a declaration that after A.'s death he will become entitled to the property; such a declaration would not, if he got it, enable him to exercise any immediate right. But here, if the plaintiffs are right in saying that the deed of appointment ought to be set aside, their reversionary interest under the will gives them a present right to come to this Court to ask for an account of the personal estate. Therefore, it appears to me that the cases cited have no application to the present. Primâ facie, the plaintiffs have a right to the account, unless they are deprived of it by the deed of appointment, and this they say is bad. I cannot hear the other side to say, "You must not attack the deed till after the death of Mrs. Graham." Demurrer overruled. VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. MAIR V. THE HIMALAYAN TEA COMPANY (LIMITED) -Dec. 7. Jurisdiction-Specific performance-Agency. By the articles of association of a limited company, the plaintiff was appointed agent of the company in India, and it was provided that he was to take a number of the shares. Subsequently the directors persuaded him to resign, on condition that he should be freed from all liability on the shares, but they found afterwards that they could not legally carry out this condition. They, however, insisted on dismissing the plaintiff, and brought an action against him for the amount due on the shares. Upon a bill being filed to restrain the dismissal of the | plaintiff, or, in the alternative, the action-Held, that the defendants being willing to undertake not to set up the voluntary resignation of the plaintiff, the whole matter was one to be tried at law, as the Court could not enforce the agreement as to the agency. This was a motion for an injunction to restrain the above company from appointing or retaining any person other than the plaintiffs' firm of Mair & Co., as their agent or general manager in India; or if the Court should be of opinion that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff was not entitled to such relief, then that the company might be restrained from further prosecuting an action at law commenced by them against the plaintiff, and from taking any proceedings to enforce a resolution of the directors, passed the 24th November, 1865. The case made by the plaintiff was as follows:He was a merchant and general commission agent, carrying on business under the style of "Mair & Co." In the year 1862 he entered into arrangements for the formation of a limited company for the culture and manufacture of tea in India, under the agency and general management of the firm of "Mair & Co. ;" and terms were settled between him and the proposed company, which were subsequently embodied in the articles of association, and it was also arranged that in return for the remuneration, commission, and profits to accrue to the plaintiff's firm, and upon the express condition, and solely in consideration that the appointment of the firm as agents and general managers in India and as consignees in England of all the produce of the company sent to England for sale, was to be permanent, the plaintiff should become a shareholder to a large amount in the company, under such conditions as were stated in the articles of association. The articles of association of the company contained, amongst others, the following provisions: The business of the company was to be managed by the directors, who were to exercise all such powers of the company as were not by act of Parliament, or by the regulations of the company, declared to be exercisable by the company in general meeting, subject nevertheless to such regulations (not being inconsistent with the aforesaid provisions or regulations) as might be prescribed by the company in general meeting. The directors might, from time to time, appoint and remove all such managers and other officers and servants as they might consider necessary for the purposes of the company; and they might appoint and remove any persons, as superintendents, commissioners, or agents on behalf of the company in any part of India, subject to such conditions and stipulations as they might think fit. Messrs. Mair & Co. were to be the agents of the company in India, and if the directors thought it advisable that the produce of the estate should be sold in England, it was to be consigned to them, and they were to have the usual merchants' commission. In January, 1863, the plaintiff proceeded to India, and he alleged that, under the agency and general management of Mair & Co., the company had been a success. In June, 1865, he returned to England, and at a meeting of the directors on the 12th July, 1865, they strongly urged him to resign, to which he at first objected; but he afterwards agreed to do so, on the terms of being freed from all liability in respect of the shares to be taken by him in the company: and a resolution was passed by the directors on that footing, and the plaintiff tendered to them his resignation, which was accepted. It was afterwards discovered that the directors had not legally any power to make this arrangement with regard to the shares, and they, therefore, apple the plaintiff for payment of the amount due him in respect of them. To this the plaintif plied, that as the shares were to be taken by him on condition that his firm were to be agents and general managers, and the directors had taken the management into their own hands, he declined to take up the shares, and subsequently, under legal advice, he gave them notice that, as they had failed to relieve him from liability under the shares, he considered the resolutions for the dismissal of his firm inoperative, and that he should require payment of, and if necessary sue for, his remuneration as agent and general manager. The directors, however, insisted on the plaintifs resignation being valid, and on the 9th November, 1865, they commenced proceedings in the Queen's Bench to recover the amount alleged to be due from the plaintiff in respect of his shares; and subsequently, on the 24th November, 1865, they passed a making a further call on the shares, and requested the plaintiff to pay it on the shares held by him. The plaintiff, therefore, filed this bill, charging that no general meeting of the company had been held, and that the directors had no power to dismiss him; and that, if they would still recognise his firm as their agents in India, he was willing to pay the amount alleged to be due; or, on the other hand, if they would release him from all liability, he would resign all connexion with the company, and give up his shares; and he prayed for an account of the dealings and transactions of his firm with the company, and payment of the amount found to be due, and for an injunction in the above terms. The defendant had not put in any evidence. Giffard, Q. C., and Bristowe, for the plaintiff, in support of the motion.-The directors ought to be restrained from dismissing the plaintiff, as they have accepted his resignation on certain conditions, which they cannot carry out. Besides, the sense of a general meeting ought to be taken, and matters should be kept in statu quo till that is done; for it is a distinct ar ticle of the association that Mair & Co. shall be the agents in India, and that cannot be altered without s general meeting being summoned. [The Companies Act, 1862, sect. 49, was cited.] Rolt, Q. C., and Archibald Šmith, for the defendants, having stated, in answer to a question from his Honor, that they were willing to give an undertaking not to take advantage of the plaintiff's voluntary resignation in any proceedings at law, Sir W. P. WOOD, V. C. (without calling on them), said-This is not a case for relief here. The whole matter is one to be tried at law, and the only thing to be seen to is, that no injury is done to the plaintiff with reference to his voluntary resignation, upon which he was to have been freed from his liabilities, though the directors afterwards found that they could not carry this out. I cannot go behind the deed of settlement of the company. It provides that the plaintiff is to take shares, and to be in the position of agent. Assuming, then, that the construction is in his favour, and that he is irremovable, except by consent of all the shareholders, or without being at the same time released from all liability in respect of his shares, what can this Court do? Upon the authorities, it is clear * See Brett v. East India and London Shipping Con pany (12 W. R. 596; 3. C., 2 Hem, & Mil. 404). 30 that it can do nothing; it cannot enforce the contract of agency, and the whole matter must, therefore, be left to law. The plaintiff will have his action for the breach of contract, where everything will be tried. His rights depend on the deed, which he does not seek to rectify. The Court cannot interfere in any of these matters. The only point to be taken care of is, that his resignation is not used against him, as it was given in, because it was held out to him that he would be released from his liability, which he could not be. Therefore, the directors being willing to give an undertaking as to that, I shall make no order on this motion. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. TRINITY TERM. [Before COCKBURN, C. J., and SHEE, J.] REG. V. THE LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH OF WORKSOP. -Dec. 13, 1864, and June 14, 1865. Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63), sects. 89 and 149-General district rate-Seal of board and signature of members, when necessary. Sect. 149 of the Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63), enacts, that whenever the consent or authority of the local board of health is required by the provisions of the act, the same shall be in writing, under their seal, and the hands of five or more of them:-Held, that this applies in the case of a general district rate imposed by a local board upon the inhabitants of the district, and that such a rate, if not under the seal of the board, and signed by five of its members, is invalid. Past and future expenses may be provided for in one and the same rate, under sect. 89, so long as the different items are sufficiently specified in the estimate. Quare, as to the effect of non-compliance with the requirements of sect. 98, with reference to the preparation of est amates of the sums required for the purposes of a rate? Ca se stated, on appeal, by the court of quarter sessions for the county of Nottingham: The parish of Worksop, in the county of Nottingham, was duly formed, in 1852, into a non-corporate district, for the purposes of the Public Health Act, 1848, and the provisions of the Local Government Act, 1858, have been duly applied thereto. There is a local board of health elected by the owners of property and ratepayers within the district. Alfred Broadhurst, a ratepayer within the district, s the appellant, and the local board of health are the espondents. On the 7th June, 1862, the local board gave public notice of their intention to make a general istrict rate. The rate was, in fact, intended to raise noney for the payment partly of future charges and expenses, and partly of charges and expenses incurred within six months before the making of the rate. An estimate of money required for the purposes in espect of which the rate was to be made was preared and approved by the local board before proceedng to make the rate. The estimate was entered in the rate-book as fol "The clerk produced general district rate, at 6d. in the pound, amounting to 4287. 15s. 11d.; and it was moved by Mr. Worth, and seconded by Mr. Martin, and unanimously resolved, that the rate now produced be, and the same is, declared made, and that the clerk do cause notice of the making thereof to be given, as required by law." The rate was set forth in the rate-book under this heading:-" An assessment for a general district rate, made by the local board of Worksop for defraying such rates as are by the Public Health Act, 1848, and the Local Government Act, 1858, chargeable upon that rate, this 16th day of June, 1862, after the rate of 6d. in the pound, upon the several occupiers and other parties liable by law to be assessed thereto, to commence and be payable on the 17th day of June, 1862." No seal or signature of the board was affixed to the rate in the rate-book. The making of the rate was duly published. Alfred Broadhurst appealed against the rate on several grounds, and the appeal was heard at the general quarter sessions for the county of Nottingham, held at Newark on the 20th October, 1862. The material objections to the rate urged at the trial were these:— That the local board of health had no power, under sect. 89 of the Public Health Act, to make one and the same rate for the payment of future expenses and of expenses already incurred; that the estimate of the money required for the purposes in respect of which the rate was to be made, did not shew the several sums required for each of such purposes with the particularity required by sect. 98 of the Public Health Act; that the rate was void, under sect. 149 of the Public Health Act, for want of the seal of the local board, and the signatures of five of its members to the rate in the rate-book. The court of quarter sessions held, that the local board had power to make one and the same rate for future and past expenditure. They held, that the purposes in respect of which the rate was to be made were set forth in the estimate with sufficient particularity; but they held, that the rate was void for want of the seal of the board and the signature of five of its members, and quashed the rate, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench upon all the three grounds of objection. If the Court of Queen's Bench should be of opinion that the rate is void in respect of any one or more of the three grounds of objection stated above, then the order of the court of quarter sessions quashing the rate was to be confirmed; otherwise, such order was to be quashed, and the rate confirmed. The costs of the appeal and special case to follow the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench. The case was first argued in Easter Term, 1864, by THE COURT (Cockburn, C. J., and Shee, J.) stopped the argument upon the point as to the absence of the seal, and took time to consider as to the two other points. The judgment of the Court was now (Dec. 13, 1864) delivered by COCKBURN, C. J.-This was a case on an appeal to the quarter sessions of the county of Nottingham, against a general district rate made by the respondents the local board of health of the non-corporate district of Worksop, on the 16th June, 1862. The objections to the rate were as follows: 1. That the estimate of the money required for the purposes in respect of which the rate was made did not shew the several sums required for each of such purposes, with the particularity required by sect. 98 of the Public Health Act, 1848. 2. That the respondents had no power, under sect. 89, to make one and the same rate for the payment of future expenses and expenses previously incurred. 3. That the rate was void, under sect. 149, for want of the seal of the board, and the signature of five of its members to the rate in the rate-book. The court of quarter sessions held the first and second of these objections to be unfounded, but they held the third objection to be fatal to the rate. We have no difficulty in holding the decision of the session as to the second objection to be right. The 89th section of the act authorises the making of rates by the local board to raise money for the payment of charges and expenses which may have been incurred within six months before the making of the rate; and it is not stated in the case before us that the expenses which this rate provided for retrospectively were of an earlier date. This being so, we see no objection to past and future expenses being provided for, so long as they are sufficiently specified in the estimate in one and the same rate. As regards the first head of objection, the 98th section of the act provides than an estimate shall be prepared by the board, of the money required for the purposes for which the rate is made, shewing the several sums required for each of such purposes, the rateable value of the property assessable, and the amount of rate which for these purposes it is necessary to make upon each pound of such value. And by sects. 99 and 100 the estimate so made is, after approval of it by the board, to be entered in the ratebook, to be open to public inspection at the office hours, any person being at liberty to take copies of, or make extracts from, it without fee or reward; and whosoever having the custody of it refuses to allow such inspetion or the taking of such copies or extracts, becomes for such offence liable to a penalty of 51. An estimate was in the present instance prepared and approved of as set forth in the case by the local board; but some of the items appear to us to be open to objection, as combining incongruous items one lump sum, in a manner inconsistent with the require ments of the act, and tending to conceal insed of conveying the information as to the local expenting which it was intended that the ratepayers should ha In the items, "Salaries of officers, 1781. 10.; re rates, and collector's poundage, 70l. 18s. 3d.; watering the public streets, and expenses of fire engine. 611: printing, stationery, advertisements, and postage, 4 3s. 7d.," the objects of expense mentioned have that sort of affinity to each other which, in any ordinary statement of outlay, would make it not improper t include them in the same class. In items thus grouped, though the exact amount already expended, or to be expended, upon any one object is not stated, a proximate conjecture may be formed of it by comparing the sum for the whole item with the various objects for which the sum is stated to be required. As t these items, therefore, we think there is in this est mate a substantial though not a literal with the requirements of the 98th section. But it is otherwise as respects the sixth and seventh items, vi "Election expenses, filling in and covering old eve and drains, and cleansing sewers and outfall, 65% law charges, surveyor's instruments, and incidental ex penses, 741. We think the ratepayers are entitled to know the amount of election expenses and law charges as well as of salaries of officers, and of rents, rates and collector's poundage. We think election expenses and law charges should not be mixed up with expenses of a totally different character, and which do not in the smallest degree assist in the formation of a proximate conjecture as to their amount. While, however, we have no hesitation in saying that the estimate in question is not a sufficient com pliance with the requirements of the 98th section, very serious difficulty presents itself as to what shoul! be held to be the consequence of the defectiveness of the estimate as respects the validity of the rate. the one hand, it is contended that compliance with the provisions of the 98th section, as regards the e timate, is a condition precedent to the authority make the rate; on the other, it is said that the enartment is directory only, and at most can only expo the board to such proceedings as may be the conse quence of disobedience to the directions of a statute on the non-performance of a statutory duty; but that the non-compliance with such directions in noy affect the validity of the rate. It appears to us the very considerable inconvenience will be likely to re from our holding in favour of either of these o flicting views. On the one hand, if we hold the visions of the 98th section and the following sectio to be conditions precedent to the validity of the te to be made under this act, the omission of any of t particulars in the estimate required by the 98th tion, however unimportant, or the uniting of two three items, not belonging to the same class, though no practical inconvenience might arise therefrom, be made a ground of exception to the validity of's rate; and so a door may be opened to a captions re payer to harass the local board, and cause expense the ratepayers, by appealing against the rates ne sary to carry on the purposes of the act. On the othe hand, if we hold the requirements of the 98th sett to be, as was contended by the respondents, directa only, it is obvious that a provision which is essent to protect the ratepayers against undue expenditu or abuse, may be set at naught, or rendered pract cally ineffectual, inasmuch as any remedy which th parties interested may have by indictment or the |