spent, should he afterwards pursue the study of fortification in all its different branches, in the works already before the public.

Lastly, in regard to the chapter which I have employed in de; scribing the influence of strong places in a general system of warfare, and in pointing out their proper situation, magnitude, distance, and number, the critic has contented himself with magisterially declaring my ideas equally ridiculous and absurd, without condescending to notice the reasons on which they are founded. It would be easy to prove that these principles have been and are still fol lowed; but I have already sufficiently trespassed on your limits; and therefore I content myself with opposing assertion to assertion; and declaring that I have drawn them from the great masters of the art, particularly from Cormontaigne, whose merit and reputation cannot be affected by my praises or the railings of my censor...

Feeling that a man of honour ought not to be indifferent to the opinion of the public in regard either to his writings or his person, the object of the present apology is simply to protest against the unqualified censures of a man whom I neither know nor wish to know, and whose design has evidently been to decry instead of to criticise my work. To leave such censures unnoticed, would have been to commit an injustice against myself; but, after this expla nation, I trust the liberality and wisdom of a British public will render it unnecessary to make any further reply to a series of invectives, not merely levelled against myself, but against national establishments of the most distinguished utility, especially in the present circumstances. I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

B. L. DE FAGES-VAUMALE.

POLITICS.

WE have long thought this country to be in a critical situation, and every day's experience seems to give fresh confirmation to the fact. Never surely was a crisis so truly aweful, nor one which more imperatively called for wisdom in council, and energy in action. The accounts received from the United States of America prove, beyond all possibility of a doubt, that Jefferson is at the head of a French faction, bent on war with England, from a servile wish to flatter the pride and to conciliate the friendship of that murderous usurper, whose iron reign is already extended over the fairest part of Europe. Indeed, Mr. Pickering, who has displayed the talents of an able statesman, has proved to demonstration, from existing and authentic documents, that the American Embargo Act was passed in compliance with the wishes of Buonaparte, as expressed by his minister Champagny, in his correspondence with general Armstrong. The very attempt to No. 127. Vol. 32. Jan. 1809.

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assign a false pretext for his conduct, and the dishonest efforts of the committee of congress to support that pretext, supply a satisfactory proof that it proceeded from motives which he was either ashamed, or afraid, to avow.

The alternative presented to the American legislature, by this complaisant committee, is well worthy the attention of our ministers. America must, they say, either continue the embargo, and ruin their trade; submit to the existing decrees and orders of France and Great Britain, by the sacrifice of their rights and independence; declare war against both; or make an enemy of the one and an ally of the other. Without stopping to analise this curious result of their laborious investigation, it is easy to perceive, that though these sage counsellors say that their country ought to go war with both France and England-the most preposterous of all notions!-they ardently wish to familiarise the minds of the people with the idea of war, with a view to prepare them for the final accomplishment of their leader's long meditated plan—a declaration of war against this country, and an alliance with France.

In pursuance of this plan, we state it as a fact, orders have been given, though not publicly, for preparing letters of marque and reprisal. Against whom, let us ask, can these preparations be made, except against Great Britain? Certainly not against France; for, independently of all the circumstances, France has not a frigate to 'fight, nor a merchantman to capture. But how far these foolish proceedings of the American government will turn to our benefit or disadvantage, must depend entirely on the conduct of our own cabinet. If we act wisely, America is playing the very game we could wish her to play. There is one leading object which should, at this crisis of our fate, engross, as it were, the attention of our ministers-the adoption of every possible means for rendering the commerce and security of Great Britain wholly independent of the continent of Europe, and of the American states. It is now an established fact, that lumber and staves, and every article of necessity, which we have been accustomed to draw from America, may be supplied either by our own colonists in Canada and Nova Scotia, or by our allies, the Portuguese, from the Brazils. It is, therefore, the bounden duty of ministers to afford every encouragement, by bounties, by an exclusive trade, or by any means which may be found most conducive to the object, to our colonists and allies, to exert themselves so as to render the supply adequate

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to the demand. This is not a matter of temporary concern, it is an object of permanent, and of paramount, importance. We have, at length, opened our eyes to our interest, and abandoned our suicidal policy, so far as to prohibit the consumption of French produce in our fleets and armies, and to substitute, in its place, the produce of our own colonies. It is now only a matter of astonishment to the world, as, indeed, it has for some time been to us, that we should so long have persisted in a practice, at once so absurd and so mischievous, so favourable to our enemies, and so destructive to ourselves. Let us, then, pursue and extend the same system of policy; let us reject the productions of France and America; draw all our supplies from Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Brazils; and endeavour to open new and sufficient markets for our manufactures, in the wide-extended regions of South America.HIC LABOR, HOC OPUS EST.

The ministers have no ordinary policy to adopt; have no trite and common maxims to follow; have no beaten track to pursue-all is new around them; their exertions must be proportioned to the exigency of the times; and they must never forget, that the opposition of ordinary means to extraordinary measures has produced the ruin of Europe and the triumph of France. We are not accustomed to employ revolutionary phrases, but, for once, we must observe, that, if the ministers be not à la hauteur des circonstances, if they be not prepared for efforts adequate to the emergency; they had much better forbear all further operations, and, without any more useless effusion of blood, bow the knee to Baal, and acknowledge the supremacy of Buonaparte! The times, in truth, are tremendously awful, and sufficient to appal the stoutest heart. All considerations must now give way to the safety of the state, and to the salvation of millionsLEX SUPREMA EST. No honest man can now take a part in the direction of public affairs, with the conscious deficiency of wisdom, activity, and vigour. In ordinary times, honesty alone is a strong recommendation to office, and a tolerable safeguard against public danger. But, in a revolutionary æra like this, first-rate talents, à mind fertile in resources, strong in resolution, and decisive in action, are essential qualifications for public situa tions of power and trust.

SALUS REIPUBLICÆ

There are, we trust, among the present ministers, men of this description; but that there are, amongst them, also, some of an opposite cast, it were folly to deny, and cowardice not to assert. Their actions, however, constitute the only fair criterion for the formation of a correct estimate of their knowledge and talents. We have given them honest praise for their past conduct; and we will judge of their future measures with the same impartiality.

The actual situation of the Spanish part of South America calls for the particular attention of government; the inhabitants of that country are extremely dissatisfied with the neglect of the Supreme Junta of Spain to allord them the smallest relief from the severe oppression, and tyrannical restrictions, under which they have long laboured. And whatever may be the issue of the present contest in Europe, they are determined to throw off the yoke of the mother country, and to assert their own independence. Had our government acted wisely, when they sent out expeditions to the Rio de la Plata, they would have offered to guarantee the independence of the South Americans, and have required no other return than a treaty of commerce, equally beneficial to both countries, instead of being actuated by visionary notions of impracticable conquests. As it is, ministers have a difficult part to play; for, by acknowledging the independence of South America, they may offend the patriots of Spain; and, on the other hand, by refusing the acknowledgement, they may lose an opportunity of the most important nature to the commercial and political interests of this country- an opportunity, which, once lost, may never return. They must have a better knowledge of the state of public affairs, and of the probability of success in any given quarter, than individuals can possibly possess. But the danger of hesitation is great, and the necessity of vigour and decision manifest.

We confess we have been disappointed at the conduct of our government, respecting the overtures which have been made to them by a public character from America. With the marked hostility displayed by the United States, what difficulty or hesitation there could be in acting on a long established and universally recognised principle of the law of nations, we are at a loss to imagine. To be scrupulous about the personal characte the individual

Avas surely no proof of political wisdom. The real points for consideration were, what good he proposed to do to this country, and what were his means of producing it. He is, unquestionably, a man of superior talents, and better acquainted with the disposition of the people of America, than any other person to whom ministers can possibly refer for information on that subject. If such scruples as these were suffered to operate as impediments to arrangements of great national importance, we should have no hope of success in a contest with such an enemy as Buonaparte, who (wisely for the accomplishment of his own plans) accepts offers of assistance from foreigners, without requiring them to bring with them certificates of good behaviour. If the amount of only one year's produce of the office of first teller of the exchequer had been properly applied in America, we should have heard nothing of embargo acts, non-intercourse bills, or alliance with France. Integrity in a statesman cannot be too highly admired; but puritanism, either in politics or religion, cannot be too strongly censured. We shall quit this subject for the present, but shall take an early opportunity of recurring to it.

The Report of the Court of Inquiry, on the Convention of Cintra, has astonished us beyond measure. And we derive no better reasons than the members have themselves supplied, to justify an opposite conclusion to that which they have drawn; and to demonstrate the necessity of further proceedings; unless, indeed, it be contended that error in judgment, in military commanders, affords no subject for prosecution and no ground of complaint, let its consesequences be what they may. We do not believe that any one will be found so bold as to maintain a proposition so preposterous; and, therefore, we shall take it for granted, that error in judgment, when it has led to error in practice, is a culpable defect, as well in military as in naval commanders. Nobody ever presumed to question the courage of an admiral who was tried, not long since, for not engaging an enemy of superior force; and indeed it was proved that his misconduct, for such it was pronounced, was imputable solely to an error in judgment. In this case, too, it was not pretended that he acted in opposition to the opinion of his best officers. But in Portugal it has been demonstrated, that Sir Harry Burrard, in refusing to pursue the defeated French, after the battle of Vimiera, acted in direct pposition to the opinion and advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley anc General Ferguson. The report