and romantic. To minds inured to danger, and with bodies hardened by incessant labour, toil, and pain, are inferior considerations. The waters of the Danube and the Euxine, the Don and the Volga, the shoals of the Caspian, the forests of Mazanderan, the sandy plains of Khorasan, the barren rocks of Herat, the mountains of the Paropamisus, or the petty warfare of the Afghan hordes, can present no obstacles to those, who have fought and conquered on the banks of the Po, the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Vistula; or have borne the privations of a Polish winter. Accustomed to conquer, they may be soon taught to despise every peril that thwarts their progress to victory. Stimulated by the remembrance of former glories, if they think on their absent friends and companions, it may only be to contrast with their exploits the bright deeds which they are preparing to achieve. Did not, they will say, Alexander trace the same victorious course? have not the Tartar, the Persian, and the Afghan, successfully invaded and conquered the fertile regions before us? and were the sons of Macedon, or the undisciplined myriads of Timur, Nadir, or Abdallah, more brave, or more powerful than the soldiers of Napoleon? • The empire of the world is the prize of our valour, and England is only to be conquered on the banks of the Indus and the <Ganges.'

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P. XXXV.

Against this formidable display of alarming dangers, which the author has too incautiously adopted from a pamphlet on the same subject, we shall adduce a few facts, Admitting the ability of France and Russia to assemble 30,000 men at Astracan, which is the utmost number that could possibly be supported in that barren region; this force has still to be embarked and transported above 200 leagues on the Caspian Sea. This voyage would require at least a month to perform in such a dangerous navigation; and when the troops landed at Astrabad, provisions for upwards of four months more must also be landed, for an army is not to expect supplies in the saline plains or mountains of Persia. Now the whole Russian shipping in the Caspian consisting only of four or five sloops of war and coasting vessels, perhaps does not amount to 2000 tons. These, it is evident, are very inadequate to transport an army of 50,000 men, with arms, ammunition, magazines, military stores, cannon, and provisions for five months. The shipping indeed necessary to transport such an army is more than all the powers of Russia can produce at Astracan in three years, Nor could this army be carried in two divisions, for, as it could not advance with safety through such countries but in great force, and as the double voyage from Astracan to Astrabad would occupy at least fou

months, the waste of provisions would form an insuperable difficulty. It is also to be remembered, that the shores of the Caspian Sea are more destructive to animal life than any other part in the known world. This is so notorious, that the least calculation which could be made of the mortality, would be two-fifths of the army before it reached the frontiers of Persia. It would then have to encounter, during the months of July and August, a hot destructive wind, not less pestiferous than the Sirocco, to march over salt and sandy deserts, plains covered with saltpetre, inaccessible summits, rocky declivities, impassable torrents, and impracticable forests, through countries inhabited by savage hordes too ferocious and too greedy of plunder to respect any alliances or any civil authority which would deprive them of their booty. The mandates of the Persian emperor would be found very unequal to the task of commanding the peaceful submission of all the petty princes and warlike nations which exist between the shores of the Caspian and Lahore, on the frontiers of British India. Nor can it be supposed that the Persians would now act as they did in the days of Alexauder, and that they would, notwithstanding their known hatred of the Russians, join them and the French, whose manners and customs are so dif ferent, to augment this allied army to 150,000 men. Mr. Chatfield seems to think, that the Franco-Russian army might proceed to Tahiran, the present capital of Persia, and thence to Delhi. Yet is it to be believed that the Persian emperor, however complaisant to Buonaparte at Paris, would quietly admit such a foreign force to enter his capital? But even were he thus credulous and imprudent, half of the army which embarked at Astracan would be dead before the remainder could reach Tahiran and Ispahan. We suspect, indeed, that it is wholly impossible for a French force ever to traverse the Caspian. If Frenchmen attempt to march to India, it will be much easier and safer for them to pass from Constantinople to Aleppo, traverse the Arabian Deserts to Bagdad, and thence to Ispahan, as they would not perhaps venture to embark in the Persian gulf, where they might find an English fleet, But there are still more difficulties: suppose Ispahan to be the place of rendezvous for the French and Russians, each pursuing their own route, would not the keeping of such a numerous body of men together, in such a country, generate mortal diseases? It is calculated, that about one

in twenty-five camels die on the road during twenty days march; one in eighteen, during thirty days; one in twelve, during forty; one in nine, during fifty; and one in five, during sixty. Now, supposing the army to set out with 50,000 camels (although this number is far too small), above 10,000 of them would be dead before they reached their first destination. Such a number of dead carcases, always increasing as the camels and men became more fatigued, and of course more susceptible of disease, would doubtless produce the annual plague of the country. If the whole army stopped, as a part could not, to bury them, its march would be considerably impeded, its sufferings by disease and fatigue increased, and would in all probability fall an easy prey to the first gang of robbers which came in sight of it. Buonaparte has already crossed the Deserts of Egypt; he will never again venture his men, unless they become rebellious, on similar destructive, and fruitless expeditions. We must then be permitted to "calculate on the distance, the incertitude, and the dangers of such an expedition to Europeans," and to conclude, contrary to our author, that, from an attentive review of the situation, climate, extent, and sterility of the country, and the manners of its few inhabitants, it is physically impossible for a French army to penetrate over land to the banks of the Indus, and there cope with 100,000 men trained and commanded by Britons *.

* It should here be observed, that the present Emperor of Persia, Fatah Ali Shah, derives his authority from the usurpation of his uncle, the Eunuch, Aga Mahomed, and can have no aversion from the usurpation of Buonaparte. But, as such power is always insecure, and particularly so in the East, the Persian emperor may not long enjoy tranquillity. He belongs to the Kajar or Quajar tribe (an appellation signifying rebel or deserter), which is detested by the Persian nobles; and even his own numerous family at his death would, no doubt, dispute the sovereignty which has long been the prize of the boldest competitor. The Persian imperial troops do not exceed 60,000 men, armed with matchlock guns, besides 20,000 honorary soldiers. The Zunds, whose family was deposed, now reside in Mazanderan, and only seek an opportunity to contend again for their legitimatę right to the throne. The appearance, therefore, of an European army, in Persia, would be the signal for civil war, and the allied French and Russians would find themselves just in time to be sacrificed to the vengeance of contending parties. The enemy, hows

Let it not, however, be supposed, that we are any more convinced of the security of Hindoostan than our author, although we may think it unassailable by a Gallo-Russian army. The wily enemy will soon find much cheaper, speedier, and more effectual means of attacking the British government in India, than by an impracticable expedition over land. His intrigues with the emperor and petty princes of Persia are already well known; he is now perhaps subsidising the powers of Cabul, Candahar, and the warlike Afghans; among whom French engineers and drill serjeants have been sent. It is not, indeed, with Frenchmen, who are now become little numerous, that he intends to vanquish the British in India; it is with countless hordes of natives, deserters, and traitors,

saries expect to glory," according to his own absurd bombast. But, admitting the possibility of a combined European army, assisted by Persia, Candahar, Cabul, and Lahore, reaching the west bank of the Indus, Mr. Chatfield asks,

cover themselves with that his emis

"Will the warlike Seiks, [who can bring 200,000 cavalry into the field, a force greater than that of any other state in Hindoostan, and] who have so long and so bravely resisted the inroads of their Afghan neighbours, suffer them to advance in peace under the banners of an invading army, which may have probably stipu lated, as the reward of their safe conduct, the surrender of their own rights and independence? Will the Rajpoot princes, the natural allies of England, refuse to join their forces with those troops, who, remembering the victories of Plassy and Buxar, and still covered with the hard-earned laurels of Delhi, Assye, and Laswarree, burn with impatience to measure again their bayonets with an

ever, has taken a much safer and more practical plan; already have his emissaries given the governor of Bombay considerable trouble, to prevent them from establishing a settlement at the bay of Cutch, on the frontiers of Guzerat. They have been more successful in Scindy, where it is believed they have privately been well received, and allowed to form settlements along the banks of the Indus. Fatah Ali has most probably ceded to the French the important islands of Ormuz and Kismis, which are the keys of the Persian Gulf. The island of Carek was expected to have a similar fate. Should the enemy thus obtain a chain of posts along the coast of Persia, he might then hope to transport an army and military stores from Aleppo to the Euphrates, and sail down that river to Bussora, thence to Ormuz and the banks of the Indus. A small British force, however, in the Persian Gulf would greatly bstruct this project.-Rev.

enemy, whom, in India, they have always conquered? Shall the eastern shore of the Indus be left open and defenceless, and the Panjab offer no obstructions to an invading army? or shall the enemy be suffered to advance to the ominous plains of Carnawl and Panniput, and the meed of empire be effeminately contended for, when the towers of imperial Delhi are almost placed within his view? No! the English army will still do its duty, and scorn to stain those laurels, which have now flourished under the growth of sixty years of success and victory. But allow this army all the glory it deserves; allow even what is, from the fickle state of the Indian mind, a matter at best problematical, that the Seiks and the Rajpoots are inclined to the English alliance, and active in its cause, this will not prove that the powers from the Indus to Cape Comorin and the Ganges, are well affected to a dominion which has so frequently given them cause of suspicion and distrust, nor will it remove the apprehension, that the seeds of revolt and disgust are not thickly sown amongst the Sepoys in our own service. What then could a handful of British troops, however ardent, however brave, effect against an enemy, equal or superior to it perhaps, in point of numbers, and having, besides, the powerful aid of religious prejudices to benumb, or divert the co-operation of the auxiliary forces?" P. xxxviii.

The following reflexions contain such cogent, indubitable, and salutary truths; evince such efficient principles of sound policy (now so rare), and breathe' such genuine patriotism and philanthropy, that they caunot be too gene

The Mutiny at Vellore, and other symptoms of sedition manifested amongst the native troops in the Carnatic, seemed strongly to indicate that other causes, besides the intrigues of Tippoo's sons, had alienated the minds of the soldiers. The measure of interfering with the religious distinctions of either Hindus or Mahomedans, is so fraught with danger, that we ought not so much to be astonished at the event, as at the folly, which gave birth to it. It is said, (Waring's Tour to Sheeraz,) that the slighest breath will often turn the tide of popular favour; and that an eastern commander, instead of looking up to his troops for protection, often considers them his most dangerous enemies; that, obedience in the East is the reward of cruelty; and that the successes of Zenghis Khan, Timour, and Nadir Shah, were chiefly to be attributed to the severity of their discipline.' But, whatever may be the peculiar effects of climate, in altering some of the feelings of men; the force of nature is too strong not to show, that a people ruled with lenity, caunot always be insensible of gratitude, and that obedience preserved by cruelty, rests only on a sandy foundation; whilst discipline, tempered with mildness, and respecting the habits and observances of men, in whatever condition they are placed, must always produce the most beneficial consequences.