THE

ANTIJACOBIN

Review and Magazine,

&c. &c. &c.

For APRIL, 1809.

Gli Stati deboli sempre fieno ambigui nel resoluersi, et sempre le deliberationi lente sono nociue. MACHIAVELLI.

An historical Review of the commercial, political, and moral State of Hindoostan, from the earliest Period to the present Time: the Rise and Progress of Christianity in the East, its present Condition, and the Means and Probability of its future Advancement. With an Introduction and Map, illustrating the relative Situation of the British Empire in the East. By Robert Chatfield, LL. B. Vicar of Chatteris, in Cambridgeshire. 4to. pp. xlii and 451. Richardson. 1808.

.

EVERY new publication relative to Hindoostan, which

either collects the detached information already before the public, or brings some original facts to our knowledge, is a national service. A country so extensive and so important, we do not say essential, to the prosperity of the British empire, cannot be too well known or too often described. It is true such minute explanations may also enlighten the enemy and expose our weak parts; but the security of British India should not depend on his ignorance. Our government there ought to rest on the immu table basis of public justice united with practical utility,' and not on any of those temporary expedients which sooner or later render weakness contemptible. A system of policy indeed which seeks to support itself by expedients, will never lay the foundation of an extensive or permanent empire, neither will it long effect the security of that already established. It is in vain that our arms interpose to prevent the rapacity of native princes, if the exactions No. 130. Vol. 32. April. 1809.

of our subordinate agents are equally distressing to the people. It is not less criminally foolish to violate their religious prejudices to-day, and flatter them to-morrow, when resistance is made. Such conduct being uninfluenced by reason, of course no rational motive for it can be perceived by the ignorant Hindoo, who will soon learn to consider it as an irrefragable proof of wanton malignity and dastardly imbecility. Individuals, we know, have attempted to palliate such measures, by alleging the stupidity of the natives was such, that their thoughts never extended beyond the sensible objects before them. Were this allegation true, we should consider the original offence still more heinous. If they are influenced only by their feelings, it follows that we should always endeavour to make that impression upon them which would tend most to the general advantage. But it is not denied that Hindoos have memories as well as Europeans, that they remember insults or extortions with equal facility, and that they can also communicate their recollections to their offspring. These recollections, there is too much reason to fear, if not decidedly hostile, are by no means friendly, to British authority. Gratitude and revenge are common to the human race; and, although they often exist without reason, they seldom endure long without a motive. A wise government would seek to inspire the former emotion, and avoid every cause for generating the latter. The ignorance and illiterateness of the natives no doubt render them extremely difficult to manage; but, although they are not capable of abstract reasoning, or of duly appreciating what would eventually tend to their own interest, we might nevertheless make a strong impression on their feelings highly favourable to the British government and laws, and above all to the immense power of our invincible arms. The effect however of objects on those who reason and those who only feel is very different; yet he who assiduously studies the latter may learn the means of influencing them as easily as reasoners are influenced by arguments. It would be foolish, indeed, to expect such acquirements in persons who only consider the speediest methods of accumulating wealth in order to return to their native country. But of these we shall have occasion to speak in the course of our analysis of this "Historical Review:" we must now turn to our author's introduction, which merits more than ordinary attention at the present

crisis.

Mr. Chatfield begins with the earliest records of society, the increase of population, wealth, and the dawn of commerce and the arts in the East; in that country, the present inhabitants of which are accounted, by certain superficial declaimers, so incorrigibly stupid as to be incapable of all intellectual improvement. As population and wealth increased, new desires were created; new sources of pleasure or gratification were alternately discovered and exhausted; until what was at first only matter of taste or delicacy became at length an object of paramount importance. In this state, from its peculiar situation and products as well as the taste and ingenuity of its inhabitants, India could best supply the increasing refinements of the times; and its delicate fabrics were not only earnestly sought after, but became a subject of competition between adjacent nations. The importance of this traffic, which was probably a principal source of the opulence and power of the empires of Nineveh and Assyria, appears to have engaged the attention of mankind, at a period too early for any authentic records of its existence to remain. The origin, decline, and fall of the Syrian, Phoenician, Egyptian, and Carthaginian commerce are better ascertained, as well as the more modern trade of the Venetians, Genoese, Florentines, and Portuguese. The fanatical crusades, however, like all other wars, extended the actual boundaries of civil refinement: the crusaders beheld, admired, and secretly imbibed a taste for, the luxuries of Asia; while the discovery of the magnetic needle led to that of the Cape of Good Hope and the passage to India, which has since contributed to enrich and adorn the people of Europe.

"The Portuguese and Dutch," (observes our intelligent author) long possessed the sovereignty of these seas; and the power enjoyed in the East by the other nations of Europe was almost too inconsiderable to be deemed a matter of national concern, when a singular concurrence of events brought the Mogul Empire to the brink of destruction, and transferred its fairest possessions to the dominion of Great Britain.

"Of all the European naval powers, England was the only one which had not hitherto made any material territorial acquisitions in the East, when the ambition and the intrigues of France compelled her to fight for her independence, until, from having been only an ally of the Nabob of Arcot, she became, by her conquests, the Sovereign of a principal portion of the Carnatic. The English power grew under the dissensions of the native princes, and the jealousy of the Mogul Omrahs: a succession of brilliant victories

and negociations gave it at length the undisputed sovereignty of India, and advanced its boundaries to the regions of the Punjab,or that country which is watered by the five branches of the Indus." P. xiii.

"France has long viewed the English empire in India with a jealous eye. Anterior to the Revolution, her object was not trade, but dominion; and subsequent to that eventful period, her views have been directed to the same quarter, with a more alarming vigilance. At every Durbar, her ministers have been active, and her emissaries have been spread through every region where the murmur of disaffection could excite the hope of revolt: nor has her attention been solely confined to the courts of Hindoostan; the seeds of future revolutions in the East have been long nourished in her capital; the languages of Turkey, Persia, and India, have been taught to the pupils of her military schools, in order, at some future period, to organise rebellion, or assist the efforts of the frontier nations in subverting the British empire in the East." P. xiv.

Mr. Chatfield then proceeds to examine the practicability of the Gallo-Russian project to invade Hindoostan by marching through Persia, and seems inclined to think it possible. We shall state his views, which are evidently well digested, although not conclusive. He takes for granted that Russia can assemble an army at Astracan, whence it may embark on the Caspian Sea, sail to the southeastern extremity, land and march to "the city of Tahiran, which is situated about twelve marches from the Caspian Sea, and little more from Ispahan," the Persian capital. Thence, according to Tavernier, he estimates the distance to Candahar at eighty-nine days journey; from Candahar to Cabul, twenty-four; from Cabul to Lahore, twenty-two; and thence to Delhi, eighteen; making one hundred and fifty-three days journey from Ispahan to Delhi, or one hundred and seventy-seven from the shores of the Caspian to Delhi.

"Of Lahore, it may be remarked, that it is a city of the highest antiquity, giving its name to the province of which it is the capital, and standing on the great road leading from Delhi to Persia and Samarcand. It is oftener named Panjab than Lahore, from the five rivers which intersect it before their junction with the Indus. Lahore is one of the largest and most fertile provinces of Hindoostan, abounding in wine, sugar, cotton, wool, and all the necessaries of life. Nor is it only from its fertility, that it deserves our particular consideration, but as it has been from the age of Alexander to the present day the theatre of those great battles, which have decided the fate of India. It was principally by the valour and enterprise of the troops of this frontier province, that

both Alexander and the first Arabian conquerors, were prevented from carrying their victorious arms to the Ganges. Mahmoud, the Scourge of Hindoostan, who, in his twelve celebrated expeditions into this devoted country, had traversed its extent from the mountains of Peropamisus to the junction of the Ganges and the Jumna, and from Moultan and Agimere to the shores of the ocean, and the Temple of Sumnaut, saw the value of Lahore, and had met many severe checks from the bravery of its inhabitants, and, therefore, in his tenth expedition, he made it an integral part of the Gaznevide empire." P. xxi.

"Two routes have been traced for the march of the combined Russian and French armies towards the Persian frontier, supposing that the expedition is conducted not only with the consent of the King of Persia, but that every thing necessary for the subsistence of the armies shall be furnished by him on their passage through his territories. One point of departure is from the duchy of Warsaw; the other from Dalmatia; Astracan to be the place of rendezvous. By the former route, the march will be more difficult, as the greater part of it must be performed by land; by the latter, the Russian vessels on the Black Sea will lessen the fatigue of the soldiers, and transport them to the right shore of the Sea of Azof. Thence, crossing the Don, they will march to Czaritzin on the Volga, where boats will be prepared to convey them to Astracan at which place they will probably be joined by the Russian reinforcements. The march by the former route has been computed at 560 leagues, and may be accomplished in three months: that from Dalmatia at about half the distance and half the time.

"Of the practicability of either of these schemes, with the aid of a Russian fleet in the Euxine, and the supplies that may be furnished by that power in the march from the Sea of Azof to the Volga, no reasonable doubt can exist. The passage of the Caspian Sea is also secured by the Russian transports, and nothing but the dangers of the navigation can prevent the combined armies from landing either at Astrabad or Balfroush on the S. E. shore, where the Persian alliance can alone contribute to the security of their further progress." P. Xxvi.

"The distance from he S. E. extremity of the Caspian Sea, to the town of Attock on the Indus is, in a direct line, 1130 miles; from Attock to Delhi, 587. The whole distance then from Astrabad to Delhi is 1717 miles; or allowing for the deviation of roads, about 2200 miles." P. Xxxiii.

"Let not any man presume to calculate upon the distance, the incertitude, the dangers of any expedition, to be undertaken by Europeans, so far from their own country, or to brand it as wild

"The distance by land from Astracan to Czaritzin is 260 miles. Thence is a chain of redoubts to the nearest point of the Don of 40 miles.