was woefully deficient in another respect, for it wholly omitted to notice one important point which was an object of specific reference to the Court-we mean, the terms or conditions of the Convention. It is not easy to conceive how this could have been overlooked by them; but so it was;-and even when the members were reminded of the omission, and called upon to supply this extraordinary defect, they contented themselves with an expression of approbation or disapprobation of the Convention in the aggregate; and assigned no specific reasons, and entered into no detail, respecting articles unparallelled in the history of military treaties! Fortunately, however, the disgrace attached to this part of the transaction will attach where alone it ought to attach; and we congratulate the nation on the formal disavowal of the principle on which the articles referred to were founded, as well as of the articles themselves, by the highest authority in the country. In the official communication to Sir H&w Dalrymple, that officer is told, that "HIS MAJESTY felt himself compelled, at once, to express his disapprobation of those articles, in which stipulations were made directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations." Again, after the Inquiry was closed, the KING repeated his disapprobation, " deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorised admission, into Military Conventions, of articles of such a description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences." We take some credit to ourselves for having been the first to point out the gross impropriety, and the dangerous tendency, of those articles, in our animadversions on the Convention immediately after it was received.

Another part of the same communication, however, has excited very different sensations in our minds, from the information which it conveys of the adoption, by the King, of the opinion of the Court of Inquiry" that no further military' proceeding is necessary to be had upon the transactions referred to their investigation." This is to us, we confess, and will be, we are persuaded, to a great majority of the nation, most unwelcome intelligence. We repeat, that, from a most attentive perusal of the report, and a most serious consideration of the reasons assigned by the different members, we not only have found no ground for this opinion, but abundant proofs, to satisfy our minds, of

the necessity of instituting further proceedings. Stripped of all meretricious embellishments, and of all collateral and superfluous matter, let us see what is the plain fact.—A British army is sent, as auxiliaries to the government of Portugal, to recover the possession of their country from the French; a general action takes place, soon after their arrival, in which the whole of the French force is defeated by a part of the British force; when the action has begun, a new British commander arrives, who, however, leaves the conduct of the battle to the officer who had planned it; that officer, and another officer who had commanded a division of the victorious army, propose immediately to improve the advantage obtained by a prompt and vigorous pursuit of the flying lines; the new commander rejects the proposal, and keeps the army on the ground; the next day another new commander arrives, and concludes an armistice with the enemy, to be followed up by a definitive convention; pending the negociation, a considerable reinforcement of British troops reaches the scene of action-no advantage, however, is taken of this favourable circumstance; the negociation continues, as if it never had occurred; and, after nine days, terminates, by granting to the conquered army terms as favourable as they could have desired had they been victorious, and still thought their services would be more beneficial to their country in another quarter.-The conditions of the Convention are universally acknowledged to be dishonourable to this country, and advantageous only to the enemy. The officer who concluded the treaty exceeds his authority, by the admission of articles on subjects of which he could have no cognisance, and by invading the rights and the sovereignty of the ally whom he was sent to protect, by extending pardon and impunity to all his traitorous and rebellious subjects. The reason assigned as the motive of his conduct is proved to be insufficient, frivolous, and absurd. He was influenced, forsooth, by a conviction of the necessity of strengthening the Spanish army with all possible expedition. Yet he suffers the transports, by which alone the British army could be either expeditiously or conveniently conveyed to Spain, to be filled with the enemy's troops. The consequence is, that twenty thousand French troops with their commander reinforce the enemy's army in Spain before sixteen thousand British troops can reach that country from Portugal. And yet we are to be told, when the nation is thus disgraced, and when the noble cause which

they are sustaining is thus injured, there is nobody to blame, that there is no ground for bringing any one of the commanders to trial!!! If indeed our military code be so dreadfully deficient as to provide no punishment for such misconduct, it is high time that it should undergo a legislative revision, and be rendered more effective for the purposes of enforcing an observance of military duty, and of protecting the nation, against dishonour and injury, from the ignorance of military commanders.

As to courts of inquiry, the conduct of the late Court has altered our opinion respecting their utility; and unless the improvements which we lately suggested are adopted, we hope never to see another such court assembled. Indeed, some of the members of the late Court seem to have rendered the duties of the judge subser, vient to the feelings of the officer; while one at least appeared chiefly anxious to transfer the blame from the commanders to the ministers. But it would puzzle a wiser head, we conceive, and we say it without meaning any disrespect to the members, than any which that Court contained, to find out any ground of censure against ministers, for sending out commanders, to whom the Court themselves attach no blame; and against whom, in the opinion of the Court, no proceedings ought to be instituted. If the commanders be blameless, how can blame attach to those who appointed them? The supposition is ridiculous. We, however, think other wise; and therefore, though it be grossly inconsistent on the part of the Court of Inquiry, it is perfectly consistent, on our part, to ayow our fixed opinion, that blame, and very great blame, attaches to the person or persons by whom Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Hew Dalrymple were appointed. This is a subject which must, and no doubt will, experience the most ample investigation. Whether the appointment of these officers originated with the commanderin-chief or with the secretary for the war-department, some very satisfactory reasons indeed, of the existence of which we have not the smallest conception, must be assigned, before such appointment can be justified in the eyes of the country. And if no such reasons be assigned, whatever the decision of Parliament may be on the subject, the voice of the nation will proclaim these censures, which every friend of his country must feel to be just, and must, of course, wish to hear strongly pronounced and properly applied. We must abolish the wretched system of favouritism and influence, in respect of military appointments, or

we shall have little chance of successfully opposing our enemy in the field. And there is not one public writer in the kingdom, unless influenced by sinister motives, and having sinister views, nor one individual who really loves his country, who will refuse to contribute his efforts to the accomplishment of an object of such vital importance to the dearest interests of the state. He must be a wretch, indeed, and wholly unworthy the name and character of an Englishman, who, in the discussion of such a subject, can suffer himself to be influenced by party-spirit, or biassed by selfish motives. It is the pure, noble, unadulterated sentiment and feeling of genuine patriotism, that should fire the heart and invigorate the mind, when an object of this paramount consequence is to be considered. All prejudice and all partiality to ministers, or to opposition, should be sunk in the discussion; and the COUNTRY alone be allowed to occupy our thoughts, to animate our efforts, and direct our judgment. In the investigation, as in the decision, all consideration for individuals, of whatever rank or party, should be disregarded; and truth, honour, and justice, employed in the best of causes, and directed to the best of purposes, should assert their undivided sway over the mind. We are well disposed to the present ministers, we admire the principles on which they came into power, and we approve the greater part of their conduct since they have been in office; but the support of them must be a subordinate consideration to the support of our country, and depend entirely on the tendency of their measures to forward her interests, and to promote her prosperity. A support so regulated, and so principled (if the expression may be allowed), is the only support which honest men will consent to give, or which honest ministers can wish to receive. Hence it follows, of necessity, that if they could have recourse to a system of policy, wholly or partially inimical to the public welfare, which, we feel persuaded, the present ministers never will, they would have us for their opponents. If, for instance, they could connive at the bestowal of blank commissions, extending even to the commission of a field officer, on a common prostitute, to be filled up with the names of any person to whom she might sell them- —a practice from the disgrace of which this country is happily rescued by the known purity which prevails in her military department-would it not be our duty to raise our voice against these faithless servants of the crown, who could basely violate the trust reposed in them by their sove.

reign, by the toleration of an abuse so well calculated to bring his authority into contempt, and so highly dangerous to the state? We hope never to be put to such a trial; but if, in some luckless hour, when the genius of Britain slumbered, it should be the case, we feel sufficient firmness to discharge that duty. Though we may not have to dread the existence of so flagrant an abuse, the occurrence of such an extreme case as that which we have suggested-and though we be ready to admit that the present commander-in-chief introduced many salutary regulations into the army-still it cannot be denied that there yet remains abundant necessity for farther and more extensive reforms. Besides the mode of appointing commanders, of the fatal tendency of which we have recently had such flagrant instances, there are many other abuses which call for immediate and effectual regulation. The fantastic mode of drilling and manoeuvring our troops, fashioned after the distinguished system of the German school, which has brought that country to the brink of ruin, is not only ridiculous but prejudicial; and should be made to yield to a more simple and natural mode of training men for offensive warfare. The arbitrary power, too, assumed by the colonels of regiments, to alter the dress of their officers at their pleasure, and too often most capriciously exercised in a manner ruinous to the subalterns, should be either wholly removed, or effectually checked. If colonels paid more attention to the principles of their officers, and less to their uniforms, we should not be so frequently disgusted by the sight of a determined jacobin in regimentals, or by hearing sentiments of disloyalty from a man bearing his majesty's commission! We trust we shall live to see the day, when no military commission will be sold, and when merit (not interest or favour) will be the only means of promotion.

Before these strictures can meet the public eye, the two houses of Parliament will probably have come to some decision on the Convention of Cintra. There is one point connected with this question, on which, we confess, we cannot devise any mode of justification to which the secretary for the war department can have recourse. From the papers laid before the Court of Inquiry, it appeared, that, on the appointment of Sir Hew Dalrymple to the command of the army in Portugal, Lord Castlereagh expressly recommended him to listen to the advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley, whom he was sent to supersede, Whence could this recommen