plishment of the object. If this were so it would only shew the necessity of some further provision on this subject, but surely it will not be pretended that it would justify the usurpation by Congress of a power, not only not granted by the Constitution, but purposely withheld.

We think, however, that this exposition of the Constitution places the protection of manufactures on the true foundation, on which it should stand in such a Government as ours. Nothing can be more monstrous than that the industry of one or more States in this confederacy, should be made profitable at the expense of others, and this must be the inevitable result of any scheme of legislation by the General Government, calculated to promote Manufactures by restrictions upon Commerce or Agriculture. But leave manufactures where agriculture and other domestic pursuits have been wisely left by the Constitutionwith the several States; and ample security is furnished that no preference will be given to one pursuit over another, and if it should be deemed adviseable in any particular State, to extend encouragement to manufactures, either by direct appropriations of money, or in the way pointed out in the Article of the Constitution above quoted, that this will be done not at the expense of the rest of the Union, but of the particular State whose citizens are to derive the advantages of those pursuits. Should Massachusetts, for instance, find it to her advantage to engage in the Manufacture of Woollens or Cottons, or Pennsylvania be desirous of encouraging the working of her Iron Mines, let those States grant bounties out of their own Treasuries, to the persons engaged in these pursuits; and should it be deemed adviseable to encourage their manufactures by duties, "discouraging the importation of similar articles," in these respective States, let them make an application to Congress, whose consent would doubtless be readily given to any acts of those States, having these objects in view. The Manufacturers of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania would thus be encouraged at the expense of the people of these States respectively. But when they claim to do more than this,-to encourage their industry, at the expense of the industry of the people of the other States, to promote the Manufactures of the North, at the expense of the Agriculture of the South, by restrictions upon Commerce,—in a word,

to secure a monopoly for their manufactures, not only in their own market, but throughout the United States, then we say, that the claim is unjust, and cannot be granted consistently with the principles of the Constitution, or the great ends of a Confederated Government. We shall not stop to inquire whether, as has been urged with great force, that provision of the Constitution, which confers the power upon Congress "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," does not, by a necessary implication, deny to Congress the power of promoting the useful arts (which include both agriculture and manufactures) by any other means than those here specified. It is sufficient for our purpose to shew that the power of promoting manufactures as a distinct substantive object of legislation, has no where been granted to Congress. As to the incidental protection that may be derived from the rightful exercise of the power, either of regulating commerce, or of imposing taxes, duties and imposts, for the legitimate purposes of government,-this certainly, may be as freely enjoyed by manufactures as it must be by every other branch of domestic industry. But as the power to regulate commerce, conferred expressly for its security, cannot be fairly exerted for its destruction, so neither can it be perverted to the purpose of building up manufacturing establishments,—an object entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal Government,—so also, the power to levy taxes, duties, imposts and excises, expressly given for the purpose of raising revenue, cannot be used for the discouragement of importations, for the purpose of promoting manufactures, without a gross and palpable violation of the plain meaning and intent of the federal compact. Acts may be passed on these subjects, falsely purporting, on their face, to have been enacted for the purpose of raising revenue and regulating commerce, but if in truth, they are designed (as the Acts of 1824, 1828, and 1832, confessedly and avowedly have been) for an entirely different purpose, viz: for the encouragement and promotion of manufactures-the violation of the Constitution is not less gross, deliberate and palpable, because it assumes the most dangerous of all forms, a violation by perversion, the use of a power granted for one purpose, for another and a different purpose, in

relation to which, Congress has no power to act at all. On the whole, even from the very brief and imperfect view which we have here taken of this subject, we think we have demonstrated that the protecting system is as gross and palpable a violation of the Constitution, according to its true spirit, intent and meaning, as it is unquestionably unequal, oppressive and unjust in its bearing upon the great interests of the country, and the several sections of the Union.

But great as are the evils of the American System, fatal as it assuredly must be to the prosperity of a large portion of the Union, and gross as is the violation of the letter and spirit of the Constitution which it perpetrates, the consequences which must inevitably result from the establishment of the pernicious principles on which it is founded, are evils of still greater magnitude. An entire change in the character of the Government is the natural and necessary consequence of the application to the Constitution of those latitudinous rules of construction, from which this system derives its existence, and which must "consolidate the States by degrees into one sovereignty; the obvious tendency and inevitable result of which would be to transform the present representative system of the United States into a Monarchy.”*

We fearlessly appeal to all considerate men, whether it be in the nature of things possible, to hold together such a Confederacy as ours, by any means short of a military despotism, after it has degenerated into a Consolidated Government;—that is to say, after it shall come to be its established policy to exercise a general legislative control over the interests and pursuits of the whole American People.

Can any man be so infatuated as to believe, that Congress could regulate wisely the whole labor and capital of this vast Confederacy? Would it not be a burden too grievous to be borne, that a great central Government, necessarily ignorant of the condition of the remote parts of the country, and regardless perhaps of their prosperity, should undertake to interfere with their domestic pursuits, to control their labor, to regulate their property, and to treat them in all respects as dependent Colonies, governed not with reference to their own interests but the inter

*Madison's Report.

to secure a monopoly for their manufactures, not only in their own market, but throughout the United States, then we say, that the claim is unjust, and cannot be granted consistently with the principles of the Constitution, or the great ends of a Confederated Government. We shall not stop to inquire whether, as has been urged with great force, that provision of the Constitution, which confers the power upon Congress "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," does not, by a necessary implication, deny to Congress the power of promoting the useful arts (which include both agriculture and manufactures) by any other means than those here specified. It is sufficient for our purpose to shew that the power of promoting manufactures as a distinct substantive object of legislation, has no where been granted to Congress. As to the incidental protection that may be derived from the rightful exercise of the power, either of regulating commerce, or of imposing taxes, duties and imposts, for the legitimate purposes of government,—this certainly, may be as freely enjoyed by manufactures as it must be by every other branch of domestic industry. But as the power to regulate commerce, conferred expressly for its security, cannot be fairly exerted for its destruction, so neither can it be perverted to the purpose of building up manufacturing establishments,—an object entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal Government,—so also, the power to levy taxes, duties, imposts and excises, expressly given for the purpose of raising revenue, cannot be used for the discouragement of importations, for the purpose of promoting manufactures, without a gross and palpable violation of the plain meaning and intent of the federal compact. Acts may be passed on these subjects, falsely purporting, on their face, to have been enacted for the purpose of raising revenue and regulating commerce, but if in truth, they are designed (as the Acts of 1824, 1828, and 1832, confessedly and avowedly have been) for an entirely different purpose, viz: for the encouragement and promotion of manufactures-the violation of the Constitution is not less gross, deliberate and palpable, because it assumes the most dangerous of all forms, a violation by perversion, the use of a power granted for one purpose, for another and a different purpose, in

over every object of local concernment; thereby reducing the States to petty corporations, shorn of their sovereignty, mere parts of one great whole, standing in the same relation to the Union as a county or parish to the State of which it is a subordinate part.

Such is the true character, and such the inevitable tendencies of the American System. And when the case, thus plainly stated, is brought home to the bosoms of patriotic men, surely it is not possible to avoid the conclusion, that a political system, founded on such principles, must bear within it the seeds of premature dissolution, and that though it may for a season be extended, enlarged and strengthened, through the corrupting influence of patronage and power, until it shall have embraced in its serpent folds all the great interests of the State, still the time must come when the people, deprived of all other means of escape, will rise up in their might and release themselves from this thraldom, by one of those violent convulsions, whereby society is uprooted from its foundations, and the edict of Reform is written in blood.

Against this system, South Carolina has remonstrated in the most earnest terms. As early as 1820, there was hardly a district or parish in the whole State, from which memorials were not forwarded to Congress, the general language of which was, that the protecting system was "utterly subversive of their rights and interests." Again, in 1823 and 1827, the people of this State rose up almost as one man, and declared to Congress and the world, "that the protecting system was unconstitutional, oppressive and unjust." But these repeated remonstrances were answered only by repeated injuries and insults, by the enacting of the tariffs of 1824 and 1828. To give greater dignity, and if possible more effect to these appeals, the Legislature, in Dec. 1825, solemnly declared, "that it was an unconstitutional exercise of power on the part of Congress, to lay duties to protect domestic manufactures," and in 1828, they caused to be presented to the Senate of the U. States, and claimed to have recorded on its Journals the solemn Protest of the State of South Carolina, denouncing this system as "utterly unconstitutional, grossly unequal and oppressive, and such an abuse of power as was incompatible with the principles of a free government, and the great