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the tyranny of majorities, driving minorities to desperation."* The resource of minorities under such circumstances has ever been, through all periods of history, one only-the surrender of their own liberties to some one man, capable of defending them against a greater oppression; and the easy and natural steps by which, in pure democracies, this transition takes place, has been lately described with philosophical accuracy by Dr. Lieber, Professor of History and of Political Philosophy and Economy in the State College of South Carolina, in his work "On Civil Liberty and Self-Government." Professor Lieber says truly "That the multitude are necessarily led by a few, or by one; and thus we meet in history with the invariable result that virtually one man rules where the absolute power of the people is believed to exist. After a short interval, that one person openly assumes all power, sometimes observing certain forms of having the power of the people passed over to him. The people have already been familiar with the idea of absolutism; they have been accustomed to believe that wherever the public power resides it is absolute and complete; so that it does not appear strange to them that the new monarch should possess the unlimited power which actually resided in the people or was considered to have belonged to them. There is but one step from the all-powerful people' (the 'peuple tout-puissant'), if indeed it amounts to a step, to an emperor all powerful." And he intimates that the changes that have actually occurred in history, from democracies, to absolutism in the hands of one man, are attributable to the fact that the people "consciously or instinctively"
* De la Démocratie en Amérique, vol. ii. ch. 7.
† London, 1853, p. 331.
surrendered their liberties, " because the ancient institutions had become oppressive."
NOTE IV. (TO CHAPTER XIII.)
There is no circumstance which is more directly preparing the way for the transition above-mentioned (from ultra-democratic tyranny, to absolutism in the hands of one man) than the growing habit of external aggression, and the wide-spread anxiety among the democratic party in the United States to take a part in the affairs of Europe. It is superfluous to refer to the solemn warnings bequeathed by Washington, and by all the great men of the revolution, on this momentous subject. From the moment that the fellow-countrymen of Washington act in opposition to that advice, they will have passed a turning-point in their history, beyond which they will have before them sea without shore."
The authors of the "Federalist," seeing in the possibility of internal war between the individual States the great danger to liberty, employed all their reason and eloquence in softening down the causes of difference, and in pointing out the inevitable consequences should hostilities unfortunately arise. Their arguments apply with even greater force to the consequences which would ensue from their involving themselves with foreign powers by an aggressive policy, which those powers would feel compelled to resist. The paper, No. 8, attributed to General Hamilton, urges that war, or the apprehension of war, which requires a state of constant preparation, infallibly produces
the necessity for standing armies; that States having recourse to them, and to "a more regular and effective system of defence by disciplined troops and by fortifications," must at the same time "strengthen the executive arm of Government; in doing which their Constitutions would acquire a progressive direction towards monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority."*"But in a country where the perpetual menacings of danger oblige the Government to be always prepared to repel it, her armies must be numerous enough for instant defence. The continual necessity for his services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil."
General Hamilton distinguishes the case of Great Britain from that of the military powers on the Continent, and shows that our insular situation and the spirit of our government expose us to no such danger. But if it be true, in the words of Mr. Justice Story, that "the best talents and the best virtues are driven from office by intrigue or corruption, or by the violence of the press and of party;" if the complaints so often uttered in the United States, that men of cultivation, of high principle, and mature wisdom are more and more indisposed to the duties of political life, are well founded, then must the tendency increase to select military men for office, if for no other reason, at least for this, that they will have had more experience in affairs, and know how to govern men. And the necessity of being governed, will, irrespective of the aspirations after conquest and a military name, be more and more pressing upon the people of the United States. + Page 45.
in proportion as ultra-democracy extends its dislocating and disturbing influences; and while “elevating the military state above the civil" in opinion, will lay the sure foundations of its predominance in real power.
NOTE V. (TO CHAPTER XV.)
The great constitutional check upon the tyranny of majorities (the independence of the judiciary), referred to by Mr. Justice Kent in the following passage, has since, as we have seen, been entirely abolished in more than fivesixths of the individual States, and is threatened in the Constitution of the United States, by the course of events and of public opinion:
"M. De Tocqueville is of opinion, that if the free institutions of America are to be destroyed, it will be owing to the tyranny of majorities driving minorities to desperation. The majority constitutes public opinion, which becomes a tyrant, and controls freedom of discussion and independence of mind. This is his view of the question, and English writers on the institutions of society in this country have expressed the same opinion. If there was no check upon the tyranny of legislative majorities, the prospect before us would be gloomy in the extreme. But in addition to the indirect checks of the liberty of the press, and of popular instruction, and of manners, religion, and local institutions, there are fundamental rights declared in the constitutions, and there are constitutional checks upon the arbitrary will of majorities, confided to the integrity and independence of the judicial department. M. De Tocqueville seems to be deeply impressed with the
dangers in a democracy, of the corrupting and controlling power of disciplined faction, and well he may be. The most dangerous and tyrannical of all crafts is party or political craft. The equal rights of a minor party are disregarded in the animated competitions for power, and if it were not for the checks and barriers to which I have alluded, this would fall a sacrifice to the passions of fierce and vindictive majorities."*
"Without independent judges," says Mr. Justice Story, the Constitution would become a democracy with unlimited powers."†
Professor Lieber, in his work above referred to, Civil Liberty and Self-Government," denounces the practice of the election of judges by the people in the terms which it deserves:
As to the election of judges by the people themselves, which has now been established in many of the United States, it is founded, in my opinion, on a radical errorthe confusion of mistaking popular power alone for liberty, and the idea that the more the one is increased, in so much a higher degree will the other be enjoyed; as if all power, no matter what name be given to it, if it sways as power alone, were not absolutism, and had not the inherent tendency, natural to all power, to increase in absorbing strength. All despotic governments, whether the absolutism rests with an individual or the people (meaning, of course, the majority), strive to make the judiciary dependent on themselves. Louis XIV. did it, and every absolute democracy has done it." Where the people are the first and chiefest source of all power, as is the case
* Kent's Commentaries, vol. i. p. 450.
† Story, vol. i. p. 482. Edit. of 1853.