3. The identity of the vessel was not lost, she being officered and manned and having on board a cargo. Ib. 4. The provisions of § 4283 apply to cases of personal injury and death. Ib. 5. The extinguishment of liability may be availed of as matter of law, on the facts, in a suit to recover for the death of the employé. Ib. 6. The provisions of the statute apply to a vessel used on the Great Lakes, she not being "used in rivers or inland navigation," within the meaning of § 4289. Ib. 7. The insurer being a corporation, the privity or knowledge of a person who was alleged to have been guilty of the negligence, and who was not a managing officer of the corporation, or employed directly by it; and whose powers were no greater than those of the master of a vessel. was not the privity or knowledge of the corporation. Ib. LETTER. See EVIDENCE, 3. LOCAL LAW. 1. Under the constitution and laws of Oregon, in force when these contracts were made, a married woman could bind her separate property for the payment of her husband's debts. Cross v. Allen, 528. 6 2. An action was brought upon three promissory notes with interest payable annually, each providing that if not paid when due it was to bear the rate of interest of the principal, it being expressly agreed that in default of payment of interest when due the principal is to become due and collectible." Each note recited the fact that it was secured by a deed of trust executed to a named trustee on certain described property. The deed described the notes and declared: "provided, however, it is agreed that if at any time said interest shall remain unpaid for as much as ninety days after the same shall become due and payable, then the whole debt as well as the interest shall become and be due and payable, and further it is understood and agreed that if said note first falling due shall remain unpaid thereafter for as much as six months, then the whole debt is to be and become due and payable, and this trust, in either event, to be executed and foreclosed, at the option of said third party." It also contained a clause to the effect that if the money due on the notes was not paid "according to the tenor and effect of said notes in hand, and according to the terms, stipulations and agreements of this instrument," the deed should remain in force, and the trustee, or in the event of his death or refusal to act, then at the request of the holder of said notes, the sheriff may proceed to sell said described property, or any part thereof, at public vendue, to the highest bidder for cash, and shall receive the proceeds of said sale, out of which shall be paid, first, the costs and expenses of executing this trust, including compensation to said trustee, or said sheriff for his services, and next to the said third party or holder of said note whatever sum of money may be due thereon, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid to the said parties of the first part, or their legal representatives." The statute of Texas provided that "actions for debt where the indebtedness is evidenced by or founded upon any contract in writing, must be commenced and prosecuted within four years after the cause of action accrued, and not afterwards." The case was heard by the court, and a general finding made. No bill of exceptions were signed. Held, (1) The error in this case was one of law, apparent on the record, and need not have been presented by bill of exceptions; (2) Construing the notes and the deeds as contemporaneous agreements, relating to the same subject matter, the limitation of four years under the law of Texas ran from the dates named in the respective notes, as the dates of maturity, and not from the date of the default in the payment of interest; otherwise, if the option given to the payee or holder by the deed of trust, to make them due upon such default, had been exercised by the payee or the holder. Moline Plow Co. v. Webb, 616. TAX SALE; Illinois. Kentucky. See TRUST; USURY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 4. MANDAMUS. A writ of mandamus does not lie from this court to the judges of the Supreme Court f a State, directing them to restore to office an attorney and counsellor whom that court had disbarred, and to vacate the order of disbarment. In re Green, 325. MAILS. See EVIDENCE, 3. MARITIME LAW. See LIMITED LIABILITY. MARRIED WOMAN. See LIMITATION, STATUTE of, 1; MISTAKE OF LAW. See EQUITY, 1. MORTGAGE. See EQUITY, 6. MOTION FOR REHEARING. Upon the rendition of a decree, a petition and motion for a rehearing was filed. At the succeeding term of the court an order was entered, granting a rehearing, which order was entered as of a previous term. The record contained no order showing the continuance of the motion and the petition for rehearing to the succeeding term. Held, that the presumption must be indulged, in support of the action of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter - nothing to the contrary affirmatively appearing that the facts existed which justified its action; and, therefore, that the court granted the application for a rehearing at the previous term. Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 384. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 6; CONTRACT, 1. NATIONAL BANK. 1. A director of a national bank is not precluded from resignation within the year by the provision in Rev. Stat. § 5145 that when elected he shall hold office for one year, and until his successor is elected. Briggs v. Spaulding, 132. 2. Persons who are elected into a board of directors of a national bank, about which there is no reason to suppose anything wrong, but which becomes bankrupt in ninety days after their election, are not to be held personally responsible to the bank because they did not compel an investigation, or personally conduct an examination. Ib. 3. Directors of a national bank must exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administration of the affairs of a bank, and this includes something more than officiating as figureheads: they are entitled under the law to commit the banking business, as defined, to their duly authorized officers, but this does not absolve them from the duty of reasonable supervision, nor ought they to be permitted to be shielded from liability because of want of knowledge of wrong loing, if that ignorance is the result of gross inattention. Ib. 4. If a director of a national bank is seriously ill, it is within the power of the other directors to give him leave of absence for a term of one year, instead of requiring him to resign, and if frauds are committed during his absence and without his knowledge, whereby the bank suffers loss, he is not responsible for them. Ib. 5. Applying these principles to this case, Held, (1) That the defendant Cushing, having in good faith sold his bank stock and taken proper steps for its transfer, and orally tendered his resignation as a director to the president of the bank, and ceased to act as such, cannot be held liable for the consequences of breaches of trust alleged to have been subsequently thereafterwards committed: (2) That Charles T. Coit was guilty of no want of ordinary care in acting upon the leave of absence given him; and, having died while absent on that leave, his estate is not liable for losses alleged to have been incurred during such absence, and with which he had no affirmative connection: (3) That the defendant Francis T. Coit, having accepted the office of director, when in infirm health, there being at the time others of the board of directors capable of attending to the concerns of the bank, and by reason of physical infirmity having failed to give the attention to the bank's affairs he otherwise would, his estate is held not liable for passive negligence on his part under all the circumstances disclosed in evidence: (4) That as no negligence is shown whereby the alleged losses can be said to have been affirmatively caused by the defendants Johnson and Spaulding, or either of them, they are not to be held responsible simply because, during the short period they were directors, they did not discover such losses and prevent them. Ib. 6. Delano v. Butler, 118 U. S. 634, and Aspinwall v. Butler, 133 U.S. 595, affirmed and applied to a case where a shareholder in the bank, having subscribed her proportional share to the doubling of its capital and paid therefor, took out no certificate for the new stock and demanded back the money so paid. Pacific National Bank v. Eaton, 227. 7. A subscription to stock in a national bank, and payment in full on the subscription and entry of the subscriber's name on the books as a stockholder, constitutes the subscriber a shareholder without taking out a certificate. Ib. 8. An action between a plaintiff and a national bank, and an action between the receiver of that bank as plaintiff and the plaintiff in the other action as defendant, are substantially suits between the same parties. Butler v. Eaton, 240. 9. A receiver of a national bank brought an action in a Circuit Court of the United States to recover the amount of an unpaid subscription to stock of the bank. The defendant set up a judgment in her favor in the state court on the same issue as an estoppel, and the Circuit Court held it to be an estoppel. That judgment of the state court being brought before this court by writ of error, was reversed here, and this court in the case from the Circuit Court, also brought here in error, Held, that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for the receiver. lb. 10. When a state bank, acting under a statute of the State, calls in its circulation issued under state laws, and becomes a national bank under the laws of the United States, and a judgment is recovered in a court of the State against the national bank upon such outstanding circulation, the defence of the state statute of limitations having been set up, a Federal question arises which may give this court jurisdiction 11. The conversion of a state bank in New York into a national bank, under the act of the legislature of that State of March 9, 1865, (N. Y. See CORPORATION, 2. NE EXEAT. In the action at law upon the bond given in the ne exeat proceedings (No. See EQUITY, 3, 4. OREGON. See LOCAL LAW, 1. PATENT FOR INVENTION. 1. Letters patent No. 86,296, granted to the New York Belting and Pack- 2. The Gately packing explained in view of prior packings. Ib. 3. The fact considered, that that packing went at once into such an exten- 4. If a patentee describes and claims only a part of his invention, he is 5. Where a claim is fairly susceptible of two constructions, that one will VOL. CXLI-46 Ib. |