cial sense; and their denomination in the market will control their
classification without regard to their scientific designation, the mate-
rial of which they may be made, or the use to which they may be
applied. American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 468.
2. Gilling twine, when imported as gilling,, for the manufacture of gill
nets, is liable only to the duty of 25 per cent under the act of March
3, 1883, 22 Stat. 488. Ib.
3. Statements made in Congress by the promoters of a customs-act are
inadmissible as bearing upon its construction; but the proceedings
therein may be referred to to inform the court of the reasons for fix-
ing upon a specific rate of duty. Ib.
4. Where a customs-act imposes a duty upon an article by a specific name,
general terms in the act, though sufficiently broad to cover it, are not
applicable to it. Ib.
5. In cases of doubt in the construction of a customs-act, the courts resolve
the doubt in favor of the importer. Ib.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 11 to 18;
PRACTICE, 3.
DISTRICT JUDGE OF ALASKA.
See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. An admitted or clearly established misapprehension of law in the mak-
ing of a contract creates a basis for the interference of a court of
equity, resting on its discretion, and to be exercised only in unques-
tionable and flagrant cases. Griswold v. Hazard, 260.
2. Whether laches is to be imputed to a party seeking the aid of a court
of equity depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. Ib.
3. In this case it is held on the evidence that the bond given by Griswold
in the ne exeat proceeding conditioned that the defendant in that pro-
ceeding should "abide and perform the orders and decrees" of the
court, was executed by him under such an apprehension of the obliga-
tions in law assumed by him in executing and delivering it, as to make
it the duty of a court of equity to reform it so as to make him liable
for the penal sum named, only in the event that the principal failed to
appear and become subject to the orders and decrees of the court; but
that, the defendant in the suit in which the ne exeat was issued having
died, and such a decree being therefore inappropriate and Griswold
being guilty of no laches, a decree should be entered perpetually en-
joining the prosecution of any action, suit or proceeding to make him
liable in any sum on or by reason of said bond. Ib.
4. D. was sued in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island by stockholders in
the Credit Mobilier for an accounting and payment of what might be
found due on the accounting, for securities and moneys coming into
his hands as president of the Credit Mobilier. The receiver of that
company in Pennsylvania released him from such liability. The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island would not allow that release to be
interposed as a defence. Held, that the error, if any, in this respect
could not be corrected by bill in equity filed by a surety on a bond
given to release D. when arrested on ne exeat proceedings in that
Rhode Island suit. Ib.
5. A holder of the legal title to real estate who has no equitable interest
therein, cannot, by his act done without the knowledge or consent of
the holder of the equitable title, who is in possession of and resid-
ing on the premises, claiming title, rescind a completed settlement of
a mortgage debt on the premises so as to bind the holder of the equi-
table title, and prevent him from setting up defences which would
otherwise be open to him. McLean v. Clapp, 429.
6. A decree of foreclosure and sale, made by a Circuit Court, on a rail-
road mortgage, provided that the purchaser should pay off all claims
incurred by the receiver, and that all such claims should be barred
unless presented within six months after the confirmation of the sale.
On the sale the property was bought by the appellants. The decree
confirming the sale provided that a deed should be given, and the
purchasers should take the property, aad the deed should recite that
they took it, subject to all claims incurred by the receiver. After the
six months had expired, the appellee filed a petition to recover dam-
ages for an injury sustained by him, as a passenger on the road,
through the negligence of the employés of the receiver. The expira-
tion of the six months was set up as a bar to the claim. It did not
appear that the purchasers objected to the terms of the decree of
confirmation, or appealed to this court from that decree. Held, that
the Circuit Court had discretion to abrogate the six months' limita-
tion, and to decree that the purchasers should pay the claim, as the
receiver had been discharged. Olcott v. Headrick, 543.
7. The plaintiff in his bill set up in himself a legal title to real estate derived
from the State of Louisiana to which it had been listed as swamp or
overflowed lands; averred that the respondents claimed the same land
under certain old French grants which had been recognized by the
Land Office as valid; and prayed that he might be declared to be the
owner and put in possession of the premises, and have an accounting
for rents and profits. Held, that on these averments he had a plain,
adequate and complete remedy at law, and that the bill must be dis-
missed. Smyth v. New Orleans Canal and Banking Co., 656.
See CONTRACT, 8;
LACHES ;
RAILROAD;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. The objection that the record of proceedings in a court of record offered
in evidence should not be received in evidence, on the ground that the
transcript was incomplete, or was improperly authenticated, should be
raised in the court below; and if not raised there cannot be taken
here for the first time. Carpenter v. Strange, 87.
2. When the defence in an action for goods sold and delivered to an agent
of the defendant is a denial that any such sale was made, the burden
is on the plaintiff throughout the case to prove every essential part of
the transaction, including the authority of the alleged agent to make
the alleged purchase in the manner alleged. Schutz v. Jordan, 213.
3. The presumption that a letter properly directed and mailed reached its
destination at the proper time and was duly received by the person to
whom it was addressed is a presumption of fact, subject to control and
limitation by other facts. Ib.
4. When, in an action to recover on a contract, testimony is admitted with-
out objection, showing the alleged contract to have been made, but on
a day different from that averred in the declaration, and the court
directs a verdict for the defendant without amendment of the declara-
tion, such ruling is not erroneous by reason of the variation. Davis
v. Patrick, 479.
5. Parol testimony is admissible to show the circumstances under which a
written instrument was executed, or that it was, in fact, without con-
sideration. Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham, 564.
6. Circumstances attending the execution of a receipt in full of all de-
mands, may be given in evidence to show that by mistake it was
made to express more than was intended, and that the creditor had, in
fact, claims that were not included.
See CONTRACT, 6;
CUSTOMS DUTY, 3;
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
This case is affirmed on the facts. Evans v. State Bank, 107.
FOOD INSPECTION LAWS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 5.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See CONTRACT, 3, 4.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
A conveyance by a debtor in Texas of his real estate there, made with intent
to delay, hinder or defraud his creditors, being void as to the latter
under the statutes of that State, a judgment sale and transfer of such
property, in an action commenced by the levy of an attachment upon
it as the property of the debtor, made after the fraudulent sale, is
upheld in this case as against a bona fide purchaser from the fraudulent
grantee, taking title after the levy of the attachment. Thompson v.
Baker, 648.
GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED.
See CONTRACT, 2;
EVIDENCE, 2.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See LOCAL LAW, 1.
See JURISDICTION, E, 1, 2.
ILLINOIS.
See TAX SALE;
TRUST;
USURY, 1 to 5.
The plaintiff took out fire insurance policies upon a vessel in 10 companies
to the amount of $40,000 in all. The vessel took fire, and, in order to
saye it, it was scuttled and sunk, and the fire thus extinguished. It
was then raised, taken to port and repaired. The loss by fire, exclu-
sive of the expense of raising the vessel, etc., was $15,364.78. The
owner made claim upon the insurers for this amount for "loss and
damage by fire and water as per agreement," stating that he would
make further claims "for expenses of raising the propeller," and was
"preparing the statement of such expenses to submit with his subse-
quent claim." The companies declined to pay such subsequent claim,
but paid in advance the amount of the loss by fire so stated, taking
receipts, expressed to be in full of all claims for loss or damage by
fire, and in which it was further stated that the policies were can-
celled and surrendered. The parties further signed a paper in which
"the loss and damage by fire" was certified at that aggregate amount,
"payable without discount upon presentation," and the amount was
apportioned among the several companies. In an action brought by
the owner to recover from the companies the amount of the claim for
raising and saving the vessel, some $15,000, it was Held, (1) That
parol evidence was admissible to explain the receipts, and to show
that they were not intended to cover the claim for raising, etc.; (2)
That the paper so signed by the parties was not in the nature of a
contract on the part of the owner. Fire Insurance Association v.
See JUDGMENT, 1;
PATENT FOR INVENTION, 16;
USURY, 1.
1. Upon rendering a decree for the plaintiff in a suit in equity, brought in
behalf of a State, pursuant to statute, to recover the amount of a tax
with interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent until paid, a sum
tendered and paid into court by the defendant, for part of that amount
and interest thereon at that rate, is to be applied to the payment of
both principal and interest of the sum so admitted to be due; interest
at the rate of twelve per cent is to be computed on the rest of the prin-
cipal until the date of the decree; and from that date interest on the
lawful amount of the decree is to be computed at the ordinary rate of
six per cent only, notwithstanding the final disposition of the case is
delayed by appeal. Massachusetts v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 40.
2. In an action in the Supreme Court of New York (the court having juris-
diction of the parties) between two sisters, the defendant being sued
in her representative capacity as testatrix of her father's will, the mat-
ters in controversy were: (1) whether the plaintiff had accepted or
rejected a provision made for her by her father's will; (2) whether
she was entitled to recover from her father's estate an amount claimed
to be due on account of a fund which came to him as trustee for her,
and which he had never accounted for; and (3) whether a certain con-
veyance of real estate in Tennessee made by the father in his lifetime
to the defendant should be adjudged to be fraudulent, and be vacated.
That court, after hearing the parties, adjudged (1) that the plaintiff
had not accepted the provision so made for her; (2) that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover the full amount so claimed; and (3) that the
deed was "absolutely null and void from the beginning," so far as it
affected the testator's said indebtedness. A litigation in equity then
took place in Tennessee, in which the plaintiff and defendant in New
York were, respectively, plaintiff and defendant. There were other
parties, whose presence was not material to the points here decided.
This litigation resulted in the Supreme Court of Tennessee deciding:
(1) That the plaintiff had elected to take the share so devised to her;
(2) that having so elected she was not entitled to recover on her
claim; (3) that the Supreme Court of New York was without power.
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