Dissenting Opinion: Field, Gray, Brown, JJ. Court of the Territory of Washington, in accordance with the terms of section 1768, Revised Statutes of the United States, and subject to all provisions of law applicable thereto;" that, on the day last named, the President issued to William G. Langford a document reciting the suspension of appellant from his office in "virtue of the authority conferred upon the President by section 1768 of the Revised Statutes of the United States," and the designation of said Langford "to perform the duties of such suspended officer in the meantime, he being a suitable person therefor, subject to all the provisions of law applicable thereto;" that, on the 11th day of August, 1886, the President sent to the appellant and to Langford, respectively, communications similar to those of December 3, 1885, the one to appellant being a second order of suspension by the President under section 1768 of the Revised Statutes, and the one to Langford showing, his designation to perform the duties of the office in the meantime; that Langford was commissioned January 29, 1887, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington, for the term of four years from that date, and until his successor was appointed and qualified, subject to the conditions prescribed by law, the commission showing that he had been nominated and appointed to that position by and with the consent of the Senate; and that Langford performed the duties of the office from December 11, 1885, to August 5, 1886, and from August 24, 1886, to February 27, 1887, under and by virtue of said several written appointments issued to him. Mr. Roger S. Greene for appellant. Mr. Solicitor General for appellee. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. Substantially the same questions are presented in this case that have been determined in McAllister v. United States, ante, 174, just decided. Upon the authority of that case, and for the reasons stated in the opinion, the judgment is MR. JUSTICE FIELD, with yo and MR. JUSTICE BROWN, dissenting. ancred Affirmed. USTICE GPAY Dissenting Opinion: Field, Gray, Brown, JJ. I dissent from the judgment of the court in this case, on the grounds stated in my dissenting opinion in McAllister v. United States. I may also add to those grounds the fact that, by the laws of the United States applicable to all the Territories, it is provided that for each Territory there shall be appointed a Governor, a Secretary, a Chief Justice and two Associate Justices of its Supreme Court, an Attorney and a Marshal, and that their terms shall be four years and until their successors are appointed and qualified, with this difference: that it is declared with reference to all the officers, except the Justices of the Supreme Court, that they shall hold their offices for that term, unless sooner removed by the President; but that qualification is not added to the term of the Justices. (Rev. Stat. §§ 1841, 1843, 1864, 1875, 1876, 1877.) It is also to be observed that the acts of Congress organizing the different Territories of the United States, and providing for judicial tribunals therein, from the foundation of the government down to the present time, with three exceptions, have fixed the term of the judicial officers of the Territories at definite periods absolutely, without any conditions, or simply with the condition "upon good behavior." In two of these exceptions where the words "unless sooner removed" are added, the power of removal is not vested in the President, but left to be exercised under the general law of the country applicable to such officers; that is, by impeachment or by the joint action of the President and Congress, after full opportunity is given to the accused of being heard upon the grounds of complaint. In the third exception the words added, are: "unless sooner removed by the President with the consent of the Senate of the United States," which implies a previous consideration by the Senate of the grounds of removal, and this would usually be accompanied with notice to the accused and an opportunity afforded to him of being heard thereon.1 1 The following list exhibits the terms of the judges and the organic acts for all, the Territories: Northwest of Ohio: "During good behavior." Ordinance of 1787; 1 Stat. 51, note; Rev. Stat. 2d ed. 13. Dissenting Opinion: Field, Gray, Brown, JJ. From this statement it is apparent that the general legislation of Congress has been against making the tenure of the Mississippi: "During good behavior." Act 7 April, 1798. Sec. 3, 1 Stat. 550. Act 2 March, 1810. Sec. 2, 2 Stat. 301. South of Ohio: "During good behavior." Act 26 May, 1790. Sec. 1, 1 Stat. 123. Indiana: "During good behavior." Act 7 May, 1800. Sec. 3, 2 Stat. 59. Orleans: "Four years," absolute. Act 26 March, 1804. Sec. 5, 2 Stat. 284. Louisiana (District): "During good behavior." Act 26 March, 1804. Sec. 12, 2 Stat. 287. Michigan: "During good behavior." Act 11 January, 1805. Illinois: "During good behavior." Sec. 3, 2 Stat. 309. Act 3 February, 1809. Sec. 3, 2 Stat. 515. Missouri: Four years, " unless sooner removed." Alabama: " Act 4 June, 1812. Sec. 10, 2 Stat. 746. Act 27 January, 1814. Sec. 1, 3 Stat. 95. During good behavior." Act 3 March, 1817. Secs. 2 and 3, 3 Stat. 372. Florida: (Judges not appointed by the President.) Act 30 March, 1822. Act 26 May, 1824. Sec. 6, 3 Stat. 656. Act 21 January, 1829. Wisconsin: "During good behavior." Sec. 4, 4 Stat. 333. Act 20 April, 1836. Sec. 9, 5 Stat. 12. Iowa: "Four years," absolute. Act 12 June, 1838. Sec. 9, 5 Stat. 237-38. Oregon: "Four years," absolute. Act 14 August, 1848. Sec 9, 9 Stat. 326. Minnesota: "Four years," absolute. Act 3 March, 1849. Sec. 9, 9 Stat. 406. Utah: "Four years," absolute. Act 9 September, 1850. Sec. 9, 9 Stat. 455. New Mexico: "Four years," absolute. Act 9 September, 1850. Sec. 10, 9 Stat. 449. Washington: "Four years," absolute. Sec 9, 10 Stat. 175. Dissenting Opinion: Field, Gray, Brown, JJ. judicial office in courts of record of the Territories subject to the will of the President. The last exception is the only one in which any authority in that respect could be exercised by him, and that is to be with the conjoint action of the Senate. I am authorized to say that Justices GRAY and BROWN agree with me in this dissent. Nebraska: "Four years," absolute. Act 30 May, 1854. Sec. 9, 10 Stat. 280. Kansas: "Four years," absolute. Act 30 May, 1854. Sec. 27, 10 Stat. 286. Colorado: "Four years," absolute. Act 28 February, 1861. Sec. 9, 12 Stat. 174. Nevada: "Four years," absolute. Act 2 March, 1861. Sec. 9, 12 Stat. 212. Idaho: "Four years," absolute. Act 3 March, 1863. Sec. 9, 12 Stat. 811. Montana: "Four years," absolute. Act 10 July, 1886. Sec. 1, 24 Stat. 138. Wyoming : "Four years," "unless sooner removed by the President with he consent of the Senate of the United States." Act 25 July, 1868. Sec. 9, 15 Stat. 178. Alaska: "Four years," absolute. Act of May 17, 1884. 23 Stat. 24. Oklahoma: "Four years," absolute. Act of May 2, 1890. 26 Stat. 81. Statement of the Case. GORMAN v. HAVIRD. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF IDAHO. No. 1296. Submitted March 23, 1891. - Decided May 25, 1891. Although it is true as a general rule that where judgment goes for the defendant, the amount of the plaintiff's claim is the test of jurisdiction, this rule is subject to the qualification that the demand shall appear to have been made in good faith for such amount; and if it appear clearly from the whole record that under no aspect of the case the plaintiff could recover the full amount of his claim, this court will decline to assume jurisdiction of the case. THIS was a petition for a mandamus filed in the Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho by the appellee Havird, who was sheriff de facto, and also claimed to be sheriff de jure, of Boisé County, to compel the county commissioners to issue warrants upon the treasury for the sum of $5595.47, for his services and expenses as sheriff for the years 1887 and 1888. His claim consisted of a salary fixed by law at the sum of $2798, and of expenses incurred as sheriff in the sum of $2797.47, making the aggregate of $5595.47. The items of his claim for expenses were $692.25 for boarding prisoners; $1302 for jailor's fees; $595.22 for collecting a license tax; $156.15 for. transportation of prisoners; and $51.85 for collecting a Territorial license tax. The answer of the county commissioners averred in excuse of their non-payment of the claim, that an action in the nature of quo warranto had been begun against petitioner, and was still pending in the District Court for the county of Boisé, upon the relation of the appellant John Gorman, to test the title to the office of sheriff, and that under the laws of Idaho, Rev. Stats. § 380, "when the title of the incumbent of any office in this Territory is contested by proceedings instituted in any court for that purpose, no warrant can thereafter be drawn or paid for any part of his salary until such proceedings have been finally determined," By leave of the court, Gorntan, the contestant, intervened in the case, claiming to have |