found advocates, the oppressed protection; and hence the daring attempts at universal monarchy, made by Louis the fourteenth, were opposed, baffled, repelled, and frustrated. What was the engine with which France operated her wished for end at this time? Influence! that secret and almost resistless power; that power with which ambition gains its purpose, almost imperceptibly, but much more effectually than with any other.

At this time, too, it ought, Mr. Fox said, to be held in mind, that Louis the sixteenth possessed abundantly more power than ever Louis the fourteenth could boast of, and that superiority, great as it was, would in all probability, be considerably heightened very shortly. At such a moment then, was it right to enter into a connection by treaty with the christian king? How was it to be accounted for, but by supposing that there were in this country some men so dazzled with the splendour of Louis the sixteenth, so conscious of the eminence of power which France had lately attained, that they sunk before it, and, lost in their own despondency, thought it right for us, diminished as our splendour was, in comparison with the aggrandizement of our continental neighbour, to seize the earliest moment of making terms with her, forming a connection by treaty, and by that means artfully securing a claim to her protection. Far was it from him to intend to charge the right honourable gentleman opposite to him, the present chancellor of the exchequer, with entertaining such abject opinions, or with thinking of abandoning all expectation of the possibility of France being once more humbled; but, he was persuaded there were men in the country, so lost to the memory of its former greatness, as to feel in the manner he had mentioned, and to advise and act upon the littleness of their own minds,

Having put this forcibly, Mr. Fox asked to what motives were we to ascribe the sudden civility of France towards us? Was it to be considered as a proof of her moderation? Had she entered into the treaty with a view to give the lie to the old and rooted opinions of philosophy, that it was a principle inherent in human nature to be eager to acquire more, in proportion as a great deal more than could have been expected, was already acquired? Did she mean to clear up her character at once, and do away the libellous charge so long alleged against her, that she was actuated by overweening ambition, and an insatiable thirst after extension of power? Glorious conduct, if such was its principle and its motive! Matchless self-denial! to abjure the acquirement of almost irresistible power, when it was rendered so easy.

But, could any man in his senses believe in the splendid allusion? Could any statesman think that moderation, at a moment when moderation seemed least necessary, was the real and true motive that had induced France, to put us in a state that had the appearance of rendering all future hostilities between her and Great Britain almost impossible to happen? Let those, who thought so, recollect, that paradoxical as the assertion might appear, the cabinet of France had been the most consistent in its conduct of any that ever existed. Notwithstanding the genius and character of the French, as a people; notwithstanding the levity of their manners, the fickleness of their minds, the constitutional mutability of their conduct, the cabinet of France, as a cabinet, had uniformly acted upon the same principle, aiming at the same end, and only changing the means of attaining that end, as the necessity of the times, and as the suggestion of a wiser policy dictated. If ministers supposed that France acted upon a principle of sincerity and friendship towards us, let them point out the proofs of that friendship. The way to judge of the friendly intentions of those with whom we negotiate, was not, he said, by looking to the manner of their negociating with us, but their conduct with other powers, as far as it regarded our interests. Ministers might, as yet, be said to be in the honeymoon of their connection with France. Had they, during that period, felt the influence of France greatly operating in our favour with those powers with whom we were negociating treaties? Did it manifest itself in the court of Portugal, in the court of Spain, or in the court of Petersburgh? Were the symptoms of it strongly traceable at any one of these courts? Where else was a symptom of it to be found? At this time France, that formerly was celebrated for having the most powerful army of any European nation, had an army the fourth only upon the continent; Prussia, the emperor, and Russia, had much greater armies. What was the reason of this? The reason was obvious. France relied for her security on other means of defence on the influence she possessed with the neighbouring powers, and the alliances she had formed. Those circumstances enabled her to diminish her land force, to reduce her army, and direct all her attention to her marine. Was her doing so a favourable symptom to this country? Did it indicate any extraordinary proportion of partiality towards Great Britain?

The honourable gentleman who had, with considerable ability and much to his own credit, seconded the address, had laid down a position, the language of which was more elegant than the sentiment, he feared, was just. He had said, that in abandoning the monopoly of our trade with America,

and opening a commercial intercourse with France, we gave up a precarious and ill-paid annuity, for a fee simple, with prompt and constant payment. The expression was captivating, and the style of it beautiful; no wonder, therefore, that the House appeared to feel it, and gave tokens of their satisfaction. But, was the position true? Could the benefits that might result from our commercial intercourse, whatever they might turn out, be compared to a fee simple, with prompt payment? Surely not. What was to ensure us the stability and permanency of peace? A commercial treaty with France?, No means, Mr. Fox said, appeared to him less likely to procure such an effect. Instead of a fee simple with constant payment, the more apt comparison would be an annuity, the payment of which was liable to frequent interruption. Did history encourage us to expect a long duration of peace, or were we weak enough to imagine that France, from her present enjoyment of uncommon power, was therefore less likely to break with us? Let former precedents teach a better prudence. Refer to the records of the best and most authentic historians, and it would be found that France was most inclined to preserve peace, when she was most humiliated and degraded. This country had been often charged with having borne herself arrogantly and dictatorially after the close of a triumphant war; but had it ever been said, that success checked the pride, or reduced the overweening ambition of France? Past experience proved, that whenever France saw this country weak, and thought her incapable of effectually resisting, she seized the opportunity, and aimed at effecting her long-desired destruction. What prompted her to commence her hostile attacks at the beginning of the war preceding the last? The occasion was flattering, it promised easy success, and the opportunity was irresistible. A similar opportunity would, doubtless, produce similar consequences. It was idle, therefore, to suppose that France, who had really had such frequent reason to consider Great Britain as her most powerful rival, and had received so many checks from her, that she had long wished to annihilate her as a state whose enmity was to be dreaded, would all of a sudden forget her resentment, and, just at that moment when there appeared to be the least rational motive to prompt her, abandon a purpose she had long and uniformly endeavoured to

atchieve.

Mr. Fox observed, that his majesty had been graciously pleased to declare in his speech, that a copy of the treaty should be laid before the House. That instrument alone, he believed, would neither enable the House nor himself to form any decision upon the propriety of the treaty. Before the VOL. III.

S

House could justify any vote upon the subject, they would undoubtedly expect to hear from his majesty's ministers, the state of the various other treaties at this time negociating. At present, there were more in agitation than this country perhaps ever had at one time before the treaty with Russia, the treaty with Spain, and the treaty with Portugal. As ministers had, a twelvemonth ago, boasted of the facility with which the treaty with Russia might be brought to a conclusion, he presumed, that it either was concluded, or so near conclusion, that it might fairly be considered the same as concluded; he would therefore say nothing upon this part of the subject. But it was material to know in what situation the treaty with Portugal stood. Perhaps the present treaty with France virtually annulled and abrogated the treaty with Portugal, commonly known by the name of the Methuen treaty. It was also important to know how the treaty stood with Spain; because, if the House meant to act as statesmen on the occasion, it was impossible for them to come to any warrantable decision respecting the treaty with France, without being fully apprized of the relative situation of every other existing treaty, or treaty that was at present negociating.

In order more strikingly to elucidate this argument, Mr. Fox said, that possibly the present connection with France might operate to the destruction of all our former connections with other powers so far, that when, at a future period, France might think it worth her while to break with us, we should find ourselves destitute of friends, and universally abandoned. Two years, he observed, had been given in the definitive treaty, as the period, by the end of which a commercial treaty with France was obliged to be concluded, clearly that ministers might have time to look about them, to see how old treaties stood with other powers, and to conclude such new ones as appeared most likely to conduce to the interest of Great Britain, before they entered into any treaty with France.

He said, he might possibly be misrepresented both at home and abroad, as a man so far prepossessed by illiberal and vulgar prejudices against France, as to wish never to enter into any connection with her. Be that as it might, he should not easily forget that those prejudices against France, and that jealousy, which had for years prevailed, of her ambition, had been productive of no bad consequences to this country; on the contrary, that the wars grounded on our alarms at her stretches after inordinate power, and the jealousy which we had entertained of her desire to overturn the balance of power in Europe, had made this country great and glorious. He

adverted to the peace of Utrecht, and talked of the bugbear which the ministers of that day had set up to frighten the people into a belief that peace was absolutely necessary, namely, the probability of the House of Austria requiring an improper share of power. He alluded also to the circumstances that characterised the history of Holland, and its present situation and future prospects.

Speaking of the convention with Spain, for carrying into effect the sixth article of the treaty of peace, he said he did not see, nor could he admit the necessity for entering into any such convention: that the article was sufficiently intelligible, and had ever appeared so to him, though he was aware there had been some doubts stated respecting its proper construction: that the country to be evacuated under the convention was a part of the Musquito coast, that never had, before the treaty, been considered as belonging to the crown of Spain; and that instead of being a mere spot for the cutting of logwood, it was an actual British colony. To oblige the inhabitants and settlers, therefore, to evacuate it by February, would be an act of the most horrible injustice, because it would be to oblige them to quit their possessions before they could reap the fruits of their industry, which must, in that case be left in the ground. Mr. Fox descanted upon this for a considerable time, and asked, for what purpose such a cession could have been made? He should have supposed, he said, that if England had a treaty in hand with the court of Madrid, and a cession to make which that court was desirous of having made to her, it would have been political to have held back the boon that Spain was anxious to obtain, till after the objects of our wishes, as stipulated for in the treaty negociating, were complied with. Possibly, the cession was made before hand, in order to put Spain in a humour to grant us what we wanted with the greater cheerfulness.

After animadverting upon this matter with obvious irony, and touching upon a variety of particular points, to which the treaty with France appeared to him to have a natural and necessary reference, Mr. Fox declared, that he joined most heartily in the congratulation of his majesty, on an event, which nothing but the phrenzy of a lunatic could have induced, and which it became the character of the nation to act upon, exactly as they had done. Having mentioned this in a style that spoke the master of the art of oratory, and intreated the pardon of the House for having taken up so much of their time, which he declared he would not have done had he not thought it necessary to repel the French mode of talking that had fallen from the noble lord who moved, and the ho