Mr. Fox rose. He began by an allusion to lord Beauchamp's apology for the apparent inconsistency of approving of the original propositions, and yet objecting to the resolutions as now before the House, declaring that he was ready to acknowledge himself in much greater danger of the censure of inconsistency; for so far was he from approving either the one or the other, that he most sincerely and heartily reprobated them both, although he confessed that they appeared at the same time to be completely contradictory to each other. He believed, indeed, that there never had been known two systems so diametrically opposite, and yet each so objectionable, as the two systems, that which had been sent from Ireland, and that which had originated in that House, were in all their parts. His right honourable friend (Mr. Eden) had made an attempt to sum up the whole account between Great Britain and Ireland, but he was afraid the calculation would be found much too sanguine; and so far from each country gaining by the arrangement, they would both of them be considerable losers. Great Britain would lose her own market, and the direct trade to her colonies, together with her navigation laws, on which her strength and importance so much depended, while Ireland would lose her constitution, and again become a dependent, subordinate kingdom.

One strong objection against the arrangement with him was, that there was at present no necessity for it, and that such an arrangement ought never to be wantonly brought forward, but only resorted to when it was found necessary. This necessity was known by the minister and his friends to be so essential to the propriety of the plan, that he had endeavoured on many occasions to enforce it by that topic. But what means did he take to point out the necessity? The principal one was that which a right honourable gentleman opposite to him (Mr. Jenkinson) had just stated, namely, that the necessity of such an adjustment had been declared by a resolution, which he had the honour to move in that House in the year 1782. He declared then, as he had declared before, that no idea of a commercial regulation had been entertained by the administration of that day, in proposing that resolution. There were at that time certainly some regulations wanting between the two countries; but those regulations were to extend to political objects alone, and not to commercial; they were partly to establish what was much wanted, something to replace that power, which, in their struggles for independence, the Irish had imprudently insisted on having abolished, and which he had himself given up, in compliance with the strong current of the prejudices of that nation, though with a reluctance that nothing but irresistible necessity

could have overcome. The power, which he wished to have seen replaced was that, which had been so often of late under discussion in parliament, and which had been variously termed, being sometimes called commercial, at other times external, and frequently, imperial legislation. It certainly was highly necessary, that power being precipitately abolished, that some succedaneum should be found for it; for without one general and superintending authority to embrace and comprehend the whole system of the navigation of the empire, it must necessarily happen, that much confusion and great inconvenience would take place. It was an unpromising circumstance in those resolutions, that they were not so much argued to be the result of the judgment of those who brought them forward, as of a strained and fabricated opinion, said to have originated with a former administration, and, as such, forced down the throats of those who had composed that administration, and under the sanction of their names imposed upon the House. He declared, that such gentlemen as had asserted, that that resolution went to any idea of commercial regulation, asserted what was wholly unfounded in fact, and diametrically opposite to the truth.

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Having so often trespassed on the time of the House in debating the different parts of the system, Mr. Fox said, he would not now enter into any arguments on the detail of the resolutions; but would confine what he had to say to the general question of policy and justice that arose out of the whole. But admitting that there was any necessity for a commercial arrangement, how was it to be ascertained which system was best, when two systems had been brought forward by the same person, the one to be laid before the parliament of Ireland to which it had agreed, and the other for the use of the English parliament? Those two systems, each invented by the same person, each promising the same effect, the mutual and permanent good understanding between the two countries, and the one professing to be an amendment of the other, were unfortunately so completely contradictory as to afford no possibility of finding a single argument in support of the one, that did not apply with equal force against the other. He desired to know why the motives for making so complete and effectual an alteration, as well in the spirit as in the words of every one of the propositions, had not been communicated to parliament? Was the right honourable gentleman encouraged to this omission by that confidence which so many of his friends had declared they placed in him? a confidence so unlimited and so determined as not to give way to the vast body of evidence which was offered to that House, and which they had since confirmed by their oaths at the bar of the House

of Lords. If confidence, and blind acquiescence in the opinion of others was a proper ground of parliamentary conduct, he thought that confidence ought to be rather placed with those persons, who, from their number, from their knowledge of the subject, from their interest in it, and from their oaths, were much better intitled to it than a single individual could possibly be. It was not his intention, however, at present, to make any effort to overturn or destroy this confidence in the minister; for being intirely at a loss to conceive on what it was founded, so must he be ignorant of the means by which it could be attacked.

He reprobated the absurdity of the whole proceeding, which had been conducted on a principle of making each parliament state what it would be willing to accept, instead of what it would be satisfied to give. Whereas on the contrary, the proper mode would have been, for each parliament to have well weighed what they could give, and then they would have been competent to determine; for each knowing, and having specified what it could give, and the other ascertaining what it was to receive, it would be easy to strike a balance between them; whereas, on the contrary, Ireland was first brought to make her demands on Great Britain in the eleven propositions sent from thence, and Great Britain in her turn had made her demands on Ireland, in the fourth and fifth of the amended propositions. Hence it was, that the whole plan had the misfortune of being equally detested, both in England and Ireland. This equal and violent degree of aversion had afforded room for a weak and pitiful argument that he had heard used, that the clamour of one country against the resolutions, was a strong argument in favour of them with the other. After exposing the fallacy and illiberal tendency of such an argument, he observed, that it was in one respect the most fortunate argument he had ever known; for being built on the unpopularity of the measure, it enjoyed the advantage of that unpopularity, to the utmost possible extent, and was equally applicable in both kingdoms, the plan being equally execrated in both. It was an unhappy omen, that in an arrangement proposed as a basis for mutual affection, and a pledge of mutual advantage, each party to the negotiation had discovered the strongest motives of discontent, and the strongest grounds of jealousy and apprehension. A right honourable gentleman opposite to him had indulged the benevolence of his own mind, and the luxuriancy of his fancy, with a picture of a liberal system of commerce, without any restraint whatever; but after amusing himself and the House with his theories, he at last acknowledged that he had been only amusing them, for that they were incapable of being applied to the

case of the two kingdoms. He recommended it to the right honourable gentleman, for the future, rather to employ his ingenuity in discovering what was practicable and useful, instead of hunting for systems, which, however beautiful in theory, were perfectly incapable of being reduced to practice. When he had said, that he had regretted the giving up the power of external legislation, as likely to prejudice the general interests of the empire, and therefore necessary to be replaced, he desired not to be understood as meaning to seek for it again; what he meant was, to find some system, that without reclaiming the power, or infringing in the smallest degree on the full emancipation and independence formerly conceded to Ireland, should afford the means of avoiding that confusion which was otherwise so much to be dreaded. The right honourable the chancellor of the exchequer had made use of an expression on a former occasion that somewhat surprized him, as little calculated to allay those apprehensions in Ireland which he had so wantonly excited. He had said, that it was by no means his intention to resume that legislative supremacy over Ireland in so short a time after having relinquished it. For his part, he did not think any time could be long enough to justify this country in again possessing herself of those legislative rights, which she had so solemnly surrendered; on the contrary, when the supremacy of the British parliament was given up, although he might lament the necessity, and perhaps dread the consequences of such a measure, yet he looked upon it as an inviolable compact, that could never be receded from without the most flagrant breach of public faith; and he should have thought it equally repugnant to the true sense of the compact between the two kingdoms to have endeavoured to get back the power then resigned by a fraudulent negociation like the present, as by a direct and barefaced act of power.

He adverted to the argument that had been used in vindication of the fourth and fifth resolutions, by comparing the principles of them with treaties between independent and so. vereign states, arraigning it as weak and inapplicable to the relative situation in which Great Britain and Ireland were to stand after the conclusion of this arrangement, Ireland was to be bound to adopt laws made by Great Britain, of the nature and tendency of which she was to have no opportunity of judging, because they were not expressly stipulated at the time of making the treaty; and therefore she was so far to give up her legislative discretion and free. agency into the hands of Great Britain; whereas he defied any gentleman to produce a single instance of any prince or state having ever made such a sacrifice; or if they had, he would then contend for it, that

such prince or state was no longer independent, but was become a vassal and feud to the other.

But there was another strong objection to the system, inasmuch as it contained a principle that essentially intrenched on the constitution of Ireland in another particular; this was the compelling her to set apart, by way of tribute, a certain sum over which she was hereafter to have no controul, nor any power of resumption. This he argued in the strongest and most brilliant manner, shewing how modern liberty, which he contrasted with that of ancient nations, depended on the limited duration of pecuniary grants. This limitation afforded an opportunity to the legislature to withhold supplies until grievances should be redressed. This check on the executive authority would be completely done away, if a sum of money adequate to the immediate expences of domestic government were permanently to be granted. This principle of temporary grants had been never abandoned by the parliament of Great Britain, except in a particular instance, where a permanent grant was necessary to secure the interest of the national debt to the public creditors; but he should be glad to know what any gentleman would think of a minister who should propose to make the malt and land tax perpetual; and yet this he declared to be an exactly similiar proposal. It was, he granted, true, that the surplus of the hereditary revenue ought never to be so considerable as to operate in this manner; but he was at liberty to argue it so, because, if it were to be contradicted, then would it follow that this compensation to Great Britain was nugatory and contemptible.

The right honourable gentleman had recommended firmness to parliament in the course of the business, and he himself would join in recommending that temper as well on every other occasion as the present; but he was very much afraid the right honourable gentleman, in recommending firmness, had unfortunately confounded the meaning of that temper, and meant, instead of firmness, obstinancy and presumption. The discontents of the people were argued from, as the cause which rendered this arrangement necessary. He was willing to admit that there were discontents, but they were not the forerunners or cause of these resolutions, they were their effect and consequence. But how were these discontents to be appeased by the plan now going forward, or what reason was there for such a hope? Was it because that from their first appearance in each of the different shapes which they had assumed, they had raised an universal outcry in both kingdoms? Was it be cause the benefits to be derived to each nation under them were looked upon by both as trivial and insignificant in the extreme; while, on the contrary, what each was to give, was