than the religious fables of Greece, or their prototypes, nourished under the shade of the pyramids? In the philosophy of the intellect, who was ever made wiser by the metaphysics of Aristotle? And who does not know that his system of dialects ruled the world of mind, from his own era down to the very dawn of our day-ruled it with absolute sway, affecting not only to teach the to knowledge, but to contain within itself the very cycle of all that was known or could be known. Studying nature in the closet, instead of walking abroad and surveying her works; not proceeding by induction, and deducing general laws from the operations of the world, but rashly advancing theories, and then boldly promulgating them, as the laws impressed by the Creator upon universal matter."

way

His large and learned auditory was charmed with the discourse. It displayed an intimate knowledge of the social and political institutions of his country, and of the world. It showed him to be a man of thought as well as of research, and that his disposi tion and inclination was to overlook the vices of other ages and nations, and retain only their virtues. The gentlemen of the Historical Society felt themselves honored by the production, and resolved to perpetuate it among their archives.

CHAPTER XX.

The Florida War-Its Origin-Its Conduct, whilst General Cass was Secretary of War-An Examination of Testimony given before a Military Court of Inquiry, at Frederick.

The Florida War-as it is familiarly called-occurred during the second term of General Jackson. The events that gave rise to it, however, date farther back. In September, 1823, a treaty was made at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, between the United States and the Seminoles, by which those Indians relinquished their claims to large tracts of land in Florida, with a reservation of a small portion for a residence. Subsequently, disputes arose respecting the construction of this treaty, the Seminoles insisting that it gave them undisputable possession for twenty years. This dispute resulted in another treaty made at Payne's Landing, in Florida, by Colonel Gadsden, agent of the United States, by which the Seminoles stipulated to cede their reservation, and remove beyond the Mississippi. A delegation of their chiefs, appointed by the treaty, was sent, at the expense of the United States, to examine the country assigned them, and also to ascertain whether the Creeks, who had already emigrated, would unite with them as one people. If the Seminoles were satisfied on these points, then the treaty was imperative. The Indian delegation, after examining, concluded a treaty with the American commissioners, rendering absolute the treaty of Payne's Landing. To this transaction some of the Indian nation objected, and contended that the delegation had exceeded their powers, and that they should have reported the result of their mission to them and taken a vote; and unfairness and treachery were charged. The Indians, as the final stipulations in the treaty now stood, were to remove within three years, and to commence emigration in 1833. The Indian nation at large, however, objected so strongly, that their removal in that year was not attempted.

But the policy of the administration was fixed, and although a short delay was granted, with the view of producing a more wil ling disposition to remove, there was no radical modification of

the policy. Hence, in 1834, the President appointed General Wiley Thompson an agent for superintending the removal, and sent him to Florida to make the necessary preparations. Captain Russell, of the army, accompanied him as disbursing officer. General Thompson soon found, and so reported to the government, that most of the Indians evinced an unwillingness to leave their homes, contending again, that the treaty gave them twenty years undisturbed possession, and also alledging that though the lands beyond the Mississippi might be good, the Indians there were bad. On reporting this to the Department of War, a reply was promptly forwarded that they were to be removed for their own benefit, and would not be permitted to remain; that the military force in the neighborhood of these Indians would be increased; and General Thompson was directed to inform them that the annuity, under the treaty of Fort Moultrie, would be withheld until they consented to emigrate; and he was also required to communicate freely with Brigadier General Clinch, by brevet, of the army, who owned a plantation near the Indian reservation.

The President, also, sent a conciliatory "talk" to the chiefs, who assembled to hear it on the twenty-eighth of December, 1834. They discussed, with the government agent, their intended departure, seemed much gratified with the President's talk, and their principal chief, Osceola, or Powel, with others, parted apparently in perfect good humor. General Clinch wrote to the War Department, inquiring if it would not be better to let them remain until the next spring, provided they would consent to remove peaceably on the first of March. "I believe," said he, "the whole nation will readily come into the measure, and it is impossible not to feel a deep interest, and much sympathy, for this people." The answer was, peremptorily to proceed without delay to their removal. The Indians, on the twenty-second of April, 1835, acknowledged the validity of the treaty of Payne's Landing, and agreed to carry it into effect.

In November, 1834, upon the receipt of the first intelligence, by the War Department, that difficulties might possibly occur with the Seminoles, General Clinch was directed to assume the command in Florida, and the necessary instructions were given him for his government.

Some two years afterwards, a military court of inquiry convened at Frederick, in the State of Maryland, in consequence of the

Florida war; and in answer to the main question before that court, "What in your opinion prevented the subjection of the Seminole Indians in the campaign conducted by General Scott, in Florida, in 1836?" General Clinch, in substance, asserts that it was owing to the neglect of the head of the War Department in not having made more adequate preparations in 1835, and early in 1836. In other words, because there were not troops enough in Florida to prevent the Indians from commencing hostilities; therefore, the campaign to reduce them was unsuccessful. A strange answer to a most sweeping inquiry.

The causes of the Indian hostilities, or the measures taken by the government to prevent them previously to the assumption of the command by General Scott, in 1836, were not subjects before the court. They were questions of public policy, properly cognizable by Congress alone, and which had more than once engaged the attention of that body. But between them, and the nature of the military operations, there was no just connection; and whether there were in the country, before the war, ten men or ten thousand, was a question having no relation to the duties of the court, or the conduct of General Scott.

From the accounts given of a dinner to General Clinch, in Florida, shortly prior to the assembling of this court, it would seem, from the address made by him on that occasion, that he entertained unpleasant feelings towards General Cass. He attributed to the latter his being suspended in command, and to the Presi dent the return of his commission, which he had tendered to the government. To this it is sufficient, here, to say that a morbid sensibility, or some other motive not more worthy of tolerance, led him, it would seem, to mistake his own claims and situation, and to become the vehicle of unjust imputation.

Two reasons produced a change of command. The occurrences in Florida, in the month of December, 1835, information of which reached Washington in January, 1836, led to the conviction, that measures upon a more enlarged scale had become necessary; and at the same time reports were received, indicating that the Creeks had manifested a determination to join the Seminoles in hostilities. As two series of operations, under different officers, against enemies near enough to co-operate, and with the same habits, and feelings, and objects, were to be avoided, if practicable, and as the amount of force to be called into service might be such as to justify

the States furnishing troops, in sending into the field major generals with their requisitions, it was obviously necessary to vest the principal command in an officer of the highest rank in our service. It was very desirable to have an officer of established character and experience, particularly in a duty involving such a heavy responsibility in its expenditures; and not to leave the command to fluctuate, as general officers of the militia might be called into or retire from service. General Clinch was a brevet brigadier-general, and therefore liable to be superseded by a major-general of the militia.

But there was a still stronger reason for this measure. The ambush of Major Dade, and his command, on the twenty-eighth of December, 1835, the battle of Withlacoochie, on the thirty-first, the massacre at Camp King, and the exposed condition of Florida, painfully excited the public mind, particularly in the Southern States. Spontaneous movements were made in that quarter for raising troops, and the patriotism of the country called into service many corps, before the state of affairs could be known at Washington. There were no telegraphic wires for the lightning to travel upon. The government was required by public opinion, as well as by the higher obligation of duty, to take the most immediate and efficient measures for the suppression of hostilities. General Clinch was isolated in the heart of Florida. In fact, his true position was necessarily unknown, for events were every moment changing, and the aspect of affairs becoming worse. His communications might at any moment have been intercepted, himself remain ignorant of the measures of the government, and they of his situation and designs. General Scott was in Washington. No time would be lost in giving him the necessary instructions, and his route would necessarily lead him through South Carolina and Georgia, whence most of the force had to be drawn. While a dispatch was traveling to General Clinch, General Scott could be in the Southern country, or joining his force and plans. And besides, such a dispatch might have failed or been intercepted, and then in what condition would the country have been? and to what just censure would the government have been exposed? And even should the necessary authority reach General Clinch, much time must be lost in returning upon the route with his communications. He could not leave his command: affairs were too critical. And it must be obvious, that the arrangements