J., 152 Smith, E., 84 Thorpe, R., 308 H., 70 Tibbits, S., 94 Tidey, T. G., 228 Tilden, T., 466 Till, R., 383 448 Voules, C. S., 397 W. Wade, R., 84 Wagstaff, J., 441 Wakefield, I., 253 Wakeling, G., 423 S., 319 S. T.. 84 W., 18, 24 W., 78 Wall, J., & Wall, T. Y., 308 Wang, L. T., 136 Warburton, J., 456, 464 Ward, C., 449 T., 252, 346 Warden, E., & Holland, J., Watson, H., & Hick, J. G., 92 S. H., & Kingston, J., 32 W.. 191 Watt, C., 43 Webb, G. J., 200 T., 308 Welch, W., Heath, R., & Barber, J. H., J., 254 N., 359 Welsh, M. T. S., 417 R., 449 Westley, J., 331 Westmacott, R., 103 W. M., 357 269 Whitaker, J., & Crowther, J., White, W., 423 Whitehead, J., Whitehead, J., the younger, & Whitfield, J., & Whitfield, Standish, J., & Kendall, W., Underwood, E., & Wyatt, D. Whitwam, J., the younger, 424 Wragge, C. J., Rufford, P., & Rufford. F., 245 Wright, R. W., Davy, C., & Wyatt, D. J., & Underwood, G., Whitehead, J., & Wynne. R. A., Phillip, J. B., Y. Young, T. A., 448 No. 731-VOL. XV. JAN. 11, 1851. Price 1s., with Supplement, 28. NAMES OF THE CASES REPORTED IN THIS NUMBER. VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT BRUCE'S COURT: COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH: Reg. v. The Registrar of Joint-stock Companies, in re The National Land Company Reg. v. The Dean and Chapter of Chester.. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS: 10 13 15 .. .... 17 18 LONDON, JANUARY 11, 1851. We propose in this paper to combat the notion at present gaining popularity, that great benefit to the public will result from a separation of the judicial from the political functions of the Lord Chancellor; and we propose to do so partly upon grounds very different from those hitherto usually considered in the discussion of this question. It seems generally to have been assumed, in all that has been said in and out of Parliament on this subject, that the administration of equity is the only thing to be considered. All the arguments have been addressed to the inconvenience alleged to be suffered by suitors from the overburthening of the Chancellor, or the danger to the interests of justice likely to arise from the Chancellor being a political and removable officer. We apprehend that this is a narrow view of the subject, and that the value to the State of the existence of the office of Chancellor, in its integrity, must be looked at with reference to broad principles of policy, not merely with reference to so small a part of our political system as the administration of equitable jurisprudence. We do not, of course, mean to assert that the due administration of justice is not to be considered, but only that other and weighty considerations exist, and must also be taken into account. It will not have been overlooked, nor will it be now forgotten by those who have reflected on the real principles of the English government, that its distinctive characteristic is the combination of a recognition of democratic rights with aristocratic leading-a combination only to be practically effected by a system which, while habitually intrusting the exercise of high political power only to the great in station, leaves open certain regular and recognised channels through which men of great powers, but of neither birth nor fortune, can make manifest their fitness for the possession of political power, and obtain legitimate authority to exercise it. In no monarchical form of government known in Europe has that principle ever been thoroughly recognised, except in our own; on VOL. XV. A the contrary, in most of the countries of Europe, governed according to monarchical and aristocratic forms, the regular access to political power has been studiously shut against all persons not of a certain caste. Not only have all high offices been confined to noble persons, but there has been no regular mode by which strong-headed and ambitious politicians could become nobles. Hence, in part, has arisen that compression of society which has led, in some of the continental states, to a gradual extinction of energy in the popular character, and to the adoption of a government in effect continuously military; in others, to a feverish and unwholesome state of general discontent, in which the multis utile bellum has brought about such convulsions as we have seen within the last two years in Germany. The history of every revolution and every insurrection that has desolated the Continent since the great French revolution would, if analysed, shew vividly the extreme political danger of a system, in which, while power is exercised-and we deny not that it ought to be exercised-by a superior class of some kind, the ranks of that class are not capable of opening, so as to admit great men to participate in its privileges, without regard to the class from which they spring. We will not waste the time of our readers by going into historical proof of the soundness of a political doctrine which is of course familiar to those who, with any knowledge of human nature, have reflected at all on the principles of government, and which requires but to be stated to educated men to be understood and admitted by them, even if their tastes should not have directed their attention to political studies. We shall therefore take it to be understood and admitted, that, in order to preserve a government in which monarchical and aristocratic forms exist, as they do in ours, consistently with public freedom and political tranquillity, there should be some regular and recognised channels of employment, through which men of strong and ambitious minds, in whatever class they may be born, can work their way up to a position in the State, second to none except that of the Sovereign; that there ought to be a few, and but very few, such posi tions, and that their attainment ought to be dependent, not on the mere favour of the Sovereign, or the caprice of any minister, but upon the constitutional and wise exercise of the power of selection which is vested in the Sovereign, with the direct effect, if not for the express purpose, of enabling the Crown to draw into the service of the State the men most qualified to assist in the task of government. and by the steady and legitimate attainment of power, but will in no times be contented with mere wealth, or with a second or third rate post in the State. Hence, if the utmost height attainable through success at the Bar be something equivalent to even a Chief Justiceship, such men will not enter the ranks of the Bar. Will they, then, be contented to remain obscure and inactive? No; it would be idle to expect it. It is of their very nature and essence to struggle for pre-eminence, and nothing else will content them. They will still seek pre-eminence, but it will be through irregular channels, with unfixed aims, though with a fixed determination. Men who now quietly join the Bar, and, with their eyes fixed on the distant and apparently unattainable woolsack, for years work on in silence, content, sustained by the hope that they nurse in their secret hearts, to labour at the common drudgery of their profession, while they are filling their minds with the fruit of reading, and of thought and experience, and so preparing themselves to govern wisely when their turn for assisting in the government arrives, would, if no such predominant position as that of the Chancellor were attainable, become political adventurers in and out of the House of Commons; harassing all men; un In England there are two, and two only, channels through which men, not born to rank and political authority, can, in time of peace, obtain either the Senate and the Bar. An Englishman may acquire wealth and extensive social influence, if those are his desire, in commercial pursuits. He may acquire fame, and perhaps wealth, in many professional pursuits. He may acquire dignity and wealth in the Church; but only through the Senate or the Bar can he reach at once high rank and high political power. The restriction extends, indeed, somewhat further; for to the man not only without rank, but poor, the Bar is the only employment through and by which political position and power are attainable. It would be tedious and useless here to inquire why this is; but unquestionably so it is. So usage has settled the social institutions of this country; and while, as experience demon-settling all things; rushing, perhaps prematurely, by strates, the humblest in origin may, by dint of talent, energy, and perseverance, work his way at the Bar, first into professional eminence, then into political distinction, and lastly into that position which is still second to none in the State, it is equally notorious, that, in times of peace, with the rarest possible exceptions, there is no road to such honour and position accessible to a man without blood and without means, except the Bar*. So that if the political prize attainable through distinction at the Bar is no longer a first prize, there will be, de facto, no legitimate course by which, without favour and without patronage, the ambitious man, of obscure birth and connexions, can reach the position for which by nature he is intended, and in which he can best serve his country. The result will be, to deprive the Crown of one of its resources for surrounding itself with able servants; to concentrate political authority in the hands of the wealthy and high born; and to leave unsatisfied, and therefore prone to hatred of the existing order of things, those energetic and restless spirits which are sometimes to be found in the bodies of obscure and friendless men. It will, perhaps, be said, that if the proposed subdivision of the office of Lord Chancellor should take place, there will be two positions of great dignity and authority, instead of one, open to the ambitious man who chooses the Bar for his career. But this argument, we think, proceeds upon a total ignorance of the character of the sort of men for whom Chancellorships and Premierships are destined. Such men are the sort of men who, in the middle ages, in the high and palmy days of the Papacy, struggled to become Popes; who, in times of turbulence and civil war, become Protectors and First Consuls; who are in all times destined to rule, and in times of peace will be contented to rule in peace, *We say there is no road except the Bar, because the House of Commons is not practically open to a man without either rank or fortune. We do not assert either that it can or ought to be so, but only that it is not. coups de main, into power; and applying, as did statesmen in the old time, to the mischievous arts of intrigue, a large portion of the time and power which are now, more beneficially for the country, applied in the acquisition of solid political information and large experience. We say, then, that it is of the highest public importance that there should be some fixed and regular channel, through which the humblest and poorest may, by the exertion of great mental and moral power, attain, not merely emolument, not merely rank, not merely the shew of dignity, but position, authority, rule—such a position as only is enjoyed in this country by two functionaries-the Premier and the Chancellor. We say that the office of Lord Chancellor, as at present constituted, is the only office which, with the rarest exceptions, is attainable to the man who is either poor or obscurely born, or both, and that the Bar is the only channel through which it is obtainable. We say, that if this office be abolished, or, what is the same thing, be divided into two second or third rate offices, some other office equally high must be made attainable by some regular, but perfectly open, course of labour, otherwise great political mischief will ensue. If these views are sound, the question to be considered is, not the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor, but the best mode of giving him assistance, if assistance he requires; and, as lightening of his labour might be effected in many ways, one and the most obvious is, that the Chancellor should not hear appeals in the House of Lords, by which, during the sitting of Parliament, two and sometimes three days in a week would be gained for the business of his court; and probably no alteration would be more satisfactory to the public than the removal of the great judicial absurdity of a judge hearing appeals from his own decrees. Another would be, that lunacy business should be, as all other business is, primarily heard by the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-Chancellors, so that the Chan ך17 Pleas, Demurrers, Causes, Further Di- Rolls. Saturday... Jan. 11 Motions. Monday. ....... 13 Tuesday.. Wednesday Thursday. Friday Saturday 18 Monday. 20 23 Motions. EQUITY CAUSE LISTS, HILARY TERM, 1851. *The following abbreviations have been adopted to abridge the space the Cause Papers would otherwise have occupied:-A. Abated-Adj. Adjourned-A. T. After Term-Ap. Appeal-C. D. Cause Day-Cl. Claim-C. Costs-D. Demurrer-E. Exceptions-F. D. Further Directions-M. Motion-P. C. Pro Confesso-Pl. Plea-Ptn. Petition-R. Re 25 Pleas, Demurrers, Causes, Further Di- hearing-S. O. Stand Over-Sh. Short. 30 Petitions in General Paper. 31 Motions. Short Causes, Consent Causes, Unopposed Petitions, and Short Claims, every Saturday at the sitting of the Court. Notice.-Consent Petitions must be presented, and Copies left with the Secretary, on or before the Thursday preceding the Saturday on which it is intended they should be heard. Vice-Chancellors' Courts. Court of Chancery. Before the LORD CHANCELLOR, at Lincoln's Inn. Before VICE-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT BRUCE, at Lincoln's Inn. Pearson v. Goulden (Ap) Pooley v. Lloyd (Cl) Newman v. Hutton (Ap, M by Thomas v. Thomas (F D) order) Ogle v. Morgan (Ap) Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp (Ap) Wellesley v. Wellesley (Ap) Before Vice-Chancellor KNIGHT BRUCE, at Lincoln's Inn. Malins v. Carr (Pl) Groves v. Attwood (D) Surtees v. Woodhouse Douglas v. Douglas (E) Kirwin v. Daniel Lane v. Green (F D) Cursham v. Campbell (CI) Harrison v. Round (part hd.) Dicken v. Ward (E, F D) Eyton v. Mostyn White v. Vernon Wheler v. Eastern Counties Vernon v. Ecclesiastical Com- missioners for England King v. King (CI) Cockburn v. Green (Cl) Topping v. Howard (F D) Wamsley v. Rawlins (FD) Lyon v. Wood Payne v. Robertson (Cl) Manson v. Hunt (CI) Smith v. Thorne Kingsford v. Ball Livesey v. Leicester (F D) Tillett v. Leake May v. Brocksopp (C1) Brian v. Hodgkins (Cl) Thomas v. Parker (Cl) Howard v. Evans Jackson v. Graham Chubb v. Pargeter Thomas v. Vignoles (Cl) Alcock v. Duncan (Cl) Collingwood v. Sitwell (F D) Evans v. Summers Needham v. Carpenter (Cl) Goodall v. Skerratt (2 Cls) Cann v. Prowse (Cl) Witherden v. Merceron (CI) Strickland v. Strickland (FD) Chambre v. Maude (Cl) Surfleet v. Kennington (Cl) Bessant v. Noble (CI) Toon v. Cotterell (CI) Brown v. Foster (Cl) Sadler v. Lovegrove (Cl) Garrett v. Chalmers Bensusan v. Nehemias (F D) Petrie v. Fothergill (Cl) Davis v. Evans Gillies v. Longlands (F D) 4 sets) Same v. Same (F D) |