we give rife to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper ufe and office. That their motion follows the command of the will, is a matter of common experience, like other natural events: but the power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable *. Shall we then affert, that we are confcious of a pow-. er or energy in our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raife up a new idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all fides, and at laft difmifs it for fome other idea, when we think that we have furveyed it with fufficient accuracy? I believe the fame arguments will prove, that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy. Firft, It must be allowed, that, when we know a power, we know that very circumftance in the caufe by which it is enabled to produce the effect: for thefe are fuppofed to be fynonymous. We muft, therefore, know both the cause and effect, and the relation between them. But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human foul, and the nature of an idea; or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation; a production of fomething out of nothing: which implies a power fo great, that it may feem, at firft fight, beyond the reach of any being, lefs than infinite. At least it must be owned, that fuch a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind. We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, confequent to a command of the will: But the manner in which this operation is performed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our comprehension. See Note [C]. Secondly, Secondly, The command of the mind over itfelf, is limited, as well as its command over the body; and thefe limits are not known by reafon, or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect; but only by experience and obfervation, as in all other natural events, and in the operation of external objects. Our authority over our fentiments and paffions, is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is circumfcribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one pretend to affign the ultimate reafon of these boundaries, or fhow why the power is deficient in one cafe, not in another? Thirdly, This felf-command is very different at different times. A man in health poffeffes more of it, than one languifhing with ficknefs. We are more master of our thoughts in the morning, than in the evening; fafting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reafon for thefe variations, except experience? Where then is the power of which we pretend to be confcious? Is there not here, either in a fpiritual or material fubstance, or both, some fecret mechanism or ftructure of parts, upon which the effect depends, and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehenfible? Volition is furely an act of the mind, with which we are fufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it: confider it on all fides. Do you find any thing in it like this creative power, by which it raifes from nothing a new idea, and, with a kind of Fiat, imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed fo to speak, who called forth into existence all the various fcenes of nature? So far from being confcious of this energy in the will, it requires as certain experience, as that of which we are poffeffed, to convince us, that fuch extraordinary effects do ever refult from a fimple act of volition. The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature; fuch as, the defcent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But fuppofe that, in all these cafes, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation; they acquire, by long habit, fuch a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with affurance its ufual attendant, and hardly conceive it poffible that any other event could refult from it. It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phænomena, fuch as earthquakes, peftilence, and prodigies of any kind, that they find themselves at a lofs to affign a proper caufe, and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is ufual for men, in fuch difficulties, to have recourse to fome invifible intelligent principle, as the immediate cause of that event, which furprifes them, and which they think cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philofophers, who carry their fcrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive, that, even in the moft familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unufual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like Connexion between them. Here, then, many philofophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse, on all occafions, to the fame principle, which the vul * Θεος από μηχανής. gar gar never appeal to but in cafes that appear miraculous and fupernatural. They acknowledge m'nd and intelligence to be, not only the ultimate and original caufe of all things, but the immediate and fole caufe of every event which appears in nature. They pretend, that those objects, which are commonly denominated Caufes, are, in reality, nothing but Occafions; and that the true and direct principle of every effect, is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who wills, that fuch particular objects fhould for ever be conjoined with each other. Inftead of faying, that one billiard-ball moves another, by a force which it has derived from the Author of nature; it is the Deity himself, they fay, who, by a particular voli-, tion, moves the second ball, being determined to this operation by the impulfe of the first ball; in confequence of thofe general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe. But philofophers, advancing ftill in their inquiries, difcover, that, as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no lefs ignorant of that power, on which depends the operation of mind on body, or of body on mind; nor are we able, either from our fenfes or confcioufnefs, to affign the ultimate principle in one cafe more than in the other. The fame ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the fame conclufion. They affert, that the Deity is the immediate caufe of the union between foul and body; and that they are not the organs of fenfe, which, being agitated by external objects, produce fenfations in the mind; but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites fuch a fenfation in confequence of fuch a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any ener gy in the will, that produces local motion in our mem bers: It is God himfelf, who is pleafed to fecond our will, in itself impotent; and to command that motion which we erroneoufly attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philofophers ftop at this conclufion. They fometimes extend the fame inference to the mind itfelf in its internal operations. Our mental vifion or conception of ideas, is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raife up its image in the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea; it is the univerfal Creator, who difcovers it to the mind, and renders it prefent to us. Thus, according to thefe philofophers, every thing is full of God. Not content with the principle, that nothing exits but by his will, that nothing poffeffes any power but by his conceffion; they rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity ftill more fenfible and immediate. They confider not, that, by this theory, they diinifh, instead of magnifying, the grandeur of those attributes, which they affect fo much to celebrate. It argues furely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures, than to produce every thing by his own immediate volition. It agues more wifdom to contrive at firft the fabric of the world with fuch perfect forefight, that, of itfelf, and by its proper operation, it may ferve all the purpofes of providence, than if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and animate by his breath all the wheels of that ftupendous machine. But, if we would have a more philofophical confutation of this theory, perhaps the two following reflections may fuffice. First, |