tion alone is not able to give a fuperior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of fome immediate impreffion *.

No one can doubt but caufation has the fame influence as the other two relations of refemblance and contiguity. Superftitious people are fond of the reliques of faints and holy men, for the fame reason that they seek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and ftrong conception of those exemplary lives which they defire to imitate. Now, it is evident, that one of the beft reliques which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a faint; and if his clothes and fur niture are ever to be confidered in this light, it is because they were once at his difpofal, and were moved and affected by him; in which respect they are to be confidered as imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a fhorter chain of confequences, than any of those by which we learn the reality of his existence.

Suppose that the fon of a friend who had been long dead or abfent, were prefented to us; it is evident, that this object would inftantly revive its correlative E 2 idea,

"

* "Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, "cùm ea loca videamus, in quibus memória dignos viros acceperimus "multum effe verfatos, magis moveamur, quam fiquando eorum ipforum aut facta audiamus aut fcriptum aliquod legamus? Velut 66 ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi PLATONIS in mentem, quem " accepimus primum hîc difputare folitum: Cujus etiam illi hortuli "propinqui non memoriam folum mihi afferunt, fed ipfum videntur " in confpectu meo hic ponere. Hic SPEUSIPPUS, hic XENOCRA"TES, hic ejus auditor POLEMO; cujus ipfa illa feffio fuit, quam "videamus. Equidem etiam curiam noftram, HOSTILIAM dico, non "hanc novam, quæ mihi minor effe videtur poftquam eft major, fo"lebam intuens, SCIPIONEM, CATONEM, LELIUM, nostrum vero ❝ in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis eft in locis; ut "non fine caufa ex his memoriæ deducta fit difciplina." CICERO de Finibus, Lib. v.

idea, and recal to our thoughts all paft intimacies and. familiarities, in more lively colours than they would otherwife have appeared to us. This is another phanomenon, which feems to prove the principle above mentioned.

The

We may obferve, that, in these phænomena, the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed; without which the relation could have no effect. influence of the picture fuppofes, that we believe our friend to have once exifted. Contiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home, unlefs we believe that it really exifts. Now, I affert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or fenfes, is of a fimilar nature, and arifes from fimilar caufes, with the tranfition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes, the flame. This tranfition of thought from the cause to the effect, proceeds not from reafon. It derives its origin altogether from cuftom and experience. And as it firft begins from an object, prefent to the fenfes, it renders the idea or conception of flame more ftrong and lively than any loofe, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arifes immediately. The thought moves inftantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception which is derived from the impreffion prefent to the fenfes. When a fword is levelled at my breaft, does not the idea of wound and pain ftrike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is prefented to me, even though by accident this idea fhould occur after the appearance of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to caufe fuch a ftrong conception, except only a present object and a customary transition

to

to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in all our conclufions concerning matter of fact and exiftence; and it is a fatisfaction to find fome analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from a prefent object does in all cafes give ftrength and folidity to the related idea.

Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the courfe of nature and the fucceffion of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by. which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have ftill, we find, gone on in the fame train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle by which this correspondence has been effected; fo neceffary to the fubfiftence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumftance and occurrence of human life. Had not the prefence of an object inftantly excited the idea of those objects commonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow fphere of our memory and fenfes; and we fhould never have been able to adjust means to ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Those who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final caufes, have here ample fubject to employ their wonder and admira

tion.

I fhall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like caufes, and vice verfa, is fo effential to the fubfiftence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trufted to the fallacious deductions of our reafon,

which is flow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to fecure fo neceffary an act of the mind, by fome inftinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may difcover itfelf at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the ufe of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the mufcles and nerves by which they are actuated; fo has the implanted in us an inftinct, which carries forward the thought in a correfpondent courfe to that which he has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of thofe powers and forces on which this regular courfe and fucceffion of objects totally depends.

TH

SECTION VI

Of Probability

HOUGH there be no fuch thing as Chance in the world, our ignorance of the real caufe of any event has the fame influence on the understanding, and begets a like fpecies of belief or opinion.

There

Mr Locke divides all arguments into demonftrative and probable. In this view, we must fay, that it is only probable all men muft die, or that the fun will rife to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common ufe, we ought to divide arguments into demonstratio is, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs, meaning fuch argumente from experience as have no room for doubt er oppofition.

There is certainly a probability, which arifes from a fuperiority of chances on any fide; and according as this fuperiority increases, and furpaffes the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable increafe, and begets ftill a higher degree of belief or af fent to that fide in which we difcover the fuperiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of fpots on four fides, and with another figure or number of spots on the two remaining fides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thousand fides marked in the fame manner, and only one fide different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and fecure. This process of the thought or reasoning may feem trivial and obvious; but to those who confider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious fpe

culation.

It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to discover the event which may refult from the throw of fuch a dye, it confiders the turning up of each particular fide as alike probable; and this is the very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of fides concur in the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more fre quently to that event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various poffibilities or chances, on which the ultimate refult depends. This concurrence of feveral views in one particular event, begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the fentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is fupported by a fmaller number of views, and recurs lefs frequently to the mind. If we