formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and afcertained. Some fpecies of beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their firft appearance, command our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it is impoffible for any reasoning to redrefs their influence, or adapt them better to our taste and fentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requifite to employ much reafoning, in order to feel the proper fentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are juft grounds to conclude that moral beauty partakes much of this latter fpecies, and demands the affiftance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a fuitable influence on the human mind. But though this question, concerning the general principles of morals, be curious and important, it is needlefs for us, at prefent, to employ farther care in our refearches concerning it. For if we can be fo happy, in the courfe of this inquiry, as to difcover the true origin of morals, it will then eafily appear how far either fentiment or reafon enters into all determinations of this nature*. In order to attain this purpose, we fhall endeavour to follow a very fimple method: We fhall analyze that complication of mental qualities, which forms what, in common life, we call Perfonal Merit: We fhall confider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit, or fentiment, or faculty, which, if afcribed to any person, implies either praife or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or fatire of his character and manners. The quick fenfibility, which, on this head, is fo univerfal P 2 See Appendix I. among among mankind, gives a philofopher fufficient affurance, that he can never be confiderably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur any danger of mifplacing the objects of his contemplation: He needs only enter into his breaft for a moment, and confider whether or not he should defire to have this or that quality afcribed to him, and whether fuch or fuch an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this nature; and as every tongue poffeffes one fet of words which are taken in a good fenfe, and another in the oppofite, the least acquaintance with the idiom fuffices, without any reafon-ing, to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of men. The only object of reafoning is to difcover the circumftances on both fides, which are common to these qualities; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree, on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find those univerfal principles, from which all cenfure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a queftion of fact, not of abftract science, we can only expect fuccefs, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a.comparison of particular inftances. The other scientifical method, where a general abstract principle is firft established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclufions, may be more perfect in itself, but fuits lefs the imperfection of human nature, and is a common fource of illufion and miftake in this, as well as in other fubjects. Men are now cured of their paffion for hypothefes and systems in natural philofopy, and will hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from from experience. It is full time they fhould attempt a like reformation in all moral difquifitions; and reject every system of ethics, however fubtile or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and obfervation. We shall begin our inquiry on this head by the confideration of the focial virtues, Benevolence and Juftice. The explication of them will probably give us an opening, by which the others may be accounted for. SECTION IL Of Benevolence. PART I. IT may be esteemed, perhaps, a superfluous task to prove, that the benevolent or fofter affections are ESTIMABLE; and, wherever they appear, engage the approbation and good-will of mankind. The epithets fociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and universally express the highest merit which human nature is capable of attaining. Where these amiable qualities are attended with birth and power, and eminent abilities, and display themselves in the good government or useful instruction of mankind, they seem even to raise the poffeffors of them above the rank of human nature, and make them approach in fome measure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted courage, profperous fuccess; thefe P3 thefe may only expose a hero or politician to the envy and ill-will of the public: But as foon as the praises are added of humane and beneficent; when inftances are displayed of lenity, tenderness, or friendship; envy itself is filent, or joins the general voice of approbation and applaufe. When Pericles, the great Athenian statesman and general, was on his death-bed, his furrounding friends, deeming him now infenfible, began to indulge their forrow for their expiring patron, by enumerating his great qualities and fucceffes, his conquefts and victorics, the unufual length of his administration, and his nine trophies erected over the enemies of the republic. "You forget," cries the dying hero, who had heard all, " you forget the most eminent of my praises, while you dwell fo much on thofe vulgar advantages, in which fortune had a principal fhare. You have not obferved, that no citizen has ever yet worn mourning on my account *." In men of more ordinary talents and capacity, the focial virtues become, if poffible, ftill more effentially requifite; there being nothing eminent, in that cafe, to compenfate for the want of them, or preferve the perfon from our fevereft hatred, as well as contempt. A high ambition, an elevated courage, is apt, fays Cicero, in lefs perfect characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more focial and fofter virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. Thefe are always good and amiable f. The principal advantage which Juvenal discovers in the extenfive capacity of the human fpecies is, that it. renders our benevolence alfo more extenfive, and gives us *Plut. in Pericle. + Cic. de Officiis, lib. 1. us larger opportunities of fpreading our kindly influ ence, than what are indulged to the inferior creation *. It muft, indeed, be confeffed, that by doing good only, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent. His exalted station, of itself, but the more expofes him. to danger and tempeft. His fole prerogative is to afford fhelter to inferiors, who repose themselves under his cover and protection. But I forget, that it is not my prefent business to recommend generofity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms of the focial virtues. Thefe, indeed, fufficiently engage every heart, on the first apprehenfion of them; and it is difficult to abstain from fome fally of panegyric, as often as they occur in discourse or reafoning. But our object here. being more the fpeculative than the practical part of morals, it will fuffice to remark (what will readily, I believe, be allowed), that no qualities are more entitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendfhip and grati-. tude, natural affection and public fpirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender fympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and fpecies. Thefe,: wherever they appear, feem to transfufe themfelves, in a manner, into each beholder, and call forth, in their. own behalf, the fame favourable and affectionate fenti-. ments which they exert on all around, PART II. We may observe, that, in difplaying the praises of any humane, beneficent man, there is one circumftance which never fails to be amply infifted on, namely, the happiness P 4 * Şat. xv. 139. & feq. |