AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

MORAL S.

D

SECTION I.

Of the General Principles of Morals.

ISPUTES with men pertinaciously obftinate in their principles, are of all others the moft irkfome; except, perhaps, those with perfons entirely dif ingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they defend, but engage in the controverfy, from affectation, from a fpirit of oppofition, or from a defire of fhowing wit and ingenuity fuperior to the reft of mankind. The fame blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the fame contempt of their antagonists; and the fame paffionate vehemence in enforcing fophiftry and falfehood: And as reafoning is not

the

the fource whence either difputant derives his tenets; it is in vain to expect that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace founder principles.

Those who have denied the reality of moral diftinctions, may be ranked among the difingenuous difputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one. The difference, which nature has placed between one man and another, is fo wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened by education, example, and habit, that, where the oppofite extremes come at once under our apprehenfion, there is no fcepticifm fo fcrupulous, and fcarce any affurance fo determined, as abfolutely to deny all diftinction between them. Let a man's infenfibility be ever fo great, he muft often be touched with the images of RIGHT and WRONG; and let his prejudices be ever so obftinate, he must observe, that others are fufceptible of like impreffions. The only way, therefore, of converting an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will, at laft, of himself, from mere wearinefs, come over to the fide of common fenfe and reafon.

There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they be derived from REASON or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all found judgment of truth and falfehood, they should be the fame to every rational intelligent

being;

being; or, whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human fpecies.

The ancient philofophers, though they often affirm that virtue is nothing but conformity to reafon, yet, in general, seem to confider morals as deriving their exiftence from tafte and fentiment. On the other hand, our modern inquirers, though they alfo talk much of the beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured to account for these distinctions by metaphyfical reasonings, and by deductions from the most abftract principles of the understanding. Such confusion reigned in these fubjects, that an oppofition of the greatest confequence could prevail between one fyftem and another, and even in the parts of almost each individual fyftem; and yet no body; till very lately, was ever fenfible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first gave occafion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from the fame confufion.

It must be acknowledged, that both fides of the question are fufceptible of fpecious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be faid, are difcernible by pure reafon: Elfe, whence the many difputes that reign in common life, as well as in philofophy, with regard to this fubject? the long chain of proofs often produced on both fides; the examples cited, the authorities ap pealed to, the analogies employed, the fallacies detec ted, the inferences drawn, and the feveral conclufions adjusted to their proper principles? Truth is difputatable; not taste. What exifts in the nature of things is the standard of our judgment; what each man feels within himself is the ftandard of fentiment. Propofi

H

tions in geometry may be proved, fystems in physics may be controverted; but the harmony of verfe, the tenderness of paffion, the brilliancy of wit, muft give, immediate pleasure. No man reafons concerning another's beauty; but frequently concerning the juftice of injustice of his actions. In every criminal trial, the first object of the prifoner is, to difprove the facts alleged, and deny the actions imputed to him: The fecond, to prove, that, even if these actions were real, they might be juftified, as innocent and lawful. It is confeffedly by deductions of the understanding that the first point is afcertained: How can we fuppofe that a different faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other?

On the other hand, those who would refolve all mo tal determinations into Sentiment, may endeavour to show, that it is impoffible for reafon ever to draw con clufions of this nature. To virtue, fay they, it belongs to be amiable, and vice odious. This forms their ve ry nature or effence. But, can reafon or argumenta tion diftribute thefe different epithets to any fubjects; and pronounce, beforehand, that this must produce love, and that hatred? Or, what other reason can we ever affign for these affections, but the original fabric and formation of the human mind, which is naturally adapted to receive them?

The end of all moral fpeculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper reprefentations of the deformity of vice, and beauty of virtue, beget correfpondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and conclufions of the understanding, which of them. felves have no hold of the affections, or fet in motion the active powers of men? They difcover truths: VOL. II.

P

Buti

But where the truths which they difcover are indiffe rent, and beget no defire or averfion, they can have no influence on conduct and behaviour. What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes poffeffion of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool affent of the understanding; and gratifying a fpeculative curiofity, puts an end to our researches.

Extinguish all the warm feelings and prepoffeffions in favour of virtue, and all difguft or averfion to vice; render men totally indifferent towards thefe diftinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.

These arguments on each fide (and many more might be produced) are fo plaufible, that I am apt to fufpect, they may, the one as well as the other, be folid and fatisfactory, and that Reason and Sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclufions. The final fentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praifeworthy or blameable; that which ftamps on them the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or cenfure; that which renders morality an active principle, and conftitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our mifery: It is proba ble, I fay, that this final fentence depends on fome internal fenfe or feeling, which nature has made univerfal in the whole fpecies. For what elfe can have an influence of this nature? But in order to pave the way for fuch a fentiment, and give a proper difcernment of its object, it is often neceflary, we find, that much. reafoning fhould precede, that nice diftinctions be made, juft conclufions drawn, diftant comparisons

formed,