the army might have been embarked: Vigo, Ferrol, and Corunna. The distance from Astorga to Vigo was too great; and, besides, there was not at Vigo any military position. The jealousy of the Spaniards would not have admitted the English into Ferrol, and farther, the roads were too narrow and winding for transports to ride in safety from an enemy on shore. The peninsula of Betanzos, Sir John Moore had reason to hope would afford a position for defending the embarkation, and was also So much nearer, that had not contrary winds detained the transports two days longer at Vigo, the army would have been embarked unmolested. As this was not the case, the general prepared for action, by occupying a small chain of hills, a short distance from Corunna. The enemy occupied a more extended chain in his front; and a valley, with the village of Elvina, separated the two armies. From the 13th to the 15th, the embarkation of the sick, the artillery, horses, &c. was going on: the enemy in the meantime, gradually drawing round, and skirmishing with our out-posts. On the 16th of January, 1809, when orders had been issued for the embarkation of the whole army, General Hope reported from his post, that the enemy's line were getting under arms: Sir John flew to the field, where the pickets were engaged, and beheld the French descending from the hills in four columns, two of which threatened the right of the British line, composed of Sir David Baird's division; upon, whose right the rifle formed a chain across corps the valley, which united it with General Frazer's division: the whole stretching in an oblique direction towards Corunna. Sir John Moore perceiving that the great effort of the enemy would be directed against Lord W. Bentinck's brigade, and General Manningham's, which composed Sir David Baird's right wing; had ordered General Frazer to move up, and General Paget to support Lord W. Bentinck with the reserve: The two lines moved on under a shower of balls, and on their closing, the general, perceiving his right to be outflanked, ordered the 4th regiment which composed it, to refuse itself, and form an obtuse angle with the other half of the regiment: a mancevere which was performed to the general's entire satisfac tion; the soldiers at the same time commencing a heavy flanking fire. The 50th and 42d, which composed the remainder of Lord W. Bentinck's brigade, charged gallantly, and drove the enemy from the village of Elvina with great slaughter. Sir John Moore was in the act of ordering up the guards to support the brave Highlanders, when he received his death wound by a cannon ball on the shoulder, and was conveyed from the field, in a blanket, by six soldiers of the 42d. Sir David Baird had already left the scene of action from a severe wound in his arm. The soldiers, however, undismayed by the loss of their leaders, maintained the advantages they had gained on the right, and continued to repulse the repeated attacks of the enemy on their centre and left, until night left them masters of the field. Not more than 15,000 C 3 British British were engaged, of whom about 7 or 800 were killed or wounded. The French engaged in this battle were estimated at 20,000, and consisted, in part, of the regiments sent back from Portugal to the ports of France nearest to Spain, by the convention of Cintra: their loss was reckoned at about two thousand. General Hope, on whom the chief command devolved, took advantage of the success which had been obtained to embark the army, before it should be overwhelmed with the increasing numbers of the enemy. The boats were all in readiness, and the previous measures were so well concerted, that nearly the whole army were embarked during the night. Though the French had no disposition to renew the engagement, when the morning of the 17th rose, and they saw that the British troops were gone, they pushed on their light troops to the heights of St. Lucia; in the forenoon they got up some cannon to a rising ground near the harbour, and fired at the transports. Several of the masters were so much frightened, that they cut their cables, and four ships ran aground. The troops of these ships were put on board others, and the stranded vessels burnt. The rest of the fleet quitted the harbour. At two o clock, General Hill's brigade, which had been stationed as a corps of reserve on a promontory behind the town, began to embark under the citadel; and during that night, and the following morning, General Beresford, who commanded the rear-guard, of about 2000 men, for covering the embarkation, sent off all the sick and wounded whose condition admitted of their being removed:Lastly, the rear-guard itself got into the boats; and the whole of the embarkation was completed by the 18th of January, 1809, without interruption*. In this retreat the British army lost all its ammunition, all its magazines, above 5000 horses, and 5 or 6000 men. But still above 20,000 were computed to have been re-landed safely in England. Thus Sir J. Moore, by a rare union of natural sagacity, military skill, firmness of mind, vigilance and circumspection, decision and promptitude of action, extricated the British army with great glory, and with far greater loss than was to be expected, from a situation in which the imprudence of both the British and Spanish governments, the puerile and frantic interference of some individuals, and the treachery of others had involved it:-Whatever may be the The report of Lieutenant General Hope to Lieutenant General Sir D. Baird, off Corunna, Jan. 18, 1809--Appendix to Chronicle, 425. This is one of the most beautiful, that is, the most simple, clear, intelligible, and interesting compositions of the kind that we have ever seen from the pen of any modern commander, and may even bear to be compared with those of Julius Cæsar. Most, nay almost all military officers of all nations, by attempting to describe every thing, describe nothing in a satisfactory manner. Their descriptions are crowded with such a number of subordinate officers and subordinate actions, that the principal lines or features are obscured and lost. We sincerely pity the historian to whom Buonaparte may bereafter give it in charge to write a bistory of his wars from his bulletins. final result of the contest, Sir John Moore's plan of operations, and its execution, actually saved Spain from complete subjugation at that time. He drew Buonaparte from the south to the north; ruined his equipments, diminished the number of his army, and so harrassed his troops as to prevent the possibility of making any progress for several months. The breathing time afforded by these means, and by the Austrian war, was employed by the Spaniards in recovering from their terrors. In the weak defence made in parliament by Mr. Canning for Mr. Frère, whom he had so injudiciously selected as the British minister plenipotentiary in Spain, and clothed with such extravagant powers, some dark insinuations were thrown out against the conduct of the general. The hint was instantly seized by some of the hirelings of administration, who, after an eager search for a fault in the conduct of the campaign, pretended that he ought to have defended the passes of Gallicia. But those who possess the slightest knowledge of military affairs, by casting their eyes on the map, will see at once, that had this been attempted, Buonaparte, by his numerous corps, would easily have sent detachments round into the rear, blocked up the communication with the sea, and thus have surrounded the British army. It appears that exclusive of small passes and mule paths, there was a practicable road for the French not 30 miles distant from that which the English had taken. Under these circumstances, Sir John Moore knowing that another road was open which he did not dare to occupy*, as it would have been dangerous to have divided so small an army, did not delay un hour more than was absolutely necessary, the retreat of the army. And it is a fact, that a Spanish battalion made good their way through small passes or mulepaths, on their march to join the Marquis of Romana. Besides, this province of Spain is so destitute of provisions, that though Sir David Baird, in conformity to the orders repeatedly sent him by Sir John Moore when he first entered Gallicia, attempted to form magazines; little more could be collected than what was required for the daily subsistence of the troops; and the country was quickly so exhausted, that some hundreds of the Marquis of Romana's men were actually fa mished in the neighbourhood of Astorga. From this dearth, chiefly, Sir John Moore was compelled to detach from his small army, Gereral Crauford with three thousand men; and to send them to Vigo by Orense. Unless then, the troops could have subsisted upon snow, it was impossible for them to remain in that country; we have not heard of any military man maintaining the propriety of an attempt to make a stand at the passes of Gallicia, except Colonel Charmilly. While General Moore was conveyed in the manner above-mentioned from the field, Captain Harding observing that his sword incommoded him, attempted to un Count Cherbot, and several other English officers travelled this very road during a heavy fall of snow, on the 2d, 3d, and 4th of January. C 4 buckle buckle it: "It is as well as it is," His Royal Highness the Duke of York, commander in chief of the British army, which he had raised to a state of the most distinguished excellence, while he was not more attentive to discipline and good order, than to the comfort of the soldiers and the good of their families, in the general order issued by his command, after the return of the army from Spain, bestows on its late commander the following just and elegantly simple praise. The life of Sir John * Vide Chronicle, p. 375. Moore was spent among the troops. During the season of repose his time was devoted to the care and instruction of the officer and soldier. In war, he courted service in every quarter of the globe. Regardless of personal considerations, he esteemed that to which his country called him, the post of honour! And by his undaunted spirit and unconquerable perseverance, he pointed the way to victo ry. His country, the object of his latest solicitude, will rear a monument to his lamented memory. And the commander in chief feels that he is paying the best tribute to his memory, in thus holding him up as an example to the army?" It is not to be supposed that this encomium would have been made on Sir John Moore by any commander in chief, at all under the influence, or of the same party with the ministers of the day, from whom the general had repeatedly met with slights and injustice, and who had discovered and loudly declared, that he had found all things in Spain the very reverse of what the ministry had represented them to be; and, in short, advised them to send no more troops to Spain. The animating breath of justice is to an army what that of liberty is to a state. The Duke of York, therefore, elevated by his royal dignity far above ministerial cabals and interested views, did not hesitate to hold up Sir John Moore, though as it were in the teeth of certain ministers, as an example to the army. It is not necessary to go A very intelligent, as well as gallant, military officer, (the Hon. Captain St-e, in his Cursory View of the Late Administration) says: “That the whole of this order is so beautiful, that it deserves to be retained in the memory of every military man. Įt not go far back in the history of the Duke of York's predecessors in the high and important office of commander in chief, to illustrate the evils that may arise to the army, when the person who holds it is not above an understanding with the heads of political parties, and even factions. There are some points in the account that has been just given of Sir John Moore's campaign in Spain, such as the extreme ignorance of the British ministry and their agents of the real state of Spain, the imbecility of the Junta, and the treachery of many Spaniards of the higher ranks there are many things in our account of this campaign that might well appear incredible, if they were not authenticated by so great a profusion of official documents, and by the official correspondence of Sir John Moore, arranged into a kind of digressive or miscellane ous narrative, in which, however, the main object is kept still in view by Mr. James Moore, the general's brother, whose publication on the present subject has been our principal, though by no means our only, guide. Yet we are well assured, that the passages in that correspondence, bearing the hardest on the conduct of both the British and Spanish government, have been suppressed. The campaign in Spain was allowed on all hands, with the exception of weak insinuations above noticed, to have been conducted by Sir John Moore with great glory to himself, his army, and his country; and with it no small advantage to the cause of Spain. But the conduct of the parties who planned the expedition, became one of the principal objec:s of discussion in the British Parliament which was assembled early in 1809. not only teaches the duty of a soldier, but inspires a laudable ambition of deserving the same just but simple praise :-That any man so capable as the Duke of York, of appreciating merit; beloved by that army that owes to him its present superiority and consideration; honoured by his King and Father, to whom he has ever demons strated the most affectionate respect as a son, and never deviating attachment as a subject; blessed by the widows and orphans of thousands, whose only legacies were the unfading laurels they left their grateful country.---That such a man should have fallen from his high situation by an imprudent connection, is a most awful lesson to the present generation. Yet services such as the Duke's, should make every feeling mind wish to draw a veil over private indiscretion. For did the French nation, when it raised the undissenting voice of gratitude for the blessings conferred on them by their Henry IV, malignantly recollect that every moment of his existence, not de Foted to his country, was passed in the society of the fair Gabrielle ?" A Cursory View of the Late Administration, p. 16. 23. CHAP. |