nowers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof."

On this point, therefore, the legislative power is perfect, and commands as well details, as general principles. The tribunals, inferior to the supreme court are the creatures of legislation; as without legislation they could not have existed. The du ties of those who fill them are defined by law. They may, by law, be increased or diminished. To their augmentation there is a constitutional li mit; but there is none to their diminution. There is no portion of the power, thus vested by law, that may not by law be divested. If every portion of power may be taken away, then may the whole be taken away, which is but the aggregate of the parts. In such an event there can be but two results. Either the office of a judge is abolished, or it remains without duties. If abolished, by these means, which are, as we have seen, strictly constitutional, there is an end of the discussion. If it be not, by these means, abolished, it follows that the office remains without the judge having any duties to perform. On this point, as if its occurrence, had been foreseen by the Constitution, it speaks an explicit language, and at once crushes the absurdity, by declaring that "the judges shall hold their offices during good behaviour, AND shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."

Thus does the constitution render inseparable the tenure of office with the rendering services, and the rendering services with receiving a compensation. The union is indissoluble. If there are no services, there can be no compensation.

1. If the alleged officer is divested of duties, which

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is an equivalent term for services, and of compensation, what remains?

It is no mean confirmation of this reasoning, that congress are made the constitutional judges of the services rendered, by that article of the constitution, which provides that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." By this provision and the antecedent one requiring service, congress are prohibited from giving a cent to a judge except for his services.

It may be said that this is an indirect way of abolishing the office. Let this, for the sake of argu-ment, be granted. It cannot be doubted that the power, indirectly to abolish, by taking away by piece meal the parts which compose the office, until nothing remains, involves the power of direct abolition, which is no more than doing that, by one legislative act, passed at one point of time, which, in the other case, was accomplished by several acts, passed at different times.

Other arguments in favor of the constitutionality of the repealing act were adduced; but this, of itself, is sufficient. In natural science, it has become a standing rule that no more causes shall be assigned than are sufficient to account for particular effects; it would be well if this fundamental rule were applied to moral disquisition. It would probably free it from much of the ambiguity in which it is at present involved; and it would cer tainly save much time at present unprofitably spent.

It is not a little extraordinary, notwithstanding the use made of the term, that the word "independence," as applicable to the judiciary, is not to be found in the constitution. That wise system, so far from countenancing the independence of any public agents, legislative, executive, or judicial,

has provided the most efficient checks to make them all dependent. By declaring that the judge shall hold his office during good behaviour, it has made him independent of the executive; but that circumstance, so far from creating a claim to legislative independence, really produces a necessity in several cases for 'egislative interference.

This consideration presents a great question, not on the constitutionality of the power exercised by congress, but on its expediency. Many of the most important laws passed by congress require the aid of the judiciary to carry them into effect. We all know that the judges have assumed the power of pronouncing laws. unconstitutional; and of refusing to execute them. Such laws may be of vast importance. They may affect the lives and properties of citizens, and may implicate the peace of the nation. Opinion may be divided on them. A great majority of congress, the president, and the people may consider them constitutional; the judges alone may pronounce them unconstitutional. It is as probable, nay more probable that the judges should err on this point, than the legislature, elected for the special purpose of passing laws. Their decision, supported by that of another department of the government, and by the people, greatly multiplies the probabilities on their side. Still the judiciary put their veto upon the laws, and thereby jeopardise life and property, and the peace of the country. Are the legislature, in this case, to submit? Are they to give an absolute control over the laws to the judiciary? For it is apparent that the power of impeachment may be futile, as any num. ber over a third of the senators may frustrate à conviction, and as this number may be found among those senators who do not represent quite one ninth of the people of the United States. If this absolute control is not to be given, then the

power of abolishing the office is the only effectual remedy. This absolute authority is opposed to the whole theory of our government, and opposes all responsibility to public opinion.

Grant the legislature to be in error. The opinion they express is that of the people most directly expressed, and if incorrect, the people themselves will experience the evils resulting from it. Unless supported by the enlightened and permanent impressions of the people, it will be short lived; it will not be likely to endure for more than two years. But an error of the judges, if paramount, will be of great duration, and will admit of no remedy until the existing judges die and new ones are appointed. Before this shall occur, the liberties of the people may be destroyed.

In

To bring these remarks to a close, there is one criterion of the constitutionality of the repealing act, which ought, in our government, to be conclusive; one which could not be urged when the law passed. A lively appeal has been made to public opinion; and the people have been called upon to displace those who supported the measure. every instance, except one, they have re-elected those who supported it; and in numerous instances they have ejected its opponents. In the congress that passed this act the republicans in the House of Representatives were sixty-eight, and the federalists thirty-eight; and in the Senate the republicans were eighteen, and the federalists fourteen. In the present Congress the republicans in the House are ninety-six, and the federalists thirtyeight; and in the Senate the republicans are twenty-five; and the federalists nine. The increase of republican members in the House is twentyeight; and in the Senate seven; while the federalists have lost five senators, and have not gained a single representative, notwithstanding the in

creased representation. More than two thirds of both branches, and three fourths of the states arc likewise republican. Public opinion, therefore, the highest and the only competent tribunal, in litigated cases, has decided this question, with a strength adequate to effecting, if necessary, a correspondent alteration in the constitution, had that been necessary.

WITH regard to the amendment to the Constitution it is unnecessary here to go into an extensive discussion, as this has been so recently done, that the arguments urged may be presumed to be fresh in the recollection of the reader.Its having been proposed, in the first instance, by two thirds of each branch of the legislature, and afterwards approved by states containing more than four-fifths of the population of the whole United States, conclusively proves the estimation in which it is held by the people. The declaration that it was a measure subversive of the rights of the small states is fully repelled by the fact, that of the six small states four have approved it.

There is only one further view which it is proper, in this place, to take. It has been said that this is a measure of the President and his personal friends; and that its chief object is to secure his future election.

We have already seen that it has not been officially suggested by him; and that no evidence is before the public of his having, even in his indivi. dual character, recommended it. Why then is it called. HIS measure? It must be from the influence it will have on the ensuing election. Let us examine what this will be. At the nominations for the President and vice-president by the republican members of congress, Mr. Jefferson had every vote. In the republican prints, and at every poli tical meeting in relation to the election of a presi