CHAPTER
XIV.

Months.

Days.

Bills and notes at sight.

Usance.

ments, and in legal proceedings, the word month is taken
to mean a lunar, and not a calendar, month, unless there be
something in the context to indicate the latter sense (p);
but in matters ecclesiastical, in Acts of Parliament passed
after the year 1850 (q), and, by the custom of trade, in bills
and notes, a month is deemed to be a calendar or solar
month (r).

The inequality in the length of the respective months
may sometimes occasion a difficulty, but it is said to be a
rule not to extend the time at which the bill falls due
beyond the month in which it would have fallen due, had
that month been of the length of thirty-one days. Thus,
if a bill at one month be drawn on the 31st of January, it
will be due on the 28th of February, and, with the days of
grace, payable on the 3rd of March (s).

When a bill is drawn at a certain number of days after date or after sight, those days are reckoned exclusively of the day on which the bill is drawn or accepted, and inclusively of the day on which it falls due (t).

We have already observed, that on a bill the words
"after sight" are equivalent to "after acceptance;" for sight
must appear
in a legal way. If a note be made payable at
sight, it must be presented before action brought against the

maker (u). ungt now. bay 5th Vers
суд
the
words as sight are equivalent to on
on demar
Usance is the period which, in early times, it was usual
to appoint between different countries for the payment of
bills. When usance is a month, half usance is always
fifteen days (a), notwithstanding the unequal length of the
months. An usance between London, Aleppo, Altona, and

(p) Lang v. Gale, 1 M. & Sel. 111; Barksdale v. Morgan, 4 Mo. 185; Jocelyn v. Hawkins, 1 Stra. 446, which, however, seems overruled by Titus v. Lady Preston, 1 Stra. 652. In a contract for purchase of lands, months are said to be prima facie calendar months. Hipwell v. Knight, 1 Younge & C. 401; and see Webb v. Fairmaner, 3 Mees. & W. 474; see 1 Sug. Vend, & Pur. 402. The meaning of the word "month" in a charter-party has been left as a question for the jury. Jolly v. Young, 1 Esp. 186; Reg. v. Chaw

ton, 1 Q. B. 247; see the authori-
ties fully collected in Simpson v.
Margitson, 11 Q. B. 23, and 2
Exch. 116.

(g) 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, s. 4.
(r) Cockell v. Gray, 3 B. & B.
186.

(s) Marius, 75; Kyd, 4.

(t) So if a bill be drawn pay-
able so many days after a certain
event. Bayley on Bills, 6th ed.
245; Coleman v. Sayer, 1 Barnard,
303.

(u) Dixon v. Nuttall, 1 C., M.
& R. 307; 6 C. & P. 320, S. C.
(a) Marius, 93.

Amsterdam, Antwerp, Brabant, Bruges, Flanders, Geneva, Germany, Hamburg, Holland, and the Netherlands, Lisle, Middleburg, Paris, or Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Rouen, is one calendar month; between London and the Spanish or Portuguese towns, two calendar months; between London and Genoa, Venice, or places in Italy, it is three calendar months (y).

CHAPTER
XIV.

It is said that all the countries with which the English old and new are in the habit of negotiating bills, compute their time by style. the new style, with the single exception of Russia (z). In the case of bills drawn in a place using one style, and payable in a place using another, if drawn payable at a certain period after date, they fall due as they would have done in the country in which they were drawn. Thus, a bill drawn Feb. 1, in London, on St. Petersburg, at one month, would be payable, without the days of grace, on March 1, in our calendar; and, as it was drawn on Jan. 21, old style, it would fall due on Feb. 21, in the Russian calendar. But, if the bill were drawn payable at a day certain, or at a certain period after sight, the time must then be reckoned according to the style of the place on which it is drawn (a).

Days of grace are so called, because they were formerly Days of grace. allowed the drawee as a favour: but the laws of commercial What in different countries have long since recognized them as a right. The countries. number of these days varies in different places. Mr. Kyd, in his Treatise on Bills of Exchange, gives the following table, which, however, has been altered in many places since his day, by the substitution of the French code, and other circumstances :

"Great Britain, Ireland, Bergamo, and Vienna, three days.

"Frankfort (b), out of the fair-time, four days.

"Leipsic, Naumburg, and Augsburg, five days.

"Venice (c), Amsterdam (d), Rotterdam (d), Middleburg, Antwerp (d), Cologne, Breslau, Nuremberg, and Portugal (e), six days.

"Dantzic, Königsberg, and France (d), ten days.

(y) Chitty, 10th ed. 254; Bayley, 203.

(z) Bayley, 201.

(a) Beawes, 444; Bayley, 202. (b) i. e. on the Maine.

(c) Not including Sundays and holidays.

(d) Abolished by the French

Code. "Tons délais de grâce, de
faveur, d'usage, ou d'habitude
locale pour le paiement de lettres
de change, sont abrogés." Code de
Commerce, liv. i. tit. 8, 135.

(e) Now, it is believed, in Lis-
bon and Oporto fifteen days on
domestic, and six on foreign bills.

"Hamburg and Stockholm, twelve days.

"Naples (e), eight; Spain, fourteen (ƒ); Rome, fifteen and Genoa, thirty days.

;

Leghorn (g), Milan, and some other places in Italy, no fixed number.

"Sundays and holidays are included in the respite days, at London, Naples (e), Amsterdam (e), Rotterdam (e), Antwerp (e), Middleburg, Dantzic, Königsberg, and France (e); but not at Venice, Cologne, Breslau, and Nuremberg. At Hamburg, the day on which the bill falls due makes one of the days of grace; but it is not so elsewhere."

Three days of grace are allowed in North America, at Berlin, and in Scotland (h).

At Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, and other parts of Brazil, fifteen days.

At St. Petersburg, ten days on bills after date, three days on bills at sight, ten days on bills received and presented after they are due.

At Trieste and Vienna, three days on bills after date (i).

The three days' grace allowed in this country are reckoned exclusive of the day on which the bill falls due, and inclusive of the last day of grace.

Where there are no days of grace, and the bill falls due on a Sunday, Christmas-day, Good Friday, public fast or thanksgiving day, or where the last of the days of grace happens on such a day, the bill becomes payable on the day preceding; and if not then paid, must be treated as dishonoured (k).

A presentment for payment before the expiration of the days of grace is premature, and will not enable the holder to charge the antecedent parties (7).

Days of grace are allowed on promissory notes as well as on bills (m). They are allowed, whether the bill or note be

(e) See note (d) preceding page.
(f) But eight days of grace only
are allowed on inland bills. At
Cadiz only six days are allowed.
(g) Now none.

(h) See Ferguson v. Douglas,
6 Bro. P. C. 276.

(i) See Freese's Cam. Comp. part 2.

(k) Tassell v. Lewis, 1 Ld.

Raym. 743; 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 42; 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 15. "Si l'échéance d'une lettre de change est à un jour férie légal, elle est payable la veille." Code de Commerce, liv. 1, tit. 8, 134.

(1) Wiffen v. Roberts, 1 Esp.

261.

(m) Brown v. Harraden, 4 T. R. 148.

made payable on a certain event, or at a certain day (n), or
at a certain number of years, months, weeks, or days, after

CHAPTER
XIV.

date or after sight, or at usance, or by instalments (0). But muchess
they are not allowed on bills or notes payable on demand (p)
Whether days of grace are allowed on bills payable at sight
seems yet undecided (g). The weight of authority has been

cheels considered to inclipe in favour of such an allowance (7). Beat this 7 35 21! the as scght or on prevention not nous allowed

Jules end grace are to be allowed on Bills drawh payable when present

ment of bill

at sight, the time when they should be presented has already payable at sight
been considered, in the Chapter on PRESENTMENT FOR AC- is to be made.
CEPTANCE. If not, then they stand on the same footing as
bills payable indefinitely, and ills payable on demand.

We have already seen that the time which bills payable of a bill payable
after sight have to run is computed from the date of the after sight.
acceptance (s); a note payable at a certain period after
sight is payable at that period after presentment for sight (t).
So, if some time after a refusal to accept, a bill payable after
sight be accepted supra protest, the time is calculated, not
from the date of the exhibition of the bill to the drawee,
but from the date of the acceptance supra protest (u).

payable on

Bills and notes payable on demand, and checks, must be When present-
presented within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable ment of bills
time seems to be a question of law (x). And such a decision demand is to
is conformable with the principles of law. "Reasonable be made.
time," says Lord Coke, "shall be adjudged by the discretion
of the justices before whom the cause dependeth; and so it
is of reasonable fines, customs and services, upon the true

(n) Ibid., and so held in America. Griffin v. Goff, 12 John's Rep. 423.

(0) Oridge v. Sherborne, 11 M. & W. 374; Carlon v. Kenealy, 12 M. & W. 139. If the whole be payable on default of payment of any one instalment the note is still a good promissory note. Ibid., and see Miller v. Biddle, Exch., M. T. 1865. Are three more days of grace to be allowed?

(p) Bayley, 241; Chitty, 10th ed. 261.

(q) Beawes, 256; Kyd, 10; Bayley, 198; Dehers v. Harriott, 1 Show. 163; Coleman v. Sayer, Barn. R. 303; 2 Stra. 829, S. C.; Janson v. Thomas, Bayley, 6th ed.

241; 3 Doug. 421, S. C.; Dixon
v. Nuttall, 1 C., M. & R. 307; 6
C. & P. 320, S. C.

(r) Selw. N. P., 7th ed. 344.
(s) Campbell v. French, 6 T. R.
200; 2 H. Bl. 163, S. C.

(t) Sturdy v. Henderson, 4 B.
& Ald. 592.

(u) Williams v. Germaine, 7 B. & C. 468; 1 M. & R. 394, S. C.

(x) Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 168; Darbyshire v. Parker, 6 East, 3; 2 Smith, 195, S. C.; Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385; 3 Smith, 358, S. C.; Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bos. & Pul. 599; Appleton v. Sweetapple, Bayley, 6th ed. 234; 3 Doug. 137, S. C.

CHAPTER
XIV.

General rule.

Different sorts of instruments payable on demand.

state of the case depending before them for reasonableness in these cases belongeth to the knowledge of the law; and therefore to be decided by the justices. Quam longum esse debet non definitur in jure, sed pendet ex discretione justiciariorum. And, this being said of time, the like may be said of things incertaine, which ought to be reasonable; for nothing that is contrary to reason is consonant to law" (y). Besides, the opinions of jurors have been so various, that there can be no certainty on the subject, unless it be held to be a question of law. Yet we have seen, that what is a reasonable time within which to present for acceptance a bill drawn payable after sight has been held a question of fact for the jury, and the same point has been ruled as to the time of presentment for payment of a note payable on demand (z).

A man taking a bill or note payable on demand, or a check, is not bound, laying aside all other business, to present or transmit it for payment the very first opportunity. It has long since been decided, in numerous cases, that, though the party by whom the bill or note is to be paid live in the same place, it is not necessary to present the instrument for payment till the morning next after the day on which it was received (a). And later cases have established, that the holder of a check has the whole of the banking hours of the next day within which to present it for payment (b).

Negotiable instruments, payable on demand, may be distributed into several classes, and the time within which they ought to be presented for payment, and the consequences of a failure to make due presentment, are not precisely the same in every class.

Negotiable instruments payable on demand are common commercial bills of exchange, checks, common promissory notes, bank notes, and bankers' cash notes and bankers' bills.

(y) Co. Litt. 56, b.

(z) Manwaring v. Harrison, 1
Stra. 508; Hankey v. Trotman, 1
W. Bl. 1; see ante, p. 180, as to
Presentment for Acceptance.

(a) Ward v Evans, 2 Ld. Raym.
928; 6 Mod. 36, S. C.; Moore v.
Warren, 1 Stra. 415; Fletcher v.
Sandys, 2 Stra. 1248; Turner v.
Mead, 1 Stra. 416; Hoar v. Da
Costa, 2 Stra. 910; Appleton v.

Sweetapple, Bayley, 6th ed. 234; 3 Doug. 137, S. C.

(b) Pocklington v. Sylvester, Chitty, 9th ed. 385; Robson v. Bennett, 2 Taunt. 388; Rickford v. Ridge, 2 Camp. 537; Moule v. Brown, 4 Bing. N. C. 266; 5 Sco. 694, S. C.; Hare v. Henty, 30 L. J., C. B. 302. As to checks,

see ante.