" " "tration of the runaways from Burgos, &c. at Segovia, and the attempt to render the passes of "the Somasierra and the Guadarama defensible, will not save "Madrid or Spain. And unless "Blake effects his union with you, " "whole of Arragon, Catalonia, Reding's division, &c. so as to "form a force superior to oppo"nents, who are increasing daily, "I cannot flatter myself with any "serious hope of a good result." "cation with any of the Spanish generals with whom I am actWing, I can send one; but, in ge"neral, I shall prefer a direct cor"respondence with the general himself, who will, of course, "communicate many particulars "to me, which it is unnecessary" and Castanos brings together the "and highly improper for him to "communicate to such officers as "are in general sent to them. My "wish is, to overset the whole sys"tem: to send them with their "Spanish rank to England; and "to send, as they may occasionally "be wanted either by yourself or me, officers, or others, who will "look to no rank or emolument "but from their own country, in "whose duty alone they should "consider themselves employed, "and who, when no longer wanted, return to their former occu"pations. Other accounts were received of the defeat of General Blake's army, which softened the misfortune. But letters were received from colonel Graham, who was stationed with the central army, and who gave a sad detail of cabals and divisions between the generals, with the injudicious interferences of the junta. But neither reason nor the experience of all ages, nor their own misfortunes, could prevail upon the junta to appoint a commander in chief. Sir John Moore's ideas are best explained by himself. From Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere. "of nuns have promised five thou"sand pounds;-all this shews great good will. The funds, however, which it can raise, are "small and very inadequate to our "wants. I trust that you will be "able to supply us more amply from Madrid, until those from "England arrive. A king's mes"senger brought me, on the night "of the 17th, a letter from Lord "Castlereagh of the 2d, in which he informs me, that two mil"lions of dollars are upon their pas"sage to Corunna: but his lord"ship adds, that the difficulty of "procuring silver is such, in Eng"land, that I must not look for a "further supply for some months: "and he impresses the necessity of "taking every means of obtaining "money upon the spot. The ex"pected arrival of the above sum "from England, must not, there"fore, lessen your endeavours to get what you can for us at Ma"drid. "The French, who entered Val"ladolid upon the afternoon of the "15th, left it the following morn"ing; they were a thousand ca"valry and two pieces of cannon: "they returned to Placentia, and "have not since advanced from "it. I have written to Sir David "Baird to advance a part of his corps to Benavente, and to close "up the rest to Astorga: when "this is done, he will forward that "from Zamora, and follow with "the rest; but as the propriety of "these movements depends upon "those of the enemy, the execu"tion of them is left entirely to "Sir David's discretion, who must "be guided by the information he "receives :-his rear will not reach "Astorga before the 4th of De"cember. "I heard of General Blake's de "feat and retreat to Reynosa; but "I knew no particulars, until I re"ceived this morning Mr. Stuart's "letter. General Leith, who is employed with that army to correspond, has never written a line "to me since I was in command. "I want general officers:-I have, "therefore, written to him to leave "any of the officers with him, "to carry on the correspondence, "and to join Sir David Baird at "Astorga. "The scenes which Colonel "Graham describes, in his letters, "as passing at the head-quarters of "the central army, are deplora"ble. The imbecility of the Spa"nish government exceeds belief. "The good-will of the inhabitants, "whatever it may be, is of little use, "whilst there exists no ability to bring it into action. "I am in communication with no one Spanish army; nor am I acquainted with the intentions of "the Spanish government, or of any "of its generals. Castanos, with "whom I was put in correspond ence, is deprived of his com"mand at the moment I might "have expected to hear from him; " and La Romana, with whom I suppose I am now to correspond (for it has not been officially "communicated to me), is absent God knows where. In the "mean time the French are within "four marches of me, whilst my "army is only assembling; in what "numbers they are, I cannot learn. "No channels of intelligence have "been opened to me; and I have "not been long enough in the country to procure them myself. "I state these particulars to you. "I wish it were in my power to go "myself to Aranjuez, or Madrid, "to represent them; for really if " things are to continue in this "state, state, the ruin of the Spanish cause, and the defeat of their ar"mies, is inevitable; and it will "become my duty to consider "alone the safety of the British "army, and to take steps to with"draw it from a situation, where, "without the possibility of doing good, it is exposed to certain de"feat. " "I shall detain the king's messenger until I hear from you, "lest you should wish to send by "him any dispatches to England. "I shall beg of Lord William Ben"tinck to join the army, where, I "think, his services will now be most "useful. "I have the honour to be, &c. In this letter Sir John Moore complains of not having heard from General Leith; which was owing probably to the dilatoriness of the messenger, who at last reached Salamanca with the following tidings: From General Leith to Sir John 66 Moore. "Renedo Valley of Caqueringa, Province of Las Mon“tanos de Santander, 15th Nov. "1808. SIR, you "commander of the British army advancing from Portugal to Ga"licia. The Estremaduran army "has also experienced a reverse at Burgos. In short, the British army has nothing to depend upon in Las Montanos de San"tander. In Asturias there are "but a few battalions, totally undisciplined; and by the last ac"counts, the French occupy from Reynosa to Burgos. Except what "remains of the Estremaduran "army (of the position of which I am ignorant), and the British "army, there is nothing to prevent the enemy from advancing "towards Leon and Valladolid "that I know of. I very much suspect that he will avail him"self of this movement, to attack "in detail the army of Palafox and "Castanos, united nominally; and "all of which are placed under the "command of the Marquis de la "Romana. The army has suffered "principally from famine; and I "do not think that it is possible to "re-unite those who are flying in "all directions, nearer than Astorga and Oviedo. It does not ap pear that there has been any "want of spirit in the men; and "in many instances, especially of "the divisions of the north, distin"guished conduct. Some of the "" that I regret to inform "the army of General Blake, in "which was lately incorporated the "infantry of the Marquis de la "Romana's division, has been de"feated in several attacks since the 5th instant, and is entirely dis"persed; I have not time to en"ter into detail of this unfortunate "reverse, carrying with it such se"rious consequences, for fear of "delaying the intimation of that "" which is so essential to make "known in general terms to the new officers have not behaved so "well. Captain Pasley, royal engineers, who was sent to headquarters to obtain information, "and to communicate with the "British army, I hope may have "given early intelligence of the "state of things. Capt. Lefebren, "R. E. is the bearer of this letter, "and will be able to give such "information as may be required. I regret to state that Captain Birch, R. E. was wounded, but "I hope he is doing well: 1 caused him to be embarked on board the "Cossack frigate, at Santander, "from whence I saw seventeen "sail of transports, with warlike "stores and provisions, when there "appeared no chance of this pro"vince remaining covered from "the enemy, who, no doubt, will "occupy a point so useful to the “Spaniards, and eventually to the "British. Santander was in the "power of the enemy, after pos"sessing the roads of Escudo and "Reynosa. The accounts of their " having entered that town are not "yet received, however. The dif"ferent attacks have been at Zo"rosa (between Durango and Bil"boa), Valmaseda, Arantia; and "the total deroute, after. a defeat "at Espinosa de las Montanax."About 7000 re-assembled at Rey"nosa on the 18th instant, but "without any order; from thence "they retreated after dark, and "have arrived in this valley, as a "half-starved and straggling mob, "without officers, and all mixed "in utter confusion. Never has "there been so injudicious and "ruinous a system begun and per"sisted in, as that which has led "to the serious disasters of the pre"sent moment. The Marquis de "la Romana, who is here, is quite "of that opinion; and if the army "on the other side, and near the "Ebro, has not, or shall not have "suffered before he can take this "direction, I hope affairs may re"sume a more favourable aspect. "I had prepared copies of reports "on the different affairs, addressed by different officers to Lord Cas"tlereagh: but, unfortunately, all "my papers are on board the Cos"sack man of war. Mr. Amiotte, "the deputy commissary general, "has been in such bad health since "his arrival, that it was difficult rior numbers. The rest of this army consisted of unfortunate peasants, who had suffered with constancy, for four months, privations which would have annihilated a British army. They had endured excessive fatigue, were without shoes, almost without clothes, exposed to the cold on snowy mountains, obliged frequently to depend for subsistence on such animals as they caught by accident; on meat without salt-a food totally repugnant to the habits of Spaniards. They passed many days without bread. Their condition was so wretched, that it is not to be wondered at that they were easily dispersed, and had no inclination to rally. Some of the fugitives even passed Salamanca. The Marquis Romana did not consider it prudent to remain at Reynosa; he retired to Leon, to re-assemble as many as he could collect. It was now in the choice of Buonaparte, either to turn his arms against Castanos, who was posted in Arragon, or to march against the British, prevent their junction, and compel them to retire to Portugal and to their ships. BATTLE of CORUNNA, and DEATH of SIR JOHN MOORE. [From the same.] THE British army thus arrived at Corunna, entire and unbroken; and, in a military point of view, the operation was successful and splendid. Nearly seventy thousand Frenchmen, led by Buonaparte, with a great superiority of cavalry, had endeavoured in vain to surround or to rout twenty-six thousand British. Two hundred and fifty miles of the country had been traversed; mountains, defiles, and rivers had been crossed, in daily contact with their enemy. Though often engaged, even their rear-guard was never beaten, nor thrown into confusion but it was victorious in every encounter. Much baggage undoubtedly was lost, and some three-pounders were abandoned; but nothing was taken by force. What was left, was owing to the death of waggon-horses and mules, and not to their escort ever being defeated. The courage and menacing attitude maintained by the cavalry and reserve were sufficient always to repel and over, awe the advanced guard of the enemy; and at Lugo, battle was offered by this handful of British, to three divisions of French, commanded by their marshals. This challenge was declined; and the impression it made, enabled the British to terminate their march almost undisturbed. In fine, neither Napoleon nor the Duke of Dalmatia won a piece of artillery, a standard, or a single military trophy, from the British army. The greatest danger was still to be incurred: the position at Corunna was found to be extremely bad, the transports were not arrived, and the enemy were appearing on the heights. Some experienced general officers, of excellent judgment and distinguished valour, were so impressed with the melancholy aspect of affairs, as to consider the state of the army almost desperate. They thought it their duty to re present |