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HE directions of government were, that the cavalry should be sent by land; but a discretionary power was given to the commander to move the infantry, by sea or land, as he judged best. Upon an examination of the subject, there was found to be no choice; for independently of the uncertainty and danger of a coasting voyage in winter, which, even when prosperous, unhinges the unhinges the whole machinery of an army, it was ascertained that, at Corunna, there were hardly the means of equipping and forwarding, the corps commanded by Sir David Baird. The Spanish government deputed Colonel Lopez, a Spanish officer, who was well acquainted with the roads and resources of the country, to assist the British Army on its march, to establish magazines, and to make the necessary arrangements with Sir John Moore. He confirmed the former intelligence, and pressed him, in the name of the Junta, to march by land; assuring him, that if he went by sea, one half of the army

could never leave the coast for want of necessaries.

The next question was, whether they should proceed in a northerly direction, through Portugal to Almeida; or should take the great eastern road to Elvas, and thence march through Estremadura. Necessity decided this question likewise; for it was found that the whole could not be subsisted on the road by Elvas; no magazines having been formed for such a body of troops. When the Spanish commissary-general was consulted on this subject, and when the quan tity of meat required by the British army was explained to him, he computed, that, were they to be supplied with the rations specified, in three months all the oxen would be consumed, and very few hogs would be left in the country.

Strict inquiry was then made respecting the roads through the north of Portugal, where there was known to be abundance of food.

He found the Portuguese at Lisbon incredibly ignorant of the state of the roads of their own 19 country:

country but all agreed that cannon could not be transported over the mountains which form the northern boundary between Spain and Portugal. Even British officers, who had been sent to examine the roads, confirmed the Portuguese intelligence.

As equipments could not be procured at Corunna, as food could not be supplied on the road by Elvas, and as the artillery could not be drawn over the Portuguese mountains, it became absolutely necessary to divide the army.

This distressing measure was adopted from necessity alone. In an absolute government, like France, where the ruler is skilled in military operations, and possesses power to bring forth all the means and resources of the country, such difficulties vanish; but in Spain and Portugal, few obstructions can even be removed by the government; they can only be evaded.

It was then determined to send five brigades of artillery to accompany the cavalry through Spain; and four regiments of infantry were added for their protection.

This important corps of six thousand men was intrusted to Lieut.-general Hope, and directed to march by Elvas on the Madrid road, to Badajos and Espinar. And two brigades under General Paget moved by Elvas and Alcantara.

The rest of the army moved through Portugal.

Two brigades under General Beresford went by Coimbra and Almeida.

Three brigades under General Fraser, by Abrantes and Almeida.

Sir Join Moore, thinking it of very great importance that some artillery should accompany these corps, ordered one light brigade of

six-pounders under Captain Wik mot, to proceed through Portugal: and he trusted to this officer's activity to transport the guns over the mountains by dint of labour.

The different regiments of each division followed each other in succession to facilitate the march; Sir John Moore intending, that the whole of the troops coming from Portugal should unite at Salamanca ; and that Sir David Baird and General Hope should either join them there, or at Valladolid.

The several divisious having moved off, Sir John left Lisbon en the 27th of October. And I shall here introduce some remarks on the state of Spain, and on the plan of the campaign decided on by the British government.

Towards the end of suminer; after the surrender of Dupont, the French army retired from Madrid, and repassed the Ebro. Their force in this direction consisted of above 45,000 men, concentrated in Navarre and Biscay; their right at Bilboa, and their left at Aybar. They had besides garrisons in Barcelona, Figueras, and other fortresses in Catalonia, amounting to full 15,000 men more.

In these positions they quietly waited for reinforcements. And every foreign journal announced that vast bodies of troops of every description were hastening through Germany and France to Bayonne.

During this period the Spanish and English newspapers were reporting the enthusiastic patriotism of the Spaniards; that all ranks, young and old, had taken up arms, were eager to rush upon their enemies, and determined to die rather than submit to a treacherous, cruel, and impious invader. Such was the spirit of the proclamations of

the