who would make a fair and candid disclosure of all the circumstances through which their situations had been procured, though information was gained with regard to facts, no example could be made, in consequence of such disclosure, of those who were found offending; and it may be doubted whether such practices have been less prevalent since that inquiry, than before. The deficiency of their power to compel persons to answer, precluded the court of directors from discovering, if they punished, or from punishing if they discovered, the traffic which was the subject of complaint.

The oath taken by the directors seems as effectual as any thing which can be devised for the purpose of guarding against corruption, so far as the directors themselves are immediately concerned; and your, committee have already remarked, that no one case of corruption or abuse, which has been before them, affects any member of that court. It is, in the passing through several hands, which happens frequently with regard to the more numerous and less valuable appointments of cadets, that opportunities for this sort of negotiation are presented, which, without a greater degree of vigilance and strictness on the part of each director, at the time of making such nomination, it will be impracticable to prevent in future.

Your committee may perhaps be exceeding the limits of their province, in the further considerations to which this subject leads; but as they decline recommending any special legislative enactment, their view of the proper remedy for these abuses may be incomplete, unless they proceed to suggest some other observations.-The unpleasant duty of increased vigilance is not likely to be performed without some incitement

of benefit or disadvantage, attendant upon the exercise, or neglect of it; and it is equally conformable to experience to presume, that patronag will continue to be abused, so long as no inconvenience is felt by the person primarily giving, or by the person ultimately receiving it.-Where strict examination is a duty, any species of negligence cannot be wholly blameless; and it appears not unreasonable to curtail, in some degree, the patronage of those, who have either not been sufficiently watchful in the disposal of it, or whose diligence has been unsuccessful in preventing the abuses which are complained of. As an additional check against those who are inclined to purchase such appointments, it may be expedient that a bond should be given by the parent, guardian, or friend, of every person receiving a nomination, containing a penalty to be paid to the East-Indiacompany, upon proof being made at any subsequent period, that any valuable consideration was given for such appointment; that species of proof being deemed sufficient to levy the penalty, upon which the court of directors may think themselves authorized to vacate the appointment.

The practices which are developed in the present report, and other transactions which this house has recently had under its cognizance, are sufficient to demonstrate, that patronage, of various descriptions, has, in several instances, become an article of traffic; that an opinion of the generality of such practices has been prevalent to a still greater extent; and that fraudulent agents have availed themselves of this belief, to the injury of the credulous and unwary, and to the discredit of those in whose bands the disposition of offices is lodged. It will depend upon the steps which may be taken

in the report of the committee on public offices upon the bank, with a reference to the allowance made for the management of the public debt, and has been since acted upon; and it no less evidently applies to the present case. But the grounds on which the commissioners have preferred their claim to a commission of five per cent. on the gross proceeds in their more recent statements, have chiefly been a precedent for that allowance, supposed to have been afforded in the case of a similar commission issued in the war of 1756, and the general practice of prize agents. The commissioners state themselves to have derived their intelligence on the former of these points from a conversation with the late Mr. Aufrere, one of the commissioners in 1756, but their information is very imperfect and incorrect; and the commissioner who gave evidence before your committee professed not to know whether the commission was charged on the gross or on the net amount of the proceeds of the sales. It appears by some authentic documents on this subject, of which copies are annexed, that a commission of two and a half per cent. on the net proceeds having been granted, out of which various undefined expences were to be defrayed, the commissioners represented these expences (which according to their construction of the term, included brokerage and various other charges besides those of their establishment) to amount to more than their commission; and that a commission of two and a half per cent. on the net proceeds of sales, independently of all expences, was consequently substituted. A copy of the entry in the account presented to the treasury by the auditor, after the termination of the transactions under this

commission, is inserted in the appendix, by which it appears, that the total sum paid for commission was 14,7681. 3s. It was divided among fourteen commissioners. The rate of commission charged by prize agents has been fixed by long usage at five per cent.; and has lately been applied by the law to the net proceeds of sale, having before been charged on the gross proceeds. It appears by the evidence, that the excess of the commission of prize agents above that of merchants, is justified chiefly by the peculiar trouble imposed on the prize agent, in the distribution of the proceeds of his sales among the crews, of the capturing vessels, a trouble from which the commissioners for the sale of Dutch property were exempt. If also the capital employed by the prize agent, and the responsibility and risk to which he is subject, are taken into consideration, little disparity between the two charges will be found. Your committee will now present an estimate of the remuneration, to which the commissioners would be entitled, according to each of the three principles which have been mentioned. First, if the commission usual among merchants of two and a half per cent. on the gross proceeds of sales should be granted, about 50,000l. would be the amount of the allowance, out of which the expences of the establishment (in all about 17,000l.) would be to be defrayed, leaving about 33,0001. clear profit to be divided among the commissioners. 2dly. If the principle adopted in 1756, of two and a half per cent. on the net proceeds, (which may amount to about 1,300,000l. or 1,400,0001.) should be resorted to, a sum of about 32,500l. to 35,0001. would would be receivable, which, the expences of the establishment be

ing paid, would leave about 15,500l. to 18,000l. to be divided among the commissioners. 3dly. If the commission should be calculated at the rate which was usual among prize agents, at the time when the commissioners began to act, namely, five per cent. on the gross proceeds of sales, the sum would be about 99,0001. subject to a similar deduction, leaving a clear profit of about 82,000l. Your committee can by no means agree to decide the question according to this principle. The commission received by prize agents at the time when the commissioners were appointed, has lately been determined to be a more than adequate remuneration for the whole of their trouble. It should also be recollected that the commissioners not only have been exempt from the labour of distributing the proceeds of their sales among the individual sailors concerned in the captures, and from much other trouble and responsibility, as well as from the advances to which prize agents are subject, but are also enabled, by the magnitude of the sum on which their commission is charged, to transact the public bu siness at a much, lower rate than is fairly due to individuals receiving ordinary consignments. On the whole, your committee recommend that a commission of five per cent. on the net proceeds of sales should be allowed to the commissioners, then paying the charges of their establishment. This allowance will probably amount to not less than about 50,000l. or 10,000l. to each commissioner, and will be more, by about 17,000l. than would be due to them, according to the usual practice of merchants, and more, by at least about 32,0001. than they could claim according to the precedent of 1756, to which they have

appealed. The excess of this remuneration above that enjoyed by merchants, as well as above that granted in 1756, may be justified on the ground partly of more than ordinary trouble imposed on the present commissioners, and partly by the length of time during which their commission has necessarily subsisted, and perhaps partly also by the circumstance of your committee, in consequence of the omission not only of the commissioners, but also of the government, having to recommend a retrospective arrangement. The sum which the commissioners will have to refund, in case of the adoption of this suggestion, will be not less than between 60 and 70,0001. They will also fail to receive nearly 20,000l. which they appear to have expected to appropriate to their own use, for further interest and commission. Your committee cannot allow any weight to the observation, that two of the commissioners, having, after a term, quitted their professions with a view to the fulfilment of their trust, some reference should be made to this circumstance in estimating the amount of the remuneration. No notice of the intended sacrifice was given; and it is obvious, that by proportioning the general compensation receivable by the body to the special claims of two individuals, a more than adequate reward would be granted to the majority. If it should be thought fit to adopt the suggestion of your committee, the commissioners ought to be credited in account for the proposed commission, and to be debited for all sums applied to their own use, since they have been taken without due authority, the same general principles being observed by the auditors, in the settlement of the concerns of these commissioners, which are usual in similar cases.