CHAPTER XIV. Affairs of Austria-Remarks on the Conduct of Bonaparte towards the Powers he conquers-The probable Motives and Objects of this Conduct -Sketch of his Behaviour towards Austria from the Treaty of Presburgh -Demands free March for his Troops through the Austrian Territories— Disputes about Cattaro-The Power of Austria in Germany attacked and greatly weakened by Bonaparte-Prevented from further insulting and degrading Austria by the War between France and Prussia-Bonaparte's Conduct to Austria at the Treaty of Tilsit, and the Conferences at Erfurth-Proposes the Dismemberment of the Turkish Empire-Correspondence betwixt the Austrian and French Ministers respecting the warlike Preparations of Austria-The Revolution of Spain again interrupts Bonaparte's Plans Fresh Complaints against Austria-That Power compelled to go to War-Remarks on the Policy of her Conduct. THE HE conduct of Bonaparte to wards the sovereigns whom he has conquered, has often borne the appearance of moderation, and even of generosity. His most usual practice is to commence the war against them with denunciations of their complete and final ruin, yet when the treaties of peace have been under consideration, he has either acceded to, or proposed, mild and favourable conditions. In this conduct it is not difficult to trace the acknowledged and deep policy of the French emperor: by his de-, nunciations of vengeance before hostilities are begun, he hopes to be able to force his enemy to a compliance with his terms; and by holding forth favourable conditions of peace, after the fortune of war has surrounded his adversary with misfortune, and nearly driven him to despondency, he looks forward to the natural effect which such conduct on his part will produce: -his opponent, dreading, from the denunciations of vengeance and ruin which were held out against him, when he dared to wage war against Bonaparte, that these threats will be fulfilled in all their horror and degradation, eagerly springs forward to the acceptance of conditions less severe and rigid, though probably, before his mind had been weakened by misfortune, he would justly have regarded them as dishonourable and unjust.-It is not improbable, that, in adopting this mode of treating his fallen and conquered adversaries, Bonaparte also has an eye to the effect it will produce on the French people : their ambition is known to consist more in being governed, however despotically, by the greatest monarch, than in enjoying the blessings of peace and liberty:-they feel proud therefore not only of his conquests, but of his apparent mo deration and clemency towards his subdued and humble foes: not perhaps, so much, because moderation and clemency are acknowledged by them to be real virtues, independently of their connexion with the more dazzling virtues of military military talents, but because by being contrasted with these talents they show them off to more advantage, and have been associated in heir minds with the idea they form of a great conqueror,-of such a conqueror as the French nation deserves, and should glory in. But although the terms which are generally signed by Bonaparte, when he accedes peace to the sovereigns whom he has conquered, are certainly, from whatever cause, more moderate and mild than he threatened, and perhaps as much so as any other conqueror in his situation would have granted; yet it does not often happen that they are strictly fulfilled: some of them are never performed at all; the execution of others is delayed so long, that, though essentially favourable, they become by this delay harsh and oppressive;-and others are found, when it is attempted to fulfil them, so much beyond the means of the country, exhausted and impoverished by the war which had given rise to them, -that the moderation of Bonaparte in proposing or granting them is felt to have been but a name. It may also be remarked, while we are upon this subject, the treatment experienced by the conquered sovereigns from the French emperor, that the principle which rules his whole conduct; the general plan which he has pursued, without deviation, or intermission; and particular instances of conformity to that plan, which, unfortunately for Europe, her recent history presents in melancholy abundance, all demonstrate, that the whole continent lies within the grasp of his ambition, and is viewed by him as at no very distant period to form his vast empire. When, therefore, he stops short of 1809. the deposition and ruin of his subdued adversaries, to them it is but a respite; they can hardly contemplate their escape from the total extinction, which was denounced against them at the commencement of their wars, with feelings of joy, or of gratitude towards their conqueror: and if they do feel and refl. ct deeply, the conviction that they are to be torn to pieces piece-meal; that their lives are to be spared, while they witness the anticipation of their fate in the ruin of other sovereigns,. formerly as powerful and secure as themselves, must lead them to suspect the reality or disinterestedness of that clemency, which spared their existence. In The truth of the observations which we have offered on this important subject is fully illustrated and confirmed by the conduct of Bonaparte towards Austria. order to supply this illustration, and at the same time as a natural and proper introduction to the history of the war, which this year took place between the French and the emperor Francis, we shall detail this conduct at some length. Although the treaty which the misfortunes of war compelled the emperor Francis to accept at Presburgh bore, in many of its articles, the essential stamp of imminent and unavertible danger to the Austrian monarchy, yet the emperor, having signed it, considered himself bound to fulfil it with the most conscientious and scrupulous fidelity and minuteness. No reserve or limitation with respect to those articles which imposed the most severe sacrifices on Austria, was either sought for by Francis or offered by Bonaparte. On the other hand, those articles which had for their object the alleviation or the advantage of 2 A Austria Austria were either left unfulfilled, or they were carried into effect after harsh, arbitrary, and disadvantageous alterations, or at the expense of new sacrifices. most solemn obligation, to perform, was watched with a jealous eye, and challenged as of a hostile tendency in a most peremptory and insulting tone. The emperor wished to be at peace; but Bonaparte was determined that peace should bring few blessings or advantages to his dominions. Even before any of the articles favourable to Austria in the treaty of Presburgh were carried into execution, demands, by no means warranted either by former usage or by new stipulations, were made upon him. An uninterrupted march for the French troops, not occasionally or for a temporary purpose, but as a matter of indisputable right, confirmed by a formal convention, was demanded through the imperial dominions, When the Austrian government complained of the perfidy of Bonaparte, in refusing to fulfil the obligations to which he had bound himself by this treaty, the reply was in the usual style of French artifice mingled with sophistry. They enumerated singly, and with great emphasis, every one, even the most trifling of the articles which they had executed; but they passed over those which they had refused to execute. They did not mention that the elector of Saltzburgh and the grand master of the German order were stripped of their territories; that the landgrave of the Brisgau was refused his indem-in order that the communication nity; that contributions were levied upon the wretched inhabitants, though the stipulated payment was made,-expressly contrary to the treaty of Presburgh. The emperor of Austria passed over the affronts which were thus offered him, and the losses which he sustained by the infraction of the treaty of Presburgh, hoping that he would be at least allowed to devote his attention and to direct his plans towards the recruiting his finances and invigorating his people, worn out by the dreadful war from which he had just freed himself; but his expectation was vain. It seemed the inflexible determination of Bonaparte to allow no plans that would restore to Austria even a small portion of her former power and resources:-the slightest and most indirect movement towards those measures which the sovereign of every state, possessed of independence, has not only an undoubted right, but lies under the between Venice and the provinces on the opposite coast of the Adriatic might be rendered easy and expeditious. Although the emperor Francis represented in mild but firm terms, that the republie of Venice had never obtained or required this privilege; and, therefore, that Bonaparte could not claim or expect it as a prescriptive and acknowledged right; that the Austrian provinces, through which the military communication was demanded, were by no means adequate to the support of troops even during their march; and that, if this demand were acceded, unsupported as it was by any fair and reasonable plea, other neighbouring states might claim similar privileges:-these objections obtained from Bonaparte neither reply nor attention. It was haughtily announced to the emperor, that the will of the conqueror had been once declared; no equivocal intimation was conveyed to him, that evils of a much greater magnitude might be inflicted if this were not endured; and even the threat of a renewal of the war, for the purpose of wresting by force the provinces in question, was held out. By one of the articles in the treaty, the French were to be put in possession of the harbour and territory of Cattaro. They de layed sending a force to receive it from the hand of the Austrians; in the mean time a Russian fleet unexpectedly appeared and seized it. Austria was made to suffer for the negligence of the French, Although the emperor, in order to evince that he was not to blame on this head, and that his intentions towards Bonaparte were as pure and peaceable as when he first signed the treaty of Presburgh, even went beyond the fulfilment of that treaty, and, in order to oblige France, exposed his subjects to the ruin of their commerce, and consequently the monarchy to the dilapidation of its finances, by shutting his ports against the Russian and English flags:-although he dispatched his own troops to recover that territory which had been lost by French delay and remissness, yet was Bonaparte not satisfied or appeased. The seizure of Cattaro by the Russians presented too favourable a pretext, for fixing on the Austrian monarch a desire to violate the treaty of Presburgh, to be overlooked or neglected. A large extent of territory on the right bank of the Isongo, which ought to have been evacuated by the French troops, was formally organized and announced as French property: the prisoners of war were not restored, and the fortress of Brennau was not delivered up. But Bonaparte adopted measures still more dan in gerous and insulting to the em peror Francis. The great French army prolonged their stay in Germany, contrary to the express stipu lations of the treaty; harassed and impoverished the provinces which they were, and incessantly threatened the Austrian monarchy. The events that took place in Germany about this time left no doubt respecting the motives which had induced Bonaparte to adopt these unjust and vexatious measures towards the emperor. Notwithstanding the treaty of Presburgh had introduced very important changes in the territories of several of the princes in the south of Ge, many, yet the ancient constitution of the empire was expressly recognised and confirmed; the title of Emperor of Germany was admitted into the treaty of peace, without the least scruple or objection; and when the royal titles of Bavaria and Wirtemberg were stipulated, it was expressly added, that they were still to be considered as united to the Imperial German confederation. But the plan which had been long formed for the annihilation of this confederation was advancing to maturity, even when the treaty which recognised and sanctioned it was agreed to. Those German princes who were under French authority or influence, suddenly, without giving the slightest intimation of their intentions to the emperor, broke asunder that bond, which was not only consecrated by the antiquity of its existence, but had hitherto been deemed venerable and obligatory, by the beneficial union which it formed between the sovereign and the subject, and constituted Bonaparte their chief, under the title of Protector. The emperor Francis was 2A 2 kept kept in profound ignorance of this measure, till its final and complete accomplishment was formally announced in these haughty words: "Henceforth the emperor Napoleon will know nothing of the existence of an emperor of Germany and a German constitution." This notification was accompanied with the most menacing expressions; as if it neither was agreeable to the disposition, nor required by the interest, of Bonaparte, to obtain any thing by mild and conciliatory measures from the Austrian mo. narch. It was impossible not to perceive the purpose and consequence of this proceeding. By adopting it, Bonaparte had taken his first, but a most important and principal step towards the annihilation of the Austrian power and influence, and the substitution of his own, among the German princes. Even in the insulting and overbearing manner in which this transaction was carried on and announced to the emperor, might be traced, not more the violence and tyranny of his disposition, than the politic and determined nature of his enmity to the house of Austria. Whether he succeeded or not, in wresting from it one of its oldest and most powerful privileges, he was equally careless-if the emperor yielded, the direct purpose of Bonaparte was obtained; it he resisted, the armies of France, still in his immediate neighbourhood, would have overwhelmed his exhausted and impoverished provinces. The emperor thought it therefore prudent to submit. Had the other powers of the continent been then disposed to oppose the exactions and conquests of the French; or even had the princes who were thus to be transferred from him to Bonaparte, discovered any signs of resistance and unwillingness; had they called upon him, as the emperor whom they had legally and voluntarily chosen, to have come forward, at their head, for the purpose of preserving the Gernian confederation from utter ruin,- perhaps he would have been put to a severe trial. But he. could look for no support, if he engaged in a contest with France, from the other powers of the continent; and the princes of the empire either silently acquiesced in the changes which Bonaparte thought fit to introduce, and thus facilitated them by their subserviency and subjection, or actually stepped forward to support and promote them, with a zeal and alacrity which too plainly spoke their hostility to their legal emperor. Scarcely had Bonaparte carried through this important measure, than he bent his mind on the further degradation of the house of Austria. Many of the conditions of the treaty of Presburgh were still unfulfilled; but every attempt to procure their execution was answered with reproaches and threats. It seemed as if every fresh instance of submission and acquiescence on the part of Austria was regarded by Bonaparte, not as a proof of her anxiety for peace, but as a basis and step towards still severer demands. The emperor could not doubt that his ruin was determined upon, and that he would be compelled either to submit to the constant renewal of injury and insult, or to have recourse to an unequal contest. It is probable that he would have been exasperated into the commencement of hostilities, had not the war between France and Prussia necessarily occasioned a pause |