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render all further enterprise useless or extremely hazardous. With means more than sufficient for the accomplishment of all he was sent to perform, he had failed in a chieving any conquest of real benefit to his country or of permanent injury to the enemy. Yet he was received on his return as if he had not disappointed the expectations of the nation, nor wasted the blood of her soldiers, nor tarnished the honour of her arms;-while the man who had defended Flushing so long against our immense force was declared by the military tribunals of France deserving of death, for having surrendered it before an assailable breach was made in the walls, There is no doubt injustice in passing sentence on a man while he is prisoner in another country, and therefore incapable of defending himself; but if we would imitate Bonaparte in exacting the full measure of their duty from our military commanders, we should do away one great cause of the failure of our expeditions.

As there appeared to be no disposition on the part of ministers to Institute any inquiry into the causes of the failure and the calamities of the expedition to the Scheldt, the common council of the city of London at length determined to address his majesty on this subject; and at the same time to express to him their indignant sense of the disgraceful squabbles that had taken place among his servants. A strong address to this effect was accordingly moved and carried, but only by the casting voice of the lord mayor. As the language and tone of this address were by no means acceptable to ministers, the party attached to them in the common council called another meeting, in

which, after a long and warm de.. bate, they succeeded in substituting an address less offensive and harsh. This party had in the first instance insisted that there was no necessity for requesting his majesty to institute an inquiry; but finding themselves unable to present an address to that effect, they were obliged to rest satisfied with the partial suc cess and triumph of having omitted or softened the disagreeable truths and plain language of that which was originally proposed and carried. To this address, even when thus rendered palatable, his majesty's reply was very short and dry. He expressed his regrets that the expedition to the Scheldt had accom. plished a part only of the objects for which it was sent out, but he did not judge it necessary to direct any military inquiry into the conduct of his commanders by sea or land, in this conjoint service. Parliament, however, might ask for such information, or take such measures, as they should judge most conducive to the public good. Of that part of the address which expressed the sorrow and indignation of the common council at the dissensions which had taken place among his majesty's ministers, his majesty took no notice in his reply. This reply is not only short, but it is also unsatisfactory, and by no means of easy comprehension. It asserts that the expedition succeeded in part.→ This certainly is not meant to add mockery to public disappointment and indignation, or to quibble away the ground on which inquiry was requested: yet it has so much this appearance, that it ought not to have been put into the mouth of his majesty. Let us hope that no attempt will be made in parliament to satisfy or console the nation, by

the

the repetition of this assertion, and that his majesty was advised by his ministers to refer the nation to the proceedings of parliament on the expedition, because in that place

they had determined not to oppose a full and strict inquiry into the authors, as well as the causes, of its failure and calamities.

CHAPTER XI.

Affairs of Spain-Campaign under Sir John Moore-Its Importance stated: as exhibiting the Character of the Spanish People, Army, and Government-Disappointment of Sir John Moore with respect to the promised Cooperation of the Spanish Army-Situation of the British from the Defeat of the Spaniards-Sir John Moore prevented from retreating by the Advice and Remonstrances of Mr. Frere-The British and French Armies meet-A partial Engagement-Superiority of the British Cavalry -Immense Force dispatched after the British-Sir John Moore compelled to retreat-Dreadful Situation of his Army-arrives at Lugo-offers Battle to the Enemy—which is refused-Arrival of the British at Corunna -obliged to wait for Transports-Battle of Corunna-Exertions and Fall of Sir John Moore-The French completely repulsed-The British embark -Last Moments of Sir John Moore-His Character and Interment.

Ν

IN resuming our narrative of the succour.

affairs of Spain and Portugal, the first subject that deserves and demands our attention and notice embraces the march and operations of the British army under the command of sir John Moore. In our former volume our information respecting it was so scanty and meagre, that, while we were under the painful necessity of recording the entry of the French emperor into the capital of Spain, we were unable either to recount any efforts on the part of the British army to arrest or suspend his progress, or to assign any sufficient and unequivocal cause for the tardiness of its progress, and the inefficiency of its

It is now in our power to

present a full and satisfactory detail of the operations of sir John Moore's army; and in doing it, we shall have to record the most disastrous retreat under which British troops ever suffered, terminated and crowned, however, by one of the most glorious victories they ever achieved.

It is not, however, merely or principally on account of the interest which the narrative of this campaign will unavoidably excite, that we are induced to enter on its detail; it is important, and must be useful in another respect; since it opens to our view the character both of the Spanish people and of

the

the Spanish government more clearly and fully than they possibly can be exhibited by any representation drawn om any other source. It will be seen that while no small part of the misfortunes, the losses, and the useless inactivity of sir John Moore's army proceeded from the injudicious plan on which he was directed or compelled to act; even that plan, injudicious and absurd as it was, would have produced some benefit to the Spaniards, had its execution been assisted, as it ought to have been, by the wisdom of the junta, the valour of the armies, or the zeal and cooperation of the people.

The British army destined to act in favour of the Spaniards consisted of the troops which marched from Portugal under the command of sir John Moore, and those which were sent from England under the command of sir David Baird. The latter arrived at Corunna on the 13th of October 1808, and was astonished and disappointed to find that the junta of Gallicia refused him permission to land his troops. When at last he was permitted to land them, his reception was so extremely cold, that he was disposed to doubt whether the Spanish government really wished for the cooperation of the British. The same impression was made on sir John Moore when he arrived at Salamanca on the 13th of November: he found so little preparation made for the reception or accommodation of his army, that he wrote to the British minister at Madrid, desiring him plainly to tell the Spanish government, that if they expected his army to advance they must pay more attention to its wants. Nor was it only of the government that he had reason to complain:-although he had marched into Spain for the

express purpose of cooperating with the forces of the patriots, yet he was left in total ignorance of their military plans; and the army of Blake, instead of moving forward to act along with him, directed its march in a quite different route, and thus exposed both themselves and the British to be separately attacked.

The further sir John Moore advanced into Spain, the more strongly was he impressed with the conviction that the information, upon the faith of which he had crossed the frontiers of Portugal, was utterly destitute of foundation. He had been officially informed that his entry into Spain would be covered by sixty or seventy thousand men; whereas when he had got so far as to be within three marches of the French army, not even a Spanish piquet had appeared to protect his front. At this critical time the Spanish main armies, instead of being united either among themselves or with the British, were divided from each other almost by the whole breadth of the peninsula. The fatal consequences of this want of union soon appeared: Blake was defeated, and a report reached sir David Baird that the French were advancing upon his division in two different directions, so as to threaten to surround him. He conse quently prepared to retreat upon Corunna; but sir John Moore, having ascertained that the report was unfounded, ordered sir David Baird to advance, in order if possible to form a junction with him. About this time Mr. Frere, the British ambassador at Madrid, first commenced his official communications with sir John Moore. Either from an excess of zeal and hope which clouded the knowledge which he possessed of Spanish atfairs, or from an ignorance of them

un

unbecoming in diplomatic charac-
ter, situated as he was, where he
had access to the best sources of
information, he represented the
defeat of the armies of Blake and
of Estramadura, and the conse-
quent success and advance of the
French, as of very trivial moment,
and strongly pressed the British
general to push forward to the ca-
pital. Sir John Moore, however,
fortunately, had more accurate and
earlier means of learning the ope-
rations of the Spanish and French
armies. On the 28th of November
he received information that Cas-
tanos was completely defeated. No
army now remained against which
the whole French force might be
directed, except the British; and it
was vain to expect that they, even
had they been united, could have
resisted or checked the enemy. Sir
John Moore therefore determined
to fall back on Portugal, to hasten
the junction of general Hope, who
had gone on towards Madrid, and
to order sir David Baird to regain
Corunna as expeditiously as possi-
ble. This determination to retreat
created great dissatisfaction among
the army: they were eager to ad-
vance and face the enemy :-not
acquainted with the motives which
had induced their commander to
fall back, and not perceiving, nor
perhaps even hearing of, the French
armies, which now might unop-
posed pour in upon them, they felt
indignant at the idea of measuring
back their steps without having
tried their strength with their ad-
versaries, or in the smallest de-
gree benefited their allies. But
though the army murmured at the
determination to retreat, it was
fully approved of by sir David
Baird and general Hope; and from
the events which afterwards took
place, there is much reason to la-

ment that the determination was afterwards changed.

A very slight review of the circumstances in which the British army was placed will most clearly and strongly point out the danger that surrounded it, the futility of expecting that it could be of any essential service to the Spaniards, and the propriety, nay the neces sity, of its immediately commencing its retreat. All the principal Spanish armies were beaten and dispersed. A week had elapsed since the army of Castanos had suffered a total defeat on the Ebro. Burgos was in possession of the French; and even Valladolid had been entered and occupied by their cavalry. A reinforcement, amounting to nearly 30,000, was advancing on the side of Biscay. The French thus numerous, having driven before them the Spanish armies, found nothing to oppose their plans, whether they were directed to the immediate attack of the British army or to the occupation of Madrid. On whichever plan they determined, there was too much reason to apprehend that they would prevent the junction of the three British corps under Baird, Moore, and Hope. It was further manifest, that a junction of these corps, even if it could be effected, could be of no avail against the immense superiority of the French; while the delay necessarily occasioned by bringing them together, would enable the enemy to gain on them, and would render our retreat more difficult and hazardous.

There is little doubt that if sir John Moore had followed the dictates of his own judgement, acting on what he knew to be the state of Spanish affairs, and the strength, position, and probable movements of the French armies, he would

have carried his determination to retreat into immediate and complete execution. But before sir John could put his determination into effect, he received a communication from Mr. Frere, strongly pressing him to advance to Madrid, and giving a most flattering picture of the enthusiastic and determined spirit of the people, and of the ample resources of the country. This communication was soon followed by a messenger sent expressly by the prince of Castelfranca and Morla the governors of Madrid, with a paper signed by them in the name of the supreme junta, and dated December 2d. This paper was still more exaggeratingly flattering in its representation of the zeal and resources of the Spaniards than even Mr. Frere's letter; and the statements contained in it were further recommended to sir John Moore's notice and attention by another letter from Mr. Frere, in which that gentleman presses upon sir John Moore in the strongest manner the necessity of supporting the determination of the Spanish people, which he represented as extending not merely to the defence of the capital, but also of clearing the whole north of Spain from the presence of the French. In an evil moment the British general suffered his own good judgement to give way to the representations of the Spanish government and Mr. Frere. He was induced to suspend his retreat, and to order sir David Baird to advance. For the purpose of learning some accurate information respecting the assistance he might hope to derive from the remnant of Blake's army, of which the marquis of Romana had taken the command, he dispatched general Graham to examine and report upon its strength, equipment and disci

pline. Soon afterwards sir Jolm Moore learnt that Madrid had capitulated on the very day on which the letter he had received from its governors had been written. As, however, he had now completely effected his junction with general Hope, and had removed every obstacle to his junction with sir David Baird, whenever it might be deemed expedient or necessary, he determined to persist in the resolution of advancing, though that resolution had been formed, and in some measure acted upon, under the idea that Madrid not only held out, but was capable of opposing the French for a considerable length of time, if not with ultimate and complete

success.

After the main body of the army had been joined by general Hope's division, they advanced towards Valladolid, in order to have the corps under the command of sir David Baird in their rear. Before; however, they had proceeded a day's march on this route, sir John Moore learnt by an intercepted dispatch, that Bonaparte was advancing towards Lisbon, and that a body of 18,000 men under Soult was posted at Saldanha. On this latter piece of information the British general immediately formed a plan, which, if he could carry it into execution, he hoped might still benefit the Spanish cause. He resolved to attempt the attack of Soult's corps: even if he were not enabled to defeat them, he hoped by this manœuvre to draw off the French armies to the north of Spain, and thus afford an opportunity for the Spanish armies to rally and reunite. It does not seem to have struck sir John Moore that Soult was posted with this comparatively small body of men, for the purpose of enticing the Bri

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