ed in his objections to that let

ter.

Mr. C. W. Wynne, in explanation, said he had not abandoned his notice on any view of having

changed his opinion, but from a desire to conform to the sentiments of the house in the mode they had thought fit to adopt.

L

ORD Castlereagh moved that the military enlistment bill be read a third time, to which he had produced two new clauses; the one extending the provisions of the bill to the fencible regiments of royal miners belonging to the counties of Cornwall and Devonshire; and the other restraining the operation of the bill, whenever the militia establishment fell as low as twofifths of the quota provided by the act of 1807. The noble lord said, that the principle upon which his bill went, was, that the militia regiments should not be weakened to less than two-fifths of their numbers, following the regulation laid down in 1807, nor exceed threefifths of that number.

Several other amendments were then moved by lord Castlereagh, and agreed to.

Upon the question being put that the bill do pass,

Lord Milton rose to object to it altogether, as being a measure introduced in direct violation of what he always understood to be the positive pledge of the noble lord upon the introduction of his former bill; namely, that it was not to be adopted as a regular and permanent system, but only be be resorted to on great and urgent occasions. It was upon the strength of this promise that many gentlemen were induced to agree to the principle, who never expected that the noble lord would convert a measure, avowedly of temporary pressure, into a regular and permanent system. But now, without stating any such emergency, the noble lord revived the measure, and seemed to rest upon it as a regular expedient for recruiting the troops of the line. But the measure itself could not fail to produce the most mischievous effects upon the dis

cipline

cipline and morality of the militia regiments themselves, by exposing the privates to be tampered with by intoxication and other means equally destructive to morals and discipline, in order to induce them to enlist; and therefore, even if it were objectionable upon no other ground, it was highly so upon this. One great object of keeping up the militia force within the country was, that it might be ready to meet an enemy in case of invasion: but it by the principle of this bill the best disciplined men of the militia regiments were to be drafted int the disposable force, and the militia regiments thus reduced to skeletons, and left to be filled up with raw levies, the noble lord would not say that regiments so circumstanced, and only called out for a month in the year, could be fit to meet an enemy in the field. He therefore thought the country rather hardly dealt by in this measure, not only upon the ground he had stated, but by the oppressive burdens which a fresh ballot would impose. The noble lord, it seemed, had at last found out that the ballot was oppressive on the people; and he had found out an expedient for easing the burden, by allowing to each balloted man ten guineas towards the bounty for procuring a substitute. The only operation however to be expected from this was to raise the price of substitutes, and impose, in another way, a heavy burden on the country. This was truly a most nstable expedient-one which it was quite impossible the noble lord himself could expect to produce the effects he proposed. Upon the whole, he was decidedly adverse, after so recently carrying into effect a militia ballot throughout the country, to resort again to another, and thus 1809.

for the noble lord to come forward, year after year, with a measure like this, totally subversive of the original intent and constitution of the militia, and converting it to a mere vehicle for recruiting the army of the line.

The bill, after a prolonged discussion, was passed, and sent to the lords.

House of Lords, Feb. 17. The order of the day for summoning their lordships having been read,

Lord Grenville rose. [We can do little more than lay before our readers some of the most prominent points of an admirable speech which took up three hours in the delivery.] His lordship began with stating, that it must be in the recollection of the house, that to wards the conclusion of the last session, after the principal merchants and manufacturers had been heard at the bar, he took an opportunity of declaring that it was his intention to bring, at an early period of this session, the whole of this important subject before their lordships. The time is now come for redeeming the pledge which he then gave. Reports had reached his ears that were highly gratifying. He understood that it was the intention of ministers to alter their policy with respect to America, and to resort to conciliatory mea sures, instead of persevering in a course that must eventually icad to hostility. He had no reason to doubt the truth of these reports; for he could not conceive the possibility of any set of men persevering in a system the fatal consequences of which were so apparent. The steps which he proposed to take would in no way interfere with this purpose: he was but the humble instrument of bringing the question before their lordships. To I

their

their feelings he left it to repeal measures which were proved to be in direct violation of the laws of nations, and the eternal principles of justice. In the interval between the last and present session, his majesty's ministers, had full opportunity of abandoning the fatal policy that had been so rashly adopted. It was not now his intention to trouble their lordships with a recapitulation of the arguments that he then urged against what the event had proved to to be, an act of the most egregious foily-of the most unexampled ignorance that ever disgraced the councils of a state. Since August last, there was not one shadow of a pretence for continuing that most impolitic system maintained in the orders in council. That was the question to which he wished to bring them. If in August last an offer was made to repeal the embargo, its continuance at this day is the effect of the orders in council. The position was not to be controverted, that, from the 23d of August, if the embargo has continued, it is solely, exclusively, totally, and absolutely on account of the orders in council. They have produced the embargo, and by their effects must the question be tried. There were two points of view in which he wished to consider the subject: one would embrace the consequences of the orders in council, since August last; the other, the measures that it would be neces sary to take for putting an end to this mischievous system. By the shameless proceedings in the Baltic, we destroyed the neutral commerce in that quarter. Nothing remained for us but America. After the unfortunate change in the North of Europe, it was our policy to conciliate the United States. Notwith

standing all the clamour that was so industriously raised against it, that was our true policy; it had been so since 1783. At the commencement of the late war, the first care of Mr. Pitt was, that all differences with America should be adjusted. The treaty was consequently concluded, which had the effect, not withstanding the accidental subjects of dispute that sometimes arose, of preserving harmo ny between the two countries during the whole of the war. When, towards the conclusion of that war, the Northern powers combined against the maritime rights of Great Britain, the United States became no party to that confederacy, 'bur adhered to the treaty. How had we to rejoice, that we had a family of our own in another hemisphere, capable of taking off all our commerce! After those fatal councils which terminated in the battles of Ulm and Austerlitz, and laid the continent of Europe at the feet of France, how consoling would it not have been for us to say, There is a country which is beyond the reach of the arms or influence of that predominating power! When he was called to his majesty's councils two years ago, he recollected the policy of Mr. Pitt, and he adopted that. policy. That was the policy which, on every view of the subject, he felt he ought to have pursued. No sooner, however, was the treaty signed, than every artifice was used to disgust the country with an arraignment of the conditions of which the persons who excited the clamour against it knew nothing. That was enough to induce them to persuade the people of this country that their rights were sacrificed, their interests betrayed, During all this uproar, the government, of which he made a part, were silent.

The

The treaty came back, and he defied any one to point out a single article in it, in which the rights or interests of the country were sacrificed or betrayed. Nay, so far, from it, he procured an article to be inserted in the treaty which went directly to recognize our maritime rights, which recalled that which the letter of the noble lord had abandoned. A change of administration took place, and those who succeeded them resolved to adopt quite a contrary course of policy. Their conduct towards Ireland, their conduct towards the Northern powers, their domestic policy, their finance measures,―all, all were directly the reverse of the conduct of their predecessors. But in no instance was it more contrary than in what respected America: his policy was to conciliate, theirs was to exasperate the government and people of America. Their policy, he had not the smallest doubt upon his mind, was to force this country into a war with America. That such was their intention, he might appeal to facts rather than arguments. They added insult to injury. Their policy is the cause that there are neither commercial nor any other relations subsisting between us and America. Such were the consequences of their system. They violate the independence of a neutral power, and tell them they shall trade with Eng land only. All your ships shall be brought to England. They shall be subject to the caprices of cur councils; and not satisfied with this, they add insult to injury, and say, You shall pay duty in our ports. My lords, you lost America by taxation; and as if there was a fatality in your resolutions on this subject, you are about to plunge into a war for the maintenance of

the same principle. I told you, last year, the effect your orders in council would inevitably produce, both here and in America. Instead of producing revenue to support you in the war against France, they are likely to involve you in hostility with America. The sublime invention of making the subjects of Bonaparte pay the expenses of the war against France, has had ample scope for operation. Let us see what the result has been. In the last year this duty produced 31,0007. Thirty-one thousand pounds is the duty levied on the necessities of Bonaparte's subjects, through the medium of neutrals. This is the large sum proceeding from ships brought in by force. Such is the resource by which ministers proposed to meet the exigencies of this great crisis. A vulgar notion prevails in America, and it is sedulously encouraged by the advocates of France, that it is the intention of this government to avail themselves of any favourable opportunity of reentering into possession of their former rights and authority in that country. No statesman, no man of common understanding, could give credit to any such intention, but still there is no doubt that the opinion prevails in the United States. A great proportion of the inhabitants of that country are persunded, that it is the intention of the British government to reesta blish the old colonial connexion. The system of the present government was calculated to encourage that idea; that it was intended to subject the commerce of America to the former state of colonial monopoly in the hands of Great Britain.` That was the sum and substance of the orders in council. When he said, on a former occasion, that the president's offer was not one of

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equal

equal justice, he was not in posses sion of the information now before their lordships. The documents were before the house, and by them let the question be tried. So far from having offered more u France and less to England, America did quite the contrary. She offered less to France and more to England. Such was the feeling in America, such was the fair construction of the president's message, and in that light was it understood by the legislature of the United States. These all incontestably prove that the larger offer was to England, and the lesser to France. [His lordship here cad several extracts from the president's message.] The proposal to both the belligerents, as it is truly stated in that document, was modified according to their relative strength and situation. To England he said, Repeal your orders in council, I will suspend the en.bargo as against you, and that state will eventually lead to war with France. The proposal to England contained, in fact, two conditions, eventual war with France, and the immediate repeal of the embargo. To France the proposal was, Repeal your decree, and if England does not follow your example, I will continue the embargo against her. This was the sense in which the proposal was understood by the committee for foreign affairs, to whom the message was referred. After a luminous review of all our political relations, he concluded with moving an address to his majesty, in substance as follows:-It began with noticing the French decrees, which were stated to be the foundations of the orders in council: the measures adopted by the American government in consequence; the offer made by America, in August,

It

to remove the embargo if we re pealed our orders in council; that it would have been highly to the interests of this country to have accepted this offer, to have repealed the orders, and secure a monopoly of American commerce; that it was still open to his majesty to renew the negotiation on the basis of the offer made by America. humbly prayed his majesty to adopt immediate measures to reestablish the commercial intercourse with America, and to adjust all differences; and concludes with pledging themselves to support his majesty against any unjust aggres sion or novel claim upon the maritime rights of the country.

The earl of Liverpool said, that when once a principle of action was laid down, it ought not lightly to be renounced. The noble earl had never made the admission that the acquiescence of neutrals was necessary to justify our retaliation of the hostilities of enemies: he had always contended for retaliation, and thought that neutrals ought to call upon the original aggressors. The order of the 7th of January was therefore to be defended upon the broad principle of the deciees of France, and the right of England to retaliate them. It was impossible to read the correspondence before the house, and say that America displayed a disposition to act fairly and impartially between the two belligerent powers. The proposition made by Mr. Pinkney was this:-Should France repeal, or satisfactorily explain, her decrees to America, the continuation of our orders was to be construed into war: should Britain repeal all her orders, the president would in a reasonable time revoke the embargo. Thus the same proposition was not held out to the

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