the acceptance of the property, and would not be revived, although the transfer were avoided for the fraud. lb. 11. (Whose name has been forged.). On an indictment for forgery, the person whose name is alleged to have been forged is not a competent witness to prove the forgery. State v. Whitten, 1 Hill, 100. 12. (Of a note.) If the subscribing witness to a note, on being sworn, should not prove it, it may be proved by other evidence. Vernon v. Hamet, 1 Hill, 269. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. COMMON LAW. Comprising 4 Barn. & Adol. Parts 2 and 3; 1 Nevile & Manning, Part 3, and 2 Nevile & Manning, Parts 1 and 2; 3 Moore & Scott, Part 2; 2 Crompton & Jervis, Part 4; 1 Crompton & Meeson, Part 4; 3 Tyrwhitt, Part 2; 2 Dowling's Practice Cases, Part 1. AFFIDAVIT. 1: Affidavits used to ground a motion ought always to be filed, whether the motion be granted or refused. Exp. Dicas, 2 D., P. C. 92. 2. Where libellous and impertinent matter was introduced into an affidavit in support of a rule, the court deprived the party of the costs of the rule to which he would otherwise have been entitled. Thompson v. Dicas, 2 D. P. C. 93. AGREEMENT. See PROMISSORY NOTE, 1: 1. (Arbitrator's authority.) A dispute as to the amount of rent due for a house, and an action of replevin in respect of the same rent, were referred to an arbitrator: Held, that he had no power to award a stet processus in the replevin; he ought to have directed a verdict one way or the other. Leeming v. Fearnley, 2 N. & M. 232. 2. (Appointment of umpire by lot.-Substitution of arbitrator.) An umpire may be appointed by lot with the assent of the parties; and such assent sufficiently appears by each party presenting three names, from which the name of the umpire is drawn, or by the parties signing a memorandum whereby the person whose name is drawn is appointed umpire. (9 B. & C. 624; 3 B. & Adol. 248.) After a submission by deed, an arbitrator may, with the assent of both parties, be substituted in the place of one of the original arbitrators; and semble, that such substi tution would constitute a new submission by parol, and that an award under it could not be enforced by attachment. In re Tunno, 2 N. & M. 328. 3. (What an award.) A letter from an arbitrator to the parties (sent, however, to one of them only, and not communicated by him to the other), in which he says, 'To meet the circumstances of the case in a liberal manner I propose that B shall pay A £10' is not an award. Lock v. Vulliamy, 2 N. & M. 336. 4. (Award, what error in immaterial.—Affidavit for attachment.) An award by an umpire was held not to be vitiated by a mistake in the recital as to the Christian name of one of the original arbitrators; nor by the correction, by a stranger, of such wrong name to the right one. The affidavit for an attachment for non-performance of the award, was defective in not showing, that the award was published before the authority of the umpire expired, but it appeared from the jurat that the affidavit of execution by the umpire was sworn before that period expired, Held sufficient. Trew v. Burton, 1 C, & M. 533. 5. (By administrator. Costs.) An action by an administrator, with counts in the declaration on promises to himself as administrator, was referred to arbitration, the costs to abide the event, and the arbitrator awarded that the plaintiff had no cause of action. Held, that affidavits could not be used to show that it was not the intention of the parties that the administrator should not be personally liable, for the purpose of relieving him from an attachment for the costs. Spivy v. Webster, 2 D. P. C. 46. 6. (Costs.) A cause was referred by agreement, containing a clause that if either party should, by affected delay or otherwise, prevent the arbitrator from making his award, he should pay costs. The plaintiff, on the day appointed for the inquiry, was not prepared with proper evidence, but was ready to have been examined in support of his own case: Held, that he was liable to costs. Morgan v. Williams, 2 D. P. C. 123. ARREST, 1. (Protection from, redeundo.) A defendant arrested on an irregular writ de contumace capiendo, was brought up before a judge by habeas corpus to be discharged. He was discharged, but before he had time to return home he was arrested again on a similar writ for the same matter: Held, that he was protected from arrest redeundo. (Rex v. Delaval, 1 W. Bla. 410.) Rex v. Blake, 4 B. & Ad. 355; 2 N. & M. 312. 2. (Privilege of barrister from.) A practising barrister is privileged from arrest on his return from court, and does not lose his privilege by going into a shop on the way, unless he re mains there an unreasonable time. Luntley v. Nathaniel, 1 C. & M. 579; 2 D. P. C. 51. ASSUMPSIT. (For reward offered by advertisement.) A person having notice of a handbill by which a reward is offered for the disclosure of facts leading to the conviction of a criminal, who makes such disclosure solely from a motive of revenge against the criminal, is entitled to the reward. Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ad. 421; 1 N. & M. 418. ATTORNEY. 1. (Lien on deeds.) Lands were mortgaged first to A and then to B. The deeds were deposited with A's attorney. The property was subsequently sold by auction to C. The attorney refused to give up the deeds until the principal and interest due to A, and his own bill of costs for preparing the mortgages, &c. were paid. C, with B's assent, paid A the amount of principal, interest and costs, and A paid over the bill of costs to the attorney: Held, that B could not recover any part of that amount back from the attorney. Ogle v. Story, 1 N. & M. 474. 2. (Summary jurisdiction over.) An attorney employed by both vendor and purchaser of a farm, receives the purchase money, and omits to pay it over; and afterwards becomes bankrupt and obtains his certificate. The court will not make a rule compelling him to pay the amount, unless fraud be clearly shown against him. (8 B. & C. 220; 9 B. & C. 652.) In the matter of Bonner, 1 N. & M. 555, 3. (Right to set off amount of bill.) In an action against anattorney, he has a right to set off the full amount of his taxed bill of costs against the plaintiff, without deducting from it the costs of taxation, which he, the attorney, is liable to pay. Field v. Besant, 2 N. & M. 207, 4. (Privileged communication.) An attorney is bound to give evidence of a statement made by him to the adverse party in a conversation at which his client was present, after the commencement of the action. (2 Camp. 9.); Ripon v. Davies, 2 N. & M. 310. 5. (Liability for negligence.) A plaintiff in chancery employed A as his solicitor: during his employment an irregular order was obtained for 'dismissing the bill on a certain day, unless publication passed; before that day a fresh solicitor (B) was retained in A's place, and the bill having been dismissed because no step was taken by B, the client sued him for negli gence: Held, that he was entitled to recover; for that B should either have conformed with the order, or have moved within the time to vacate it. Frankland v. Cole, 2 C. & J. 590. 6. (Personal liability on undertaking.) The solicitor of the London creditors of a country bankrupt wrote to the solicitor of the country creditors'I am willing, on behalf of the London creditors, to bear two thirds of the expense of Messrs. B. & B., or such barrister as you may think fit, for resisting K's. proof, and investigating the accounts of the assignees at the meeting on the 18th. I hereby undertake to pay and bear on behalf of these creditors two thirds of the expenses incident thereto accordingly.' The meeting in question was adjourned, and he wrote again I shall have no objection to bear, as before, the proportion of expense attending the meeting stated in your letter,' Held, that he was personally liable for the above proportion of the expenses of the several meetings. (3 B. & A. 47; 5 East, 147; 2 B. & C. 11.) Hall v. Ashurst, 1 C. & M. 714; 3 Tyrw. 420. 7. (Liability for negligence or ignorance.) Where there appears to be negligence or ignorance of law on the part of an attorney, which creates unnecessary costs, the court will order those costs to be disallowed on taxation, without prejudicing his right to bring an action for them. Cliffe v Prosser, 2 D. P. C. 21. 8. (Action for bill, after verdict against, for negligence.) After a verdict against an attorney in an action against him for negligence, (the jury finding that he had been guilty of gross negligence,) he brought an action for his bill of costs; the court refused to stay proceedings in the latter action. Smith v. Rolt, 2 D. P. C. 62. 9. (Striking off the roll.) The court refused to strike an attorney off the roll for the publication of a libel alleged to be of an aggravated nature, for which the party libelled had obtained a verdict against him with 1s. damages. And semble, that the court will not strike an attorney off the roll, unless for misconduct in his business of an attorney, or where criminal proceedings have been taken against him. Exp. 2 D. P. C. 110. 10. (Lien of, on deeds.) The court cannot interfere to compel an attorney to deliver up deeds in his possession, except at the instance of the party who deposited them with him. In the matter of Thornton, 2 D. P. C. 156. 11. (Liability of agent.) If the agent of an attorney is guilty of neglect, the client cannot make a summary application against |