obnoxious amendment, rendered less obnoxious, perhaps, by the clause relative to the most favoured nation, or making a treaty without any article upon the subject, which would have the same, and probably worse effects, or of making no treaty at all. We preferred the first.

The fourth and fifth articles regulate the trade between the United States and the British possessions in Europe. By these we are persuaded that much greater satisfaction will be given to our government and country, than by the preceding one. The three first clauses of the fifth article, which place the vessels and merchandise of each country in the ports of the other, in respect to duties and prohibitions, on the footing of the most favoured nation, are taken from the treaty of 1794. To these we were not aware that any well founded objection was ever made. But the subsequent clauses give a new character to this intercourse. The right which the British government reserved by the treaty of 1794, to impose a tonnage duty on American vessels equal to the duty which was payable on British vessels in the United States, is by the first of these clauses made reciprocal. Under that reservation, or rather as we presume the pretext of it, the British government had actually imposed a tonnage duty on American vessels of 68. 5d. per ton, being almost three times the amount of the duty which was payable on British vessels in the United States. And as the United States had expressly stipulated not to raise the duty on British vessels higher than it then was, it was out of their power, without a palpable violation of that stipulation, to countervail the duty imposed by Great Britain on American vessels. But, by making the reservation reciprocal, the United States have an unquestionable right to raise the duty on British vessels to the same level, wherever that may be. And by confining the reciprocity strictly to the principle of national equality, that is, an equality of tonnage duties which shall be payable on the vessels of each party in the ports of the other, a right is reserved by each to give what preference it thinks fit, within that limit, to its own vessels and peo

ple. At present such preference is given by our law to the amount of 44 cents per ton, which is not only protected by this clause against any countervailing measure, other than by lessening the duty, but the right is secured to increase it in the degree above stated. By this we do not wish to imply that it would be advisable to take all the advantage of this circumstance which the article admits of. The presumption is, that the British government will, in case the treaty is ratified, repeal the additional duty on American vessels, which will leave them charged in common with their own, and those of every other nation, with the sum of 48. 5d. per ton. Should our government think proper to raise the duty on British vessels to the same point, it may, perhaps, be advisable not to increase the present discrimination. The last clause of this article, which stipulates that the same duties of exportation and importation shall be paid on all goods and merchandise, and that the same drawbacks and bounties shall be allowed in both countries, whether the same be in British or American vessels, will, it is also hoped, be found of very essential advantage to the United States. The right which Great Britain had reserved by the treaty of 1794, to countervail the difference of duty payable in the United States on European and Asiatic goods, when imported in British or American vessels, had been productive of very serious injury. The duties which had been imposed by the British government on American productions, on that principle, were so high, making in most cases a difference of

shillings per ton in favour of British vessels, that it must have been impossible, in peace, for our navigation to have borne it. The evil was the greater, because the species of commercial warfare in which it engaged us, in consideration of the comparative value and bulk of the articles subject to it in each country, furnished no remedy. On the contrary, as the principle was unfavourable, the farther it was carried, the worse would be its effect. By this clause it is presumed that the evil will be completely done away, while we flatter ourselves that the stipulation in favour of

drawbacks and bounties, without exposing us to any inconvenience, will be productive of some advantage.

It is proper to remark that we did not omit to propose an arrangement on the subject of export duties, by which the United States should at least be placed in that respect upon the footing of all other nations. The discrimination to our prejudice in the British duties on exportation, which took their rise in the convoy duty of the last war, has undoubtedly an unkind and oppressive effect. This discrimination is found in the 43. Geo. S, ch. 68, a permanent act, (which repealed the then existing duties, and substituted others) and in the 43. Geo. 3, ch. 70, which imposes additional duties during the present war. Taking the war duty and the permanent duty together, the consumers in the United States of certain British manufactures [for the duties in question apply only to British manufactures, and not to all of them; British cotton yarn and manufactures, and some other articles being excepted] pay two and a half per cent. ad valorem more than the consumer in Europe, or within the straits, pays on the same goods.

The only mode in which it could be supposed to be possible, that this unpleasant distinction could be removed, was by applying to the subject the rule of the most favoured nation. Great Britain was not likely in her present situation to stipulate against all export duties, or even to agree to a maximum. Neither was she likely, by considering the actual duties as originally, and even now convoy duties, and therefore in their principle applicable only to the navigation which her convoys protect, to relieve. from them, wholly or in part, such merchandise as should be carried to our country in American vessels, and leave them to oppress her own tonnage; thus offering a bounty in favour of American ships against her own. The rule of the most favoured nation was therefore finally suggested, with a hope that it would meet with no objection. It was, however, perseveringly opposed. We were told that the single effect of such an arrangement would be to compel Great Britain to raise the export duties against other

countries, not to reduce them as to us, and that this would be of no advantage to the United States, but might be a serious embarrassment to Great Britain. It was urged on our part, that, if Great Britain could not give up entirely the excess of export duty, now paid by us, it did not follow that it might not be fairly distributed among the consumers of her merchandise in every part of the world, so as still to produce the same revenue with more regard to justice ; that, as her best customers, we had a right to be placed upon at least an equal footing with other nations, and to complain if we were rather distinguished by the peculiar burdens which she undertook to impose upon us; that the discrimination against us, upon the notion that the duty had reference to convoy, was a fallacy, since part of the discrimination was permanent, and of course a peace, as well as a war duty; since we, who paid the duty, derived no benefit from the convoy, which was professed to be the consideration of it; and since the protection of their own trade in their own navigation, being a general and national con ern, there was no sound reason why the relative expense of particular convoys should be allowed to suggest the relative measure of the duties, which were to supply the means of affording them. They replied to the idea of distributing the amount of the discrimination among all the consumers of their merchandise, by referring us to the present state of Europe. They reminded us that their own colonies in America paid the same export duty that was paid by us, and repeated, that as it was only the diserimination between the United States and Europe, of which we could have any right to complain, we could not demand to have any part of the duty against which we remonstrated, withdrawn from us, and that we could gain nothing by forcing this country to add to the burdens of others, already overwhelmed and impoverishing by the calamities of war. We were obliged, though very reluctantly, to abandon this object.

The sixth article relates to the commerce with the West Indies, which it was found impossible to arrange in a satisfactory manner. There were many serious obstacles to

an agreement on this point, some of which seemed to be peculiarly applicable to the present time. The British West India merchants had at an early stage represented, that by the trade which our citizens enjoyed with the colonies of their enemies, we had so completely stocked the markets of the continent with West India productions as to shut those markets on them. They had remonstrated earnestly against any arrangement of that point which should sanction, in any degree, our trade with those colonies. This question had taken deep hold of the minds of a great proportion of this community, among whom may be classed, not those in the mercantile line only, who were immediately engaged in the trade, but the whole commercial interest, and many in other circles of great consideration in the country. Of this fact sufficient proof was furnished by the debate which took place in the last session of parliament, on the bill for regulating the intercourse between the United States and the West Indies. The British commissioners seemed to have taken from that debate, more especially from the support which their opponents apparently received from the publick in it, a very strong admonition not to touch the subject by treaty at this time. They were apprehensive that any regulation of this trade, however fair it might be, which should accompany their sanction of that with the colonies of their enemies, would produce the worst effect with all parties, and endanger any treaty which might be formed. They were, therefore, desirous of postponing the subject for the present; to which we agreed. In the stipulation which provides for the postponement, we have, as you will perceive, in conformity with our instructions, reserved the right to our government to counteract any regulations by which the British government may exclude us from a fair participation in that commerce. While the war lasts we shall enjoy it in a certain degree, with the consent of the British government, by necessity. And the reservation eannot fail to be considered by it as a powerful weapon of defence, to be used when occasion calls for it. It must be