the walls and fortifications, the beauty and splendor of their buildings, whether sacred or civil, public or private. We have in Herodotus a very fine description of Babylon, which was once the strongest, largest, and most regular city in the world. And Cicero has accurately described the city Syracuse, in the island Sicily, in one of his orations against Verres.

But facts come much oftener under the cognisance of an orator: and these receive their commendation from their honour, justice, or advantage. But in describing them all the circumstances should be related in their proper order, and that in the most lively and affecting manner, suited to their different nature. Livy has represented the demolition of Alba by the Roman army which was sent thither to destroy it, through the whole course of that melancholy scene, in a style so moving and pathetic, that one can hardly forbear condoling with the inhabitants upon reading his account.

But in discourses of this kind, whether of praise or dispraise, the orator should (as he ought indeed upon all occasions) well consider where, and to whom, he speaks: for wise men often think very differently both of persons and things from the common people. And we find that learned and judicious men are frequently divided in their sentiments from the several ways of thinking to which they have been accustomed. Besides, different opinions prevail and gain the ascendant at different times. While the Romans continued a free nation, love of their country, liberty, and a public spirit, were principles in the highest esteem among them. And therefore when Cato killed himself that he might not

fall into the hands of Cæsar, and survive the liberty of his country, it was thought an instance of the greatest heroic virtue; but afterwards, when they had been accustomed to an arbitrary government, and the spirit of liberty was now lost, the poet Martial could venture to say,

Death to avoid 'tis madness sure to die.

A prudent orator therefore will be cautious of opposing any settled and prevailing notions of those to whom he addresses; unless it be necessary, and then he will do it in the softest and most gentle manner.

Now if we look back and consider the several heads of praise enumerated under each of the subjects above mentioned, we shall find they are taken from their nature, properties, circumstances, or some other general topic, as was intimated in the beginning of this discourse.

Of Arguments suited to deliberative Discourses.

THIS kind of discourses must certainly have been very ancient, since doubtless from the first beginning of men's conversing together they deliberated upon their common interest, and offered their advice to each other.

All deliberation respects something future, for it is in vain to consult about what is already past. The subject matter of it are either things public or private, sacred or civil: indeed all the valuable concerns of mankind, both present and future, come under its regard; and the end proposed by this kind of discourses is chiefly profit or interest. But since nothing is truly profitable but what is in some respect good;

and every thing which is good in itself may not in all circumstances be for our advantage; properly speaking, what is both good and profitable, or beneficial good, is the end here designed. And, therefore, as it sometimes happens that what appears profitable may seem to interfere with that which is strictly just and honourable, in such cases it is certainly most adviseable to determine on the safer side of honour and justice, notwithstanding some plausible things may be offered to the contrary. But where the dispute lies apparently between what is truly honest, and some external advantage proposed in opposition to it, all good men cannot but agree in favour of honesty. Now when it proves to be a matter of debate whether a thing upon the whole be really beneficial or not, as here arise two parts, advice and dissuasion, they will each require proper heads of argument: but as they are contrary to each other, he who is acquainted with one cannot well be ignorant of the other. For which reason, as in my last discourse, I recited only the topics suited for praise, leaving those for dispraise to be collected from them; so here, likewise, I shall chiefly mention those proper for advice, from whence such as are suited to dissuade will easily be perceived. Now the principal heads of this kind are these following, which are taken from the nature and properties of the thing itself under consideration.

And first, pleasure often affords a very cogent argument in discourses of this nature. Every one knows what an influence this has upon the generality of mankind. Though, as Quintilian remarks, pleasure ought not of itself to be pro

posed as a fit motive for action in serious discourses, but when it is designed to recommend something useful, which is the case here. So, would any one advise another to the pursuit of polite literature, Cicero has furnished him with a very strong inducement to it from the pleasure which attends that study, when he says: If pleasure only was proposed by these studies, you would think them an entertainment becoming a man of sense and a gentleman. For other pursuits neither agree with all times, all ages, nor all places; but these studies improve youth, delight old age, adorn prosperity, afford a refuge and comfort in adversity, divert us at home, are no hindrance abroad, sleep, travel, and retire with us in the country.

A second head is profit or advantage, which has no less influence upon many persons than the former, and, when it respects things truly valuable, is a very just and laudable motive. Thus Cicero, when he sends his Books of Offices to his son, which he wrote in Latin for his use, advises him to make the best advantage both of his tutor's instructions and the conversation at Athens, where he then was; but withal to peruse his philosophical treatises, which would be doubly useful to him, not only upon account of the subjects but likewise of the language, as they would enable him to express himself upon those arguments in Latin, which before had only been treated of in Greek.

The last head of this kind which I shall mention is honour. And no argument will sooner prevail with generous minds, or inspire them with greater ardour. Virgil has very beautifully described Hector's ghost appearing to Æneas, the night Troy was taken, and advising him to depart from this motive of honour.

O goddess-born, escape by timely flight
The flames and horrors of this fatal night.
The foes already have possess'd the wall,
Troy nods from high, and totters to her fall.
Enough is paid to Priam's royal name;
More than enough to duty and to fame.
If by a mortal hand my father's throne
Cou'd be defended, 'twas by mine alone.

The argument here made use of to persuade Æneas to leave Troy immediately is, that he had already done all that could be expected from him, either as a good subject or brave soldier, both for his king and country, which were sufficient to secure his honour; and now there was nothing more to be expected from him, when the city was falling and impossible to be saved; which could it have been preserved by human power, he himself had done it.

But although a thing considered in itself appear beneficial if it could be attained, yet the expediency of undertaking it may still be questionable; in which case the following heads, taken from the circumstances which attend it, will afford proper arguments to engage in it.

And first the possibility of succeeding may sometimes be argued as one motive to this end. So Hannibal endeavoured to convince king Antiochus, that it was possible for him to conquer the Romans if he made Italy the seat of the war; by observing to him, not only that the Gauls had formerly destroyed their city, but that he had himself defeated them in every battle he fought with them in that country.

But the bare possibility of a thing is seldom a