in the former, the estate determines as soon as the contingency happens, and the estate in remainder which depends upon such determination becomes immediately vested, without any act to be done by him, who is next in expectancy, but in the latter the law permits it to endure beyond the time when such contingency happens, unless the grantor or his heirs take advantage of the breach of the condition, and make an entry in order to avoid the estate, Express conditions are void, if they are impossible at time of creation, or afterwards become impossible; or if contrary to law, or repugnant to the nature of the estate, when, if the condition is subsequent, the estate becomes absolute in the tenant, if precedent, the estate is void. Note that, a grantor can waive the condition at his pleasure, but by 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38 an actual waiver extends only to the special breach waived, unless a contrary intention appears.

Now note that, a vivum vadium, or living pledge occurred when a man borrowed a sum of money of another, and granted him an estate to hold till the rents and profits should repay the sum so borrowed; a mortuum vadium, dead pledge or mortgage is where a man borrows of another, and grants him an estate on condition that if the sum is repaid on a certain day, then the mortgagee will reconvey the estate to the mortgagor. Remember that by the equity of redemption is meant the right of the mortgagor to redeem in equity after the right is gone at law. By 37 and 38 Vict.. c. 57 (Real Property Limitation Act, 1874), this right to redeem is limited to 12 years from mortgagee taking possession unless an acknowledgment is given. A mortgagee has the following remedies: he (1) can bring an action for recovery of debt; (2) may foreclose; (3) can sell under power of sale given, either by the mortgage deed, or the Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict., c. 41); (4) he may enter and receive the rents. It should be observed that, by Locke King's Act (17 & 18 Vict., c. 113) and amending Acts, mortgage debts are made primarily payable out of mortgaged lands (including leaseholds) unless a contrary intention appears, and this applies whether the mortgagor dies testate, or intestate. By the 5th sub-section of section 25 of the Judicature Act, 1873, power is given to a mortgagor to sue for possession or recovery of rents or profits.

Other species of estates defeasible on condition are estates held by (1) statute merchant, which is a security for money, and entered into before the chief magistrate of some trading town, pursuant to 13 Edw. I. (De Mercatoribus.) (2) Statute staple, which is acknowledged pursuant to 27 Edw. III., stat. 2, c. 9, before the mayor of the staple. Both these are securities for debts acknowledged to be due, and not only might the debtor be imprisoned, and his goods seised, but his lands might be taken till satisfaction. (3) An estate by elegit. An elegit is the name of a writ founded on the statute of Westminster II., by which, after a plaintiff has obtained judgment, the sheriff gives him possession of the lands and tenements of the defendant to be occupied and enjoyed until the debt be paid, and during the time he so holds them he is called tenant by elegit. By 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and amending Acts a creditor is enabled to seise by that writ the whole of the debtor's lands. Remember that these three estates are chattels, and pass to the personal representatives of the tenant. (To be continued.)

Correspondence, Queries, &t.

[These columns being open for free discussion on all points in any way relating to Law Students, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinions or statements expressed. Correspondents must in all cases give their real name and address, though not for publication unless desired. We reserve to ourselves the right of refusing any letters, and where there are several answers to the like effect to the same query we endeavour to select the plainest and best for insertion. Correspondents are specially asked to aim at brevity, and when we receive more correspondence than we can possibly insert we give preference, in the absence of some special reasons, to letters received earliest. Letters on different subjects must be on separate sheets of paper.]

SEISIN.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal.” SIR,-In reply to " F. I. J." it appears to me that he has not read the case quoted by him carefully, otherwise he would have seen that there is not the slightest ground for supposing the decision in that case to be contrary or different to the context in Stephen. The reason that the heiress did not obtain seisin either in law or in fact was because upon the death of the intestate his widow entered into possession of the property under colour of a pretended will of her husband, and retained possession until her death, whereupon her devisees entered. The possession, therefore, had been held adversely to the heiress from the time of the death of the ancestor, and consequently the seisin in law which the heiress had at the time of the death of the intestate was defeated and destroyed. She had not (as the late learned Master of the Rolls said) "either at law or in fact" any seisin. The possession or seisin in law which the heir acquires upon the death of an ancestor is only presumptive, being, in fact, defeated by the entry of a stranger. Yours, &c., SAMUEL BAGULEY.

Mansfield, June 13th, 1883.

[Answers also received from S. W. and H. N.-ED. L. S. J.]

LIMITATION.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-In reply to "Cavendo tutus," I submit that the creditors have not, and never could have, a claim on B for the payment of their debts, B being no party to the fraud committed by A. Both the creditors and B would, however, have their remedy against A, the former for their debts, and the latter for the amount of the residue left by the testator. The Statute of Limitations would not apply in either case as interest was paid.-Yours, &c., Bristol. EN AVANT. [Answer also received from H. N.—ED. L. S. J.]

THE CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE ACT, 1881. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-In reply to "R. E. S." succession duty is payable on leaseholds or any personal property settled by way of succession (see secs. 1 & 3 of the Succession Duty Act, 1853), both of which would pay probate duty if settled by a will. Again, too, property appointed under a power taking effect on the death of a person pays succession (see sec. 4 of same Act); but if personal property, and the power created by a will, it would pay probate duty. The latter part of sec. 41 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881, would apply to such interests as the above.

STUDENT.

[We have also received answers from Geo. Crispin, Noys, J. F. F. and S. T. James.-ED. L. S. J.]

PRIDEAUX,

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,—With reference to Albert Cook's letter in your last issue, may I draw your readers' attention to one or two

further amendments and improvements to be made in the first volume of the last edition of "Prideaux." Page 33, line 19 from top, insert "to" after " timber is "; page 154, line 12 from top, "registry" should be "registration"; page 185, line 7 from bottom, insert "married" before "woman ; page 413, add to note A, "See also form given in Whatman v. Gibson, 9 Sim. 196"; page 473, note s, add "p. 478"; page 615, note A, third line, "mortgagor" should be "mortgagee "; page 693, line 11, from top, insert "registered" before "bill of sale"; also in note G cross out the words "it is apprehended that," and add " (Swift v. Pannell, Fry, J. W. N. 7 Apl., 1883) "; page 682, line 8 from bottom, add "without delivery page 686, note E, add after "attestation by a solicitor," or registration"; page 792, note A, add "but see the Act of 1882, sec. 2, sub-sec 1, page 806 infra."-Yours &c.,

WHAT ESTATE?

POLONIUS.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-May I ask the opinion of your correspondents on the following: Freehold land is vested in trustees upon trust for A for life, with remainder to B and C as tenants in common in fee, with a proviso that should € die without issue, then to D and all other children of B by her present husband as tenants in common in fee. A, the life tenant, is dead, Cjoins with the trustees and B in a conveyance of the land to a purchaser in fec. Subsequent to the conveyance C dies a bachelor without any children. D is the only child of B, and was a witness to the execution of the above-mentioned conveyance. Is the limitation to D (being a fee on a fee) a good one? what estate does he take? What are his remedies? Authorities will oblige.Yours, &c., H. D.

8, Duke-street, Kingston, Jamaica, W.I.

LEGACY TO HUSBAND OR WIFE OF AN ATTESTING WITNESS. (7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 26. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75.)

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-Having regard to the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, and the recent decision of Mr. Justice Chitty in re March, Mander v Harris (Weekly Notes for June 23rd, 1883), would the attestation of a will by the husband or wife of a legatee render the legacy void?-Yours, &c.

J. H. DENNIS.

I SHOULD be glad to correspond with an articled clerk reading for the Final Examination, more especially on the Law of Real and Personal Property, and the Practice of Conveyancing.-J. F. BROWN, 31, Hill Street, Haverford

west.

INTERMEDIATE.-I should be glad to hear of a candidate for this examination going up in April next to correspond for mutual improvement.-Address, A. E. C. LUDLAM, 35, Southgate, Eckington.

WILL any student correspond with me by way of question and answer for the Final Pass and Honours, or for either?-J., 24, Calthorpe Street, W.C.

SIGMA. It is really impossible just yet to give a satis factory answer on your questions as to how the examiners will deal with bankruptcy in November if the Act passes. Let us wait and see if it passes and when it comes into operation.-[ED. L. S. J.]

J. L. D.-Any costs there were would have to be paid by the party bound over.-[ED. L. S. J.]

A. BUSH.-Both Deane and Goodeve will repay perusal -see our reviews this month. No doubt first-class honours may be obtained without reading the large vols. of Leading Cases, but they are excellent reading and tend to form a substantial ground-work.-[ED. L. S. J.]

J. C. A.-Too simple to insert. Of course if one tenant in common acquires the other's share in any way he will have an estate in severalty.-[ED. L. S. J.]

E. N. WILKINSON.-Law is one thing, and History another. The study of "Constitutional History" is, however, a first rate scientific foundation for that of law. Read Hallam's "Constitutional History," students' edition, price 7s. 6d., published by J. Murray, Albemarle Street, London.-[ED. L. S. J.]

NIL DESPERANDUM.-The Statute of Limitation runs from the date of bill payable on demand, and if more than six years has elapsed the debt is barred.-[ED. L. S. J.]

A. J. DARNELL.-You can go up November, 1885. No; read Stephen's thoroughly, and master that first.-[ED. L. S. J.]

JACOBUS.-Put your question to some comic paper.[ED. S. L. J.]

C. H. P. We do not undertake to answer general questions. If you want letter inserted, observe rules at head of these correspondence columns. However we answer one of your questions. The rules of the Supreme Court do not apply to the county court and the practice under the Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, therefore still exists in the county court.-[ED. L. S. J.]

LEX. It is continually announced in these columns that there is now no limit as to age at the Solicitors' Final Honours Examination.—[ED. L. S. J.]

SUBSCRIBER.-Read Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, and Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 2nd edition, together with Judicature Acts and Rules. We have not heard of a forthcoming edition of Williams' Personal Property.—[ED. L. S. J.]

S. BAGULEY.-The new edition of Deane will do. Better read Williams' Personal Property. Indermaur will do in Common Law. Bankruptcy, wait to see if new Act passed. Of course this year's statutes may be asked next January. -[ED. L. S. J.]

S. JAMES.-No student at his examination is expected to mention the division in which case decided, or give references to reports.-[ED. L. 8. J.]

ICONOCLAST.-It is always usual to convey unto and to the use, but the declaration of a use is not absolutely necessary unless there is no consideration, when it is, to prevent a resulting use to the grantor.-[ED. L. S. J.]

LEX. Thanks; but the errors are too palpable to need the insertion of your letter.-[ED. L. S. J.]

DISTRACTED. In our opinion if a student can do so it is best to come to London for his last year. He gains an insight into practical procedure then which he would not otherwise acquire, and in addition has facilities for study in the shape of libraries, lectures, and classes which he would not have in the country.-[ED. L. S. J.]

S. J. JAMES. -30 & 31 Vict. c. 35 sec. 8, no doubt enables a jurior to make an affirmation, but the motive must be conscientious, and this would not include Atheism, which makes a person incompetent to take an oath.[ED. L. S. J.]

F. B.-Yes. See Stephen's Commentaries, 7th edition, p. 242.—[ED. L. S. J.]

JOHN F. THOMPSON.-Yes, we think so. We can find no reported case upon the point.-[ED. L. S. J.]

R. A. CHRISTIAN.-The table shows that Geoffrey Styles married again by setting out the brother of the purchaser of the half-blood. It is unnecessary to name or show Mrs. Styles the second, as no relatives of hers could possibly inherit John Styles's property except her children by Geoffrey Styles.-[ED. L. S. J.]

LEX.-There is no discrepancy between the answers. A petitioning creditor is not bound to accept payment of his debt after a petition has been presented, but can if he choose insist on an adjudication. (See Baldwin, p. 37, and cases there cited.) But where one of two petitioning creditors accepts payment of his debt, then the petition cannot be carried on by the other.-[ED. L. S. J.]

J. H. K.-Rose v. Rose, (8 P. D., 98), and Gandy v. Gandy, (7 P. D., 168), were decided on a totally different principle to Blandford v. Blandford, (8 P. D., 19). In Gandy v. Gandy, there was a separation deed in which the wife agreed that she would take no proceedings in respect of any cause of complaint which arose before the deed. No such agreement was contained in the separation deed in Blandford v. Blandford. -[ED. L. S. J.]

Examinations.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT THE SOLICITORS FINAL EXAMINATION, JUNE, 1883.

(The Answers to the first three Papers are by the EDITOR, and to the remainder by T. EUSTACE SMITH, Barristerat-Law.)

I. PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND PROCEDURE. (In matters usually determined or administered in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice).

1. Q. State the heads of the affidavit to be made in support of summons for leave to pay into Court capital money arising under the Settled Land Act 1882 by any person directed by the tenant for life to make such payment under that Act, and give the authority for your answer?

A. The heads of the affidavit will be the name address and description of the person paying, address for service of notices, the amount paid in and the account to which it is to be placed, name of tenant for life, and short particulars of the transaction. (Rules under the Settled Land Act, Rule No. 10.)

2. Q. What are the respective rights of a tenant for life who is impeachable of waste, and of one who is not impeachable for waste, with regard to timber? Give authority for your answer.

A. If not impeachable for waste he can cut all timber except that planted for ornament, but if impeachable for waste formerly, he could only cut timber in the way of botes or estovers. (Lewis Bowles Case, Indermaur's Conveyancing and Equity Cases, 4th edition,3). Now, however, under the Settled Land Act 1882, (sec. 35) if there is timber ripe and fit for cutting, he may cut it by the consent of the trustees or an order of the Court three-fourths of the net proceeds forming capital money and the remainder being taken by him as rents and profits.

3. Q. Is a mortgagee of a mortgage executed before or after the passing of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, bound to produce his mortgage deed or any of the title deeds in his possession to the mortgagor or any person claiming under him, and can he be compelled to re-convey on payment into Court of the money due to him?

A. In the case of a mortgage executed prior to the Act he could not be made to produce the deeds before payment of the money (Snell's Principles of Equity, 6th edition, 302), except perhaps the mortgage deed itself (Patch v. Ward, L. R. 1 Equity 436). In the case of a mortgage since the Act, he can be called on to produce all deeds on payment of costs (sec. 16). He could always be called on to reconvey on payment, but not to assign the mortgage debt, but he can now be compelled to do this as well (sec. 15, amended by 45 and 46 Vict. c. 39, sec. 12). Provision is also made under which on sale of an estate subject to an incumbrance the amount of the incumbrance and a sum for costs may be paid into Court, and the property be then declared free from the incumbrance and the Court may make any order proper for giving effect to the sale (sec. 5).

4. Q. Land is by deed directed to be sold, and money is by will directed to be laid out in the purchase of land. How does this affect the devolution of the properties, and when will the conversion take place? Mention the maxim of equity applicable thereto.

A. As from the date of the deed the land will be considered as money, and as from the date of the death the money will be treated as land, and each property will devolve accordingly. The maxim is, "Equity looks on that as done which ought to be done." (Fletcher v. Ashburner, Indermaur's Conveyancing and Equity Cases, 91; Snell, 177.)

5. Q. When is time considered the essence of the con. tract in equity?

A. When it is either expressly made so by agreement or by reasonable notice, or it appears to be intended to be sofrom the nature of the property e.g. where a life interest or any changing property is sold. There is now by reason of sec. 25 (7) of the Judicature Act, 1873, no distinction between the rules of law and'equity on this subject. (Snell, 544,545.)

6. Q. A grants a first legal mortgage to B for securing £500 and future advances. A afterwards grants a second mortgage to C, who at the time of advancing his money is aware of the nature of the first mortgage. B, with notice of the second mortgage, then makes A a further advance of £200; what is the position of B as regards this further advance?

A. He will be postponed to C's mortgage as regards the further advance, for it has now been decided that although the second mortgagee knew of the nature of the first mortgage, yet having completed and given notice, the first mortgagee cannot go on making advances to his detriment. (Rolt v. Hopkinson, 34, L. J. Ch. 468; Shaw v. Neale, 19, Jur., 666; Prideaux, 12th edition, 493, 494.)

7. Q. State the recent change in the law with regard to the effect of a judgment of non-suit, and give the authority for your answer.

A. Formerly a plaintiff who was non-suited had a right to bring his action over again, but it is no longer so now, it being provided by Order 41, rule 6, that a non-suit shall have the same effect as a judgment upon the merits for the defendant except that it may be set aside in cases of mistake, surprise, or accident, on such terms as to the Court or a judge may seem meet. (Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 2nd edition, 96.)

8. Q. Where personalty is directed to be converted as soon as conveniently may be, as between the executors and the persons principally interested in the estate, what time is allowed the executors for conversion?

A. One year; but the rule is not an absolute one, and if in the circumstances of any case a longer delay seems to have been reasonable no liability is incurred thereby. (H. A. Smith's Principles of Equity, 108.)

9. Q. Where a legacy is given to an infant, payable at a future day, and no maintenance or interest is given by the will, will he under any, and what circumstances be entitled to interest?

A. He has always a right to interest from the death if not otherwise provided for (Snell, 173). The trustees have

also under sec. 43 of the Conveyancing Act 1881, a general discretionary power to pay the income resulting from any investment of the legacy for his maintenance.

10. Q. Where money secured by mortgage is also secured by bond as collateral security, within what time must an action on the bond be brought?

A. Twelve years. (37 & 38 Vict. c. 57 sec. 8; Sutton v. Sutton, 22 Ch. D., 511; Fearnside v. Flint, 22 Ch. D., 579; Students' Guide to Prideaux, 15.)

11. Q. Is a husband liable for the debts of his wife contracted before marriage? Give the authority for your

answer.

A. Yes, absolutely, if married before 9th Aug. 1870; if since that date and before 30th July, 1874, he is not liable at all (33 & 34 Vict. c. 93 sec. 12); if since that date and before 1st Jan., 1883, he is liable to the extent of any assets he has with his wife (37 & 38 Vict. c. 50); but they must be sued together so that after his wife's death he is no longer liable (Bell v. Stocker, 10 Q. B. D., 129). If married on or since 1st Jan., 1883, husband is liable to the extent of any such assets and wife need not be joined in the action. (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75 sec. 22; Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, 202-206.)

12. Q. Where a tenant for life is a lunatic, so found by inquisition, how may the powers given to a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act 1882 be exercised?

A. By his committee under order of the Lord Chancellor or other person entrusted by the Queen's sign manual with the care and commitment of the custody of the possessions and estates of lunatics (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38 sec. 62). Notice must be given to the trustees of the settlement.

13. Q. Define an express and a constructive trust. A. An express trust may be defined as one which is clearly expressed by the author thereof, or may fairly be collected from a written document. (Smith's Manual of Equity, 12th edition, par. 227.) A constructive trust may be defined as one raised by construction of Equity to satisfy the demands of justice, without reference to any presumable intention. (Ib. par. 322.)

14. Q. How are applications under the Lunacy Regulation Act, 1862, to be made, and what are the formalities to be observed on giving notice to an alleged lunatic of an application for an order in pursuance of that Act?

A. By petition to the Lord Chancellor signed by the petitioner and attested by a solicitor. The petition is personally served on the lunatic and an affidavit of service filed. (Lunacy Orders 1883, Nos. 58-65.)

15. Q. Can an officer in the army or navy assign his future accruing pay, or a retired officer assign a pension given him for past services? State reasons.

A. The former cannot do so for it is against public policy; the latter can because it is for past services, and there is no infringement of public policy. (Smith's Manual of Equity, 12th edition, par. 429.)

II.-COMMON LAW.

(Practice and Procedure in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice.)

1. Q. To what extent is the executor of a deceased person liable on a judgment recovered against him as such executor?

If an

A. In the first place the estate of the deceased is liable, but if not sufficient the executor is liable personally for the costs, though not for the damages unless he has set up some defence false within his own knowledge. executor plaintiff sues and fails he will be liable for costs in the same way as an ordinary plaintiff, unless the Court otherwise orders. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, 400, 401.)

2. Q. What is the object of demurring to a pleading? What change in procedure under the Judicature Act has rendered the argument of demurrers less frequent than formerly?

A. The object is to dispute the sufficiency of the pleading of the other party in point of law. The argument of demurrers is to some extent lessened by the power of the

party whose pleading is demurred to to amend it by leave, which leave will only be granted on payment of costs. (Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 2nd edition, 62, 63.)

3. Q. In what cases will leave be granted to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction of the Court?

A. When the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction, or the action is in respect of property situate within the jurisdiction. Also if the Defendant is resident in Scotland or Ireland only provided there is no local Court of limited jurisdiction having jurisdiction in the matter in question, or if there is such a Court that it is more convenient and a saving of expense to sue here. (Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 42.)

4. Q. What is a chose in action? Give an instance of one. If the owner of a chose in actions assigns it to another person who wishes to sue on it, who is the proper Plaintiff? State the grounds of your answer.

A. It may be defined as some outstanding thing and the right of sueing in respect thereof, e.g. an ordinary debt. If an absolute assignment and notice in writing has been given to the holder of the chose of the assignment thereof, the assignee is the proper Plaintiff. (Judicature Act, 1873, sec. 25, (6.) In other cases the action must be in the assignor's name, with some exceptions the chief of which are policies of life, and marine insurance, bills and notes, bail bonds and bills of lading. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 137, 138.)

5. Q. A sues B and C in tort. B appears, C does not. What course should A adopt to obtain damages from both Defendants?

A. Sign Interlocutory Judgment by default against C. But he should not then issue a writ of inquiry, but the jury who try the issue which will be raised by C assess the damages against both the defendants generally. (Archbold Practice, 13th edition, 802.)

6. Q. In an action in contract the defendant pleads a counter-claim. Plaintiff gets verdict for £50 on his claim; defendant for £10 on the counter-claim. Nothing is said about costs. How would they go?

A. The plaintiff will get the general costs of the action, and the defendant any special costs in respect of the counter-claim. (Blake v. Appleyard, 3, Ex. D., 195; Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 110; Pocock on Costs, 29, 30.)

7. Q. Mention in order the different items which would form the plaintiff's bill of costs in an action for breach of a written contract (including the usual interlocutory applications), up to trial, setting them out, as near as you can, in the form of a bill?

A. (The student is referred to any ordinary costs book. The items given should be the strictly essential ones, within in addition one consent to time, interrogatories, and summons for discovery.)

8. Q. What is a continuing guarantee? A and B jointly guarantee payment of a debt due from C. Under what circumstances might A and B, or either of them, be released without any action of their own?

A. One which applies not merely to one particular amount, but to future debts. A and B, or either of them, might be released by the principal's discharge of C, or his connivance at his laches or agreement to give him time without reserving the rights against the sureties. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 42-44.)

9. Q. A ship having been wrecked, how must the shipowner proceed in order to insure the loss being treated as total? What is the result if he is successful?

A. If the wreck constitutes a loss total per se it will not be necessary to do anything, but if not total per se notice of abandonment must be given to the underwriter, and the assured must do everything possible to avert a total loss. If this is done, and it is shown that at the time of the notice there was some prospect of recovery or preservation, he can recover as for an actual total loss. (Newson's Shipping, secs. 218, 219.)

10. Q. How do you put yourself in position to give in evidence a copy of a document in possession of (a), a

party to the action; (b) a third party? Who pays the costs of proving the copy?

A. (a) Give notice to produce the original, and then the copy may be given in evidence; notice to inspect and admit the copy would also usually be given. (b) Strictly if the original of the document is in existence in the hands of a third person within the jurisdiction, the copy is not admissible as you must subpoena the party duces tecum. All that can be done is to give notice to inspect and admit, and if admitted then the copy may be given in evidence. In either case the costs of proving the copy will not be allowed unless notice to inspect and admit has been given unless, in the opinion of the taxing master, the omission to give the notice has really been a saving of expense. (Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 90, 91.)

11. Q. Defendant to an action for debt has a defence on the statute of limitations, but, after writ served on him, he writes to say if the action is discontinued he will pay. Give reasons for the course you must adopt in order to recover the debt?

A. The action must be discontinued for the reason that the acknowledgment is only conditional on this being done, and in all cases of conditional acknowledgment, the plaintiff to entitle him thereafter to recover must be prepared to prove that the condition has been performed, or that the event has happened. (Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. and C., 638; Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 239.)

12. Q. What are the respective liabilities of a gratuitous bailee of goods and of a bailee for hire, in case the goods are lost while in their custody?

A. A gratuitous bailee is only liable for gross negligence (Coggs v. Bernard, Indermaur's Common Law Cases, 5th edition); but if he possesses any special skill, then he is liable for any omission to exercise that skill (Wilson v. Brett, Ib.). A bailee for hire is bound to use ordinary diligence, and is liable for ordinary neglect. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 101.)

13. Q. Why is a promissory note preferable to an IOU, or mere acknowledgment of receipt of money?

A. For the following reasons: It is negotiable, it carries interest, it imports a consideration, it is evidence of the existence of a debt due from the maker to the holder.

14. Q. Why cannot a debt, for which an infant cannot be sued, be pleaded as a set-off to a debt due to him, and for which he is suing?

A. Because by the Infant's Relief Act, 1874, the contract which is the foundation of the debt is made absolutely void, and also because to allow it to be set-off would be in effect the same as allowing an action to be brought for it. 15. Q. A contract is signed for sale of a freehold house which is insured for £1000. After the contract and before completion the house is burnt down. What are the principles to be considered in deciding who is entitled to the benefit of the policy?

A. The principles to be considered are 1. Has the vendor suffered any loss. 2. Was there any agreement that the purchaser should have the benefit of the policy? 3. Has any requisition been made under the 14 Geo. III. c. 78, to lay out the money in rebuilding. Practically the vendor will have suffered no loss, as he had agreed to sell, so he could not recover (Castellain v. Preston 8 Q. B. D., 613), nor could the purchaser recover (Rayner v. Preston, (18 Ch. D., 1.), unless there was some agreement for him to have the benefit of the policy; but it appears he might, as a person interested in the premises, require the money to be laid out in rebuilding under the above statute. (Students' Guide to Prideaux, 6.)

III. THE LAW OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE PRACTICE OF CONVEYANCING.

1. Q. What is the position of a tenant for life as regards responsibility for improper exercise of the powers given to him by "The Settled Land Act, 1882 ?"

A. It is provided by the Act (sec. 53) that the tenant for life shall have regard to the interests of all parties entitled under the settlement, and shall in relation to the

exercise of his powers be deemed to be in the position and to have the duties and liabilities of a trustee for those parties.

2. What is an estate in co-parcenary, and how does the land devolve in the event of the intestacy of one of the co-parceners?

A. That estate in lands which is held by two or more taking the same as co-heirs, e.g. where two daughters take by descent. There is no survivorship, and on the death of one co-parcener his share goes to his heir. (Deane's Principles of Conveyancing, 2nd edition, 236).

3. Q. How is the ordinary devise of trust and mortgage estates affected by recent legislation?

A. It is as regards any death since 1st January, 1882, inoperative, it being provided by the Conveyancing Act, 1881 (sec. 30), that notwithstanding any testamentary disposition the same shall go to the personal representatives

4. Q. What is the duration of the copyright in a book? A. The life of the author and 7 years from his decease, or the entire period of 42 years from publication, whichever is the longer. (5 & 6 Wm. IV., c. 45, sec. 3; Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, 178, 179.) 5. Q. In the absence of any express condition or stipulation, who is entitled to the custody of title deeds under the following circumstances ?-(1) When the vendor himself retains part of the property. (2) When the whole of the property is sold in lots.

A. (1) The vendor. (37 & 38 Vict., c. 78, sec. 2.) (2) The purchaser of the largest lot in value. (Prideaux, 12th edition, 19.)

6. Q. How may land be alienated by the owner in fee for the endowment of a church without complying with the formalities required by the Mortmain Acts?

A. The grant may be made to either the "Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty" or the "Ecclesiastical Commissioners," specifying particular purposes or not, and these corporations are empowered to accept the benefaction, and it will be applied by them. Also in the case of new churches built under the Church Building Acts, persons not under legal disability may give any lands, &c., as endowment in such manner as they think fit, so long as the whole amount of the endowment does not exceed, in value, £300 per annum. (Cripps' Church Law, 5th edition, 292, 293.)

7. Q. A obtains a loan on the security of an insurance of his life and a bond for repayment by instalments; B joins in the bond as surety without taking any indemnity or security, and is called on to pay several instalments; on the bankruptcy of A what is B's position with regard to security for his advances?

A. He has a right to have the advantage of the original security, for it is provided by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, sec. 3, that this is to be the rule even as regards the principal or primary security. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 43.)

8. Q. What reversionary interests in personalty can be disposed of by a woman who was married before 1883, and whose title accrued before that date; and in what manner?

A. All such interests which she acquired, otherwise than by marriage settlement, under any instrument made after 31st Dec. 1857 and provided there is no clause therein against anticipation. (20 & 21 Vict. c. 57.) Property coming to a married woman now whether in possession or reversion is, by reason of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, to her separate use, and may be disposed of by her as a feme sole.

9. Q. Under what circumstances may a purchaser of property at an auction be debarred from relief on the ground of misdescription, though it be shown that the property was inacurately described in the particulars?

A. Only where the vendor can show that the purchaser knew the real quantity or particulars of the property, and therefore was not deceived by the misdescription. In other cases the purchaser must be entitled to relief, either by entire repudiation of the sale or by the allowance