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GENERAL ORDER. MADE IN PURSUANCE OF THE SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION ACT, 1881. (44 & 45 VICT., C. 44.)

96 To what solicitors' business does this order apply?

97. To what remuneration under this scale is a solicitor of a vendor and vendee respectively entitled? 98. The like question as to solicitor of mortgagor and mortgagee respectively.

99. The like question as to solicitor of lessor and lessee respectively.

100. To what remuneration is a solicitor entitled in respect of (a) Preparing a will. (b) Journeys from home on a client's business?

Correspondence, Queries, &c.

[These columns being open for free discussion on all points in any way relating to Law Students, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinions or statements expressed. Correspondents must in all cases give their real name and address, though not for publication unless desired. We reserve to ourselves the right of refusing any letters, and where there are several answers to the like effect to the same query we endeavour to select the plainest and best for insertion. Correspondents are specially asked to aim at brevity, and when we receive more correspondence than we can possibly insert we give preference, in the absence of some special reasons, to letters received earliest. Letters on different subjects must be on separate sheets of paper.]

SOLICITORS' INDEMNITY.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR, A solicitor in practice, viz. A in conducting a prosecution for his client B, writes a letter to various persons in B's interest and on B's behalf for the purposes of the prosecution, under the advice of B's counsel and with B's approval. C the party who is being prosecuted by B, sues the solicitor A for libel (viz. for writing the letter). A verdict is returned in favour of A with costs, which costs A cannot recover from C who is worthless. Can A recover in an action the costs against B his client, on an implied indemnity, and what authorities are there on the subject-Yours, &c., CHARLES J. MACCOLLA.

VESTED INTEREST.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-A by his will proved in 1840, devised certain freehold property unto trustees, upon trust to pay the income thereof to his daughter B, and after her decease to pay the income thereof to his grandson C during his minority, and on his attaining 21 years in trust to convey the said property unto C, his heirs, executors and administrators. Cattained his age of 21 years, but died intestate in the lifetime of B (the tenant for life) leaving D his eldest son and heir-at-law, and E his widow. Can D call upon the trustees to convey to him and did E become entitled to dower on the death of B ?-Yours, &c.,

NIL DESPERANDUM.

POLICEMAN EXCEEDING HIS DUTY. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-A, a policeman, while on his usual beat in a country district, sees B, a poacher, ranging with a couple of lurcher dogs in a field adjoining the highway over which he knows perfectly well B has no permission. A steps over the fence and accuses B of trespassing in pursuit of game, and in due course takes out a summons against him for that offence. Will you kindly inform me through your columns if A was legally justified in going out of the highway over the fence for the above purpose, and whether at the hearing of the summons a legal objection could be sustained to such a

course on the ground that A, as a police constable, has no right to interfere with persons for an offence like the above, when they are not on the highway or some public place, and, as a public officer, cannot be considered to do the duties of gamekeeper to a private individual?— Yours, &c., E. A. B.

CONSTRUCTION OF WILL.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-A by his will in the year 1820 devised all his freehold property to his eldest son B during the term of his natural life and after his decease to his legitimate child or children (if any); but if he died without issue, then unto his youngest son C. Did B take an estate tail, or simply an estate for life with remainder to his issue in fee? The following references may be of assistance to students in forming an opinion :-Morgan v. Thomas, 51, L. J. Q. B., 289, Montgomery v. Montgomery, and Clifford v. Koe, 43 L. T., 322.-Yours, &c.,

MORTGAGE.

W. B. R.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal.” SIR,-Would you, or your readers give me an opinion on the following:-"A mortgagor having fallen several months in arrear with his interest, the mortgagee proceeded to a sale of the mortgaged property, but before same took place, the mortgagor's solicitor undertook to pay full amount of principal and interest within one month from the advertised date of sale, provided same was withdrawn. The mortgagee agreed, but the mortgagor's solicitor did not offer to pay till two months after advertised date of sale. Under the circumstances, is the mortgagee justified in demanding six months extra interest, or what interest is he entitled to ?-Yours, &c., G. A. CAPES.

SURETIES.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR, A borrowed £300 in 1873 from B on a promissory note, payable on demand, and C and D also signed the note to B as sureties for the repayment thereof. A paid the interest on the £300 regularly to B up to 1881. A then

filed his petition, and liquidation by arrangement was resolved upon. A's estate was, however, worthless. What remedy (if any) will B have against C and D, the sureties for the recovery of the £300? A case on a similar point will oblige.-Yours, &c., NOVICE. December 12th, 1882.

BEQUEST OF MONEY.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal! SIR, I shall be glad if one of your numerous readers will, through the medium of the correspondence columns of your valuable journal, enlighten me on the following intricate point :-A bequeaths £500 to B, the wife of C, and appoints D his executor. On A's death D, by agreement with C, retains the money as a loan from him and pays him interest. On C's death the £500 is claimed by his executors, and also by B, his widow. Who is legally entitled to it? The cases and other authorities on which any opinion may be founded will oblige-Yours, &c., LOSTWITHIEL.

DAMAGE FEASANT.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-Can a farmer whose land is trespassed upon by his neighbour's cattle impound them, and if so (providing there is not a proper parish pound in the vicinity), is it legal for him to constitute any part of his own premises one for that purpose?

Any information on this subject not asked by the above question will oblige.-Yours &c., LEXICON.

RIGHT OF WAY BY PRESCRIPTION.

To the Editor of the "Law Students Journal." SIR, A and B are the owners each of a farm, which adjoin one another, A having an easement of a right of carriage or footway over B's farm, in the exercise of which before the year 1854, it was necessary to cross a watercourse. In the above year, for the convenience of his tenant, B erected a bridge over the said watercourse by the side of the place where it had been usual for both the said parties to cross the watercourse, but leaving that place intact so as as not to interfere with A's easement, but let it be exercised by him as usual. In the above year, on the completion of the bridge, an agreement was come to between the said parties (which, however, was not put into writing), for A to have the right of going over B's bridge, in return for which, B was to have the exclusive right of shooting over B's farm, both of which privileges have been exercised by each party up to the present time. A's farm is now about to be sold in the beginning of the new year, and, of course, B does not want the right of going over his bridge to be sold as appurtenant to A's farm, and, therefore, intends to prevent it being dealt with as such. Would you kindly say if, under the above circumstances (considering the length of time A has had the privilege of going over the bridge), it is in B's power to extinguish the right of passing over it, and compel the purchaser of A's farm (if any), to take the original course which was used prior to the year 1854, and if so, kindly advise what steps he should take for the purpose.-Yours, &c. LUMEN. Decr. 21st, 1881.

CONSTRUCTION OF WILL.-We have to acknowledge the receipt of letters from W. B. R., C. E. R. Day, and E. W. Forward, arguing against the answer of "Horatio" in our last number. We agree with them that words of procreation in a will are not actually necessary to create an estate tail if the intention is clear. We think in the question put by "Horatio," J. R. takes an estate in tail male with remainder in fee in the event of his dying leaving no male issue.-[ED. L. S. J.]

JEHU. (1.) Does the new edition of Snell's Equity (published last month) contain the alterations effected by this year's statutes? (2.) Can you say when new editions of Williams' books on Real and Personal Property, containing the aforesaid alterations, will be out? (3.) Does Haynes' Students' Statutes contain an analysis of all the leading statutes for examination purposes?

(1.) Yes, as far as we can see. (2.) No, we are not in a position to say. Enquire of the publishers of those works. (3.) For examination purposes you will find this work all you require.-[ED. L. S. J.]

AFTER having passed the Final Law Examination for a solicitor, and before admittance, is one able to go in for the bar? If so, after passing the Bar Examinations could a man be admitted a solicitor of the Supreme Court? 2. How many examinations has a man to pass before he is called to the bar? 3. What books should a man read for the first bar examination ?-Yours, &c., FAR.

1. Yes, to both questions. 2 and 3. If you go from the solicitors' branch of the profession, only the Bar Final; otherwise unless you have taken a degree, you must pass the Bar Preliminary, on subjects of general knowledge and education. Write for particulars to the Secretary, Council of Legal Education, Lincoln's Inn.-[ED. L. S. J.]

A. L.-Yes, eight months all but six days will be added to your articles, unless you can show illness or other special grounds. (See p. 149 of the Incorporated Law Society's Calendar for 1882). You will be able to go up for your Final in April next.-[ED. L. S. J.]

DEUS PASCIT CORVOS.-Yes, you can go in for your Final in January, 1884.—[ED. L. S. J.]

ENQUIRER.-There is no necessity for any indorsement on your articles. When you present yourself for your examination questions must be answered by the barrister. (See Incorporated Law Society's Calendar for 1882, p. 154.)-[ED. L. S. J.]

ION.-Probably there will be a new edition some time during this year. We cannot say more.-[ED. L. S. J.]

J. E. W.-You will not be able to go in for your Final before June next unless you obtain a judge's order enabling you to do so. For this you would have to show by affidavit some special grounds.-[ED. L. S. J.].

E. H. H.-You cannot go in for your Intermediate until November next.--[ED. L. S. J.]

A. T. U.-Would a thorough knowledge of Stephen's Commentaries as affected by the recent Acts, be sufficient to secure a pass at the Final?

[No, that would not be a proper course of reading.-ED. L. S. J.]

A. BUSH, T. LANKS.-We cannot undertake to increase the size of this journal, which, for all ordinary occasions, is large enough. Being a monthly paper, to increase it, would prevent its passing for the ordinary rate of postage. -[ED. L. S. J.]

CYMRO. We do not know that a new edition of Stephen's Commentaries is contemplated yet, and advise your procuring the present (8th) edition.-[Ed. L. S. J.]

JURISPERITUS.-You could have gone in for your Intermediate in June. If you do not pass this month you will be liable to postponement.-[ED. L. S. J.]

FORISFAMILIATED.-We have no recollection of any prior letter from you. If you were articled 1st October, 1880, you can, of course, go in for your Intermediate in April next.-[ED. L. S. J.]

A. H. BURGH.-See Editorial Note in this number.[ED. L. S. J.]

T. COLLINS.-We cannot undertake to give, in these columns, full advice as to general reading; it would be impossible. We advise you to procure "Indermaur's Self Preparation to the Final," 3rd edition, published by Stevens & Haynes: London.-[ED. L. S. J.]'

A's articles are cancelled by mutual consent after two years' service. He allowed three months to elapse, and now wishes to complete his term. (1) What stamp duty would he have to pay? (2) Would any difficulty be caused by the fact of his having engaged in journalism during the interval? W. MCKAY.

[(1) Ten shillings. (2) We do not think so.-L. S. J.]

FERRET.-(1) Yes, we think you can make a fresh proof. (2) Pollock and Nicol is a good book.-[ED. L. S. J.]

INQUIRER. You will have to be articled to a notary, but there is no examination to pass. We know of no book giving information; you had better write to some notary. -[ED. L. S. J.]

COUNTY COURT.-See sec. 45 of the Judicature Act, 1873, and read notes to that section in Griffith's and Loveland's Judicature Practice, 2nd edition, and see also Order LVIII., rule 19.-[ED. L. S. J.]

RYLAND CROOKE.-You are quite right, a body can be anatomically examined under the 2 & 3 Will. IV., c. 75, amended by the 3 & 4 Vict., c. 16, as well as in the case mentioned in our answer to question 5 of the criminal paper.—[ED. L. 8. J.]

Examinations.

ANSWERS TO THE SOLICITORS' VOLUNTARY HONOURS EXAMINATION, MICHAELMAS TERM, 1882.

(These answers are by EUSTACE SMITH, Barristerat-Law.)

(The questions appeared in our last month's number.) I-THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE PRACTICE OF CONVEYANCING.

I. Dower is the right of the wife to a third part of her husband's freehold lands if she survive him. In gavelkind lands it extended to a half of the lands, but continues only so long as she remains unmarried and chaste. Freebench is the right of a wife to a part of her husband's copyhold lands if she survive him; the right and the proportion of the land she is entitled to are governed entirely by custom. Women married before the Dower Act, 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 105, came into operation, are entitled to dower out of all freehold lands of which their husbands were solely seised of an estate of inheritance, at any time during the coverture. Freebench as a general rule attaches only to those copyhold lands of which the husband dies possessed. The important manor of Cheltenham is an exception to this rule. (Williams' Real property, 14th edition, p. 400. Stephens' Commentaries, 6th edition, Vol. I, pp. 266, 627.)

2. The son of the deceased daughter. This point was decided in Cooper v. France, 14 Jur., 214; 19 L.J., Ch. 313, on the ground that prior to the Inheritance Act, 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 106, the share of the deceased daughter would (even if she had not obtained seizin) pass to the issue of the deceased coparcener, and that the Inheritance Act did not change the law on this point. (See Williams on Real Property, Appendix B. Williams on Siezin, p. 80.)

3. No; the remainderman could not sue the tenant unless he was expressly named in the covenant. The tenant would, by the ordinary form of covenant, covenant only with the tenant-for-life, his executors, administrators and assigns. The remainderman is not an assign of the tenant for life.

4. John's heir-at law, who will be his brother Thomas. John, under the terms of the Will, takes a vested estate, the enjoyment of which only is postponed until he attains the age of 21 years. As he dies after the vesting of the estate, it will go to his heir-at-law, and he is the purchaser from whom descent is to be traced. (See Boraston's case, Tudor's Leading Cases.)

5. The appointment would not be good as regards the consols, because as the power in this case is a special one, the limitation must be considered to be inserted in the instrument creating the power, and if so inserted, it would exceed the rule of perpetuities. If inserted in the instru ment creating the power, the limitation would run to A for life, with remainder to one of his children at 23, this would be a limitation which might not vest within a life in being and 21 years afterwards, and would consequently be void. (See Prideaux's Conveyancing, Vol. II.) As regards the reduced stock, the appointment will be perfectly good, as the power is a general one, and the limitation is in the case of a general power considered to be created at the time of the execution of the power, not at the creation of the power. (See Notes to Cadell v. Palmer, Tudor's Leading Cases; Indermaur's Conveyancing and Equity Cases.)

6. It will be operative to pass the property belonging to A for her separate use, and the property over which A had a power of appointment by will, but it will not pass the property coming to her under B's will, as her will was made before her title to that property existed. In order to pass the property derived by her under B's will, she should re-execute her will after B's death. (See Noble v. Willock, H. L. 580, and Sec. 8 of the Wills Act: 1 Vict. c. 26.)

7. The executor will be entitled to the personal estate as the provisions of the 1 Will. IV., c. 40, which makes an executor hold undisposed of residue for the next-of-kin,

only applies where the testator leaves next-of-kin. (Williams on Executors, 8th edition, Vol. II., p. 1482.)

If there be no executor, the administrator will hold the personalty on trust for the Crown.

Real estate if vested in a trustee or mortgagee, will be held by the trustee or mortgagee free from the trust or equity of redemption. (Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177.) 8. A will be entitled to (1) cash, (2) money at bankers on current account and deposit account, (3) cheques, whether endorsed in blank, or fully endorsed, (4) book and other debts, (5) policies of insurance on the testator's own life.

B will be entitled to (1) promissory notes and bills of exchange, whether endorsed in blank, or fully indorsed, (2) mortgages, and (3) Government stock.

C will be entitled to the bank stock and the railway shares and stock. (Jarman on Wills, 4th edition, Vol. I., p. 768, note e.)

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9. The assistance of the court cannot be had to constitute a party, cestui que trust, who has given no consideration, but if a legal conveyance is actually made constituting the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, as if stock be actually transferred, though even without consideration, the equitable interest will be enforced. (Ellison v. Ellison, White and Tudor's Leading Cases Eq., Indermaur's Conveyancing and Equity Cases.)

B would not be liable to repay the loan, because the appointment of B as executor releases the debt at law, and any claim in equity is rebutted by the release of the debt by A. (Strong v. Bird, 18 Eq., 315.)

10. Yes, although A is a purchaser for value, yet as the consideration is a private debt due to C, such a dealing with the note is inconsistent with the trust and A will take with knowledge of the breach of trust, and will be a party to it. (Keane v. Roberts, 4 Mad, 357).

The lapse of time will be no bar to the action, as the time will not run so long as C had no notice of the breach of trust.

11. That the separate use, clause, and the restriction against alienation only affect the property of a woman while she is under coverture, but that if apt words are used the separate use, clause, and the restraint on alienation, though suspended whilst the woman is unmarried, again arise upon her marriage. (Tullett v. Armstrong, Indermaur's Conveyancing and Equity Cases.)

The separate estate of a married woman with restraint on anticipation is not liable for frauds connected with or participated in by her during coverture. (Stanley v. Stanley, 7 Ch. D., 589.)

12. Where the equities are equal, the law shall prevail, and equity would render no assistance against a bond fide purchaser for value, who is protected by the legal estate. The purchaser must specially plead that he is a purchaser for value without notice. A legal mortgagee can maintain an action for foreclosure against a purchaser of the estate for value without notice, unless the mortgagee is estopped by some act of his own, because the mortgagee has the legal estate, and the equities are equal. (Bassett v. Nosworthy, Indermaur's Conveyancing and Equity Cases.)

13. An implied trust is one founded on an unexpressed but presumable intention of the parties.

A constructive trust is a trust raised by construction of equity, in order to satisfy the demands of justice without reference to any presumable intention of the parties.

A trust coupled with a power is a power given to a person to be exercised by him as a trustee.

Examples of the 1st.-Where property is settled by a deed upon certain trusts, some of which fail, there will be a resulting trust to the settlor.

Of the 2nd. Where a person, who is only joint owner, acting bona fide, permanently benefits an estate by repairs or improvements, he would be entitled to a lien in respect of the sum he has expended.

Of the 3rd.-Where a fund is given to a certain class of persons, in such proportions as a third person shall appoint. (Smith's Manual of Equity, chapters on implied and constructive trusts.)

A mortgagee in exercising his power of sale is not a trustee for the mortgagor, except as to the balance of the purchase-money. (Warner v. Jacobs, 20 Ch. D., 220.)

14. An agreement between two or more persons to carry on any lawful business or adventure together upon the terms of mutual participation in its profits and losses. (Stephen's Commentaries, Vol. II.) As distinguished from a corporation, it is not like a corporation, a fictitious body composed of one or more persons having a perpetual right of succession. and which can only be formed under Royal Charter, Letters Patent, or Act of Parliament. As distinguished from a company, it does not require to be registered with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, where in an ordinary partnership the number of its members does not exceed twenty, or in the case of a banking partnership its members do not exceed ten. Nor can the liability of its members be limited. (Eustace Smith's Summary of Companies Law, 2nd edition, p. 9.)

15. (1) A declaration that the trusts of the will are to be carried into execution.

(2) An account of the personal estate not specifically bequeathed.

(3) An account of the testator's debts.

(4) An account of the testator's funeral expenses,

(5) An account of the legacies and annuities given by his will.

(6) An inquiry as to outstanding personal estate. (7) An inquiry as to leaseholds.

(8) An inquiry as to real estate of the testator.

(9) An account of the rents received since testator's death.

(10) An inquiry as to incumbrances affecting the real estate.

(11) An inquiry as to the priority of incumbrancers. (Seton, p. 849, Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 2nd Edition, Appendix II., p. 202.)

The costs of the suit, so far as they have been increased by the administration of real estates, are to be borne by the real estate. (Patching v. Barnett, 51 L. J., Ch. D., 79. In Re Middleton, 19 Ch. D., 552.) 16. (1) When the company has passed a special resolution requiring itself to be wound-up by the court.

(2) When it does not commence business for a year, or suspends business for a year.

(3) When the members are reduced to less than seven. (4) When it cannot pay its debts.

(5) Whenever the court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that it should be wound up.

An association requiring to be registered and not complying with the provisions of the Companies' Act, 1862, cannot be wound up by the court, as such an association is an illegal one, and the court cannot recognise its existence. In re Padston Assurance Association, 20 Ch. D., 137. An unregistered company which is not required to be registered can be wound up by the court. (Eustace Smith's Summary of Companies, 2nd edition, p. 54.)

III. THE LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE OF THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, AND OF THE COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.

17. It is quite clear that if B's fraud was committed within the knowledge of the company and for its benefit, the company will be bound by fraud. (Blake v. The Albion Assurance Society, 4 C. P. D., 94.)

If the company was not a party to the fraud, B will have no remedy against it. The company do not authorize him to make misrepresentations, and he, in fact, makes them in his own character, and not as agent of the company. (Swift v. Jensbury, L. R. 9, Q. B., 301.)

The general rule appears to be that a company is liable for the fraudulent acts of its agent acting in the course of his business, but that if an officer, not being a director,

answers inquiries which do not fall within the business deputed to him by the company, his representations cannot, in the absence of evidence, be imputed to the directors, and through them to the company. (Partridge v. Albert Life Assurance Co., 16 Solicitors' Journal 199. See Buckley on Companies, 3rd edition, 402.)

18. Yes, a disclaimer by a trustee in a bankruptcy of a lease, operates only so far as is necessary to relieve the bankrupt and his estate and the trustee from liability, and does not otherwise affect the rights or liabilities of third parties. (Ex parte Walton in re Levy, 17 Ch. D., 746; In re East and West India Dock Co. v. Hill, W.N. April 29th, 1882.)

19. From the date of the instrument. The words "on demand" do not constitute a condition precedent, but merely imply that the debt is payable immediately. If a bill on demand is not expressly made payable with interest, interest runs not from the date of the instrument but from the date of the demand. The interest is due by the custom of Merchants (Byles on Bills, 13th edition pp. 347, 310.)

20. The contract set out in the question would constitute a legal contract between B and C, so as to entitle B to sue C for an indemnity and commission as a broker. Such employment of B by C is not against public policy and is not illegal at common law, and is not of the nature of a gaming and wagering contract within the meaning of the statute 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109.

The facts asked in the question are precisely the same as the facts in the case of Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q.B.D., 685. 21. Both the local board and the contractor will be liable. The repairing of a road is an act lawful in itself, but injurious consequences are likely to arise unless it is done with all due caution and skill. The principal is therefore bound to see that the work is properly done and cannot relieve itself by showing that it has employed some one else to take care to prevent accident on its behalf. (See Bower v. Peate, 1, Q. B. D., 321; Perceval v. Hughes, 9, Q. B. D., 441.)

22. First Case.-The inventory and receipt taken by B from the vendor is a bill of sale, and must be registered as such. (Ex parte Cooper re Baum, 10, Ch. D., 313.)

Second Case. The inventory and receipt given by the sheriff are not a bill of sale, and do not require registration as such, as the sale is complete without them. (Marsden v. Meadows, 7, Q. B. D., 80.)

23. Yes; he will be entitled to recover if he can prove the fraudulent misrepresentations, that he was induced to enter into the contract by them, and that he brings his action within six years after they were discovered. The Statute of Limitations only runs from the time when the fraud was discovered. (Gibbs v. Guild, 8, Q. B. D., 296; Law Student's Journal, April, 1882, p. 49.)

24. The words "interlocutory order," in sec. 25 of the Judicature Act are not confined in their meaning to an order made between writ and final judgment, but mean an order other than final judgment in an action, whether such order be made before judgment or after. The creditor can apply in the action, and need not commence a fresh action. (See Smith v. Cowell, 6 Q.B.D. 75, Law Students' Journal, May, 1881, p. 59; where the facts were the same as those set out in the latter part of the question; and Salt v. Cooper, 16 Ch. D. 544.)

IV. THE LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES, IN THE PROBATE, DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION, AND IN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.

25. Upon the question whether A was under a legal obligation to obey the commands given him by his superior. Where, for instance, an action is brought against a constable who has acted under a warrant, the constable has to produce his warrant to the magistrate granting the warrant has to be joined with the constable, and the mere production of the warrant at the trial entitles the constable to a verdict. (Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 2nd edition, p. 35.)

26. (1) To the quarter sessions (2) By special case on a point of law to the Queen's Bench Division.

(1) By sec. 19 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, where a person is adjudged by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction to be imprisoned without the option of a fine, and if he has not pleaded guilty or acknowledged the truth of the information, he may appeal to the quarter sessions. By sec. 31 he appeals to a court of quarter sessions held not less than 15 days after the giving of the decision appealed from. Seven days'

notice of appeal must be given to the other party, and the clerk of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction. The appellant must enter into a recognizance within three days after giving notice that he will appear at the sessions and by the appeal, and if so ordered pay

costs.

(2) By sec. 23 any person may appeal from any conviction, order, determination, or other proceeding of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction by special case on the ground that it is erroneous in point of law (Rule 17, Rules of Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1880). The application to state a special case must be made within seven days. (Harris' Criminal Law, 2nd edition,

p. 482.)

27. When the executor is an infant, or lunatic, or where he is abroad, and it appears to the court to be necessary or convenient, the court may grant letters of administration with the will annexed to any other person on his behalf. The letters of administration will in each case be limited to suit the necessities of the case. Such administrator must enter into the usual bond required from an administrator with two sureties to faithfully administer the estate.

28. The doctrine of revival arises from the implied condition of condonation, that is, that where a marital offence has been pardoned, it is only pardoned on the condition that the offender shall not transgress again, and that if he or she transgresses again that the pardon is revoked, and that the party offended against has a right to apply to the court for relief on the ground of the original offence. (Browne's Divorce.)

29. (1.) Yes; because there would in this case be a maritime lien which the court could enforce against the ship by an action in rem.

(2.) If the remedy given by the foreign court is only against the captain or owners personally, the court will not enforce it in rem, as the court have no jurisdiction to enforce a judgment in a merely personal action by proceedings in rem. (The City of Mecca, 6, P. D,, 106; Eustace Smith's Summary of Admiralty, 2nd edition, p. 110.)

30. An advowson is appendant when it has been retained along with the manor from which it was originally endowed.

An advowson is in gross or at large when it has been separated from the manor.

Advowsons, when appendant, pass by a mere grant of the manor. When in gross they are conveyed by deed of grant like any other incorporeal hereditaments.

An advowson appendant will become an advowson in gross by being severed from the manor. When once severed from the manor and made in gross, the advowson can never become appendant again. (Eustace Smith's Summary of Ecclesiastical Law, 47.)

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
Honours Examination, November, 1882.

At the Examination for Honours of Candidates for the admission on the Roll of Solicitors of the Supreme Court, the Examination Committee recommended the following gentlemen as being entitled to Honorary Distinction:

FIRST CLASS. [In order of Merit.]

1. Thomas Henry Field Lapthorn, who served his clerkship with Mr. Edward Walter Haines, of London. 2. Edward Jenks, who served his clerkship with Mr. James Frederick Robinson, of London.

3. Frederick Harvey Harvey-Samuel, who served his clerkship with Mr. Frederick Price, of Birmingham, and Mr. Samuel Horace Candler, of London.

4. James Arthur Hudson, who served his clerkship with Mr. Henry Brierley, of Rochdale.

SECOND CLASS. [In alphabetical order.]
George Beverley Wyatt Digby, who served his clerkship
with Mr. George Wyatt Digby, of London.
William Oxley Foster, who served his clerkship with
Mr. John James Dumville Botterell, of Sunderland
and London.

John Graham, who served his clerkship with Mr. Silas
George Saul, of Carlisle.

Charles Hodson Kent, who served his clerkship with
Mr. Richard Arthur Wilson, of Salisbury.
Edwin Perkins Ridley, who served his clerkship with
Mr. Howard Samuel Winnett, of London.
Samuel Henry Stockwood, who served his clerkship with
Mr. Thomas Stockwood, of Bridgend.
Harry Craufurd Thomson, who served his clerkship with
Mr. Edward Sedgwick, of London.

John Tweedale, who served his clerkship with Mr. Joseph
Walker, of Leeds.

THIRD CLASS. [In alphabetical order.]
John Alsop, who served his clerkship with Mr. John
Whitbourne, of Teignmouth.

Leonard George Bolingbroke, who served his clerkship
with Mr. John Oddin Howard Taylor, of Norwich.
Benjamin Boothroyd, who served his clerkship with
Mr. William Henry Palmer, of Doncaster.

David Davis, who served his clerkship with Mr. Joseph
Ansell, of Birmingham.

Walter Gerald Gurney, who served his clerkship with
Mr. James Batten Winterbotham, of Cheltenham.
John Herbert Hall, who served his clerkship with
Mr. John Hall, of Bolton.

Godfrey Knight, who served his clerkship with Mr.
Clarence Harcourt, of London.

William Argent Pilgrim, who served his clerkship with
Mr. Stephen Pilgrim, of Hinckley.

Arthur Brown Porter, who served his clerkship with
Mr. William Tomlinson Page, of Lincoln.
William Thomas Munby Snow, B.A., who served his
clerkship with Mr. Henry Mountrich James, of
Exeter.

Hubert Waldron, who served his clerkship with Mr.
Thomas Plews, of London.

The Council of the Incorporated Law Society have accordingly given class certificates and awarded the fol lowing prizes of books :

To Mr. Lapthorn, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clement's Inn. Value 10 guineas; and the Daniel Reardon Prize. Value about 25 guineas.

To Mr. Jenks, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clifford's Inn. Value 5 guineas.

To Mr. Harvey-Samuel, the prize of the Honourable Society of New Inn. Value 5 guineas.

To Mr. Hudson, the prize of the Incorporated Law Society. Value 5 guineas.

The Council have given class certificates to the candidates in the second and third classes.

The number of candidates who attended the examination wus eighty-eight.

The solicitors' Preliminary Examinations throughout the year 1883 will take place on 14th and 15th February, 9th and 10th May, 11th and 12th July, and 24th and 25th October. Full particulars of the subjects and the books in the languages, form of notice, &c., can be obtained by applying to the Secretary of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery Lane, London. Thirty days' notice to the secretary of the Incorporated Law Society is necessary. The fee on giving notice is £2, and for a renewed notice £1. The prospectus of Preliminary Examination is prepared five months previously to each examination, and may be obtained on application at the Incorporated Law Society's office.

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