of all other services. It is created by words of pure donation, and livery of seisin attended with the obligation of fealty. The incidents of this tenure should be compared with those of knight service, to which they are very similar. It should be noted that, by 12 Car. II., c. 24, a father can appoint a guardian by will, till his child attain 21 or marries; this statute also abolished some of the incidents, e.g., aids, and primer seisin. Other kinds of socage tenure are:-Petit serjeanty, resembling grand serjeanty; tenure in burgage, the most remarkable kind of which is Borough English, where the youngest son and not the eldest succeeds to the burgage tenement; gavelkind, in which tenure the tenant can alien by feoffment at 15, there is no escheat, tenant has power of testamentary alienation, the lands descend to all the sons together. (III) Copyhold. This tenure you will observe sprang from the tenure of villeinage. The origin and nature of manors, and an honor is important. Note that villeins were either regardant, i.e., annexed to the manor, or in gross, or at large, i.e., annexed to the lord's person, and transferable by deed. Remember that villeins might be enfranchised by manumission, which is either express, as by granting to the villein a deed of manumission, or implied, as by giving the villein, an estate in fee. These tenants had no title to shew for their estates, but the will of the lord according to the custom of the manor. This form of custom committed to writing, together with the admission of each tenant in pursuance of it, was entered in the several rolls of the courts of the manor, and hence they were called tenants by copy of court roll, and their tenure a copyhold. Note, that by enfranchisement was meant the turning of copyhold into freehold. Bear in mind the incidents to copyholds, which are: (1) Descendible to heir; (2) Heriots; (3) Wardship; (4) Relief; (5) Forfeiture and escheat; (6) Fines, which are either arbitary or fixed. These incidents should be compared with those in knight service and socage tenure. Two varieties of copyholds are (1) Ancient demesne, which is a tenure existing in certain manors held from the crown. The tenants required admittance by the lord to perfect their title, and they held according to the custom of the manor though not ad voluntatem domini. (2) Customary freehold. The evidences of this title are found on the court-rolls. These tenants hold according to the custom of the manor, though not at the will of the lord. : Tenure in frankalmoign is of a spiritual nature. It is, where a religious corporation, aggregate or sole, holds lands of the donor to them, and their successors for ever. They were discharged of all secular services, except the trinoda necessitas of (1) repairing the highways; (2) building castles; and (3) repelling invasions. The lord had no power of distress for neglect of services, wherein it differed from tenure by divine service, where the tenants were obliged to do some special service, and for neglect of which the lord might distrain. Note that frankalmoign is excepted out of 12 Car. II., c. 24. Chapter III.-Of Freehold Estates of Inheritance. A freehold estate is an estate either of inheritance, or for life, in lands of free tenure. It might be transferred by feoffment, which by the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II., c. 3), must be in writing. It may be classed, as being (a) of inheritance, or a fee; or (b) not of inheritance. Estates of inheritance are either : A. Fee simple, which is that estate which a man hath to hold to him and his heirs for ever. Note that if a man claims an estate in fee simple in possession in a corporeal hereditament, the precise technical expression is "seised in his demesne as of fee" (in dominico suo ut de feodo), the meaning of these words is important. The Statute of Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. I., c. 1, abolished sub-infeudation. Remember that formerly the word "heirs" was necessary to make a grant or donation of a fee or inheritance, but this rule did not extend to dispositions by will, hereon note 7 Will. IV., and 1 Vict., c. 26, and now by the Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict., c. 41), it will be sufficient in a deed, to use the words in "fee simple" without the word "heirs." Note that, estates in fee simple are divisible into (1) A fee absolute, free from all qualifications; (2) A qualified fee, which must be determined whenever the qualification is at an end; and (3) A conditional fee, comprising every fee simple granted upon condition, but referring more especially to that particular species called a conditional fee, at the common law. This latter was a fee restrained in its form of donation to some particular heirs exclusive of others, and upon issue being born, the estate became absolute for three purposes: (1) Alienation; (2) Forfeiture; and (3) For charging the land with incumbrances. B. An estate tail is that estate which a man has to hold to him and the heirs of his body, or to him and the particular heirs of his body. Bear in mind the provisions of the Statute of Westminster II. (commonly called de donis conditionalibus) 13 Edw. I.. c. 1, which enacted that thenceforth the will of the donor should be observed, secundum formam in cartâ doni expressam (according to the form in the deed of gift expressed). Estates tail are either tail male or tail female, tail general or special. Note that the word "body," or some other word of procreation was necessary in a deed to make a fee tail, though more indulgence was allowed in the case of wills; and now, by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, it shall be sufficient, in a deed, to use the words "in tail," or “in tail male," or "in tail female." On the subject of estates tail, note the following statutes:-De Donis, from the mischievous effects of which may be said to have sprung the fictitious proceedings called common recoveries, which were introduced by Taltarum's case -26 Hen. VIII. c. 13, rendering estates tail liable to forfeiture for treason-32 Hen. VIII., c. 36, declaring that fines (another fictitious species of proceeding) should be a complete bar to the tenant in tail, and his heirs, if duly levied-33 Hen. VIII., c. 39, rendering estates tail liable to be charged for payment of debts -21 Jac. I., c. 19, rendering estates tail liable to be sold for benefit of creditors, if the tenant became bankrupt-43 Eliz., c. 4, whereby an appointment by a tenant in tail of the land entailed, was held to be good without fine or recovery-3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 74, abolishing fines and recoveries, and also permitting tenants in tail in possession to make leases without enrolment for any less term than 21 years, at a rack rent, or not less than five-sixths of a rack rent-1 & 2 Vict., c. 110, and 27 & 28 Vict., c. 112, rendered entailed estates liable to be taken, under an elegit, provided they be actually delivered in execution-and 40 and 41 Vict., c. 18 (Settled Estates' Act, 1877) enabling a tenant in tail to demise his estate for 21 years in England or 35 in Ireland, in such form, and with such restrictions, as the Act prescribes. (To be continued.) NEW ORDERS, &c. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, MAY, 1883. RULES DISPENSING WITH ORDERS OF COURSE. 1. The duties hitherto discharged by the Secretaries of the Master of the Rolls in regard to petitions are hereby assigned to the Chancery Registrars. All petitions which require to be answered shall be answered in the name of the Senior Registrar, and any orders on petitions which, according to the practice heretofore prevailing in the Chancery Division, have been drawn up, passed, and entered in the office of such Secretaries, shall henceforth be drawn up, passed, and entered by or under the direction of the Chancery Registrars. 2. An infant shall not enter an appearance, except by his guardian ad litem. No order for the appointment of such guardian shall be necessary, but the solicitor applying to enter such appearance shall make and file an affidavit in the following form : A. B. of is a fit and proper person to act as guardian ad litem of the above-named infant defendant, and has no interest in the matters in question in this action [matter] adverse to that of the said infant, and the said A. B. has signed a written consent to act as such guardian, by the document hereto annexed. (To such affidavit there shall be annexed the document signed by such guardian in testimony of his consent to act..) 3. Every infant served with a petition, or notice of motion, or summons in a matter, shall appear on the hearing thereof by a guardian ad litem in all cases in which the appointment of a special guardian is not provided for. No order for the appointment of such guardian shall be necessary, but the solicitor by whom he appears shall previously make and file an affidavit as in the last rule mentioned. 4. It shall not be necessary for a person served with notice of any judgment or order to obtain an order for liberty to attend the proceedings under such judgment or order, but such person shall be at liberty to attend the proceedings upon entering an appearance in the central office in the same manner, and subject to the same provisions, as a defendant entering an appearance. 5. A defendant, before appearing, shall be at liberty, without obtaining an order to enter, or entering, a conditional appearance, to serve notice of motion to set aside the service upon him of the writ, or of notice of the writ, or to discharge the order authorising such service. 6. A party suing or defending by a solicitor shall be at liberty to change his solicitor in any cause or matter, without an order for that purpose. upon notice of such change being filed in the central office, but until such notice is filed and a copy thereof served, and (in causes or matters pending in the Chancery division) left in the chambers of the judge to whom the cause or matter is assigned, the former solicitor shall be considered the solicitor of the party. 7. An order to read evidence taken in another cause or matter shall not be necessary, but such evidence may, saving all just exceptions, be read on ex parte applications by leave of the court or judge, to be obtained at the time of making any such application, and in any other case upon the party desiring to use such evidenee giving two days' previous notice to the other parties of his intention to read such evidence. 8. No order shall issue for the return of any writ or to bring in the body of a person ordered to be attached or committed, but a notice from the person issuing the writ or obtaining the order for attachment or committal (if not represented by a solicitor) or by his solicitor, calling upon the sheriff to return such writ or to bring in the body within a given time, if not complied with, shall entitle such person to apply for an order for the committal of such sheriff. 9. It shall not be necessary to obtain an order to enter an order or judgment nunc pro tunc; but in all cases in which such entries have heretofore been made under orders of course, the solicitor applying to have an order or judgment so entered shall leave with the clerk of entries a memorandum in writing, countersigned by the registrar, and bearing a stamp according the scale of court fees for the time being in force. 10. Where an order has been made, not embodying any special terms, nor including any special directions, but simply enlarging time for taking any proceeding or doing any act other than payment or transfer into court, or giving leave-(a.) for the issue of any writ other than a writ of attachment; (b.) for the amendment of any writ or plead ings; (c.) for the filing of any document; or (d.) for any act to be done by any officer of the court other than a solicitor, it shall not be necessary to draw up such order unless the court or a judge shall otherwise direct, but the production of a note or memorandum of such order, signed by a judge, registrar, master. or chief clerk, shall be suffi cient authority for such enlargement of time, issue, amendment, filing, or other act. A direction that the costs of such order shall be costs in any cause or matter shall not be deemed a special direction within the meaning of this rule. The solicitor of the person on whose application such order is made shall forthwith give notice in writing thereof to such person (if any) as would, under the practice existing before the coming into operation of this rule, have been required to be served with such order. 11. These rules may be cited as "Rules of the Supreme Court, May, 1883," and shall come into operation on the 22nd of May, 1883. Correspondence, Queries, &c. [These columns being open for free discussion on all points in any way relating to Law Students, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinious or statements expressed. Correspondents must in all cases give their real name and address, though not for publication unless desired. We reserve to ourselves the right of refusing any letters, and where there are several answers to the like effect to the same query we endeavour to select the plainest and best for insertion. Correspondents are specially asked to aim at brevity, and when we receive more correspondence than we can possibly insert we give preference, in the absence of some special reasons, to letters received earliest. Letters on different subjects must be on separate sheets of paper.] MARRIAGE LAW. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-In reply to "Lostwithiel," I submit that A cannot legally marry his divorced wife's sister, because sec. 57 of 20 and 21 Vict., c. 85, enacts that divorced persons may marry again as if the original marriage had been dissolved by death, thus making illegal after divorce such marriages as are illegal after death. It is therefore obvious that, as A could not, according to the present law, have married his wife's sister C had his wife died, so is he unable by the above statute to marry her when his wife has been divorced, and consequently the issue of such a marriage would be illegitimate.-Yours, &c., R. E. S. Carmarthen. [Answers also received from F. Lamb, F. M. G., Student, F. H. Bright, Novice, H. Prince, and H. N. There is considerable diversity of opinion amongst our Correspondents, but we take it the answer contained in the above letter is correct.-ED. L. S. J.] JOINT TENANCY. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-In reply to your correspondent, " J. H. Dennis," I think that considering the fact that the courts lean towards a tenancy in common in preference to a joint tenancy (Morley v. Bird, 3 Ves., 629), the charging with the annuity of B's estate to the exclusion of C's, will, I think, be sufficient to rebut the presumption of a joint tenancy in which both estates should be equal. Even if the devise should declare by express words that the devisees should take their estates as joint tenants, I do not think the falling in of the annuity will affect the parties, B's interest would then be identical with that of C.Yours, &c., H. N. [Answer to the same effect also received from F. M. G. -ED. L. S. J.] INSURANCE. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal! SIR,-A is guilty of arson and not B, so B could recover on the policy. The insurance company could, as A has been convicted for the felony, recover against him as damages for his tort the amount paid to B.-Yours, &c., F. M. G. [Answers also received from H. N. and F. Reynolds. We would refer our correspondents to the case of Midland Counties Insurance Co. v. Smith and wife, 8 Q. B. D., 561; 50 L. J., Q. B., 329.-ED. L. S. J.] SEISIN. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-In Stephen's Commentaries, Vol. I., p. 427, I read that a person entitled to an estate by descent has a seisin in law only, and does not obtain a seisin in deed until entry. But on referring to the case cited in the foot note (Leach v. Jay, L. R., 9 Ch. D., 42), I find that it was held that the heiress not having entered, had neither seisin at law nor in fact, which seems to me to be a direct contradiction to the context in the commentaries. An explanation of this will oblige.-Yours, &c., F. I. J. 20th May, 1883. LIMITATION. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-Will you or some of your readers kindly express an opinion upon the following point :-"A testator by his will, after appointing A sole executor thereof, directed him to sell, call in, &c., all his real and personal estate, to pay all debts, &c., and to pay the residue to B, testator's widow. Before any accounts were taken and balance struck, B asked A to invest the residue for her and to pay the income when and so often as the same should become due to her. A, without the knowledge (then or subsequently) of B, kept the debts alive by paying interest on them; he also paid periodically sums of money to B as the income of the residue, which B considered about the right amount. Nearly eight years after, A was made bankrupt. Can the creditors come upon B for payment of their respective debts, or are they barred by the Statute of Limitations ?" Any authority will greatly oblige-Yours, &c., CAVENDO TUTUS. Leicester. THE CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE ACT, 1881. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-Permit me to inquire as to the value of the latter part of sec. 41 of this Statute, which provides for the cesser of succession duty at the rate of £1 per cent. where the property on which it is payable has been previously subject to Probate duty. As succession duty attaches to real property and Probate duty does not, it appears to me that this piece of legislative generosity, though no doubt kindly meant, is practically of no benefit.-Yours, &c., "R. E. S." PRIDEAUX. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR, I shall be glad if you can insert the following inaccuracies which occur in the 12th edition of Prideaux, in the interest of other "students," who perhaps have not noticed them all. Volume I., p. 165, line 8 from the top, 6. "registered" ought to be "re-registered"; p. 473, line 4 from top. "20" ought to be "12"; p. 484, line 18 from top or bottom, on "ought to be "for." Volume II., p. 173, line 18 from top, "1883 " ought to be "1882 ; " p. 175, line 18 from top, "with her money" ought to be "with his money"; p. 199, line 8 from bottom (not counting the notes) "clauses" should be " causes"; p. 355, note (m), "24 & 25 Vict., c. 114, sec. 21," should be "7 Wm. IV., and 1 Vict., c. 26, sec. 21."-Yours, &c., ALBERT COOK. May 11th, 1883. EXECUTION OF TRUSTS. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR.-A made a Will in 1828 which was proved in 1832, whereby he devised unto B, C, and D, certain lands, to hold the same unto and to the use of the said B, C, and D, their executors administrators and assigns, for the term of 1000 years, to commence from the testator's death. Upon trust from time to time on certain events happening to raise sums of money by sale or mortgage for purposes therein mentioned. C and D died leaving B surviving, who, by his Will proved in 1872, devised all estates vested in him as a trustee unto his son E, and appointed his wife and E executrix and executor of his Will. E made a similar devise to F, G, H, their heirs and assigns. Can F, G and H execute the remaining trusts of the Will of A, or is it necessary to appoint new trustees for the purpose? Authorities will oblige.-Yours, &c., NIL DESPERANDUM. VIGILANT.-This is so according to Prideaux, though the point is not free from doubt. We do not, however, think it was necessary to refer to this point in answering the question, though no harm could, of course, be done by so doing.-[ED. L. S. J.] I OBSERVE that it is stated in Snell's Equity, 5th edition, p. 427, that in cases of defective execution of powers, the aid of equity will be afforded in favour only of (1) a purchaser; (2) a creditor; (3) a wife; (4) a legitimate child; and (5) a charity. In Indermaur's Leading Conveyancing and Equity Cases, 4th edition, p. 16, a sixth favoured class is named, an intended husband. As I have not succeeded in finding the authority for this addition, can you oblige me by giving it in your next issue.-Yours, &c., TUDNO. [An intended husband is a purchaser, and, therefore, is included under that expression in Snell. In the latter work you refer to, the point is simply mentioned to impress on the student that the court will not relieve in favor of an actual husband.-ED. L. S. J.] DURING the course of my reading for the Final, I have followed, as nearly as possible, your advice as given in your Self Preparation, and intend to enter upon the final four months' course in July next. I have not read as yet any book on bankruptcy, and do not know much about it from practice. Do you recommend me to wait till the new Bankruptcy Act comes out, or to read the present law ?Yours, &c., UNDER-GRAD. [You can very well put off reading bankruptcy till you see the position of matters.-ED. L. S. J.] A. COOK.-The Order of Her Majesty in Council merging the Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions in the Queen's Bench Division is dated 16th December, 1880, was issued on 6th January, 1881, and came into force on 26th October, 1881.-[ED. L. 8. J.] STUDENT.-It is usually advisable to search for Crown debts, annuities, and lites pendentes. It is hardly necessary now to search for judgments, though some firms still do so. -[ED. L. S. J.] E. A. W.-If we are not to insert your address, how can our Correspondent communicate with you ?-[ED. L. S. J.] H. JONES.-A thorough knowledge of Stephens's is all that is necessary. If you are, however, sure that you know it thoroughly, you may also read Williams' Real Property, and Williams' Personal Property, but you had better not go further.-[ED. L. S. J.] S. E. P.-You will not be able to go up for your Intermediate until April, 1885.-[ED. L. S. J.] ALFRED SOUTHWELL.-Make the penal sum a reasonable amount-there can be no rule- and stamp it as a deed with a 10s. stamp.-[ED. L. S. J.] RUSTICUS.-No; the Intermediate in January, 1884, is sure not to be before the 9th, as Hilary Sittings only commence on 11th January, and it is never till after this. —[ED. L. S. J.] W. L. C.-The month's notice a servant is entitled to is a lunar month. (Hulton v. Brown, 29 W. R., 928; Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, 26, 27.)— [ED. L. S. J.] NOVICE. Of course it should be "Brehon," not "Breton." -[ED. L. S. J.] A. P.-It is not necessary for the next Intermediate to get up the recent Acts you name. It is sufficient to read the last edition of Stephen's.-[Ed. L. S. J.] J. A. A.-Procure the 8th edition of Stephen's and begin at once. Indermaur's Self Preparation for the Final, 2nd edition, published by Stevens and Haynes, London, will assist you.-[ED. L. S. J.] FINAL.-Will some fellow articled clerk read hard with me (through the post) for the next April examination ? Address:-J. B., Derby Villa, Dogsthorpe Road, Peterborough. J. H. C.-We know of no intended change. We can give no reliable information as to whether there will be a new edition by then; very likely we should think, but do not wait for that.-[ED. L. S. J.] DISTRACTED.-Your letter is too late, but we will insert it, with our views, next month.-[ED. L. S. J.] Examinations. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT THE SOLICITORS' PROPERTY, AND THE PRACTICE OF CONVEYANCING. 1. Q. Land is conveyed by deed to the use of A for life, on condition that he do not marry B, with remainder to C. A marries B. Who is entitled to the land? Would the result be the same if a similar settlement were made by will? Give the grounds of your answer. A. C will, after the marriage of A, become entitled to the land. The result would be the same if the settlement were made by will. The condition in restraint of marriage is a partial one only, and therefore good. (See Notes to Scott v. Tyler, W. and T. Leading Cases, Eq.) 2. By what statutes is the limitation of actions for the recovery of real property now governed, and what were the principal changes in the law effected by such statutes respectively? A. The Real Property Limitation Acts of 1833 and 1874, Statutes 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, and 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57. The first of these Acts makes the question of whether the possession has been adverse or not of no importance. By the latter statute the time within which actions must be brought to recover land is reduced from 20 years to 12 years. The time allowed for bringing the action after the cesser of any disability under which the plaintiff suffered is reduced from 12 to 6 years, and the total time within which the action must be brought, notwithstanding disability, is reduced from 40 to 30 years. 3. Q. By post-nuptial settlement real estate is limited to uses in strict settlement, power being reserved to the settlor to revoke the uses and resettle the estate. The settlor subsequently conveys the estate by way of mortgage, the proviso for redemption providing for the reconveyance to himself in fee. Upon whom will the equity of redemption devolve upon the death of the settlor? State the grounds of, and any authority for, your answer. A. The equity of redemption will be held upon the trusts of the settlement. The mortgage being nothing more than a transaction for raising a loan, there is a presumption against an intention to alter the previous rights of the parties, further than is necessary to effect that object. The mere fact that the proviso for redemption is to the settlor in fee will not amount to prima facie evidence of intention to revoke the settlement as regards the equity of redempton. (See Fisher on Mortgages, 3rd edition, 746, 747.) 4. Q. A tenant in tail contracts in writing to sell the fee simple of the entailed lands, but dies before completion. What effect has the contract on the remainder man? A. The answer to this question is doubtful, but in my opinion the contract will have no effect on the remainder man. This was the case prior to the Settled Land Act, 1882, even if it was made by deed and enrolled in Chancery. (See section 40 of the Fines and Recoveries Act, 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 74.) It was an established rule before the Fines and Recoveries Act that the issue in tail was not bound, either at law or in equity, to complete any contract or agreement of his ancestor respecting the estate tail, because the issue claimed by a paramount title per fortnam doni. And although by section of the Settled Land Act, 1882, a tenant in tail would be included in the definition of a tenant for life, and by section 31 of the same Act the remainder man is to carry out contracts made by the tenant for life, yet I do not think that this section was intended to override the express provisions of section 40 of the Fines and Recoveries Act. 5. Q. A testator bequeaths his residuary personal estate to trustees to be laid out by them in the purchase of land, which he directs them to settle to the use of his nephew for life, with remainders in favour of his (the nephew's) issue in tail. After the purchase of the land the nephew dies without issue. Who is entitled to the land? A. The issue of the nephew take by purchase under the rule in Shelley's case, so that if the nephew had issue at the death of the testator, and they predeceased him, yet they would have attained a vested interest, and the property would go to their heirs. If the nephew had no issue at the death of the testator then the heir-at-law of the testator. If no heir-at-law of the testator can be found the trustees will hold for their own benefit. (Burgess v. Wheate, 1; Eden, 117; Prideaux's Dissertations, 11th edition, Vol. 1, p. 189.) 6. Q. What is the effect of the following bequests: (a) £1000 to children of A, B, and C ; (b) £1000 to children of A, B, and C, with a gift over of the share of any child dying under 21 to his brothers and sisters; (c) £1000 to A and B as tenants in common for their lives, and after their deaths to their issue; (d) £1000 to A and B for life, and on the death of the survivor to the children of A and B. A. (a). All children of A, B, and C, living at the death of the testator will take per capita; (b) the same as in case (a), except that the share of any infant child would on his death pass to his brothers and sisters; (c) on the death of A or B his share would go to his issue; (d) on the death of the survivor of A and B the whole fund would go to the issue of A and B per capita. (Jarman on Wills, 4th edition, p. 194-197.) 7. Q. A married woman wishes to dispose of her reversionary interests expectant on her mother's death in the residuary personal estate bequeathed by the will of her grandfather, who died in 1855, and in a sum of money bequeathed by the will of her father dated in 1878. In what way can she do this? Does the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, affect your answer to this question? A. She cannot, unless married since 31st December, 1882, dispose of the reversionary interest under the will of her grandfather, as she takes this under an instrument made before the 31st December, 1857. The interest under her father's will she may dispose of by deed acknowledged with the consent of her husband under 20 & 21 Vict., c. 57. This Act only applies to instruments made after the 31st December, 1857. If the married woman was married on or after the 1st of January, 1883, she can dispose of the reversionary interest alone, as by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, all property belonging to a woman married after that date is to belong to her for her separate use. 8. Q. A sum of money is bequeathed to trustees upon trust to apply the same in payment off of a debt due by a charitable institution. The debt is partly secured by a mortgage of certain land held by the charity, partly by an equitable deposit of the title deeds of other land of the charity, and the remainder is unsecured. The money is sufficient to pay off the entire debt. Is the bequest good? A. The part of the debt which is unsecured can be paid off out of the bequest, as this will not give the charity a larger or more extensive interest in land than it had before. The remainder of the bequest will be void. (See Corbyn v. French, Tudor's Leading Cases, Conveyancing; Indermaur's Notes to Leading Cases; Waterhouse v. Holmes, 2 Lim., 162, and In re Lynall's Trusts, 12 Ch. D., 211.) 9. Q. What is the effect of a limitation to the next-ofkin of a married woman under the statute if she had died "intestate and unmarried," or, "intestate and without having been married," or, "intestate and without ever having been married," where the married woman dies leaving a husband, children and other relatives? A. The terms "intestate and without having been married," or, "without ever having been married," will mean that the wife's settled property shall go as her own property. would, if she left neither husband or children. The limitation "intestate and unmarried," or, "without being married," will not prevent the trust property from devolving on children surviving the wife, but dying without having obtained a vested interest under the trust of the settlement in favour of the issue of the marriage, who will by reference to the statute, take under the limitation a vested interest, an interest which they would not take under the trusts of the settlement until 21 or marriage. On the death of the child, an infant, the property would go to the husband as representative of the child. (Davidson's Conveyancing Precedents; Dissertation on Settlements; Prideaux, 11th edition, Vol. II, p. 199.) 10. Q. What is the rule governing the right of a solicitor to a lien on documents in his possession? Can the mortgagee's solicitor claim a lien on the title deeds after the mortgagee has been paid off and before reconveyance, or where the property has been sold subject to the mortgage, in respect of the costs of the mortgage payable by the mortgagors? A. The solicitor has a general lien on all the deeds and documents of his client which come to his hands. The mortgagee's solicitor can claim a lien on the title deeds after the mortgage has been paid off, for his costs in relation to the mortgage, but not for costs due from the mortgagee. The mortgagee's solicitor can claim a lien on the title deeds after the mortgage has been paid off if the mortgagee's costs of the mortgage have not been paid either as against the mortgagor or a purchaser of the equity of redemption as the costs in fact form a part of the mortgage debt. (Snell, 5th edition, p. 335.) II. THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN MATTERS USUALLY DETERMINED OR ADMINISTERED IN THE CHANCERY DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. 1. Q. Explain the meaning of equitable execution. What is the general nature of a debenture, and to what rights are the holders of debentures entitled ? A. Equitable execution is the enforcing of a judgment against some equitable estate or interest of the debtor. Before the Judicature Acts, where the creditor had obtained judgment at law, he had to bring a separate action in Chancery if he wished to enforce his judgment against any equitable interest of the debtor. The Chancery Court would then enforce the judgment by declaring it a charge on the equitable interest, and appoint a receiver of it. Since the Judicature Acts the creditor can obtain this relief in the Queen's Bench Division if he recovers his judgment there. (See Smith v. Cowell, 6. Q. B. D., 75; and Salt v. Cooper, 16 Ch. D., 544.) A debenture is a deed issued by a company acknowledg ing a debt due. The debentures usually are (1) A mere acknowledgment of a debt due from the company; or (2) a charge or mortgage on the whole or some part of the property of the company. The remedies of the debenture holders depend on the form of their debenture bonds and the interest in the company or property of the company given by them. If the debentures create a charge on the property of the company the remedy of the debenture holders is to commence an action in the Chancery Division for the realisation of their security. 2. Q. State the distinction existing between seeking and resisting specific performance as to admission of evidence of parol variations, and explain the grounds of it. By a written agreement the plaintiff agrees to sell and the defendant to buy a certain estate, and the plaintiff agrees to buy and the defendant to sell another estate, the two stipulations not being expressed to be dependent on each other. In an action by the plaintiff for specific performance of the first stipulation it appears that the defendant cannot make a title to the second estate, and he alleges that an exchange was intended. Is the plaintiff entitled to succeed? A. Although a defendant resisting specific performance may go into parol evidence to show that by fraud, accident, or mistake, the written agreement does not express the real terms, a plaintiff can only do so for the purpose of obtaining specific performance with a variation when he alleges a parol variation in favour of the defendant. (Snell, 6th edition, page 538; see also Wollam v. Hearn, Williams and Tudor's Leading Cases, Equity.) The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed in the case given. As there is no ambiguity in the written instrument the defendant can only give evidence of any term which has been left out, where it has been left out by fraud, and no fraud is alleged in the question. 3. Q. What is the rule applied to residuary bequests of personal estate to be enjoyed by several persons in succession; and in what class of cases is it excluded? A testator, entitled to a reversion expectant on lives, directs a conversion and investment of his personal estate, with a discretion to his trustees as to time, and the trustees decline to sell the reversion till it falls into possession. To what is the tenant for life entitled? A. Such part of the residuary estate as may be wearing out (such as leaseholds) must be converted, and the proceeds invested, so as to secure the corpus for the remainder men. If the residue comprises property of a reversionary nature that too must be converted for the benefit of the tenant for life. If, however, an intention can be collected from the will that the property should be enjoyed in specie, it ought not to be converted. (Howe v. E. of Dartmouth, W. & T.'s Leading Cases, Equity; Indermaur's Notes to the Leading Cases; Snell 6th edition, p. 155.) |