OUTLINES OF PROCEDURE BEFORE By Mr. C. THWAITES, Solicitor, 1st Prizeman, June. THE subject of this paper forms a pons asinorum of practice to many an articled clerk, and is a problem which besets the large majority of solicitors almost immediately after admission. It is for the assistance of those who (like the writer) find no royal road to success or learning, but have to pick up their experience as they go along, that I propose to sketch out briefly the progressive stages of a case in the police courts, and in doing this I shall assume that the reader is acting as solicitor to the prosecutor or complainant. Where the duties of the advocate for the defence differ from those of the advocate on the other side, they are specially mentioned. There are many special proceedings before justices which I shall not attempt to deal with; all that comes within my intention are the ordinary steps in relation to summary convictions and indictable offences. It is probable that the person at whose instance the proceedings are taken, and who is called the complainant or prosecutor, consults his solicitor before setting the law in motion. Where this is the case, it is the duty of the solicitor to advise his client, whether his case is good or bad, or must be ranked in the still larger class of doubtful ones; and to enable him to do this properly, he must get at the facts of the case. Now, getting at the facts, does not mean simply listening to whatever story the client chooses to tell. To a conscientious adviser-and what advocate is otherwise?-it means far more than this. I have repeatedly found a client come and tell me a story which on the face of it, presents a first rate case; but, on my sifting the matter and questioning him closely, I have found that he has omitted to relate some fact which throws quite another complexion on the case. This is a common difficulty, and may arise from intentional deceit on the part of the client, or from a not unnatural desire to make out the best case he can. The difficulty has to be faced and (if possible) overcome, and the client convinced that when he comes for advice, he must tell everything. The most convenient way is to take down the client's story either in short or long hand, questioning him as you go along on anything that occurs to you as bearing on the case, and it has this advantage, that your client's evidence is briefed at once. Generally speaking, at this stage, you will be in a position to advise your client on his case in such a manner that he can decide whether to go on or not. But if not, you must have what further evidencedocumentary and oral--is needed to enable you to advise properly. It is the client's business to bring this evidence to you unless he is willing to pay you for getting it. Having then got at the facts, you must apply the law to them and advise accordingly. Assuming that your client decides to go on, you will have to set the law in motion; and at this stage it is as well to ask your client for something on account of costs. If you are willing to ask for nothing there will soon be plenty of business, but empty pockets. The first step is issuing process, which, in a police court, is either a summons commanding the defendant to appear on a certain day, or a warrant for the arrest of the wrongdoer to answer the charge preferred against him, or arrest without warrant. The details of the processes of the courts are outside my limits, and may be gathered from any ordinary book of practice. The next thing to be done is to get up your case, which includes preparing the brief, issuing summonses to witnesses, and doing all other things which are allowed by the practice and appears advisable. Preparing the brief means setting down on paper all the evidence for your client. For this, quarter sheets of draft with a pretty wide margin will be found convenient, or, if the evidence is lengthy, on half sheets of draft or foolscap. The backs of your pages will serve for notes of the evidence on the other side. Then comes the hearing, prior to which the solicitor for the prisoner, or defendant will have pursued the same course that you have done in getting up his client's case. When the case is called on, the advocate on each side should state that he is in the case, and for whom he appears. Appearance at the hearing is a waiver of all objections to improper service of process Before the case is commenced, it is often desirable for the witnesses on both sides to be ordered out of court, so that a witness as yet unexamined, may not, as the case progresses, cook up a story to suit the evidence that has already been taken; and an application to the court for that purpose will seldom be refused, as the truth is thus much more likely to be arrived at, although the exclusion cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The parties themselves with their legal advisers and medical witnesses, called simply to speak to medical facts, are allowed to remain. The evidence is taken on oath or affirmation. The primary rules of evidence are that no irrelevant matter should be adduced and that the best evidence possible should always be given. The side to begin is generally the plaintiff in civil proceedings, and always the prosecutor in criminal ones. The rule is, that the onus probandi lies on that side which in the absence of any proofs would fail. The procedure at the hearing now varies according to the nature of the offence. The ordinary cases coming before this tribunal are either (a) cases punishable on summary conviction, in which the bench has power to hear and finally dispose of the charge or, (b) indictable offences, in which merely a preliminary enquiry is held, followed either by a dismissal of the charge, or the committal of the offender to take his trial at quarter sessions or assizes. (a) In cases of offences punishable summarily, the judges consist of one or more justices of the peace (one being sufficient unless a statute expressly provides otherwise); the place of trial is an open and public court, and the parties may appear in person or by counsel or solicitor (11 & 12 Vict., c. 43, sec. 12.) When the case is called on, if the defendant does not appear, the court may either hear the case in his absence on proof of service of process, or an adjournment will be made and, if necessary, a warrant issued for arrest of the defaulter. If the complainant does not appear, or neither party appears, the case may be either dismissed or adjourned. Where both parties appear the case may at any stage be compromised by arrangement between the parties with the consent of the court, such consent being entirely discretionary. The substance of the information or complaint is then stated to the defendant, and he is required to plead to it, which practically consists in his saying guilty or not guilty. In case of a plea of not guilty the justices must in certain cases inform defendant that he can claim the right to be tried by a jury if he think fit. (42 & 43 Vict., c. 49, sec. 17.) Where the hearing is proceeded with, no formal defect in the process issued can be taken advantage of unless the court is satisfied that the defendant has been really misled by it, when an adjournment will be granted. Objections to the jurisdiction or to the forms should be taken at the beginning of the case, or the earliest moment possible for taking them if they only appear as the case goes on, as otherwise the objector is open to the remark that by his own conduct in allowing the case to go on he has waived them. There is no statute and (I believe) no reported case on the point; the justices, therefore, exercise their own discretion. The case is then heard upon its merits. In all cases not falling within 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43, the course pursued in the superior courts is followed, but under that statute the practice is as follows: (1) The complainant's advocate states his case and his evidence is taken; (2) the advocate on the other side opens the defence; (3) his evidence is taken; (4) the complainant's evidence in reply is taken; and (5) the decision follows. There is thus no right of reply on either side under 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43. It is a safe rule to be brief in the opening statements in all cases. An advocate's duties have a much wider range than that of simply airing his eloquence, and his speeches should always be practical and to the point. All that is needed is to state the salient points on either side. By no means infrequently the opening statements are omitted, and in a large number of cases no harm is done and a good deal of valuable time is saved by following this plan, as the summons states in sufficiently terse and explicit terms the nature of the charge to be proved and met. The advocate must, however, exercise his discretion. 66 In examination of a witness, the aim is to bring out as clearly as possibly the salient points which prove your client's case. To be long-winded, or go a roundabout way, is a great mistake. Never quarrel with your own witness, or bully him, but draw your evidence out of him in as easy and unaffected a manner as possible. No leading questions, i.e., questions which suggest to the witness the answer he is expected to give, or which can be answered by a mere "yes" or no," are allowed on examination-in-chief, except by consent of both sides. Always bear this rule in mind; and, if need be, study your case before you go into Court, so as to avoid a breach of it, which will instantly bring your opponent on to his legs with an objection, and may prejudice the Court against you. So, far as possible, get your witness simply to answer your questions, and nothing more. A garrulous witness may let the case down, and will confuse the salient points. Always endeavour to get out of your witness sufficient facts to prove your case, and then sit down. After examination-in-chief, your witness will have to undergo the ordeal of cross-examination from the other side. The object of this is, to bring out any facts which tell in favour of the side adverse to that on which the witness has been called, and, if possible, to break his testimony down out of his own mouth. In order to effect this, leading questions may be put as well as direct ones, and the witness may be questioned as to his antecedents, to show that his evidence should be received with caution. The re sponsibility of cross-examination is very great, as on it often depends the success of the side adverse to the witness. To cross-examine successfully, requires a knowledge of men and women, which may come naturally, but is generally only to be acquired by experience. The cross-examiner treads on dangerous ground, as he may only succeed in strengthening the case for the other side. I have read of a trial for murder, where one unlucky question asked in crossexamination brought out a fact which hung the prisoner; but, this is an extreme instance, The value of cross-examination is very great, but the privilege requires to be exercised with discretion. Where a witness has been cross-examined, the party who called him has a right to re-examine him. The object of re-examination is not to elicit any facts which may have been omitted in the examination-inchief, but to give the witness an opportunity of explaining what he has stated in cross-examination. No new matter may therefore be introduced. After the defendant's evidence has been given, the complainant may call witnesses in reply merely for the purpose of explaining or rebutting any new facts given in evidence by the defendant. Then comes the decision, either convicting the defendant or dismissing the case. The decision is that of the majority, and an equal division of opinion necessitates a re-hearing. Where a witness refuses to give evidence, the justices have no power to punish him unless the case falls within 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43, when he may be committed to prison for 7 days (section 7), or, unless the statute under which the proceedings are taken, expressly confer an authority. The jurisdiction of justices under this head is ousted in cases where the complaint arises out of title to real property, insolvency, or execution (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 46), and wherever the evidence shows that a bona fide claim of right is raised and disputed. (Reg. v. Stimpson, 32 L.J.M.C., 208), unless the statute expressly, or by necessary implication, gives jurisdiction. (Ex parte Vaughan, L.R. 2, Q.B., 114.) If the case is dismissed, a certificate of dismissal may be given on request to the defendant, which, without further proof, shall bar any subsequent proceedings for the same offence; but on a conviction a minute of the decision is to be made, and the conviction or order afterwards drawn up by the justices and filed with the Clerk of the Peace. (11 & 12 Vict., c. 43, sec. 14). Where the case is dismissed, the justices should be asked to give defendant his reasonable costs, and to fix the amount (sec. 18); and if not paid, such costs may be recovered by distress on the complainant's goods, and imprisonment, (sec. 26). If, however, the case is not within 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43, the justices have no power to give costs unless by express statutory declaration. Where a conviction is obtained, costs may be given. (Sec. 18; and 42 & 43 Vict., c. 49, secs. 6 and 35). (b) Where an indictable offence is the subject of enquiry, the proceedings may result in a commitment for trial to quarter sessions or assizes, and the procedure is somewhat different. Here the enquiry is merely a preliminary one, and all that the prosecution has to do to ensure a commitment is to make out a prima facie case. The advocate for the defence therefore holds a watching brief rather than anything else. His duties are to closely watch the case for the prosecution; and, if he thinks the proceedings will end in a committal, he should not enter into his client's defence at all. He should see that all the weak points for the prosecution are put down in the evidence, and refrain from cross-examination, unless there is an undeniable advantage to result from it. In cases within the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, the accused may be dealt with summarily, instead of being committed to take his trial at quarter sessions or assizes. Where the matter is dealt with summarily, the procedure is the same as that on the trial of offences punishable summarily. The law on this point will be found in sections 10 to 14, 20, 24, 27 and 18 of the Act of 1879. The appearance of the accused is necessary to the case being gone into, as the evidence cannot be taken without (11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, sec. 17); and where a summons has been issued, and the accused does not appear, a warrant will be issued (11 & 12 Vict, c. 42, sec. 9). Where the prosecutor does not appear, the case may be dismissed or adjourned (sec. 21). Where both parties appear, adjournments may be granted on application, such remand not exceeding eight clear days (sec. 21). It is, however, the duty of the person setting the law in motion to be in attendance with his evidence. The proceedings do not take place in open courts, and the justices have power to exclude everybody, except the parties themselves, from the hearing even the professional advisers (sec. 19); although from sec. 17 it does not appear the latter power was the deliberate intention of the legislature. The privilege to appear by solicitor is, therefore, only by courtesy of the bench, except for the purpose of cross-examining the witnesses called against the accused. The accused is not called upon to plead to the charge until a case has been made out against him, calling for enquiry or answer. After stating his case, the prosecutor's advocate proceeds to call his evidence. The evidence is taken upon oath or affirmation, and a witness can be compelled to give evidence (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, sec. 17). As it is given the evidence is reduced into writing by the magistrate's clerk, and is then called the depositions. The depositions must be read over, to and signed by the witnesses in the presence of the accused, and are then signed by the justices presiding. The importance of depositions is very great, for, if a witness is dead or ill, his deposition may be used as evidence at the final hearing, provided it was properly taken and completed (s. 17). By sections 6 and 7 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, in certain cases, depositions may be taken otherwise than at the actual preliminary hearing. The depositions should include the actual evidence given so far as it is relevant; and care should be taken to see that the real meaning of the witness is recorded, as it will be found witnesses frequently use expressions which do not convey their real meaning. Both the cross-examination and the re-examination are included in the depositions. If committed, the accused is entitled to a copy of the depositions (11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, sec. 27. If the prosecutor fails to make out a primâ facie case, the accused is to be discharged (11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, sec. 25); although the bench has power under 29 & 30 Vict., c. 52, and 44 & 45 Vict. c. 70, to allow the costs of the prosecution in certain cases. Where, however, a primâ facie case is made out to the satisfaction of the justices, they must ask the accused for his answer to it, first cautioning him that the answer may be taken down and used as evidence against him (11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, s. 18). The justices then ask the accused if he wishes to call witnesses; and, if he does, their evidence must be taken, and where material, they must be bound over to appear at the quarter sessions or assizes (30 & 31 Vict, c. 35, s. 3). And now a serious responsibility devolves upon the accused's advocate, who must advise him either to make a plain statement of facts (which if he is really innocent may do great good) or to reserve his defence and as to calling any evidence. The accused's advocate may now exercise the privilege (it is not a right) of addressing the justices upon the prosecutor's case, pointing out the weak points in it with a view to the case being dismissed. This is matter of discretion; but if it appears the case must end in a committal, it is better to make no address as you only point out to the prosecution the weak points in their case and the way in which you hope to get the prisoner off at the final hearing. Both in the address and in tendering evidence for the accused, the one thing to consider is, will either or both result in the case being now dismissed? If not, avoid both. The accused's witnesses (if any tendered) are then examined and their depositions taken; rebutting evidence may afterwards be called by the prosecutor, but no reply is permitted. The magistrates now deliberate whether the evidence given raises a strong or probable presumption of the accused's guilt; and in the exercise of their discretion either discharge the prisoner or commit him for trial. (11 & 12, Vict., c. 42, sec. 25.) If discharged, the accused may be brought up again on additional evidence against him being obtained. Where the case is dismissed, the prosecutor can, nevertheless, compel the justices to bind him over to prosecute at quarter sessions or assizes, in cases within 22 & 23, Vict., c. 17, sec. 1; but if the trial results in an acquittal, and the court thinks the prosecution unreasonable, it may order the prosecutor to pay the costs (30 & 31, Vict., c. 35, sec. 2). Where the accused is committed for trial the prosecutor and his witnesses are bound over to appear and give evidence (11 & 12, Vict. c. 42, sec. 20), and so are the accused's witnesses. An application may now be made to let the prisoner out on bail. The justices have no power to grant bail in cases of treason, and have a discretion in the cases mentioned in section 23 of 11 & 12, Vict. c. 42. In all other cases they are compelled to give bail. The only object in keeping the accused in custody is to secure his presence at the trial; and where that appears consistent with giving bail the points to consider are (1), are the sureties substantial? and (2) is it likely they can perform the condition of the bond? Two sureties are usually required, and the amount must be reasonable. It is illegal to demand excessive bail (1, Wm. & Mary, session 2, c. 2). Where bail is refused an application may be made to the Queen's Bench Division. Ön commitment of the accused a certificate for costs should be asked for by the prosecutor's advocate, to be paid after the trial; and an allowance might also be made under 29 & 30, Vict., c. 52, in certain cases where no committal was obtained. It often happens that an advocate is instructed at the last moment, or, perhaps, even when the case is called on. This is, of course, a great disadvantage; but he must do the best he can under the circumstances. It is prudent to ask for an adjournment for a few minutes to enable you to confer with the client, an indulgence rarely refused when courteously asked. An advocate is bound to do the best he can for his client. He is retained to look after the client's interests, even where his only instructions are the old fashioned ones of "no case, bully the other side." The advocate should always keep on the best possible terms with the court. To do otherwise is sure to prejudice his client's case, and can do him no good. He should never really lose his temper, or he may let down his client, and put himself in a very undignified position. An angry man is usually a feeble opponent. Above all, the advocate should never lend himself to any fraud or deceit on the court. That the court have perfect confidence in the pleader is a great step towards success. Where practicable the case should always be got up thoroughly beforehand. And lastly, no advocate can always win, although he should strive to do so. I hope next month to follow out the idea of this Essay by a similar one on County Court procedure. Correspondence, Queries, &t. [These columns being open for free discussion on all points in any way relating to Law Students, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinions or statements expressed. Correspondents must in all cases give their rea! name and address, though not for publication unless desired. We reserve to ourselves the right of refusing any letters, and where there are several answers to the like effect to the same query we endeavour to select the plainest and best for insertion. Correspondents are specially asked to aim at brevity, and when we receive more correspondence than we can possibly insert we give preference, in the absence of some special reasons, to letters received earliest. Letters on different subjects must be on separate sheets of paper.] VESTING OF LEGAL ESTATE. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-In reply to "Lostwithiel," there is a case reported in the Law Reports almost analogous to his question. The case is re Mercer and Moore, 14 Ch. D., 287, and according to that decision, A's and C's conveyance to B would be inoperative, and the legal estate would be vested in the Crown.-Yours, &c., G. A. C. [Answers also received from R. E. S., Forward, and E. E. G., F. Parkin in J. B., Show."-ED. L. S. J.] POWERS. Inigo, C. R. and "Dumb To the Editor of the " Law Students' Journal." SIR,-As far as I can see there has been no case decided on this point since the Conveyancing Act of 1882 came into force, therefore the case, as put by your correspondent "F. B. H.," is one of opinion and not of fact. I find it stated in the note to the 52nd section, as given in the 3rd edition of Rubenstein's work on the Act:-"The words of this section are general, but it is suggested that it does not apply where the release of the power would constitute a breach of trust, as in Weller v. Ker, L. R., 1 Sc., Ap. 11." The above, I think, may help to solve the question.Yours, &c. C. RIDGE FORWARD. Chard. POSITION OF BANKRUPT CHURCHWARDEN. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-Kindly inform me through your journal whether a churchwarden, whose affairs are in liquidation is in a position to take the chair at a vestry meeting (in the absence of the incumbent), and to perform his other duties. And whether it would make any difference if he had to pass through the court. Any authority on the sub ject would oblige.-Yours, &c. QUERIST. CONSTRUCTION OF LEGACY. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR, A, by his will in 1845, directed a sum of money to be paid to B, upon trust to invest the same and pay the interest thereof to D, for her life. At the decease of D, the testator directed the principal sum to be paid to E, if living, for his own use and benefit, and if dead to his children in equal shares. E is recently deceased, D is living. E leit a son G alive, and the issue of a deceased son H (who died in 1870). On the death of D will G, and the issue of H, take the principal sum of money in equal shares; or will G come in for the whole? Authorities would oblige. -Yours, &c. R. E. S. Carmarthen. ATTESTING CODICIL. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-I shall be glad to be informed whether, or not, any person, who takes under a will, would be disqualified from attesting a codicil to that will. The cases of Gurney v. Gurney and Tempest v. Tempest, are the only authorities that I can find bearing on the subject, but these cases appear open to question.- Yours, &c., 7th February, 1883. VENN. SUTTON v. SUTTON. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-Can you oblige your readers in your next number with a short note of, and the reasons of, the Court of Appeal for its decision in the recent case of Sutton v. Sutton, on this question referred to in answer to question 6 of the Chancery paper in your last issue. It seems to be an important and somewhat novel decision, as can be judged from the question being put at the last Final Examination, and I know some most eminent counsel who advised that the effect of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, was that after 12 years had expired the mortgagee was barred of all his remedies as against the land, but that it did not affect the mortgagee's right to sue under the covenant as it existed under 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 27, and that an action for principal and interest could be brought at any time within 20 years, as in case of a specialty. Prideaux in his dissertations to even the last edition of his Precedents expressly puts it so, and Mr. Justice Chitty, whose decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, seemed to consider it so. Assuming, then, that the recent decision has now settled the matter so far as the mortgage debt is concerned, and that after 12 years the right to recover the principal is gone, do you think it would cover a case where a mortgage deed contains a separate covenant for payment of interest so long as any money remained owing? Such interest would not be expressly charged upon the land; and as the statute only bars the remedy, and does not extinguish the debt, would not an action on the separate covenant lie to recover arrears of such interest up to 20 years' arrears as might be due? If the recent decision is binding as to both principal and interest, surely it diminishes the importance and the high nature in which a covenant was always considered; and it seems to be well worth the consideration of solicitors whether they will not at once, in all cases where they advance money on mortgage, resort to the old practice which formerly existed, of taking a bond by way of collateral security to secure the amount, and thus make sure of having a specialty to fall back upon, and be enabled to recover at any time within 20 years.-Yours, &c., INIGO. Aberystwith. [We have not space to discuss this subject, but we certainly consider Sutton v. Sutton an extraordinary decision, and it took us by surprise. Doing what you suggest in the latter part of your letter could not improve matters. We believe the case is going to the House of Lords, and if so, shall expect to see it reversed.—ED. L. S. J.] LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETIES IN UNION. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR, On the 17th inst. I received through the former secretary of our society the annual report of the United Law Students' Society, and on perusing it I find that a Mr. Chas. Kains-Jackson still occupies the honourable, if not responsible, post of secretary of Societies in Union. On turning to page 4 I found Mr. Kains-Jackson's Report for 1882, and it is therein stated that the Hull, among other societies, " appears to be doing well." I am very happy to be able to say that this is entirely correct, but at the same time I should very much like to know on what grounds the honourable secretary for Societies in Union makes this statement, and for the following reason:I have, apart from writing Mr. Kains-Jackson, forwarded to him regularly from October, 1882, to the present time, the circulars issued by our society, but, notwithstanding this, he is quite unaware of the change of secretary, and this leads me to think that Mr. Kains-Jackson cannot have even glanced at the circulars sent him, and therefore cannot possibly know whether our society is in a prosperous state or not. I may also say that I found the names of the old secretaries of the Birmingham, Liverpool, Newport and Nottingham Law Students' Societies still appearing in the schedule to the report. I myself have received and noted the change of secretaries of these societies, and surely the secretary for Societies in Union could and should have done so. My object, Sir, in writing this letter, is simply to express my opinion that a gentleman occupying such a post as the one Mr. Kains-Jackson does, should not issue a report concerning country Law Students' societies, which is not only inaccurate, but which cannot but have been written in the dark, and upon mere supposition.-Yours, &c. FRED. W. SPINK, Hon. Sec. Hull Law Students' Society. 9, Parliament Street, Hull. Feb. 19th, 1883. JANUARY INTERMEDIATE QUESTIONS. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal.” SIR, In running my eye over my answers to these questions printed in this month's journal, I notice an inaccuracy in answer 3. The second half of this answer should read as follows:-"The widow is not entitled to dower, for the husband must have been solely seised and B was never seised, except subject to the paramount claim of the survivor. (Coke upon Littleton, 31b; Burton's Compendium, 5th edition, p. 143; Stephen's Commentaries, 8th edition, Vol. I., p. 340; Williams' Real Property, 13th edition, p. 234)." Some of your readers have doubtless noticed the mistake, but I shall be obliged by your calling attention to it for the sake of those who may not have done so.-Yours, &c., C. THWAITES, Doncaster, February, 1883. [This letter answers numerous correspondents, and we can hardly regret an inaccuracy which has proved to us how carefully many students go through the questions and answers as published in these columns.-ED. L. S. J.] SALE OF SEED. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-A purchases from a seedsman a quantity of what is supposed to be Swede turnip seed. On being sown, it turns out to be Common turnip seed, and there is no doubt that A has sustained a considerable loss through the defect in the seed. The two kinds of seed cannot be distinguished from each other before sewing, and, in fact, the seed had been purchased by the seedsman for Swede turnip seed. Is the seedsman liable in damages, and to what extent? Recent cases will oblige.-Yours, &c., J. F. D. MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-I am interested in knowing whether the "Married Women's Property Act" affects the law of husband and wife holding in joint tenancy with a third person. By the common law the husband and wife in such a case took but a moiety. Do they now each take a third? I presume that as the wife is capable of acquiring and holding property as a feme sole, she can take and hold in joint tenancy as a feme sole with power to constrain her husband and the other joint tenant to make partition. I shall, however, be glad of a further opinion on the subject.-Yours, &c., FREDK. H. STAPLEY. Eastbourne, Feb. 22nd, 1883. A FRIEND of mine has passed the previous examination at Cambridge, and is now reading for the special law degree at that University. If he is at once articled for four years and subsequently obtains his degree, can the period of service be shortened to three years (of course, with the principal's consent), and would a memorandum on the articles, signed by the parties, be sufficient evidence?— Yours truly, LEX. [No. If he wishes to have his term three years only, he must take his degree before being articled. (See 23 & 24 Vict., c. 127, sec. 2.)-ED. L. S. J.] W. TOMASSON.—The Companies' Act, 1862.—[ED. L.S.J.] R. O. G.-Read from Stephens' Commentaries well, and get up some slight idea of the prominent features of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, and the Bills of Sale Act, 1882.—[ED. L. §. J.] W. J. MELVILL ROBERTSON.-No doubt the work for January, 1884, will be as now, Stephens' Commentaries, omitting Books IV. and VI., but as it is not actually announced till July next, you had better refer to the Acts you name.-[ED. L. S. J.] R. H. H. C.—You can go in April, 1884. Stephens' Commentaries, omitting Books IV. and VI.-[Ed. L. S. J.] HANCOCKE.-As to your first question there is no such statute. As to your second, in the absence of special circumstances it is a trespass; we do not know of the case you refer to.-[ED. L. S. J.] CANDIDATES UNDER 21.-We have several times been asked whether candidates can go up for the Solicitors' Final before attaining 21, and we have invariably replied "No, not without a judge's order." This was the practice until towards the latter part of last year, when the council considered the subject an1 decided that they would admit such candidates to the examination without a judge's order, and this is now done. We regret that we should have given wrong answers on this point to two correspondents lately. These remarks answer letters received this month from W. E. Douglas and T. B. S.-[ED. L. S. J.] FORTI NIHIL DIFFICILE.-Your selection is not good, for amongst such a mass you will get into confusion. Leave out Addison's two works, substitute Baldwin for Robson, and Harris' Criminal Law for Stone. We advise you procuring Indermaur's Self Preparation for the Final, 3rd edition, published by Stevens & Haynes, London.—[ED. L. S. J.J |