LANDLORD AND TENANT. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal,” SIR,-In answer to "Lex," I am of opinion that if the goods were not removed clandestinely, the landlord had no right to distrain, as it has been decided in Parry v. Duncan 7 Bing., 243, that goods must be distrained on the premises for which the rent has accrued. The case of Gray v. Stait, is somewhat different, as the tenancy had terminated by lapse of time, but A having had notice to quit, had no alternative but to remove his goods, and he would do this, relying on the consent of the landlord to take the rent by instalments. If the distress was legal, the landlord had no right to sell, as the notice was irregular, it not stating the place where the goods were, and if A commenced an action, he would recover the value of the goods.-Yours, &c., Manchester, 10th November, 1883. H. BARBER, OUR space being this month most fully occupied, we cannot insert a number of legal questions as usual, but to prevent disappointment we give short answers which will serve to inform each enquirer: A. Z.-Prior to the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII., c. 10, entry by the feoffee or purchaser was necessary to acquire the legal seisin. In modern conveyancing, however, the statute is taken advantage of to avoid the necessity of entry. When the statute is not used actual entry is necessary to complete the title.-[ED. L. S. J.] GEORGE CANN.-The point was actually decided by the case we quote, in the way we have answered. The reason of the decision was that there was no contract.-[ED. L. S. J.] JUSTINIAN.-A may deduct property or income tax (5 & 6 Vict., c. 35) but no other tax.-[ED. L. S. J.] G. E. B.-Yes-B should have sued A for the damage done by the pigeons instead of shooting them.—[ED. L. S. J.] G. E. B.-If there was a dispute about the amount due -No. If there was no dispute about the amount due and money remained owing from B-Yes. See Cumber v. Wane, Indermaur's Common Law Cases.-[ED. L. S. J.] B. J. S.-(1) No. (2) The legal estate of the property unsold remains in A, and he is a trustee for the various mortgagees who will rank in order of date in accordance with the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure.-[ED. L. S. J.] F. PARKIN. We do not understand your question, and so far as we understand it it appears one on which you should take counsel's opinion.-[ED. L. S. J.] C. H. P.-A may disclaim the devise, and so avoid the merger. No doubt a long leasehold term will merge in a shorter leasehold reversion.-[ED. L. S. J.] To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR, I shall be obliged by an opinion as to whether I can serve the last year of my term with a London firm, who act occasionally as my principal's agents, but are not his regular agents, and do not appear as such in the Law List, without being re-articled or assigned. A reply through the columns of the L. S. J. will be esteemed a favour.Yours, &c., H. HATTON. Padgate, Warrington, 26th October, 1883. [Certainly you can do so. You go there with your principal's consent, and they are constituted his agents in a manner quite sufficient by him sending them one or two stray pieces of agency business. There is nothing to say they must be the regular agents (6 & 7 Vict., c. 73, sec. 6).— ED. L. S. J.] CLERK.-Yes. this is so; refer to 23 and 24 Vict. c. 127. Your articles will be for 3 years, proper evidence of service being given. For further particulars enquire at Petty Bag Office, Rolls Yard, Chancery Lane, London.[ED. L. S. J.] L. E. C.—See “Notes of Month.—[ED. L. S. J.] X; STUDENT; ENQUIRER.-As to your remarks about Mr. Gibson's answers to the last Final question in the Conveyancing paper-quite true, the first is no answer at all, the third is mainly wrong, and the twelfth, all wrong-see our answers. You should, however, recollect that Mr. Gibson's answers are, of necessity, got out very hurriedly, and are therefore entitled to be criticised most leniently.—[ED. L. S. J.] J. R. PROCTER.-Quite so; Lord Tenterden's Act is 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, and the Act meant by Mr. Uttley was the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97).-[ED. L. S. J.] INQUISITIVE. If at the date of the November, 1885, examination, two-and-a-half years of your articles have then expired, you will be able to go up then-otherwise, not till January, 1886. See also our answer to G. Smith.[ED. L. S. J.J G. SMITH.-We cannot prophesy, but should advise you procuring the new (9th) edition of Stephen's and reading that.-[ED. L. S.J.] HOSTIA. It is most usual for the description to be clerk to the firm.-[ED. L. S. J.] J. ADDISON.-Your correction is quite right. Glad to see you got through.-[ED. L. S. J.] IGNORANTIA.-You can spend the last year with London agents without any assignment or new articles.-[ED. L. S. J.] VOLENS ET VALENS.-Read the Act and set of Test Questions in last month's L. S. J. Ringwood will not come out till after the Bankruptcy Rules are published.-[ED. L. S. J.] S. BAGALEY.-(1) Yes, you want nothing besides Indermaur's Manual of Practice and a copy of the new rules. (2) Yes. (3) It is certainly not necessary, (4) It will do. (5) Hallilay's Statutes and Cases should be your chief occupation during last three weeks.-[ED. L. S. J.] L. L. B.-Yes. See Law Society's calendar for this year, p. 143.-[Ed. L. S. J.] THE WRITER.-No. See Law Society's calendar for this year, p. 143, where are stated the different examinations which give this advantage. [ED. L. S. J.] J. R. PROCTOR.-With reference to your remarks on Mr. Uttley's Notes last month dealing with the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, observe :-(1) If the examiners set any questions on bankruptcy, they are only likely to do so on the Act of 1883, inasmuch, as the Act of 1869 will be repealed from the 1st of January next, and consequently will not be good law; (2) as the reading of the Commentaries are supposed to fit students for their future professional life, and these "Hints are also a slight aid in that direction, the student should only read the recent law, and not that which is repealed; (3) perhaps a notice will be issued, requiring students to read the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, in connection with the chapter on bankruptcy.-[ED. L. S. J.] DEMOCRITUS.-We will enquire into the existence of this library, and notice the matter and your letter generally next month. By paying a subscription of £2 a year you are entitled to read in the Law Institution Library, you being articled to a member, See Law Society's Calendar for this year, p. 62.—[ED. L. S. J.] Letters from the following received too late for attention, and if insertion or answers still desired, must be repeated: —C. T. W., In Statu Pupillari.—[Ed. L. S. J.] Examinations. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT THE SOLICITORS' FINAL EXAMINATION IN NOVEMBER, 1883. (The Answers to the Common Law, Conveyancing, and Bankruptcy Papers are by the EDITOR, and to the remaining Papers by Mr. T. EUSTACE SMITH, Barristerat-Law.) I. PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND PROCedure. (In matters usually determined or administered in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice). 1. Q. What is the effect of the marriage, death, or bankruptcy of any party to an action? A. If the cause of action continues, the court may order that the husband, personal representative, trustee, or other successor in interest (if any) of such party, be made a party, or be served with notice of the proceedings. An order for this purpose may be obtained on an ex parte application. (Order L., rules 2 and 4 of the Rules of 1875, and Order XVII., rules 2 and 4 of the Rules of 1883; Indermaur's Practice, 3rd edition, pp. 32, 33.) 2. Q. Where a tenant for life is an infant, how may the powers of a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act, 1882, be exercised? A. They may be exercised on his behalf by the trustees of the settlement, and if there are none, then by such person, and in such manner as the court appoints on the application of the guardian, or if there is none, of the next friend of the infant. (Settled Land Act, 1882, sec. 60.) For an instance of appointment of a guardian under this section, see In re Wells, W.N., 1883, III. 3. Q. State the recent alterations in the law with regard to the power of a mortgagee of land while in possession to grant leases, and give the authority for your answer. A. By the Conveyancing Act, 1881, sec. 18, a mortgagee of land whilst in possession has power to lease the lands(1) For agricultural or occupation leases for not exceed. ing 21 years. (2) Building leases not exceeding 99 years. The lease must be made to take effect in possession within 12 months after date. The best rent must be reserved-regard being had to the circumstances of the case. No fine must be taken. The lease must contain a covenant for payment of the rent, and a proviso for re-entry on non-payment of rent for not exceeding 30 days. A counterpart must be executed. A building lease must be made in consideration of buildings, or improvements, to be made within five years of the date of the lease, and a nominal rent may be reserved for the first five years. The power to lease may be excluded by the mortgage deed. Prior to this Act, which applies only to mortgages made after the 1st January, 1881, the mortgagee had no power to make any lease which would be binding on the mortgagor after he had redeemed the property. 4. Q. What are the essential ingredients in contracts or agreements in order to obtain specific performance thereof in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice? A. (1) The parties must be sui juris, e.g., the Chancery Division will not specifically enforce a contract at the suit of an infant, as it would not enforce it against him. (2) The contract must be of such a nature that money (a) Where there has been such a part performance (4) The contract must be founded on a valuable consideration. (Ellison v. Ellison, Indermaur's Leading Cases, Equity.) (5) The contract must be of such a nature that the court can enforce the carrying out of it, e.g., the court will not specifically enforce a contract requiring personal skill. (6) The contract must not be illegal or immoral. (Snell, 6th edition, p. 519-521.) 5. Q. Explain what is meant by marshalling of assets. A. Marshalling of assets is the term applied to the doctrine of equity, that the assets of a deceased person should be so arranged as to satisfy all the debts and claims against the estate so far as this can be done without prejudice to the rights of particular creditors, e.g., if a deceased person dies leaving debts and legacies and real estate undisposed of by his will, if the creditors exhaust the personal estate in payment of their debt, the legatees will be allowed to stand in the creditor's place, and to claim payment of their debts out of the lands descended to the amount by which the personal estate has been diminished by payment of debts. (Snell, 6th edition, p. 277.) 6. Q. Is inadequacy of price alone sufficient to avoid a bargain? State some of the cases in which the court would set aside a sale for inadequacy of price. A. No, it will not, per se, avoid a bargain. There may be, however, such unconscionableness, or inadequacy of price, as to amount to proof of gross imposition or undue influence. This inadequacy must, however, be such as to shock the conscience, and to amount in itself to conclusive evidence of fraud. Inadequacy of price, when coupled with other suspicious ingredients, c.g., if proper time is not allowed to the party parting with property, may amount to strong evidence of fraud. Bargains with expectant heirs or reversioners will be set aside, unless the purchaser can show that a fair price was paid. This rule is not altered by the 31 Vict., c. 4. (Snell, 6th edition, p. 452, 472.) 7. Q. When will the court grant relief against the defective execution of a power? A. Where the defect is not of the very essence of the power, and where the power is exercised in favour of one of the following favoured classes--a charity, creditor, purchaser, wife, or legitimate child. (Notes to Aleyn v. Belchier, Indermaur's Leading Cases, Equity.) 8. Q. Where a specific legacy of chattles is given to one for life, and after his death to another, what rights of protection has the legatee in remainder? A. He can apply to the chancery division for protection, and the court will protect him by requiring the tenant for life to give security for the safe keeping of the chattels if there is proof that they are likely to be injured or destroyed. If there is no proof of this, the court will make the tenant for life give the remainderman an inventory of the chattels. (See Rules of 1875, Order LII., rule 3; Rules of 1883. Order L., rule 2; Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 3rd edition, p. 190.) 9. Q. In any cause or matter before the court how can the oral testimony of a person residing abroad be obtained? A. If the witness is in Her Majesty's dominious a writ in the nature of a mandamus may be issued to the tribunals there to take the evidence, or the evidence may be taken as though the witness was out of Her Majesty's dominions, i.e., a commission may issue for the examination of the witness in the country where he may happen to be. (Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 3rd edition, p. 122.) 10. Q. Where real estate is settled by deed upon trust to sell for certain specified purposes, and one of those purposes fails, what will become of that portion of the property the trusts of which have failed? A. If the direction for conversion is contained in a deed, the real estate will have to be sold, but the portion of the proceeds of the sale, the trusts of which fail, will go back to the settlor as personal estate. If the direction for conversion is contained in a will the real estate will still have to be sold, but the portion of the trusts which have failed will go to the testator's residuary devisee if he has made a residuary devise, or if the testator has made none, then to the testator's heir-at-law. The residuary devisee or the heir will take the property as personal estate, i.e., if the devisee or heir die intestate it will go to his next of kin, and not to his heir-at-law. (Ackroyd v. Smithson, Indermaur's Leading Cases, Equity; Haynes' Outlines of Equity, Chapter on Conversion.) 11. Q. How is a partnership dissolved in ordinary cases, and when will the court dissolve a partnership before the regular time. A. (1) By effiuxion of time. (2) By mutual consent. (3) If a partnership at will by notice. (4) By a general assignment by one partner, or by execution issued against the partnership goods for the debt of one partner. (5) By death. (6) Formerly, by the marriage of a female partner, but see now the Married Woman's Property Act, 1882. The Court of Chancery will dissolve a partnership at the suit of either partner. (1) If it originated in fraud. (2) Where one partner has been guilty of gross misconduct with relation to the partnership articles. (3) Where there have been continued breaches of the partnership contract. (4) Where by reason of the disagreement of the partners the business cannot be carried on at all or with profit. (5) Where an active partner becomes permanently insane or incapable of acting in the partnership affairs. (Indermaur's Common Law, 3rd edition, pp. 134, 135.) 12. Q. When will the court set aside and cancel instruments which are voidable only? A. (1) Where the defendant has been guilty of actual or constructive fraud, in which the plaintiff has not participated. (2) Where both parties have been guilty of constructive fraud; but public policy will be served by relieving the plaintiff, e.g., relieving him from gaming securities, or where the plaintiff is not in pari delicto with the defendant. (Snell, 6th edition, p. 601.) 13. Q. How long is ordinary and short notice of trial? A. Ordinary 10 days, short notice 4 days. (Indermaur's Manual of Practice, 3rd edition, p. 117.) 14. Q. Can a father or mother appoint a guardian to their children? And, if so, by what means? A. The father may appoint a guardian to his infant children unmarried, by deed or will, under 12 Car. II., c. 24. The father, if he is an infant, cannot now appoint a guardian by will. (The Wills' Act, 1 Vict., c. 26, sec. 7.) The mother has no power to appoint a guardian to her children. 15. Q. Husband and wife agree to separate, and execute a deed of separation between them; afterwards they become reconciled, but subsequently again separate. What effect has the deed of separation (1) on the reconciliation, (2) on the subsequent separation? A. If the separation deed relates only to the separation, it will be put an end to by co-habitation, and being put an end to, it would not arise on any future separation. If, however, the deed applies to matters beyond the separation, it may amount to a settlement, and will not then be affected by a return to co-habitation. (See Ruffles v. Alston, 19, Eq., 539, where the earlier cases are cited.) II. COMMON LAW. (Practice and Procedure in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice.) 1. Q. Under what circumstances can a creditor recover a debt due under simple contract, after the expiration of six years from the date of the debt being incurred? A. Where the Statutes of Limitation have been prevented from applying and barring it, which may be in either of the following ways: 1. By an acknowledgment which must be must be in writing, signed under 9 Geo. IV., c. 14, and 19 & 20 Vict., c. 97, sec. 13. 2. By payment of interest on the debt during the six years. 3. By payment of some part of the debt during the six years. 4. If a writ of summons was issued before the six years had expired, the debt might be recovered by judgment after that time. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, 238.) 2. Q. How should you put in evidence an entry in a banker's book, and a will respectively? A. As to the banker's book, that is governed by 42 Vict., c. 11, under which a copy of the entry is allowed to be given, it being proved: 1. That the persons or company is a bank within the meaning of the Act. 2. That the book in which the entry is contained is one of the ordinary books of the bank. 3. That the entry was made in the usual course of business. 4. That the book is in the custody or control of the bank; and 5. The correctness of the copy. As to a will, ordinarily the proper course is, under 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77, sec. 64, to give a notice 10 days prior to the trial, of intention to adduce the probate in evidence, and if a counter-notice of intention to dispute the validity of the devise is not given within four days, the probate is sufficient evidence. If the will has been proved in solemn form the probate is always conclusive evidence. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 422, 441.) 3. Q. In action for libel against a newspaper editor who does not wish to justify, what statutory course is open to him? A. Under 6 & 7 Vict., c. 96, he should at once insert an apology in his paper, or if published at intervals exceeding a week, he should offer to insert such apology in any paper, to be chosen by the party libelled, and then when sued he may plead this, and that the libel was inserted without malice and without gross negligence, and he must together with this plea pay something into court by way of amends. (S & 9 Vict., c. 75, sec. 2.) It may also be mentioned, that if the libel complained of is a report of some public meeting, it is now provided by 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, that if the report is fair, the editor is not to be liable to any action if he inserts a letter of explanation, by the person who is complaining. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 353, 349.) 4. Q. Who can sue under Lord Campbell's Act for compensating families of deceased persons killed by accident, and for whose benefit? A. The executor or administrator of the deceased, for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, or child. (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.) The period of limitation for the action is 12 months, and by 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95, it has been provided that if the executor or administrator does not sue within 6 months, then any of the persons beneficially entitled may sue. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 375.) 5. Q. Upon what principle is the bidder at an auction allowed to retract his bidding before the fall of the hammer? A. Upon the principle that there is but an offer, and no acceptance, and the auctioneer, until the hammer falls, is not invested with any authority to sign the contract, upon the purchaser's behalf. 6. Q. A and B are jointly liable to C on a bill of exchange for £100, and also together commit a trespass against C. The latter brings two actions. and recovers judgment against both-in the action on the bill for £100, in the action for trespass, damages £50. He issues execution against A only, and recovers from him the whole £150 and costs, in both actions. Can A recover the whole or any portion of this from B? Give reasons. A. A can recover from B half of the amount he has had to pay in the bill of exchange action, but nothing in the trespass action, for there is no contribution between wrongdoers, the maxim being ex turpi causâ non oritur actio. (Merryweather v. Nixan, Indermaur's Common Law Cases, 5th edition, 76; Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 283.) 7. Q. What is the effect of a parol lease for a period of more than three years? A. Under the Statute of Frauds (sec. 1) it is void, and operates but as an estate at will, but the well-known case of Clayton v. Blakey (Indermaur's Common Law Cases, 57), decided the point that, notwithstanding this enactment, yet, if a tenant under such a lease enters and pays rent yearly or half-yearly, or quarterly, then it will operate as a yearly tenancy. Doe d. Rigge v. Bell (Indermaur's Common Law Cases) also decides that such a yearly tenancy will be governed by the terms of the lease in other respects. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 55, 56.) 8. Q. What is the right of "stoppage in transitu"? To what extent may it be defeated by the negotiation of the bill of lading? A. It is the prevention of wrong by a mere personal act, being the right of an unpaid vendor of goods to stop them after they have left his possession, but whilst in course of transit, on hearing of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the purchaser. If the bill of lading is indorsed bona fide for value, without notice, the right is lost (Lickbarrow v. Mason, Indermaur's Common Law Cases, 46), but in such a case, if the sub-purchaser had not paid his purchasemoney, or all of it, the vendor could attach that, though he had lost his right to seize the goods. (Ex parte Falk, re Kiell, 14, Ch. D., 446.) (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 88-91.) 9. Q. In what case can a distress for rent be levied upon goods which are not upon the premises in respect of which the rent accrues due ? A. Under 2 George II., c. 19, where they have been fraudulently, or clandestinely removed by the tenant after the rent became due, and there is not a sufficient distress left the landlord may, within 30 days, follow and distrain on them if not sold bona fide for value without notice in the meantime. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 69.) 10. Q. If an agent contracts in his own name in the ordinary course of business without disclosing his principal against whom can the contract be enforced? A. It can always be enforced against the agent, for he has concealed his principal; and on discovering who the principal was, the vendor would have a right to sue him, but he must at once make his election, which he intends the charge. (Thompson v. Davenport, Indermaur's Common Law Cases; Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 119.) 11. Q. In preparing a bill of sale, as security for the payment of money, what are the principal points to bear in mind? A. 1. That it is governed by the Act of 1882 (45 & 46 Vict., c. 43). 2. That though attestation by a solicitor is not necessary, yet there must be some credible witness. 3. That the form given in the Act must be followed, if not strictly, at any rate, as far as possible. Davis v. Burton, Blaiberg Claimant (W. N., 24th March, 1883, p. 54). 4. That the instrument must be registered within seven days, or it is void. It should also be remembered that the bill of sale must not be for less than £30, and that the true consideration must be expressed. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 96-98.) 12. Q. Upon what principle of law has it been decided that a husband is not liable for the debts of his wife to any particular tradesman with whom he has forbidden her to pledge his credit? A. Upon the principle that a wife is not necessarily in vested with any authority to bind her husband, that at most there is but a presumption of her authority, and that can always be rebutted by shewing that she had no such power. (Jolly v. Rees, 12 W. R., 475; Debenham v. Mellon, 6 Appeal Cases, 24; 50 L. J., Q. B.. 155.) Of course, if a woman has actually been invested by her husband with a general authority to contract debts, he cannot take away her power by simply forbidding her to pledge his credit. Here she would stand in the position of a general agency, and any determination of her authority must be communicated to the tradesman. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 211.) 13. Q. What is a negotiable instrument? In what respect is the holder of a bill of exchange in a superior position to the assignee of an ordinary contract? A. A negotiable instrument is one capable of transfer by delivery alone, or delivery and indorsement. If the holder has taken it before it became due, bonâ fide for value, without notice of any defect in the title of the transferor, he has a perfect title to it, in which respect there is a material difference from the position of an assignee of a simple contract, who ordinarily takes no better title than the assignor. (Miller v. Race, Indermaur's Common Law Cases, 37; Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 155.) 14. Q. A landowner, having on his estate an artificial lake of great antiquity, let the banks fall into disrepair, so that they gave way and a neighbour's land is inundated. Can the latter recover damages from the landowner? Would there be any difference in the rights of the parties if, the walls being in good repair, the inundation were due to an unusual flood? Give reasons. A. Yes, he can recover damages, for it is the duty of the landowner to keep his banks in proper repair, and the principle is that involved in the well known case of Rylands v. Fletcher (L. R. 3, H. L. Cas., 330). If however the inundation was due to an unusual flood, assuming all precautions that might be reasonable (if any) were taken, it would be otherwise, for this would be an act of God. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 309; Box v. Jubb, L. R. 4, Ex. D., 76; 48 L. J.. Ex., 417.) 15. Q. A dilapidated chimney falls and injures a passer by. Has he any remedy; and, if so, against whom? A. He has a remedy, which will be against the owner, if he is also the occupier. If he is not, then still his remedy will be against him and not the tenant; unless when the owner demised the premises the chimney was not dilapidated, but has been let to become so by the tenant on whom the obligation to repair rested. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 381.) III. THE LAW OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE PRACTICE OF CONVEYANCING. 1. Q. What alteration was made by "The Wills' Act" in the devolution of lapsed devises of realty? A. Whereas formerly they would have gone to the heir, the will now speaks from the date of the death, and they pass to the residuary devisee, if one. (1 Vict., c. 26, sec. 25.) If there is no residuary devisee, the heir will take as before. 2. Q. In what cases should the assigns of a covenantor be specially mentioned in a covenant? A. In all those cases in which, before the Conveyancing Act, 1881, it was necessary to express assigns for them to be bound, which was where the obligation related to something not in esse on the land at the time, e.g., where, in a lease, there is a covenant to build a wall on the demised premises. (Spencer's Case, Indermaur's Common Law Cases, 5th edition, p. 6.) Section 11 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, does not alter the law on this point. (Goodeve's Real Property, 152.) 3. Q. By marriage settlement dated in 1821, real estate was settled to the use of the settlor, A, for life, and after his death to the use of all or any, exclusively of the children, grandchildren, or other issue of A (to be born before the appointment was made), as he should by deed or will appoint, and in default to the uses therein declared. By will dated in 1867, A appointed the estate to his son, B, in fee, but if B should have no child who should attain 21, then to the settlor's grandson, C, in fee. On the death of A, how does the land devolve, and why? A. This question presents the exact facts in re Brown and Sibly's Contract (3 Ch. D., 156), in which it was held that the executory devise over to C was void, as exceeding the rule of perpetuities, and that B took the estate in fee. (Goodeve, 307, 308.) 4. Q. Trustees have power to invest in "real securities." Does this include (a) copyholds, (b) leaseholds for 99 years, (c) a term of 300 years at a peppercorn rent, and (d) leaseholds for years renewable for ever, respectively? A. (a) Yes. (b) No. (Re Boyd's Settled Estates, 14 Ch. D., 626; 49 L. J., Ch., 808.) (c) No; unless indeed the term can be converted into a fee simple under sec. 65 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, as amended by sec. 11 of the Conveyancing Act, 1882. (d) Yes, for it is practically a “real security." (Prideaux, 12th edition, Vol. II., 152, 153.) 5. Q. Under what circumstances should land-tax and tithe be referred to in particulars of sale? A. In the interest of the vendor they should be referred to when the land-tax has been redeemed, or there is no tithe, or there are other circumstances connected with them rendering mention advisable for the benefit of the vendor. As regards duties towards the vendee, however, there is no need to refer to either, they being both charges incident to land without special mention. (Seaborne's Vendors and Purchasers, 2nd edition, 166; Turner's Duties of Solicitor to Client, 16-19). 6. Q. In what cases is acknowledgment of deeds relating to the real estate of married women still necessary, and how is the mode of taking acknowledgments simplified? A. Where the property devolved upon her prior to 1st January, 1883. (45 & 46, Vict., c. 75, sec. 5.) One commissioner is now sufficient, and no affidavit or certificate of acknowledgment is now required, but the memorandum of acknowledgment duly signed by the judge or commissioner is sufficient. (Conveyancing Act, 1882, sec. 7; Goodeve, 114, 115.) 7. Q. On the sale of land held by underlease, what is to be assumed by the purchaser on production of the receipt for the last payment due for rent under the underlease? A. He is to assume, unless the contrary appears, that all covenants and provisions of the underlease have been observed and performed up to date, and that all rent due under any superior lease, and the covenants and provisions thereof have been duly paid, observed, and performed up to that date. (Conveyancing Act, 1881, sec. 3 (5.) 8. Q. How are the rights of an assignee for value of the interest of a tenant for life protected against any improper exercise of the powers conferred on the latter by the "The Settled Land Act, 1882"? A. The tenant for life's powers may not be exercised to the assignee's prejudice, and his right shall not be affected without his consent, except that if the assignee is not in possession, the tenant for life has then the power of making leases in accordance with the Act (sec. 50 (3.) 9. Q. Who can convey the land of a deceased copyhold tenant ?-(1) where at his death there was subsisting a contract enforceable against his heir or devisee for the sale of such land; (2) where he was sole trustee? A. Sec. 4 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, gives power to personal representatives to carry out contracts, but this section does not appear to include copyholds and it is open to doubt whether sec. 30 applies to copyholds either. Messrs. Clerke and Brett in their notes on the Conveyancing Act (2nd edition, 120) says it does not, and Messrs. Wolstenholme and Turner (3rd edition, 78) say it does. Probably the latter opinion is correct. If so, then I think in either of the cases put in the question, the personal representative will be the person to convey. As to the 2nd case this is apparent; and as to the 1st I submit it must be so also, as on the authority of Lysaght v. Edwards, L. R. 2, Ch. D., 499, the deceased has died possessed of a trust estate. 10. Q. How far is a purchaser liable to be seriously affected by a condition providing that no compensation shall be allowed by the vendor in case of misdescription? A. He will only be affected by such a condition where the misdescription comprises unintentional errors and inaccuracies, and if there are any reckless and careless statements then he is not bound by it, and may claim compensation. But where the property is of such a kind that the vendor is unable to accurately and definitely describe it and only gives the best description he can, and he makes use of careful and guarded language in his conditions, then the purchaser must look out for himself, and though the property may be misdescribed he may be affected by this condition, and indeed absolutely bound by it. (Turner's Duties of Solicitor to Client, 29, 30.) 11. Q. What are the proper modes of transferring the ownership of (a) A registered British ship, (b) consols, (c) railway stock, and (d) bonds payable to bearer respectively? A. (a) By bill of sale under seal, in the form given in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, duly registered; (b) By entry in the books at the Bank of England; (c) By a deed of transfer duly entered in the company's books; (d) By delivery. 12. Q. A married woman, before the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, was equitable tenant in tail to her separate use of certain freehold estates, but restrained from alienation of income during coverture; had she any, and if so what, powers of barring the entail and disposing of the estates? A. Yes, she always had such power, for the restriction does not extend to prevent her from barring the entail and limiting the property in fee to her separate use. This point was expressly decided in Cooper v. Macdonald. (7 Ch. D., 288; 47 L. J. Ch., 373.) 13. Q. How far is notice to one of several partners and to a director of a joint stock company binding on the firm and the company, respectively? A. Notice to one partner in respect of any matter in connection with their partnership affairs will be notice to all, but notice simply given to a director of a company is not necessarily notice to the company, for under the Companies' Act, 1862, service of notices, &c., must be effected by leaving or sending by post to the registered office of the company. (Williams' Personal Property, 11th edition, 371; Buckley on Companies, 4th edition, 144, 166.) 14. Q. How does a joint stock company enter into contracts which in the case of private persons (1) would be required to be under seal; (2) would be required to be in writing and signed by the parties to be charged therewith; (3) would be valid although not reduced to writing? A. (1) Under the company's common seal; (2) by some person in writing authorised by the company; (3) by some person, by parol, authorised by the company. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, 189.) 15. Q. How far was the land of a deceased person, not being specifically charged by him with debts, liable to their payment at the common law, and by what steps has such liability been enlarged? A. Only where the lands descended to the heir. and the debt was a specialty by which the heirs were bound. By 3 William & Mary, c. 14, such debts also bound the lands in the hands of a devisee. By 47 Geo. III., c. 74, lands of traders were made liable for their debts generally. Now by 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 104, all lands of a deceased person are liable for his debts, and the priority conferred on specialty debts by the statute has, by 32 & 33 Vist., c. 46, been taken away. (Goodeve, 333, 334.) IV.-THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY. 1. Q. What provisions of the Act of 1883 are now in force? A, Secs. 66, 127, 128, 129, 153, 162, and 170. Of these |