forfeited, be liable to execution for debts; or to escheat for want of an heir-wife was entitled to dower, husband to curtesy.

All persons competent to take a conveyance of land might also take an interest in it by way of use, i.e. become cestui que use. This kind of ownership had in equity the following properties: (1) uses for life or greater interest might be created or assigned by secret deeds between the parties or by will; (2) uses might be in possession, reversion, or vested remainder, when they were called uses, in esse, or in contingent remainder, or for future interests not corresponding with the legal idea of a remainder, when they were described as uses in futuro, contingent uses or uses in possibility; (3) a use was not subject to forfeiture nor escheat; (4) no dower or curtesy could be claimed; and (5) a use could not be extended by writ of elegit.

On account of the great inconveniences that attended this state of things, the Statute of Uses (27 Hen. VIII., c. 10.) was passed which enacted that where any person or persons shall be seised of lands, tenements, or other hereditaments, to the use, confidence, or trust of any other person or persons or body politic by any means whatsoever, the estate of the person or persons so seised to uses, shall be deemed to be in him or them, that have (ie., are beneficially entitled to) the use, trust, or confidence, and he or they shall stand and be seised or possessed of the said lands or other hereditaments for such estates as he or they had in the use, confidence, or trust. Note that to bring the statute into operation there should not only be a use but a person seised to the use. By the common law it was held: (1) that no use can be limited on a use; (2) that where the person entrusted has any active duty to perform, he cannot be considered as holding to a use, or at least such a use as the statute execute.

The uses excluded from the operation of the statute because there was no seisin to support them, or, because they were limited on a precedent use, obtained protection from the courts of equity, which recognised them under the name of trusts. Remember, that there may be a trust of personal chattels.

may

Trusts be either (1) passive, (2) active, (3) executory, (4) executed, (5) declared, or (6) implied. Note, that by resulting trusts, are meant trusts raised by implication, for the benefit of the grantor himself.

The incidents to the estate of a trustee at law, are, (1) it devolves to legal representative; (2) is liable to alienation, hereon note the Trustee Act, 1850, (13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, and 15 & 16 Vict. c, 55); (3) is liable to be taken in execution; (4) wife is entitled to dower; and (5) husband to curtesy. Note that a trust estate was not liable to escheat or forfeiture.

The estate of a cestui qui trust subsists only in contemplation of equity. Note that equitable interests may be either in possession or expectancy, the doctrine of merger applies, the same rules of construction apply, particularly the rule in Shelley's case, a trust of inheritance is liable to curtesy, dower, and execution of judgment creditor. A trust was never liable to for. feiture or escheat.

Trusts to attend the inheritance. These are now abolished by 8 & 9 Vict., c. 112, which enacts that satisfied terms attendant on the inheritance (otherwise than by express declaration) on 31st December, 1845, and terms becoming subsequently so, are to absolutely determine.

Chapter X-Of Title in General.

An estate in land may be acquired, (1) by act of law which includes title by descent, and title by escheat; (2) by act of the party or purchase which includes title by occupancy, by forfeiture, and by alienation.

Chapter XI.-Of Title by Descent.

Remember the maxim, Nemo est hæres viventis (no one is heir to the living), and that by an heir apparent is meant one whose right of inheritance is indefeasible provided he outlives the ancestor, an heir presumptive is one who, if the ancestor should die immediately would be his heir, but whose right of inheritance may be defeated by the contingency of some nearer heir being born.

The rules of descent as laid down by the Inheritance Act, (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106) are, (1) descent shall be traced from the purchaser. Hereon note, that, the word "purchaser" means the person who last acquired the land, otherwise than by descent, escheat, partition, or enclosure; that a feudum novum is a feud newly acquired by a man, and not descended upon him from his ancestors; that a feudum antiquum is an ancient feud, i.e., a feud which has descended to a man from his ancestors; and that a feudum novum ut antiquum is a feudum novum, or newly acquired fee granted to a man to hold ut feudum antiquum, ie, with all the qualities of a feud derived from one's ancestors. Remember, that if land is devised to the heir, he will take as a devisee, and not by descent. (2) Inheritances lineally descend to the issue of the purchaser in infinitum. (3) Children of purchaser are preferred to their issue, and males to females, an elder male to a younger male, but females inherit altogether. Note that primogeniture means the right of the first-born to inherit. (4) Issue of the children of the purchaser represent or take the place of their parents, in infinitum, subject among each other to the last rule. Note that succession per stirpes, means succession according to the roots; succession per capita, succession in their own right. (5) On failure of issue of purchaser, the nearest lineal ancestor in preferable line inheritssupposing no issue of a nearer lineal ancestor exists. (6) Anong the lineal ancestors of the purchaser, the paternal line (whether of the purchaser or of any ancester, male or female) is preferred to the maternal. (7) Where ancestor dies before purchaser, leaving issue, the issue of such ancestor in infinitum shall represent him according to same law of succession, as laid down with respect to issue of purchaser, but with this important addition, that those related by the whole blood to the purchaser are preferred to those related by the half blood. Remember that the maxim, Possessio fratris facit sororem esse haeredem (the possession of the brother makes the sister heir), is obsolete. (8) On failure of heirs of the purchaser, the descent shall be traced from the person last entitled to the land as if he had been the purchaser thereof. This was added by 22 & 23 Vict., c. 35, subsecs. 19 and 20. Note that the descent is broken when a person who has acquired an estate by descent conveys it to a new purchaser. Remember that land is chargeable with all debts, under 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 104, whether it be made equitable assets or not, and that simple contract debts are put upon an equal footing with specialty ones, in cases of administration by 32 & 33 Vict., c. 46.

Chapter XII.-Of Title by Escheat.

Escheat is where the owner of an estate in fee

simple dies without having disposed of it, and leaves no heir behind him to take it by descent, so that it results back to the original grantor or lord of the fee. Escheats are divided into ::

(I.) Escheats propter defectum sanguinis (through defect of blood), as if a tenant, without having disposed of the land, (a) dies without heirs, or (b) dies leaving none so related who is not at the same time subject to a personal disability to take as heir. These latter may be (1) monsters; (2) bastards; and (3) formerly aliens, but now by 33 & 34 Vict,, c. 70, aliens can acquire, hold, and dispose of all kinds of property (except a British ship), in the same manner as a British subject.

(II.) Escheat propter delictum tenentis (on account of the crime of the tenant), as where by attainder the blood of the person attainted became no longer inheritable. Note that by 33 and 34 Vict. c. 23, forfeitures or escheats for treason or felony are abolished.

Chapter XIII.-Of Title by Occupancy. Occupancy is the taking possession of those things which theretofore belonged to nobody. This only extends to that estate which may be acquired on the death of a tenant pur autre vie, during the life of the cestui qui vie. If given to the tenant and his heirs, the heir enters and holds as special occupant, but if the heirs are not named then formerly anyone could enter, and would be called a common or general occupant. Estates pur autre vie, were first made deviseable by the Statute of Uses (29 Car. II., c. 3,) sec. 12, and are now by the Wills' Act (7 Will. IV., and 1 Vict. c. 26) deviseable. If not disposed of by will, and the heirs are named, the estate goes to the heirs subject to the tenant's debts, if the heirs are not named the estate goes to the executors or administrators as assets. Note that an estate pur autre vie may be granted to a man and the heirs of his body when it is called a quasi entail or may be granted with a remainder thereon during the life of cestui qui vie. Note that lands may be gained from the sea, either by alluvion, i.e., the washing up of sand and gravel, so as to make terra firma; or by dereliction, i.e., when the sea shrinks back below the usual water mark; if the gain be by small and imperceptible degrees, it goes to the owner of the land ́immediately behind, but if it be sudden and considerable it belongs de jure communi to the crown.

Chapter XIV.-Of Title by Forfeiture. Remember that forfeiture is a punishment annexed to some illegal act or negligence in the owner of lands, whereby he loses all his interest therein, and they go to the party injured. There are three kinds of forfeitures :

I. Alienation in mortmain is an alienation of lands or tenements to any corporation-sole or aggregate, ecclesiastical or temporal. Hereon note the following statutes-9 Geo. II. c. 36. (The Mortmain Act) which enacts that no lands, hereditaments, or money to be laid out in the purchase thereof, shall be settled for charitable uses, unless (a) by deed executed in the presence of two witnesses, (b) be executed 12 calendar months before the death of the donor, and (c) enrolled in Chancery within six calendar months after its execution, and (d) unless it be made to take effect immediately, and be without power of revocation, or other clause or covenant for benefit of donor, or those claiming under him:-24 & 25 Vict. c. 9 (amended

by 25 & 26 Vict., c. 17) now allows of a clause or covenant in the donor's favour-provided it shall consist of a grant, or reservation of a nominal rent, or of mines, minerals, or easements; or shall consist of provisions as to buildings, roads, or the like, for the betterenjoyment as well of the property granted as of adjacent property, or of provisions as to re-entry, on breach of such covenant or other stipulations of the like nature. Note the following exceptions from these acts, (1) in the case of stock in the public funds, the transfer should be made 6 months before the donor's death; (2) in the case of a bonâ fide purchase with a full and valuable consideration, or a substantial and not a nominal rent, such purchase will be good; (3) gifts to the following will be good, (a) the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, or any of their colleges, or (b) in trust for the scholars on the foundations of Eton, Winchester, or Westminster, or (c) in favour of the British Museum.

II. Alienations by particular tenants, when they conveyed a greater estate than the law entitled them to, were forfeitures to the person in remainder or reversion. Note that if a tenant in tail aliened in fee this was a mere discontinuance, which the issue might afterwards avoid by a real action or by entry. Note, also, that this kind of forfeiture differs from forfeiture by breach of condition in deed, in that the reversioner in that case is in as of his former seisin, and the estate of the tenant and all interests derived out of it are defeated; but, in cases of forfeitures by wrongful alienation, all estates previously created, and all charges made on the land, are good in law. The subject of forfeiture by alienation is now unimportant, as by 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 74, and 8 & 9 Vict., c. 106, a feoffment shall no longer have any tortious operation.

III. A disclaimer is where a tenant neglects to render his lord the due services, and upon an action brought to recover them, disclaims to hold of his lord; this disclaimer of tenure in a court of record was a forfeiture of lands to the lord. (To be continued.)

Correspondence, Queries, &c.

[These columns being open for free discussion on all points in any way relating to Law Students, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinions or statements expressed. Correspondents must in all cases give their real name and address, though not for publication unless desired. We reserve to ourselves the right of refusing any letters, and where there are several answers to the like effect to the same query we endeavour to select the plainest and best for insertion. Correspondents are specially asked to aim at brevity, and when we receive more correspondence than we can possibly insert we give preference, in the absence of some special reasons, to letters received earliest. Letters on different subjects must be on separate sheets of paper.]

WHAT ESTATE?

To the Editor of the " Law Students' Journal." SIR,-The executory devise of a fee on a fee is in this case a good one, as the contingency, if it happens at all, must take place within one life or 21 years after the testator's death. (Cadell v. Palmer, 7 Bl. 202). D would take an estate in severalty in fee. I take it, that there was no power of sale vested in the trustees, and therefore, unless the sale took place after the Settled Land Act of last year, C being in the position of a tenant for life, (as he had no issue) had no power to sell, even with the concurrence of the trustees, and therefore the purchaser took a defective title, and D might commence an action for the recovery of the land from such purchaser, and sue the trustee for breach of trust.-Yours, &c., C. RIDGE FORWARD. [Answer to the same effect received from En Avant.ED, L. S. J.]

LEGACY TO HUSBAND OR WIFE, &C.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-In reply to J. H. Dennis, notwithstanding that the ntention with which the Married Women's Property Act was passed, was to render a married woman, to all intents and purposes, a feme sole, and that intention is strengthened by the recent decision of Mr. Justice Chitty, in re March Mander v. Harris, I think that the attestation of a will, by a husband or wife of a legatee would still render the legacy void, seeing that by The Wills' Act it is expressly declared: "That if any person shall attest the execution of any will to whom or to whose wife or husband any legacy, &c. shall, so far as concerns such person attesting the execution of such will, or the wife or husband of such person, or any person claiming under such person or wife or husband, be utterly null and void." This statute is construed very strictly.-Yours, &c., EN AVANT.

[We quite agree with our correspondent.-ED. L. S. J.]

COVENANT NOT TO ASSIGN WITHOUT LICENCE. To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-I shall feel obliged if you, or any of your readers, would enlighten me on the following point:-A, a landowner, leases a piece of property for building purposes to B. The lease contains a covenant by B not to assign without the consent in writing of A. B wishing to mortgage the property obtains from A a license to assign by way of mortgage to C. B having made default in payment of interest, C wishes to exercise his power of sale and assign the property to D. Does C require from A a licence to assign for that purpose ?-Yours, &c., Llanelly, Carmarthenshire.

R. MARGRAVE, Jun.

SETTLED LAND ACT, 1882.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal.” SIR, A died 20 years since, having by his will devised his freehold estates to trustees upon trust for sale with the usual power of sale, as to his copyhold estates, the proceeds to be divided amongst his children equally, to his sons absolutely, to his daughters as separate estate for life, and after their decease, to their children absolutely in equal shares, rents to be received by trustees until sale, and paid to sons and daughters. Some parts of the estates were sold some years since, but the greater part remains unsold, one daughter is dead, leaving children all of age, the other daughter is living and has one son who is 21. It is contended the trustees cannot now sell in consequence of the Settled Land Act, without the consent by deed of the living daughter, and of the children of the deceased daughter. Is this so? I shall be glad to have an opinion from some of your readers.-Yours, &c. F. G. M. 14th July, 1883.

CLERGYMAN'S RIGHTS.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal.” SIR,-Has the clergyman of the parish any right to keep the churchyard in hay? By so doing many of the parishioners are prevented from going to their graves.

ARTICLED CLERK.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR PRACTICE IN THE
COLONIES.

To the Editor of the "Law Students' Journal." SIR,-I am anxious to know, whether a solicitor admitted in England can practise in the Colonies without having to undergo a further service under articles, or a further examination. I refer more particularly to New South Wales, where I have friends.-Yours, &c., OUDEIS.

A. C. F.-We always decline to advise generally in these columns as to course of reading. Procure Indermaur's Self Preparation for the Final, 3rd edition: Stevens & Haynes, London,-[ED. L. S. J.]

DUM SPIRO SPERO.-Yes, obtain Indermaur's Conveyancing and Equity Cases. Deane you will find very good. Read Williams' Personal Property, read Prideaux, read Harrison's Criminal Law, and of course, the Act if it passes.-[ED. L. S. J.]

SPES. He must be articled for residue of 5 years, and will not be required to pass Intermediate again. Of course we are assuming that the intervening period can be satisfactorily accounted for. The fees to pay for the Bar amount to about £150, more or less (see fully Law Students' Journal for 1879, page 47). Yes, you can go up for the Roman Law separately.-[ED. L. S. J.]

I GO up for my Final Examination in November next, and should be very glad if I could meet with one of your readers who has similar intentions, and who would read up with me through the post. Would any such kindly address: T. HUGHES DAVIES, 38, Bellevue Street, Swansea.

I INTEND going up for my Intermediate Examination in January next, and shall be glad to hear of some gentleman going up at the same time with a view to studying together for mutual improvement. Any gentleman so inclined will oblige by replying to "G. E. L.," 69, Guilford Street, Russell Square, W.C.

W. H. C.-Yes, there will be a new edition this year.[ED. L. S. J.]

J. H. P.-You can go up January, 1884.-[ED. L. S. J.] G. S. P.-A final certificate is now available for admission without limit as to time.-[ED. L. S. J.]

ENQUIRER.-There is nothing to prevent you adding another Christian name to that you already possess; for the purpose of evidence possibly it may be advisable to execute a deed poll and enrol it.-[ED. L. S. J.]

CRIPPS.-We do not anticipate a new edition of Indermaur's Conveyancing and Equity Cases just yet.-[ED. L. S. J.]

VENUS. This depends on the date of the June, 1884, Intermediate Examination, which will be published in next month's issue. If it is after 20th June you can go up then.-[ED. L. S. J.]

QUERIST.-The 1882 edition will do.-[ED. L. S. J.]

INTERMEDIATE.-January, 1884. See full particulars in our next month's number.-[ED. L. S. J.]

SUBSCRIBER. We see nothing to prevent you going up, but, of course, your Final will be postponed.-[ED. L. S. J.1

K.E.X.—January, 1884. Yes, Stephen's.—[ED. L. S. J.]

R.-We cannot insert this unless sent and paid for as an advertisement. If you want it inserted as a letter you must give address for insertion as others do.-[ED. L. S. J.]

A. W.-You will see what you want in our next month's issue.-[ED. L. S. J.]

J. C. P.-Your letter too late for insertion.-[ED. L, S. J.]

Examinations.

ANSWERS TO THE VOLUNTARY HONOURS EXAMINATION IN JUNE, 1883.

(The questions appeared in the last number of the "Law Students' Journal.")

(These answers are by EUSTACE SMITH, Barrister-at-Law.)

1. The various Acts for the commutation of the lords' rights in the mines and minerals in copyhold lands are the statutes 4 & 5 Vict., c. 35; 6 & 7 Vict., c. 23; 7 & 8 Vict., c. 55; 14 & 15 Vict., c. 53; 15 & 16 Vict., c. 51; 21 and 22 Vict., c. 94; 23 & 24 Vict., c. 81; 25 & 26 Vict., c. 73; 30 & 31 Vict., c. 143; and 31 & 32 Vict., c. 89. The Copyhold Enfranchisement Acts are the following :-The Copyhold Act of 1841 (4 & 5 Vict., c. 35); 1843 (6 & 7 Vict., c. 23); 1844 (15 & 16 Vict., c. 51); 1852 (16 & 17 Vict., c. 57), repealed in 1858; and the Copyhold Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict., c. 94.) The Copyhold Acts of 1852 and 1858, which are the most important, make enfranchisement compulsory, at the instance of either the lord or copyholder If the enfranchisement be made at the instance of the tenant, the compensation is to be a gross sum of money; if at the instance of the lord, the compensation is to be an annual rent charge, charged on the enfranchised lands. No enfranchisement under the Acts is to affect the lord's rights to mines and minerals in the lands enfranchised, except with the lord's consent in writing. The Acts contain provisions for the extinguishment of heriots. (Williams' Real Property, 9th edition, p. 353; Stephen's Commentaries, 7th edition, Vol. I., p. 645.)

2. An interesse termini is the right which a tenant has in the lands granted to him by a lease, before he has entered under the lease. The owner of an interesse termini may assign, release, or sublet it, but he cannot surrender it, nor will it merge if the reversion in the lands be granted to the tenant. (See Woodfall, 10th edition, p. 147; Smith's Comp., 5th edition, pars. 558 & 1985.)

3. The power of sale can be exercised either by the trustees or the tenant for life. The alienation by the tenant for life of his life interest does not destroy the power of the tenant for life to consent to the alienation. (Alexander v. Mills, 6 Ch., 124, Dart. 77.) Or, the tenant for life can sell under the power of the Settled Land Act, 1882, as his powers are not assigned with his estate (sec. 50, s. 1), but any such sale must be made with the consent of the person to whom his estate has been assigned, whether by purchase or mortgage. (Sec. 50, ss. 3.)

4. An equitable mortgage arises whenever property is charged with the repayment of money, and the legal estate in the property does not pass to the mortgagee. As a general rule the remedy of an equitable mortgage is by foreclosure and not by sale; but if the mortgagor has agreed to execute a legal mortgage the mortgagor is entitled either to a foreclosure or sale. (Backhouse v. Charlton, 8 Ch. D., 444; York Union Banking Co. v. Artley, 11 Ch. D., 205.)

5. The effect of a gift by will, of real and personal estate to A for life, and, if he shall die without issue, to B, is to create an executory limitation in fee in favour of B, which will take effect if A dies, leaving no issue at his death. (See sec. 39 of the Wills Act.) With regard to wills coming into operation after the 31st December, 1882, it appears that the executory limitation of the land (but not of the personal estate) will become void if A has any issue which attain the age of 21 years. (See sec. 10 of the Conveyancing Act, 1882.)

The effect of a gift of real and personal property by will to A for life, and then to the heirs of his body, and if he die without issue, then to B, will be to vest the personal estate absolutely in A (Levinthorpe v. Ashbie, Leading Cases, Conveyancing), and the real estate in him for an estate tail with an executory limitation over in favour of B. 6. He cannot distrain on the partnership property. The

point has been expressly decided in the case of ex parte Parke, 18 Eq., 381.

7. Where a testator charges his debts or any legacy or specific sum, and has not devised the estate to a trustee or trustees for his whole estate therein, the executor for the time being may sell or mortgage. This power extends to the executors of the surviving executor, but not to an administrator cum testamento annexo. (See 22 & 23 Vict., c. 35, sec. 16, and Lewin on Trusts, 6th edition, p. 409.)

8. The limitations to the children of the daughter as she should appoint, and in default of children as she should appoint, are bad, on the ground that they are delegations of the power. The limitation to the daughter for life is good, and as the power of appointment given to the daughter is bad, the only other limitation will be to the children equally, in default of appointment. (See Ingram v. Ingram, 2 Atk., 88, Tudor's Leading Cases, Conveyancing; Notes to Alexander v. Alexander.)

9. An alien, the subject of a friendly state, was always allowed to hold goods, money, and other personal estate, or to hire a house for his habitation (but not to take one on lease). He was required to be registered here under the 6 & 7 Wm. IV., c. 11. He could always bring an action here in respect of personal chattels, and make a will, and dispose of his personal estate. Under the 7 & 8 Vict., c. 66, an alien might take a lease for the residence or occupation of himself, or his servants, or any trade, business, or manufacture carried on by him for a term not exceeding 21 years. By the Naturalization Act, 1870, real and personal property of every description (except a British ship) may be held and disposed of by an alien, as though he were a British subject, and a title to real and personal property claimed through him. (Stephen's Commentaries, 7th edition, Vol. II., p. 408; Williams on Real Property, 9th edition, p. 63.) 10. Such a purchase would be set aside as being a constructive fraud on the client. The solicitor may now, however, by the Attorneys' and Solicitors' Act, 1870, take a security for future costs, and may take a mortgage of his client's interest in the subject-matter of the action to secure them. Such a mortgage will, however, be set aside if the solicitor has taken any unfair advantage of his client, and the client allowed to redeem the security on repaying the actual amount advanced, with fair interest. (Snell, 6th edition, p. 467.)

11. That if a person elect against the instrument, that is, elects not to comply with the intention of the instrument under which the election arises, he will not lose the whole of the gift under the instrument, but only so much as will satisfy the person affected by his election.

No case of election will arise in the instance given in the question. The gift to the son for life is good, but the remainder, to such uses as the son should appoint by will, is not authorised by the original power, and is bad. Consequently, the share given to the son for life, will, after his death, vest in all the children equally. (Snell, 6th edition, p. 210.)

12. Legacies of equal amount given by the same instrument simpliciter are considered substitutional.

Where legacies are given by the same instrument and are of unequal amount they are considered to be cumulative. Where legacies either equal or unequal are given by different instruments they are considered to be cumulative, unless the same motive is expressed in both instruments and the legacies are both for the same amount, in which case the testator is supposed to have forgotten the former legacy.

The rule, as to the admission of parol evidence is, that where the court raises the presumption against double legacies, (e.g., two legacies of the same amount given by the same instrument), parol evidence can be given to show that both legacies were intended to be given. But where the court does not raise the presumption (e.g., where legacies of the same amount are given simpliciter by different instruments), parol evidence is not admissible to show that the testator intended the legatee to take one only. (Snell, 6th edition, p. 239.)

13. Yes, he may delegate matters arising out of the trust in these cases, in which a prudent person would employ some other person if the business were his own, eg. f he use all care and diligence in selecting and employing a stockbroker; he will not be liable to his cestui que trust if the stockbroker misappropriates the trust property. (Speight v. Gaunt, 22 Ch. D., 727; L. S. J., 1883, p. 80 (June number.) But as to the employment of a solicitor see Bostock v. Floyer, 1 Eq.. 26.)

14. Yes. The father does not exceed the power. The mere fact that the children may die under age, and that the father will thereupon become entitled to the fund appointed does not make it a fraud on the power. (See decision of the Court of Appeal in Henty v. Wrey, 21 Ch. D., 332, reversing the decision of Mr. Justice Kay, 19 Ch. D., 492.)

15. A demonstrative legacy is a legacy which is in its nature a general legacy, but a particular fund is pointed out to satisfy it; in other words a legacy payable out of a particular fund in the first place, but out of the testator's general estate if the particular fund fails. It differs from a general legacy because it is so far of the nature of a specific legacy that it does not abate with the general legacies until the fund out of which it is payable is exhausted, and it differs from a specific legacy because it is not liable to ademption.

A and B will be entitled to any dividends on the bond payable after the testator's death; in the proportion of one-fifth to A and the rest to B. If no dividends are payable after the testator's death A and B get nothing, as their legacies are specific, not demonstrative. (Snell, 6th edition, p. 171.)

16. In the recent case of Wallis v. Smith, (21 Ch. D., 243), the Court of Appeal commented on and reviewed all the earlier cases on the subject of penalties, and laid down the rule that where a contract contains a condition for payment of a sum of money as liquidated damages for breach of stipulations of varied importance, none of which is for payment of an ascertained sum of money, the general rule is that the sum named is not to be treated as a penalty, but as liquidated damages.

17. Legal debts and choses in action, can by sec. 25 of the Judicature Act, 1873, be assigned so as to give the assignee the right to sue for them in his own name. The assignment must (1) be absolute, (2) in writing, and (3) notice must be given to the debtor or holder of the fund. If the debtor or holder of the fund has notice that the assignment is disputed he may interplead.

A is not entitled to priority, for notice properly given at the time does not make an absolute title, but is liable to be defeated by an alteration of circumstances, e.g., the death of the then trustees. To make himself sure, A should place a distringas upon the stock. (See Phipps v. Lovegrove, 16; Eq. 80, when the facts were the same as those asked in the question. Lewin on Trusts, 6th edition, p. 583.)

18. The retiring partner may commence a similar business in the neighbourhood in competition with the old one. He may not solicit the customers of the old firm, but may deal with them if they come to him. (Leggett v. Barrett, 15 Ch. D., 306.) This rule does not, however, extend to a case where a bankrupt's business has been sold by his trustee, and the bankrupt can set up a business in the neighbourhood and solicit his old customers. (Walker v. Mottram, 19 Ch. D., 355.)

19. Inquiries should be taken at the hearing, "with a view to a sale or partition being taken on further consideration," and an order should be obtained under 39 & 40 Vict. c. 17, ses. 3, dispensing with personal service of the judgment on the persons interested, who are out of the jurisdiction, and on whom personal service cannot be made, or where the expense of such service would be disproportionate to the value of the property. The judgment should be served personally on all persons interested who are parties to the action, and on whom personal service has not been dispensed with. At the hearing on further considera

tion, the plaintiff must be prepared with evidence, showing his right to a sale (as to which, see secs. 3, 4 and 5 of the Partition Act, 1868).

20. This question seems to be undecided. It appears, however, that he cannot be made liable as a contributory of the company, as there is nothing to prevent his buying shares in the market, and not from the company; nor is there any agreement by the company to allot him any shares. (See re Magnetic Company, Limited, 46 L. J. N. S. 1653. See contra in re Australian Direct Steam Navigation, 3 Ch. D. 166.)

21. This was held to be such a material alteration as vitiated the notes, and justified the bank in refusing pay. ment in Suffield v. The Bank of England, 9 Q. B. D., 555. (See, however. sec. 64, sub-sec. 1. of The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882. as to alterations in "Bills." It appears. how. ever. that this section would not apply to bank notes. (See sec. 3, sub-sec. 1.)

22. It will depend on the questions whether A's wall has been built 20 years. If it has been built for 20 years, and if during that period the owner of the adjacent soil (B), knew, or might have known, that the building was thereby supported, &c., then A will have acquired a right by prescription to the easement of having his wall supported by B's land. (See Angus v. Dalton, 6 Appeal Cases, 740.)

If, however, A's wall was erected within 20 years of the damage arising, then he has gained no prescriptive right to have his buildings supported by his neighbour's land and he cannot recover for the damage done to the wall. (Smith v. Thackerah, 1 C. P. 564.)

23. No action can be maintained for the £500 claiming as due under the document set out in the question. (See Lowe v. Peers, 4 Bar., 2,225.) The reasons for the decision were that the document contained no promise to marry the plaintiff, and that the promise (if any) was not mutual. 24. He cannot in respect of the sale of grass, as that is the sale of an interest in land within the meaning of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, grass being a natural product of the soil, and the agreement for the sale of it to be valid, must be in writing. The agreement for the sale of growing potatoes will be a valid one, notwithstanding that it is not in writing, as potatoes are emblements or fructus industriales, and a sale of them, whether growing or not, is not a sale of an interest in land. If, however, the price of the potatoes is £10 or upwards, then the provisions of the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds must be complied with, or the contract will be bad. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, p. 52.)

25. Yes; if A sells the gun as one fit to be used, he has been guilty of a misrepresentation, and C may sue him for the tort in making such misrepresentation. (See Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W., 519; Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, p. 276.)

26. Yes; the point was expressly so decided in the leading case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. and B., 224, on the ground that the damages of the plaintiff were the consequence and natural result of the wrongful act of the defendant. (Indermaur's Principles of Common Law, 3rd edition, p. 365.)

27. No. The railway company has power to arrest a person travelling on the rail without paying his fare (8 Vict., c. 20, secs. 103, 104), but has only power to detain goods for non-payment of carriage, and as the railway company had no power to detain the plaintiff, their servant the station master had no implied power to detain him. Consequently the station master's act was an unauthorised one, for which he only was liable. (Poulton v. The London and South Western Railway Company, 2 Q. B., 535, when the facts were the same as in the question.)

28. Yes, the disclaimer by the trustee of the assignee does not affect the rights and liabilities of the original lessee, and the original lessee will still be liable on his covenant to pay the rent. (East and West India Dock Co., v. Hill, 22 Ch. D., 14.)