northern entrance to the Sea of Japan had been lost still rankled in the national consciousness. Nevertheless Russia did not despair of conciliating Japan and having her own way in the end. After the failure of her first attempt to secure a sort of protectorate of Manchuria, in consideration of a sham evacuation, by means of the Tseng-Korostovitch protocol and the Draft Treaty of February 1901, she set to work in earnest to arrive at a settlement. The Russian press exhausted itself in amiabilities for the Mikado and his people,* and at the same time diplomatic pourparlers were set on foot at Tokyo. It has been publicly stated† that on that occasion Russia proposed a Treaty of Alliance against Great Britain; but this is quite inaccurate. As a matter of fact, the negotiations never got beyond the preliminary stages of an exchange of views in regard to a basis of settlement. So informal were they, that the Russian minister himself was not concerned in them; and they were exclusively conducted on the Russian side by M. Poklevsky, now First Secretary of the Russian Embassy in London. The suggestion made was that, while Russia adhered to all her pledges, Japan should agree not to oppose Russian action in Manchuria or her acquisition of Masampho, in consideration of a modification of the Nishi-Rosen Convention of 1898, which would leave the government of the Mikado absolutely unfettered in its relations to Korea. This being the proposal, it may readily be imagined that a detailed discussion was never entered upon. How it struck the Japanese may be gathered from the Marquis Ito's own description of it. A free hand in Korea, with Masampho in the power of Russia,' he said to one of his colleagues, would be like a free hand in a bag of gold, with the mouth of the bag drawn tightly round one's wrist.' The rejection of the proposal did not disconcert Russia. In the friendliest way she expressed her willingness to re-open the negotiations at any moment convenient to Japan; and, when subsequently the Marquis Ito visited Europe, it was his intention, if other projects failed, to sound the St Peters *See, for example, the extracts quoted in the 'St Petersburger Zeitung,' March 7-20, and 11-24, 1901. † National Review,' March 1904, p. 33. burg Foreign Office with a view to discovering whether they had a more acceptable scheme to propose. Meanwhile this very proposal convinced Japan that if she was to enjoy a free hand in the Far East an alliance with one of the great Powers was essential to her. Naturally her thoughts first turned to Great Britain. Since the days of Port Hamilton the identity of the interests of the two Powers had become more and more marked. Great Britain had been her only friend-certainly not a very helpful one-in 1895; she had been the first to place Japan on an equal footing with other civilised states; she had assisted her to save Masampho in 1900; the two Powers had acted together during the Boxer crisis; and it was owing to the united stand they had made in February 1901 that the first efforts of Russia to secure a permanent hold on Manchuria had been defeated. Moreover, by a curious circumstance, there was already the germ of an alliance in official existence in no less a document than the Anglo-German agreement of October 1900. Article III of that agreement provided that, 'In case of another Power making use of the complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever advantages calculated to impair the undiminished territorial condition of the Chinese Empire, the two contracting Powers reserve to themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China.' It happened that Lord Salisbury had laid it down at the time that third Powers accepting the principles of the agreement became not merely adherents but contracting parties. All the Powers had adhered to the principles; but only one - Japan - had specifically accepted the position of a signatory. Thus, as a compact providing for action, the agreement only concerned Great Britain, Germany, and Japan; and when Germany refused to recognise its application to Manchuria it became, so far as that incidence of it was concerned, an exclusively Anglo-Japanese agreement. Here then was a readymade clue to an alliance; and, in pursuance of it, Viscount Hayashi was instructed in April 1901 to open negotiations with Lord Lansdowne. The overtures were received in a very friendly spirit by the British Cabinet, but for four months no practical progress was made towards a definite treaty. When, after the signature of the final protocol between the Powers and China, it was found that Russia was still indisposed to observe her pledges in regard to Manchuria, and that she was even tightening her hold on the treatyport of Niu-chwang, the negotiations were taken in hand in earnest. They were so far advanced in November 1901 that, when the Marquis Ito reached Paris from New York on his way to St Petersburg and Berlin, a special emissary was despatched to warn him not to entertain any proposals that might be made to him by the Russian Government, nor to carry out his design of sounding Germany on the subject of an alliance. The warning was superfluous; for, although M. de Witte strongly urged the Marquis to come to an agreement, he had nothing better to offer than the basis of settlement outlined by M. Poklevsky earlier in the year. The fact that an exchange of views-the exact nature of which was then unknown-had taken place in St Petersburg gave a strong impetus to the negotiations in London, for it was obviously not desirable in the interest of Great Britain that a RussoJapanese alliance should be concluded. The news in the middle of December that Russia had proposed to China a modified revival of the Manchurian agreement of February 1901, and that it had been rejected by Prince Ching, finally decided the two Powers; and in January 1902 the treaty of alliance was signed. Japan was now free. Henceforth she had no fear of coalitions against her in the Far East, and she could defend her interests against Russia or any other Power on equal terms. The anticipation that the alliance would make for the permanent peace of Eastern Asia seemed at first destined to be fulfilled. In the belief that Japanese isolation was assured, and that the visit of the Marquis Ito to St Petersburg implied that Japan was even disposed to nibble at the Poklevsky scheme of settlement, the party of annexation in Russia had once more secured the ascendency. Throughout November and December 1901, *So far as Germany is concerned the intentions attributed to the Marquis Ito rest on the authority of Mr. Alfred Stead. ('Review of Reviews,' January 1902, p. 27.) and even down to the conclusion of the alliance, the foreign settlements in Eastern Asia had been full of rumours of fresh exorbitant demands presented to China by the Russian Government.* As soon as the Alliance was announced these rumours died away. It speedily became evident that the Russian Annexationists had suffered a serious check. The feebleness of the FrancoRussian counterblast, which showed that in the Far East the nation amie et alliée could not be prevailed upon to depart from its cautious attitude, gave the measure of the predicament into which Admiral Alexeieff and his clique had dragged the St Petersburg Cabinet. It was suddenly discovered that 'latterly the pacification of China had progressed with notable success,' and hence that 'the problem was solved.' Instructions were accordingly given to negotiate an honest evacuation treaty with China; and this was forthwith done. On April 8, 1902, the treaty was signed; and, together with the publication of the text in the Official Messenger' of St Petersburg, came a fresh assurance of the unalterable fidelity of the Imperial Government to 'the principle of the integrity and independence of China.' In the following October the evacuation began. In November a further withdrawal took place. In April, 1903, Mukden was evacuated. Then there came a mysterious pause. This was followed by sinister rumours of the revival of the Tseng-Korostovitch agreement; † and at the same time it was announced by the British Minister at Peking that Russia was demanding further concessions before proceeding with the evacuation. Protests from the Powers followed. There were angry scenes in Peking and a brisk interchange of polite innuendoes at St Petersburg; and then it became clear that the old dead-lock had reappeared, with a firm intention on the part of Russia to stay. It is not difficult to understand what had happened. when Count Lamsdorff was first interrogated about the new conditions, he indignantly expressed his ignorance of them. We have no reason for doubting the sincerity of the protest, especially as two days later the Russian *Hong-Kong Daily Press,' January 7 and 23, 1903. Japan Daily Herald' (Mail Summary), November 15, 1901; January 7 and 9, 1902. t Hong-Kong Daily Press,' May 18, 1903. chargé d'affaires at Peking told Prince Ching 'that the delay in the evacuation was due to the military party in Russia; and General Kouropatkin, in a conversation with the Chinese Minister at St Petersburg, stated that the whole difficulty had originated with Admiral Alexeieff. A year's reflection had in short revived the drooping spirits of the Annexationists. The Anglo-Japanese alliance had lost its terrors for them. Great Britain, they were convinced, would not fight, and Japan could not. Consequently it was childish to carry out the evacuation. Setting aside stories about private commercial concessions, as to which our recollection of South African slanders should make us careful, the fact remains that after two years and a half of solemn promises to evacuate Manchuria, Russia was as firmly fixed in that Chinese province as she was on the northern bank of the Amur. The The The indignation in Japan was, of course, intense, but this did not disturb the equanimity of the Alexeieff party. They knew the 'unpricked bubble' of Japanese resentment-as well as Mr Rhodes had known the Boers. Anglo-Japanese alliance had been openly defied. question was not what its members would say, but what they would do. The answer came towards the end of last July. To the utter confusion of the apologists for evacuation, it took the form, not of an ultimatum from the allies, but of a polite enquiry by the Japanese Government alone whether Count Lamsdorff would be disposed to resume negotiations on the Manchurian and Korean questions. One can imagine the elation of the Alexeieff-Bezobrazoff combination. The game of Russia's enemies was evidently up. It was clear on the face of it that, in spite of the alliance with Great Britain, Japan's only course was to make the best terms for herselfprobably on the basis of the Poklevsky scheme. Since the beginning of the war there has been much exultant talk among the Russophobes about the military and naval ‘collapse' of Russia. On that point, perhaps, the last word has not yet been spoken; but of the diplomatic collapse of Russia, or rather of the collapse of the legend of Russian diplomacy, there can be no question. It is difficult to conceive a more hideous miscalculation than that which the St Petersburg Foreign Office based on the Japanese overtures of last July. The idea that |