should, it seemed to me, be sent to and used at Chicago. At the same time, it was necessary as far as practicable to avoid anything like an armed collision between the strikers and the United States forces, not only on general and obvious grounds, but because, by reason of the great disparity of numbers, it was entirely possible that the result might be to diminish rather than increase the wholesome respect of the populace in general for the regular soldiery. In accordance with these views, the strike was tackled at Chicago first; whatever regulars were readily available were sent there; by direct orders from Washington the force was kept together so as to be formidable wherever and whenever and in whatever direction it was called upon to act; while the actual use of the military against the rioters, being postponed until circumstances should compel it, proved in the end not be to required. The prestige of the United States, its readiness to act and its determination to act with its troops in support of the United States Courts should that course become necessary, brought the strike to an end in Chicago and its vicinity without a single individual having been wounded or killed by the forces of the United States.

The troops remained in Chicago until the [20th] of July, and with General Miles at their head were daily paraded through the streets of the city. During one of these parades an artillery caisson exploded, killing and wounding men, and inflicting the only loss sustained by the United States forces during the Chicago émeute. For some days prior to the [20th] July, the Administration at Washington were satisfied that the object of the presence of the troops in Chicago had been accomplished and that they should be withdrawn from the city. Several inquiries on that subject from [to?] General Miles eliciting nothing definite- he seemed to rather favor postponing the departure of the troops -explicit instructions from Washington directed their removal and they were removed accordingly.

The strike being ended in Chicago, the United States were in a position to send troops elsewhere for the same purpose if needed. But, as was anticipated, the termination of the

strike in Chicago terminated it everywhere else, and, with one exception, the use of troops in connection with the strike was no longer required. The exception came in the cases of the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific Railroads. Both those roads were Government roads were by their charters bound to carry for the Government men, supplies, munitions, and materials of all sorts — and were then required for such use and were then in actual use for those purposes except so far as such use was prevented by the strikers. It was impossible to open those roads to their customary functions by sending troops to particular points. The army was not large enough to cover all the points of disturbance, while at the same time the interruption of transportation, if prevented at one point, would be renewed at another, or, if prevented at one point to-day, would be renewed at the same point tomorrow the moment the United States troops had departed. In these circumstances, it was deemed best to send a force of United States Marshals and troops on the trains from one end of the route to the other. The expedient proved successful, and the Pacific roads, having once been cleared for travel, the attempts to close them were not renewed. Serious resistance of the troops at some California points -Sacramento in particular was anticipated and prepared for. But, by the time those points were reached, the hopelessness of the Debs movement was recognized and practically no organized opposition was made to the opening of the roads for traffic by the United States authorities.

APPENDIX II

THE CLEVELAND ADMINISTRATION AND THE

SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST LAW

[DURING the political campaigns of 1904 and 1908 Republican speakers accused the Democratic Party loudly of having failed to enforce the Sherman Anti-Trust Law while it was in power. These accusations seemed quite unwarranted and unjust to Olney and provoked him to write the following memorandum and letter. See also his "Reports of the AttorneyGeneral" and the last page and a half of Cleveland's annual message of December 7, 1896.] 1

Memorandum sent John H. Holmes, Editor " Boston Herald" - to be used as reply to New York "World" article — and published as editorial March 18, 1904

The New York "World's" recent statement that the second Cleveland Administration did nothing to enforce the Sherman Anti-Trust statute is a complete misrepresentation. The real facts, including the legal situation as Mr. Cleveland's Attorney-General found it, are as follows:

1. The Sherman Anti-Trust statute was passed in 1890. 2. In May, 1892, an indictment in the Massachusetts District against officers of the so-called "Whiskey Trust" was quashed by Judge Nelson. (50 Fed. Rep. 469.)

3. In August, 1892, an officer of the same Trust, being arrested in Ohio for removal to Massachusetts for a trial upon an indictment found under the Act of 1890, was discharged on habeas corpus by Mr. Justice Jackson, afterwards Judge of the United States Supreme Court upon practically the same grounds afterwards adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the case of the United States v. Knight et al., to be hereafter referred to.

1 Richardson, IX, 744–45.

4. In October, 1892, an indictment against a combination of lumber dealers was quashed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on substantially the same grounds as those set forth in the cases above referred to. (United States v. Nelson, 52 Fed. Rep. 646.)

5. In November, 1892, it was held in the United States Circuit Court for the Kansas District that the Act of 1890 had no application to common carriers -— an adjudication afterwards affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. (United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 53 Fed. Rep. 440; 58 Fed. Rep. 58.)

6. In March, 1893, a bill in equity was pending, which had been brought under the direction of Attorney-General Miller against the combination known as "the American Sugar Trust." This case was pushed to argument and decision with all possible dispatch, with the result that towards the end of January, 1895, the Supreme Court dismissed the bill on the ground that manufacture was not commerce and that, although the products of manufacture were intended to be sold and might be sold beyond the State of manufacture, no interstate commerce would be involved until the goods were actually en route to their destination beyond such State. (United States v. Knight et al., 156 U.S. 1.)

7. Judge Harmon became Attorney-General in June, 1895. 8. In December, 1896, an appeal having been taken from the Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court in the case above referred to of United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, Judge Harmon caused the case to be argued, with the result that on March 22, 1897, the Supreme Court (four judges dissenting) reversed the decision of the courts below and held the Act of 1890 to be applicable to railroads engaged in interstate commerce. (166 U.S. 290.)

It was a notable triumph for Judge Harmon inasmuch as before the argument the defendant Association had been dissolved, so that, besides the construction and the legal merits of the Act of 1890, an important question of jurisdiction was involved.

9. In 1896 or 1897, by the direction of Judge Harmon, pro

ceedings were begun by the United States against the Addyston Pipe & Steel Company. (78 Fed. Rep. 712.)

It will be seen from the foregoing

First, that during the seven years succeeding the enactment of the statute authoritative adjudications of the courts had been against its application to the cases brought before them;

Second, that industrial combinations for the purpose of manufacture, no matter how large or monopolistic, were decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1895 not to be within the purview of the statute a decision which has never been overruled and is still the law of the land;

Third, that the first important adjudication in favor of the Act in its practical operation upon interstate commerce was procured by Judge Harmon in the case of the United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, whereby the Act of 1890 was declared to be applicable to railroad companies engaged in interstate commerce;

Fourth, that the decision in the Northern Securities case simply applies the doctrine settled in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case; and

Fifth, that the notable Addyston Pipe & Steel Company case, which has been thought to qualify in important respects the previous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Knight et al., was initiated by Judge Harmon.

Copy of the above memorandum was sent to various people in 1904, and in 1908 a copy was sent to the Editor of the New York "World" accompanied by the following letter: 30 September, 1908

C. M. VAN HAMM, Esq.,

Editor New York "World," New York, N.Y. MY DEAR SIR:

The telegram of the "World" of the 28th inst. offering its columns for any statement in refutation of President Roosevelt's charges against the Department of Justice during Mr.