Congress reflected the popular state of mind. Its members moved resolutions and made speeches, not only in the House, but on the floor of the Senate; and considering that our foreign relations are supposed to be dealt with in a responsible way in the latter body, the carelessness and intemperance of some of its members were so extreme as to touch the low mark in the record of the Senate's failures to maintain its dignity and America's reputation for good manners toward other countries. Needless to say such debates exasperated Spain, excited the insurrectos, and made it harder than ever for the Executive to perform its duties.

The State Department watched the progress of the revolt in the Island very closely, especially with a view to discerning signs of the existence of an efficient revolutionary government. But even as late as the end of 1896, nothing was discernible which could warrant according a belligerent status to the insurrectos, and certainly nothing to justify recognizing the independence of the Island.

From every accessible indication [said Olney in his Report for 1896] it is clear that the present rebellion is on a far more formidable scale as to numbers, intelligence, and representative features than any of the preceding revolts of this century. Yet, so far as our information shows, there is not only no effective local government by the insurgents in the territories they overrun, but there is not even a tangible pretense to established administration anywhere. Their organization, confined to the shifting exigencies of the military operations of the hour, is nomadic, without definite centers, and lacking the most elementary features of municipal government. There nowhere appears the nucleus of statehood. The machinery for exercising the

legitimate rights and powers of sovereignty and responding to the obligations which de facto sovereignty entails in the face of equal rights of other states is conspicuously lacking. It is not possible to discern a homogeneous political entity, possessing and exercising the functions of administration and capable, if left to itself, of maintaining orderly government in its own territory and sustaining normal relations with the external family of Govern

ments.

Under these circumstances the course of the Executive was determined for it. In the first place, the State Department - with the coöperation of the Department of Justice and the Army and Navy-had to check filibustering and prevent the United States from being used as a military base by her rebellious subjects. The widespread sympathy with Cuba naturally added to the difficulty of detecting and intercepting gun-runners. Spain on her side did little to patrol the Cuban coast, although the physical task of guarding it was slight compared with that of watching the Florida Keys and the very much longer coast-line of the United States. In contending with its difficuties the Administration made a record of law enforcement which was highly creditable. It appears that "of the 71 expeditions of which there is report, but 5 were stopped on the coast of Cuba by the Spanish. The United States authorities stopped 33, the English 2; 4 were prevented by storms; 27 were successful. Nearly all the vessels were but small tugs of less than 100 tons." 1 Had the Spanish patrols exercised anything like the vigilance with 1 Chadwick, 418.

which the United States watched for filibusterers, practically nothing would have got through.1

Then, too, there was all the while pouring into the State Department a stream of protests and complaints about outrages or injuries done in Cuba to the persons and property of bona fide American citizens and of other persons whom the Spaniards regarded as Cubans, but who claimed that they had been naturalized in the United States. The insurgents were attempting to paralyze the economic life of the Island and so harass and cripple the Peninsula party, and incidentally they were working on the theory that until their belligerency should be recognized it was to their interest to destroy plantations and other property belonging to foreigners, and let the foreigners hold Spain responsible under international law. The Spanish on their side were unable to police the Island successfully and were cruel and violent in carrying out retaliatory and punitive measures against persons whom they regarded as insurgents, and some of their officials pretended that martial law warranted them in ignoring treaty obligations and disregarding questions of citizenship. The result was a succession of petty emergencies in which the State Department had to intervene through its consular agents or protest to Madrid, and a still larger number of cases in which it had to claim compensation. Any one who had American papers had to be protected against illegal or cruel treatment, without delaying to decide at the moment whether his alleged citizenship was

1 See quotation in Chadwick, 429, which shows De Olivart's recognition of the perfect correctness with which the United States used its endeavors.

unimpeachable; and in respect of damage to property that might belong to Americans, it was necessary to make a record such that indemnification could be insisted upon. In dealing with these cases the Department sought to keep Spain up to her maximum exertions by pressing it strongly upon her representatives that she would have to pay for injuries inflicted upon Americans by either side, and in doing so it had to avoid the discussions that might have served Spain's dilatory purposes "by judiciously withholding the special ground of liability in each case." It must be borne in mind, therefore, when one reads over the State Department's missives of remonstrance, that they were not "necessarily founded upon any well-formed conclusions as to [Spain's] obligations. They were often more or less in terrorem and often," Olney believed, produced the immediate result that was his prime object.1

But in addition to holding down filibustering and keeping the record clear, a Secretary of State might also use his diplomacy constructively. This, Olney did attempt to do. In March, 1896, as soon as it was apparent that he had got past the dangerous corner in the Venezuelan controversy, he took up the future of Cuba. He framed an elaborate note and presented it to the Spanish Minister in Washington, Señor Dupuy de Lome, on April 4th. This was kept secret at the time, and was not given to the public until Senator Foraker quoted it in the Senate after President McKinley's inauguration.'

1 Letter regarding the extent to which these protests might be looked upon as legal opinions. (Olney to Geo. H. Olney, Esq., May 23, 1901. Olney Coll.)

* The letter will be found in Appendix V, and in Foreign Relations (1897),