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"if he fhould communicate to our Souls the "Ideas we have of the Bodies, tho' there were really no Bodies at all. But this Argument "is weak, because it proves too much. Since "the Beginning of the World all Men, except "perhaps one among a hundred millions, firm

ly believe that the Bodies are colour'd; and "this is an Error. Now I afk, did God im"pose upon all Mankind with regard to Colours? "If he did it in this refpect, why could he ii not do it alfo with regard to Extention,

Motion, &? This laft Impofition will not "be lefs innocent, nor lefs confiftent with the "Perfections of the Supreme Being, than the "former. And if he does not impose upon them "with regard to Colours, it is because he does "not force them irrefiftably to believe that Colours really exift without them, but only

that it thus appears to them. The fame "will be maintain'd with regard to Exten"fion. God does not irrefiftably induce us to <6 fay, that it exists, but only that it thus appears to us. 'Tis more difficult for a Car

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tefian to fufpend his Judgment, with regard "to the Being of Extenfion, than it is for a "Countryman to withhold from affirming that. "the Sun fhines, or that Snow is white. There"fore if we are mistaken when we believe that "Bodies exift, God will not be the Author of "that Mistake, fince he is not the Author of "the Countryman's Miftake with regard to

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Light or Colours. Thefe are the Advan"tages, which accrue to the Scepticks from the "modern Philofophy." Thus far Mr. Bayle, whofe Words our Author quotes: he then endeavours to answer these Arguments; but he does it in fo prolix and confused a manner,

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that it is very difficult to give the Subftance of his Answer.

He fays that if we attentively confider the Objects of our Senfes, and the Impreffions they make upon us, we fhall find indeed, that we often afcribe to the Bodies Properties which are only Modifications of our Souls, occafioned by the Bodies; but that we will alfo be forced to conclude that there must be fome things without us, which are the Occafion of our Senfation, and which we call Bodies. He afterwards gives us another Proof of the Being of Bodies. “The "Senfations, fays he, which feem to be the "Effect of the Impreffions, which the exter"nal Objects make upon us, are not at our "command; we feel painful Senfations whe"ther we will or not, and we cannot have

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agreeable ones when we pleafe. If then "there be no Bodies, there must be a Caufe "different from ourselves, which creates those "Senfations in us, at its own Will and Plea"fure, not at ours. This Caufe must be in

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telligent, fince it knows our Thoughts and disposes of them. The Power and Know"ledge of this Cause must be admirable and in"finite; it must have the Ideas of all the Im"preffions, that have ever been made upon us, and of all the Senfations they have occafion'd,

that the fubfequent Senfations may answer "the preceding as exactly, as if the external "Objects were really extant. It is plain, that * fuch a Cause could not act coherently, if it "did not propofe fome End, or if it did not "intend to reprefent to us a regular Series of "Senfations well link'd together. Such a Caufe has therefore the Ideas of those things, No. XXII. 1733. D d VOL. IV.

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"which it reprefents to us as really exifting; it "must then conceive thofe Things are poffible; "otherwise it could not create in us the Ap"pearance and Images of them; it could not imitate them. If then a World, as it ap66 pears to us, is poffible, why should not the "powerful Caufe, of which we are speaking,

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really create it, rather than be constantly im"ployed in barely reprefenting it to us? Should

fuch a Caufe delight more in the Appea"rances than in the Reality of Things? Should "it take more pleasure in deceiving us than "in not impofing upon us? But if it intends to "deceive Men, without their being aware of

it, why does it permit that fome Men be "cunning enough to find out the Cheat? Or "if it intends that Men fhould know there's "no Reality in the Phenomena of this World,

how comes it to pafs that the greatest Part "of Mankind cannot be perfuaded of it." The more we reflect upon fuch a System, adds our Author, the more it appears incredible and monftrous; and fhall a Sceptick never fo little attentive and fincere dare to affirm, that this Syftem is as probable, as that which fuppofes that the Phænomena of this Universe are real?

Mr. de Croufaz afterwards fhews that the fupreme Cause must be an intelligent Being, who loves Order, Wifdom, and Juftice, and cannot therefore be fuppofed to deceive Mankind: How far this Obfervation, and the Paffage we have tranflated from our Author, be a folid Anfwer to Mr. Bayle's Argument, we leave the Reader to judge.

OUR Author examines afterwards another Argument, which Mr. Bayle proposed against the Poffibility of Extenfion; which is as follows:

If there was an Extenfion or Space, it should confift of Mathematical Points, or of Phyfical Points (Atoms) or of Parts infinitely divifible; but it can confift of neither of thefe, therefore Extenfion or Space is impoffible. That Extenfion cannot confift of Mathematical Points, not of Atoms, (undivifible Parts) is granted: but how does Mr. Bayle make it appear, that Extenfion cannot confift of Parts infinitely divifible? Why, he fays, that Philofophers will never answer the following Objection, which he pretends is felf-evident, and as clear as the Sun at Noon-day; viz. An infinite Number of Parts, each of which is extended and diftinct from all others, not only with regard to its Entity or Being, but alfo with regard to the place it fills up, can never be contain❜d in a Space an hundred thousand Millions of Timés lefs than the hundred thousandth Part of a Grain of Mustard Seed. And here we will obferve, that this Argument can puzzle fuch Perfons only, as have no Skill in Mathematicks; for as Mr. de Croufaz very juftly answers, the Place which every Particle of Matter fills up is proportioned to the Smallnefs of that Particle. We'll obferve further, that Mr. Bayle fuppofes in this Argument,and in another which Mr. de Croufaz alfo gives us, that an infinlte Number of Patticles infinitely fmall, must be equal to another infinite Number of Particles; whence it would follow, that the whole Univerfe is equal to a Grain of Corn, fince both contain an infinite Number of Particles. But no Mathematician will grant his Pofition, fince they muft main-. tain that there are feveral Degrees or Claffes of Infinites, as there are of Things finite. Mr. Bayle's reafoning is like that of a Man, who Dd 2 would

would fay that fince the Earth has two Halfs, and a Grain of Mustard-Seed has alfo two Halfs, the Earth and a Grain of Muftard-Seed must be equal: but every body understands that each Half of both thefe Bodies are proportionable to their refpective whole Bodies.

MR. De Croufaz gives us afterwards fome Mathematical Demonftrations, by which it appears that Space, or any other Quantity, is infinitely divifible. But thefe Demonstrations appear very needlefs; fince Mathematicians don't want them, and they that have no Skill in Mathematicks, will not be able to understand them. Then follow fome Obfervations of Mr. De Croufaz upon this Mathematical Paradox; That the Angle form'd by the Arch of the Circle and its Tangent, is lefs than any Angle formed by two ftrait Lines; and that nevertheless that fame mixt Angle can increase, without ever becoming equal to an Angle form'd by two ftrait Lines, and alfo decrease without Bounds. Mr. De Croufaz's Obfervations on this Paradox deferve to be confidered; but we cannot infert them here, without making this Abftract too long, and too tedious for thofe of our Readers who don't understand Mathematicks.

FOR the fame reason, we pass what Mr. De Croufaz fays to prove the Poffibility of Motion against Mr. Bayle. As this celebrated Author lov'd to confirm his own Affertions by the Authority of learned and famous Men, he quoted Father Malebranche as being of the fame Opinion with him, with regard to the Being of Bodies. Father Malebranche, fays he, is of the fame Opinion, and thinks that it is by Faith only we can acquire a certain Knowledge. But Mr. Arnauld, a Doctor of the Sorbonne, maintain'd that what

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