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ci pore upon altitror. Nowes are colou
« if he should communicate to our Souls the « Ideas we have of the Bodies, cho' there were "s really no Bodies at all. But this Argument
is weak, because it proves too much. Since 66 the Beginning of the World all Men, except « perhaps one among a hundred millions, firm. 66 ly believe that the Bodies are colour'd ; and " this is an Error. Now I ask, did God in“ pose upon all Mankind with regard to Colours? “ If he did it in this respect, why could he « not do it also with regard to Extencion, “ Motion, óc? This last Imposition will not so be less innocent, nor less consistent with the • Perfections of the Supreme Being, than the “ former. And if he does not impose upon them 66 with regard to Colours, it is because he does « not force them irresistably to believe that « Colours really exist without them, but only “s that it thus appears to them. The fame ut will be maintain'd with regard to Exten
sion. God does not irresistably induce us to - say, that it exists, but only that it thus apos pears to us. 'Tis more difficult for a Car. “ tefian to suspend his Judgment, with regard " to the Being of Extension, than it is for a 66 Countryman to withhold from affirming that. " the Sun shines, or that Snow is white. There6 fore if we are mistaken when we believe that " Bodies exist, God will not be the Author of rs that Mistake, since he is not the Author of " the Countryman's Mistake with regard to “ Light or Colours. These are the Advan• tages, which accrue to the Scepticks from the “ modern Philosophy.” Thus far Mr. Bayle, whose Words our Author quotes : he then endeavours to answer these Arguments ; but he does it in so prolix and confused a manner,
that it is very difficult to give the Substance of his Answer.'
He says that if we attentively consider the Objects of our Senft's, and the linpressions they make upon us, we shall find indeed, that we often ascribe to the Bodies Properties which are only Modifications of our Souls, occasioned by the Bodies ; but that we will also be forced to conclude that there must be some things without us, which are the Occasion of our Sensation, and which we call Bodies. He afterwards gives us another Proof of the Being of Bodies. “ The “ Sensations, says he, which seem to be the • Effect of the Impressions, which the exter, “ nal Objects make upon us, are not at our " command ; we feel painful Sensations wheos ther we will or not, and we cannot have "sagreeable ones when we please. If then 66 there be no Bodies, there must be a Cause 66 different from ourselves, which creates those so Senfations in us, at its own Will and Plea“ sure, not at ours. This Cause must be in“ telligent, since it knows our Thought; and " disposes of them. The Power and Know-' . « ledge of this Cause must be admirable and in6 finite; it must have the Ideas of all the In" pressions, that have ever been made upon us, 6 and of all the Sensations they have occasion'd, so that the subsequent Sensations may answer " the preceding as exactly, as if the external “ Objects were really extant. It is plain, that *« such a Cause could not act coherently, if it “ did not propose some End, or if it did not • intend to represent to us a regular Series of
Senfations well link'd together. Such a Cause 56 has therefore the Ideas of those things, No. XXII. 1733. Dd ......which
it, why nough to fin mould
66 which it represents to us as really existing ; it 66 must then conceive those Things are possible ; 56 otherwise it could not create in us the Ap
pearance and Images of them ; it could not imitate them. If then a World, as it ap. pears to us, is possible, why should not the
powerful Caufe, of which we are speaking, 66 really create it, rather than be constantly im- ployed in barely representing it to us ? Should “ such a Cause delight more in the Appeau rances than in the Reality of Things ? Should “ it take more pleasure in deceiving us than « in not imposing upon us? But if it intends to “ deceive Men, without their being aware of 6. it, why does it permit that some Men be “ cunning enough to find out the Cheat? Or 66 if it intends that Men should know there's " no Reality in the Phenomena of this World, “ how comes it to pass that the greatest Parc “ of Mankind cannot be persuaded of it." The more we reflect upon such a System, adds our Author, the more it appears incredible and monstrous ; and shall a Sceplick never so little attentive and sincere dare to affirm, that this System is as probable, as that which supposes that the Phænomena of this Universe are real?
Mr. de Crousoz afterwards shews that the fupreme Cause must be an intelligent Being, who loves Order, Wisdom, and Justice, and cannot therefore be supposed to deceive Mankind: How far this Observation, and the Passage we have translated from our Author, be a solid Answer to Mr. Bayle's Argument, we leave the Reader to judge.
Our Author examines afterwards another Argument, which Mr. Bayle proposed against the Possibility of Extension ; which is as follows:
If If there was an Extension or Space; it should consist of Mathematical Points, or of Physical Points (Atoms) or of Parts infinitely divisible; but it can consist of neither of these, therefore Extension or Space is impossible. That Extenfion cannot consist of Mathematical Points, not of Atoms, (undivisible Parts) is granted: but how does Mr. Bayle make it appear, that Extension cannot consist of Parts infinitely divisible? Why, he says, that Philosophers will never answer the following Objection, which he pretends is self-evident, and as clear as the Sun at Noon-day ; viz. An infinite Number of Parts, each of which is extended and distinct from all others, not only with regard to its Entity or Being, but also with regard to the place it fills up, can never be cotitain'd in a Space an hundred thousand Millions of Timés less than the hundred thousandth Part of a Grain of Muscard Seed. And here we will observe that this Argument can puzzle such Persons only, as have no Skill in Mathematicks ; .for as Mr. dė Crousaz very justly answers, the Place which every Particle of Matter fills up is proportioned to the Smallness of that Particle. We'll obferve further, that Mr. Bayle supposes in this Argument, and in another which Mr. de Crousaz also gives us, that an infinite Number of Patcicles infinitely small, must be equal to another infinite Number of Particles; whence it would follow, that the whole Universe is equal to a Grain of Corn, since both contain an infinite Number of Particles. But no Mathematician will grant his Posicion, since chey must main-. cain that there are several Degrees or Classes of Infinites, as there are of Things finite. Mr. Bayle's' reasoning is like that of a Man; who, Dd 2
would say that since the Earth has two Halfs, and a Grain of Mustard-Seed has also two Halfs, the Earth and a Grain of Mustard-Seed must be equal : but every body understands that each Half of both these Bodies are proportionable to their respective whole Bodies.
MR. D: Crou saz gives us afterwards fome Mathematical D monstrations, by which it appears that Spice, or any other Quantity, is infinitely divisible. But these Demonstrations appear very needless; since Mathematicians don't want them, and they that have no Skill in Mathematicks will not be able to understand them. Then follow some Observations of Mr. De Croufaz upon this Mathematical Paradox;. That the Angle form'd by the Arch of the Circle and its Tangent, is less than any Angle formed by two strait Lines ; and that nevertheless that fame mixt Angle can increase, without ever becoming equal to an Angle form’d by two strait Lines, and also decrease without Bounds. Mr. De Croufaz's Observations on this Paradox deserve to be considered ; but we cannot insert them here, without making this Abstract too long, and too tedious for those of our Readers who don't understand Mathematicks.
For the same reason, we pass what Mr. De Crousaz says to prove the Poñibility of Motion against Mr. Bayle. As this celebrated Author Jov'd to confirm his own Affertions by the Au. thority of learned and famous Men, he quoted Father Malebranche as being of the fame Opinion with him, with regard to the Being of Bodies. Father Malebranche, says he, is of the fame Opinion, and thinks ibat it is by Faith only we can acquire a certain Knowledge. But Mr. Arnauld, a Doctor of the Sorbonne, maintain'd that wbat